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STUDENT COMMENTS
I. Constitutional Law
CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL
OF STATE OFFICIALS

ACTION FOR.DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS-NEGLIGENCE

IS INSUFFICIENT TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER

42 U.S.C. § 1983
Bonner v. Coughlin*
Introduction
In Bonner v. Coughlin, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit faced the question of whether an allegation of negligent conduct on the
part of state officials resulting in the deprivation of an individual's constitutional
rights is sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 This provision of the
Civil Rights Act of 18712 provides a private federal remedy for the deprivation
of federal civil rights under color of state authority. The scope of § 1983 has
long been the subject of considerable dispute among the courts. Indeed, a diversity of opinion currently exists among the various circuit courts of appeals with
regard to the issue .presented in Bonner.' Moreover, several Seventh Circuit
cases decided prior to Bonner had created an aura of uncertainty with respect
to this court's own opinion as to the type of state action proscribed by the statute.'
Any doubt as to the Seventh Circuit's position on this question has been dispelled by the court's en banc decision in Bonner. According to the court, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy only for intentional or reckless conduct by
state officials which results in constitutional deprivations; thus, the statute's protection does not extend to state action that is merely negligent.
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act has been used with increasing frequency in recent years by individuals seeking to redress violations of constitutionally protected rights.' Thus, the position adopted by the Seventh Circuit in
Bonner with regard to the applicability of common law tort concepts to determine the merit of § 1983 claims is of more than purely academic interest.
The Seventh Circuit's en banc decision originated with a complaint filed
by a state prisoner against the acting director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, the warden of the Illinois State Penitentiary, and two prison guards.
Bonner alleged that his constitutionally protected interests in privacy and prop*
1

2

545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). Entitled "An Act to enforce the

Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for
other Purposes, this legislation "was one of the means whereby Congress exercised the power

vested in it by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the provisions of that Amendment." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
3

See notes 40-42 infra and accompanying text.

4
5

See note 44 infra.
Section 1983 is one of the most heavily litigated sections in the United States Code.
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erty had been violated by a "shakedown" security search of his prison cell. The
search, which was conducted in Bonner's absence, resulted in the loss of his
copy of the transcript of the trial at which he had been convicted of murder.6
Bonner presented alternative allegations concerning the incident in his complaint: either the defendants had intentionally taken the transcript from his
cell, or their negligence in failing to close his cell door after concluding the search
had been the proximate cause of the removal of the transcript by some unknown
person. The defendants admitted that the two guards had conducted the shakedown of Bonner's cell, pursuant to a regulation of the Department of Corrections
which authorized such searches. The defendants also did not dispute Bonner's
allegation that the guards had negligently left the cell door open.
Bonner asserted a federal right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover damages
against the defendants for depriving him of his transcript. In support of his
claim, he advanced three separate theories of recovery: (1) that his transcript
had been taken during the course of a search that violated his fourth amendment rights; (2) that the taking of the transcript constituted a deprivation of
his property prohibited by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment;
and (3) that the defendants had interfered with his right of access to the courts
protected by the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
The district court held that Bonner had established no right of relief against
the defendants. Accordingly, the district court granted the defendants' motion
for summary judgment, on the grounds that Bonner had suffered no compensable
injury as a result of the temporary deprivation of his transcript. Alternatively,
the court held that the prison guards' reliance on a valid prison regulation
established a defense of good faith.'
On appeal,' the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment and remanded the case. The Seventh Circuit considered in turn each of
Bonner's theories of recovery and determined that he had stated a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 on fourth9 and sixth amendment" grounds. The court, however, rejected Bonner's due process claim."
The Seventh Circuit specifically chose not to decide on appeal "the broad,
6 The search of Bonner's cell took place on November 28, 1972. At the time of the
incident, Bonner was in the process of preparing documents in order to obtain review of his
conviction. Although his original transcript was never returned to him, Bonner was provided
with another copy on December 5, 1973. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Bonner's
conviction on May 29, 1973 (12 Ill. App. 3d 245 (1973)).
7 The Supreme Court established the availability of good faith as a defense in § 1983
actions in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
8 Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975).
9 The court held "that a prisoner enjoys the protection of the Fourth Amendment against
unreasonable searches, at least to some minimal extent," id. at 1317, although this protection
"does not rise to that possessed by the unincarcerated members of society." Id. See Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) in which the Supreme Court stated that "There is
no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country."
10 The court held that a serious factual dispute existed with regard to the question of
whether the temporary deprivation of Bonner's transcript constituted an interference with
his right of access to the courts protected by the sixth and fourteenth amendments. 517 F.2d
at 1320-21.
11 The court held that Bonner had not alleged the breach of a constitutional duty derived
from the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1320. The panel reasoned that the availability of an
adequate state remedy to redress any damage that had been inflicted by the defendants "forestalls the conclusion that there has been any deprivation of plaintiff's property without due
process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
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and somewhat abstract, question whether negligence by the defendant may ever
be sufficient to justify relief in a § 1983 case." 12 Subsequently, however, the court
granted a rehearing en banc to consider the viability of Bonner's due process
claim. The sole question before the Seventh Circuit on rehearing was whether
Bonner could recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the loss of his copy
of the trial transcript, as a result of the prison guards' negligent failure to close
the cell door after the security search. The panel's findings on the fourth and
sixth amendment issues were not reviewed en banc.
The Seventh Circuit's En Banc Decision
The en banc majority in Bonner reversed the panel opinion and affirmed
the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for the defendants on Bonner's alternative claim of negligence under § 1983. The Seventh
Circuit asserted that the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of
Paul v. Davis" had stated that negligent state action could not provide the basis
for a "constitutional tort" claim under the statute. On the basis of Paul, the
Seventh Circuit held that Bonner had "pointed to no specific constitutional guarantee against the negligence of the two prison guards, even though they might
be tortfeasors under Illinois law." 1 The Bonner majority concluded that "If
Section 1983 is to be extended to cover claims based on mere negligence, the
Supreme Court should lead the way.""
According to the Seventh Circuit, the negligence of the guards resulting in
the loss of Bonner's transcript did not constitute a deprivation by the state without due process of law under the fourteenth amendment "because any state
6
Likewise,
action ended when the guards left the cell after the security search."
the court declared that the taking of the transcript by some unknown person did
not represent action "under color of state law" within the meaning of § 1983,
7
"because it was neither encouraged nor condoned by state agents."' Therefore,
the guards' culpability "was not of sufficient magnitude to constitute a deprivation of rights under Section 1983."'"
An obvious intention of Congress in passing the Civil Rights Act had been
to deter official misconduct. 9 Extension of the statute to cases of simple negligence, asserted the court, "would not deter future inadvertence as much as in
the case of intentional or reckless conduct."'" Indeed, the court found no indication of congressional intent to include mere negligence claims within the scope
of the statute's protection."
12

13
14

Id. at 1318.

424 U.S. 693 (1976).
545 F.2d at 567.

15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See generally CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 390 (1871). See also the discussion
of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-87
(1961).

20 545 F.2d at 568.

21 In this context, the Bonner majority expressed fear of a proliferation of § 1983 cases
based on negligence. Id.
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However, a minority of other circuits, cited by Bonner, have held that negligence is actionable under § 1983.22 The Seventh Circuit disregarded these decisions as well as several of its own earlier decisions. The court stated that its preBonner decisions regarding § 1983 were consistent with the result in the instant
case, although the prior cases contained several statements of "broad dicta"
helpful to Bonner.2" The court placed its strongest emphasis, however, on the
observation that all case law cited by Bonner in support of his position was inapposite since it had been rendered prior to Paul v. Davis.
The Bonner Court's Interpretationof Paul v. Davis
The Bonner majority believed that further dispute as to the scope of § 1983
was precluded by the Supreme Court's decision in Paul. The majority interpreted Paul to say that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must prove not only a
deprivation of constitutional rights and action under color of state law, but also
the defendant's intentional conduct or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Furthermore, according to the majority, the Supreme Court
in Paul had shown the essential interconnection among these three elements of a
cause of action under § 1983. Neither a deprivation of rights protected by the
fourteenth amendment nor action under color of state law could result from
negligent conduct. As Judge Swygert's dissent indicates, however, it is questionable whether Paul fully supports the broad propositions advanced by the majority in Bonner.
In Paul, the plaintiff based his § 1983 action on the inclusion of his name
and photograph in a circular of "active shoplifters" distributed by the defendant
police chiefs among local area merchants. Plaintiff Davis had been charged
with shoplifting at the time the circular was prepared and distributed, although
his guilt or innocence had not yet been resolved. Shortly after circulation of the
flyers, the charge against Davis was dismissed.
Davis subsequently brought a cause of action under § 1983 on the grounds
that the circular, prominently titled "Active Shoplifters," deprived him of
"liberty" in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Davis asserted that his
designation as a shoplifter would inhibit him from entering business establishments because he feared suspicion and the possibility of arrest for shoplifting.
He also alleged that it would seriously impair his future employment oppor24
tunities.
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's determination that Davis
had alleged facts sufficient to support a cause of action under § 1983. The
Court held that Davis had pointed to "no specific constitutional guarantee" safe22 See notes 40-41 infra.
23 545 U.S. at 568. Further, the court asserted that its decision in Bonner was fully
supported by a number of other Seventh Circuit decisions dealing with § 1983. See note
44 infra.
24 The defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint was granted by the United States
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky on the grounds that Davis had, not
alleged facts sufficient to establish that he had been deprived of any constitutional right. On
appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Davis v. Paul, 505 F.2d 1180
(6th Cir. 1974). The court concluded that Davis had set forth a valid § 1983 claim "in
that he has alleged facts that constitute a denial of due process of law." Id. at 1182.
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guarding the interest that he asserted had been invaded."5 Moreover, the Court
rejected Davis' contention "that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
should ex proprio vigore extend to him a right to be free of injury whenever the
State may be characterized as the tortfeasor."' 6 Finally, the Court concluded
that Davis' interest in reputation alone was "neither 'liberty' nor 'property' guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of law."'27 Thus, his claim
was deemed insufficient to support a cause of action under § 1983.
On the basis of Paul, the Seventh Circuit concluded in Bonner that the
fourteenth amendment does not extend to a claim of negligent state action which
results in the deprivation of property without due process of law. The Seventh
Circuit analogized Bonner's situation to that of the plaintiff in Paul, asserting
that Bonner had "pointed to no specific constitutional guarantee against the
negligence of the two prison guards, even though they might be tortfeasors under
Illinois law.""8 The court characterized Bonner's claim as an assertion that substantive due process could provide the foundation for an attack on the prison
guards' conduct. The Bonner majority responded that "[i]t was precisely such
an ex proprio vigore extension of the substantive aspect of due process that the
Supreme Court rejected in Paul."9
However, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court in Paul intended totally to
foreclose the possibility of a federal cause of action under § 1983 based on negligence. The focus of the Court's decision in Paul was not the nature of the defendants' conduct. Rather, the Court emphasized the fact that Davis had pointed
to no protected liberty or property interest in his reputation cognizable under
the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court in Paul elaborated upon the rights encompassed by the
due process clause as follows:
It is apparent from our decisions that there exists a variety of interests which
are difficult of definition but are nevertheless comprehended within the
meaning of either "liberty" or "property" as meant in the Due Process
Clause. These interests attain this constitutional status by virtue of the fact
that they have been initially recognized and protected by state law, and
we have repeatedly ruled that the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment apply whenever the State seeks to remove or significantly alter
that protected status. 30
As previously noted, the Court concluded that the interest in reputation alone
which Davis sought to vindicate was different from the liberty or property interests protected by the due process clause. Kentucky law did not provide any
legal guarantee of present enjoyment of reputation which was altered or extinguished as a result of the defendants' actions. Rather, the Court explained,
Davis' interest in reputation
25

424 U.S. at 700.

26
27
28
29
30

Id. at 701.
Id. at 712.
545 U.S. at 567.
Id.
424 U.S. at 710-11.
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is simply one of a number which the State may protect against injury by
virtue of its tort law, providing a forum for vindication of those interests by
means of damages actions. And any harm or injury to that interest, even
where as here inflicted by an officer of the State, does not result in a deprivation of any "liberty" or "property" recognized by state or federal law,
nor has it worked any change of respondent's status as theretofore recognized
under the State's laws. 31
Since Davis could not assert the denial of any right granted him by the state
and thereby protected under the fourteenth amendment, the Court held that the
defendants' defamatory publications, however seriously they may have harmed
Davis' reputation, did not provide the basis for a cause of action under § 1983.
In contrast, Bonner's claim was based upon the guarantee set forth in the
specific language of the fourteenth amendment prohibiting the state from depriving him of his property without due process of law.2 As Judge Swygert
noted, Bonner's right to possession of his property was a right accorded him by
state law, in the form of prison regulations."3 His interest in the transcript, therefore, qualified as a protected property right under the due process clause as
interpreted in Paul, and, as a result of the prison guards' negligence, "a right or
status previously recognized by state law was distinctly altered or extinguished. 3 4
In this sense, Bonner's claim was supported rather than contradicted by Paul.
Contrary to the conclusion of the en banc majority, Bonner had indeed pointed
to a specific constitutional guarantee against the loss of his property through
the negligence of the prison guards.
Thus, in determining whether a plaintiff under § 1983 has satisfied the first
requirement to obtain relief under the statute-deprivation of a constitutional
right-an inquiry into the nature of the defendant's conduct appears misdirected.
The sole concern of the court at this stage of the process should be to determine
whether the right allegedly violated falls within any of the fourteenth amendment's protected categories of "life, liberty, or property." Paul does not appear
to destroy the validity of this assertion.
A more troublesome issue, however, relates to the Bonner majority's suggestion that negligent conduct can never be state action for purposes of § 1983.
The Seventh Circuit has adopted the position that only the common law of
intentional tort should apply to allegations of § 1983 violations. Bonner thus
raises a fundamental issue concerning this section of the Civil Rights Act-the
viability of the mechanical application of common law tort concepts to determine the merits of § 1983 claims.
Section 1983 and Tort Law
The determination of the type of conduct on the part of the defendant that
will support a § 1983 claim is a fundamental issue under this provision of the
31

Id. at 712.

33

545 F.2d at 571 (Swygert, J., dissenting).

34

424 U.S. at 711.

32 [Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Civil Rights Act. The language of § 1983 does not mention a state of mind
requirement for the defendant."
The legislative history of the statute also is
silent as to this aspect of the defendant's liability. These factors, when considered
in light of several others to be discussed below, have produced a variety of interpretations among both courts and commentators with regard to the prerequisites
of a cause of action under this statute.
For many years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act, it appeared that
an official must have acted with a specific intent to deny a federal right in order
for his conduct to be within the scope of § 1983.36 Prior to 1961, courts generally
read into § 1983 some sort of purposive intent requisite to liability by analogizing
the statute to its criminal counterpart.3 7
In 1961, however, the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape38 rejected the
contention that a specific intent to deprive an individual of a constitutional right
is a prerequisite to liability under § 1983. The Court analogized to common
law negligence actions in defining the elements of a cause of action under the
statute. In this context, Justice Douglas, the author of the majority opinion,
stated that "Section 1979 [now 1983] should be read against the background of
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his
actions."" Monroe thus introduced the idea of foreseeability into the interpretation of § 1983 and originated the concept of "constitutional tort."
Justice Douglas' reference to the "background of tort liability," in connection with his discussion of the basis of liability under § 1983, has been interpreted in various ways by courts and commentators. A minority of circuits has
applied this dictum literally, making traditional common law tort concepts determinative of liability under the statute.4" In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has concluded that there is no state of mind prerequisite to liability under § 1983, creating a rule of absolute liability for constitutional deprivations by state officials.4
35 As one commentator has stated, "The language of section 1983 . . .is notable for the
absence of qualification or limitation and has always held potential for lending itself to
sweeping interpretations." Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe
v. Pape, 82 HARv. L. RaV. 1486 (1969).
36 See, e.g., Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948), in which the court
stated that "to make out a cause of action under the Civil Rights Statutes, the state court
proceedings must have been a complete nullity, with a purpose to deprive a person of his
property without due process of law." Id. at 707. According to the Bottone court, "[t]o hold
otherwise would open the door wide to every aggrieved litigant in a state court proceedings
[sic], and set the federal courts up as an arbiter of the correctness of every state decision." Id.
37 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, wilfully
subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of
the United States . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any
term of years or for life.
In the leading case of Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), the Supreme Court considered the proper application of this criminal counterpart of § 1983. The Court construed
the word "wilfully" to mean the doing of an act with "a specific intent to deprive a person
of a federal right." Id. at 103.
38 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
39 Id. at 187.
40 Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W.
3489 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1977); MlcCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972); Carter v.
Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., 409 U.S. 418
(1973).
41 Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969).
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However, a majority of the circuits has given Monroe a more restricted reading,
holding that there can be no § 1983 violation as the result of negligent state
action.42 The majority courts have apparently placed great emphasis on the
admittedly intentional deprivations of rights committed by the officers in Monroe.43 On this basis, they have interpreted Justice Douglas' reference to tort
liability to mean that the common law of intentional tort should apply by analogy
to determine the type of conduct proscribed by § 1983. This interpretation of
4
Monroe was adopted by the en banc majority in Bonner.
Judge Swygert, however, criticized as "neither logical nor just" the Bonner
majority's suggestion that negligent conduct can never be sufficient to satisfy the
second essential element of a claim under § 1983-action "under color of state
law." Judge Swygert noted:
State action in constitutional law is a concept that is similar to legal or
proximate cause in tort law. Whether the presence of the state is great
enough to justify the sanctions of section 1983 must be decided by how
much the conduct of the state was in fact related to the plaintiff's injury
rather than by whether the state intended that conduct.45
42 Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974); Page v. Sharpe, 487 F.2d 567
(1st Cir. 1973); Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1973); Howell v. Cataldi,
464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972); Puckett v. Cox, 456 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972); Daniels v.
Van De Venter, 382 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1967).
43 As one commentator has noted, "If tort concepts-are applied to the alleged facts in
Monroe, the defendants probably committed intentional torts such as assault, battery, false
imprisonment, intentional infliction of mental distress, and invasion of privacy." Nahmod,
Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1974).
44 Bonner contended that three post-Monroe Seventh Circuit decisions supported the
minority view. In each of the cases cited by Bonner, the court made some reference to, but
did not decide, the question of the sufficiency of an allegation of negligence to state a claim
under § 1983.
In Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968), the court concluded that where a
police officer makes an unlawful arrest that violates the Constitution because of a lack of a
warrant or probable cause, the officer is liable for damages. The court asserted that "Additional circumstances coloring the officer's action as flagrant or malevolent are not required."
Id. at 370.
In Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972), the court cited approvingly Whirl v.
Kern, 407 F.2d 781, in which the Fifth Circuit held, on the basis of Monroe, that negligent
nonfeasance was a proper basis for the imposition of tort liability under § 1983. In
Byrd, the defendants were police officers who failed to stop other unidentified police officers
from beating plaintiff in defendants' presence. The Seventh Circuit concluded that a refusal
to allow the plaintiff's claim under § 1983 would be to insulate the officers from "liability
for reasonably foreseeable consequences of the neglect of their duty to enforce the laws and
preserve the peace." Id. at 11.
Similarly, in Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974), the court held that the
alleged failure of the employees of a mental hospital to protect one of the patients from a
beating inflicted by other patients "was of sufficient magnitude to constitute a deprivation of
rights under § 1983." Id. at 557.
However, the Bonner court refused to recognize inconsistency between these three cases
and its decision in Bonner that negligence cannot support a claim under § 1983. The court
asserted that these cases involved either affirmative conduct by the defendant resulting in a
purposeful violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights (Joseph v. Rowlen) or the defendant's purposeful failure to act when he owed this duty to the plaintiff (Byrd v. Brishke,
Spence v. Staras).
In further response to Bonner's contention, the Seventh Circuit asserted that its holding
in Bonner was supported by other post-Monroe decisions of the court. See Kimbrough v.
O'Neil, 523 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1975), aff'd on rehearing, 545 F.2d 1059 (1976) (en banc);
Carroll v. Sielaff, 514 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1975); Gutierrez v. Department of Public Safety,
479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir., 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974).
45 545 F.2d at 572 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
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The Bonner majority's conclusion regarding state action under § 1983 is equivalent to an assertion that negligence can never be the legal or proximate cause
of an individual's loss of rights secured by the Constitution.
As applied to the facts in Bonner, the majority's holding that the negligence
of the guards was not sufficiently connected to the loss of the transcript, so as to
be considered state action, necessarily implies that the guards' conduct was not
the legal or proximate cause of Bonner's loss. Yet as Judge Swygert noted, this
conclusion is illogical. As a matter of tort law, the loss of the transcript would
not have occurred "but for" the failure of the guards to lock the door to Bonner's
cell and was a foreseeable result of that failure.46 Nor does the majority opinion
provide support for its broad statement that the taking of Bonner's transcript
was not under color of state law "because it was neither encouraged nor condoned by state agents." Indeed, it was settled in Monroe that the color of law
requirement under § 1983 is satisfied whenever a state official deprives a person
of a protected right, whether the defendant acts in accordance with state law or
contrary to it.47
Judge Swygert's dissatisfaction with the majority's decision in Bonner indicates the difficulties which result from a mechanical application of tort law
concepts in a § 1983 context. The Bonner majority adopted the view that the
common law of intentional tort should apply to allegations of § 1983 violations.
This conclusion was grounded to a large extent on the court's belief that the sole
function of the statute is deterrence and on the court's fear of a proliferation of
§ 1983 cases based on negligence."
Conclusion
It is difficult to specify with certainty the policy objectives of § 1983." 9 As
the Bonner court observed, deterrence of official misconduct was certainly one
of the primary benefits contemplated by the supporters of the Civil Rights Act.5"
Yet, so far as appears from the legislative history, compensation is also a function
46 See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 236-70 (4th ed. 1971).
47 365 U.S. at 182-87. The Court cited United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941)
for the proposition that "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under
color of' state law." Id. at 326. This view of the meaning of the words "under color of" state
law was reaffirmed in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108-13 (1945) and Williams v.
United States, 341 U.S. 97, 99 (1951).
48
"In enacting the Civil Rights Act, Congress was obviously intending to provide a
deterrent for the type of conduct proscribed. If an officer intentionally causes a
property loss, a remedy under Section 1983 might deter similar misconduct. On the
other hand, extending Section 1983 to cases of simple negligence would not deter
future inadvertence as much as in the case of intentional or reckless conduct. . . .
Otherwise the federal courts would be inundated with state tort cases in the absence
of Congressional intent to widen federal jurisdiction so drastically." 545 F.2d at 568.
49 In Monroe, Justice Douglas suggested three purposes of § 1983: to "override certain
kinds of state laws," to provide "a remedy where state law was inadequate," and "to provide a
federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in
practice." 365 U.S. at 173-74.
50 The passage of the Civil Rights Act was in large part a reaction to the situation of
widespread violence in the South following the end of the Civil War, principally as the result
of the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, and the virtual breakdown of law and order resulting
from the relative inaction of Southern state and local governments in the face of the problem.
The relevant legislative history is set out in Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172-87.
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of § 1983.51 The Bonner court's decision to foreclose this federal remedy in the
case of negligent deprivations of constitutional rights, therefore, achieves judicial
efficiency in dealing with § 1983 claims at the cost of screening out cases for
which Congress intended to provide a remedy through § 1983.
There is no easy solution to the question presented in Bonner. It is clear
that the language of § 1983 is broad enough to accommodate an argument that
there should be absolute liability for constitutional deprivations by state officials.
Yet it is also evident from the distinct historical background of the Civil Rights
Act that the overriding concern of the legislature was to provide a federal remedy
for the more egregious violations of civil rights which threatened a substantial
part of the nation with anarchy in the years following the Civil War. In this
latter respect, extension of § 1983 to cases of negligent deprivations of constitutional rights may not be justified by congressional intent.
Nevertheless, a mechanical application of tort law concepts is an unsatisfactory means of determining the merits of claims under the statute because it
fails to give due consideration to the policy objectives of the statute and the
possibility that the purposes of § 1983 and tort law may conflict.52 Moreover,
an inquiry into the nature of the defendant's conduct tends to detract the court's
attention from the threshold concern in all § 1983 cases-whether there has been
a violation of a right secured by the Constitution. The defendant's state of mind
should play no part in the court's consideration of this question.
An individual's claim to access to the federal courts for relief from the misuse of state authority should not hinge upon the actor's intent. This treatment
of claims arising under § 1983 is neither logical nor just, and may in certain
circumstances produce results inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the
statute. Instead, the courts must be cautious about extrapolating broad general
rules from particular holdings and must realize that proper implementation of
the purposes underlying § 1983 will require that standards of care be defined
differently for different constitutional duties.
Charles R. Hood

51 It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court emphasized in Monroe that even
where the plaintiff has adequate recourse against a state official under state law for a deprivation of constitutional rights, "[tihe federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy,
and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." 365
U.S. at 183. This indicates that compensation was not thought by the Court to be the
major function of § 1983.
52 Whereas § 1983 basically represents a Congressional attempt to protect federal rights
against infringement by state officials, tort law principles were developed in other contexts for
other purposes. See generally Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability,
50 IND. L.J. 1 (1974).
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Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc.*
Introduction
As a result of the vigorous enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1
many discriminatory racial and sexual employment practices have been eliminated. While there is a comparatively long history of litigation brought against
blatantly discriminatory policies, the Civil Rights Act has only recently been
used as a weapon against more subtle forms of intentional and unintentional
discrimination. Provisions of the Act are now being employed to combat the
lingering effects of prior discriminatory practices which are perpetuated by
policies of an otherwise nondiscriminatory nature.
Such an application of the Act was raised before the Seventh Circuit in
Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc.,' where the court held that a nondiscriminatory
seniority policy could violate the Civil Rights Act if it perpetuated the adverse
effects of an employer's prior sex discrimination. In reaching its decision, the
court relied on developing authority that the operation of such a neutral policy
constitutes a continuing violation of the Civil Rights Act. Evans is distinctive,
however, in that it permits such suits to be brought without regard to the length
of time between the original discriminatory act and the point at which the effects
of the practice are felt through the operation of an otherwise lawful company
policy. In permitting a suit based upon an act of sex discrimination which took
place five years earlier, the court in Evans has extended the continuing violation
theory beyond previous applications.
This comment will analyze the continuing violation concept, and will
evaluate the applicability of that theory to the particular facts of Evans. Additionally, ramifications of the decision will be explored, and possible means of
avoiding those inequities which result from the application of the doctrine will
be suggested.
Until 1968, United Air Lines, Inc. required its stewardesses to remain unmarried' during the tenure of their flight-related employment.4 If a stewardess
decided to marry, she could be forced to resign her flight position, though she
might be employed in a nonflight capacity. Controversy concerning these rules,
however, ultimately forced United to abandon the no-marriage requirement
pursuant to a 1968 agreement with an employee union. As part of that agreement, United began reinstating former stewardesses who were dismissed under
the policy, provided they had filed grievances with the union.'
534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 308 (1976).
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Supp. II 1972).
2 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 308 (1976).
3 Delta Air Lines, Inc. had a similar no-marriage rule. See Stroud v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1977); so did Pan American World Airways, Inc., see Kennan v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., No. C-76-1245 '(N.D. Cal., decided Nov. 22, 1976).
4 534 F.2d at 1247.
5 Id. at 1248 n.2.
*
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Carolyn J. Evans was employed as a stewardess for United Air Lines from
November, 1966, to February, 1968, when her marriage forced her resignation
under the then applicable no-marriage rule.' However, she failed to file the
requisite grievance, and thus was not reinstated under the union agreement of
1968.
On February 16, 1972, Evans was rehired by United and began work as a
stewardess after undergoing a four-week training progam for new employees.
Pursuant to United's general policy, she received no seniority for her previous
employment. It was the practice of United to compute seniority solely on the
basis of continuous time, rather than total time, in service.' One year after being
rehired, Evans filed charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to recover her
lost seniority, as well as back pay and other benefits allegedly lost as a result of the
termination of her employment in 1968.8
Evans' charge asserted that United Air Lines, Inc. unlawfully discriminated
against her in 1968 when it forced her to resign. Furthermore, United's current
procedure for determining seniority benefits served to perpetuate the adverse
effects of that original unlawful termination. Evans claimed that United's
seniority policy, though neutral on its face with respect to sex, was nevertheless
unlawful as it allowed prior discrimination to reach into the present and thus
prolong the effects of the 1968 termination.9 United, however, contended that
the only actionable injury suffered by Evans was the 1968 termination," and,
since Evans had failed to file a charge with the EEOC within 90 days of her
termination, as then required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) of the Civil Rights
Act," her suit was barred.
In response to the statute of limitations defense raised by United, Evans
argued that the filing time provision was not applicable to her particular situation.
The effects of the previous termination were presently being felt through the
operation of United's seniority system; thus the 1968 violation was a continuing
violation. Consequently, since she had filed her complaint during the operation
of the seniority policy, she had timely filed her charge.'
In an unreported opinion, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois found for United Air Lines, indicating in the dismissal of
6 Id. at 1247.
7 Id. at 1249 n.6.
8 It is not clear from the report whether Evans is demanding full seniority from November
1966 when she originally started work with United Air Lines or whether she is demanding
seniority and back pay from February, 1968, when she was terminated under the no-marriage
rule. Id. at 1249.
9 Id. at 1248.
10 Id. at 1249.
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970) originally provided:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty.
days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) of this section
(except that in either case such period may be extended to not more than sixty days
upon a determination by the Commission that further efforts to secure voluntary
compliance are warranted), . . . the Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved
and a civil action may, within thirty days thereafter, be brought against the respondent named in the charge. ...
The section was amended to allow 180 days for filing, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e) (Supp. II 1972).
12 534 F.2d at 1249.
13 Id. at 1248.
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Evans' suit that there was no "continuing violation."' 4 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit initially affirmed the dismissal" but, on rehearing, reversed its earlier decision and remanded the case to the district court
for further proceedings.' United's petition for a writ of certiorari was granted
by the United States Supreme Court on November 1, 1976.
The Seventh Circuit's Treatment of Evans
1. The Original Decision
When the Seventh Circuit originally dismissed Evans' appeal, it agreed with
United's contention that the statutory filing time for the 1968 violation had
elapsed. 8 The court relied on the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Collins v.
United Air Lines, Inc. 9 In that case, Doris R. Collins, a former stewardess who
had been required to resign because she married, sued United after being denied
reinstatement several years later. Although her employment had been terminated
in 1967, Collins did not file a charge with the EEOC until 1971. The Ninth
Circuit, finding that the charge had not been timely filed, held that the three years
during which plaintiff was not employed did not constitute a continuing violation.2"
The Collins court noted that
the alleged unlawful act or practice-not merely its effects-must have
occurred within [the statutory period] preceding the filing of charges before
the EEOC. Were we to hold otherwise, we would undermine the significance
of the congressionally mandated 90 day limitation period."
Adopting the Collins interpretation of the statutory filing limit, the Seventh
Circuit held that the filing period had expired 90 days after Evans' employment
was terminated in 1968."
The Seventh Circuit further relied upon Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works,"
a 1974 class action in which it was held that a racially neutral seniority system did
not perpetuate a company's prior racially discriminatory hiring policies. In that
case, one of the plaintiffs, a black bricklayer hired in July, 1964, was laid off during a slack period two months later, pursuant to a "last-hired, first-fired" seniority
policy. The Waters court denied a remedy to the bricklayer, holding that the
14 Id. at 1248.
10,665 (7th Cir. Jan.
15 Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., [1976] 11 Empl. Prac. Dec.
29, 1976).
16 Id. at 1251.
17 United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 97 S. Ct. 308 (1976).
18 Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., [1976] 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 10,665 (7th Cir. Jan. 29,
1976).
19 514 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1975).
20 Id. at 596.
21 Id. The Evans court also cited Buckingham v. United Air Lines, Inc., [1976] 11 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cases 344 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 1975), decided independently of Collins. The
Buckingham court stated, "[e]mployer action . . . such as the termination of an employee ...
constitutes a 'completed act' at the time it occurs, and unless a charge of discrimination is
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within the statutory time period
following the completed act, an action under title VII is barred." [1976] 11 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cases, at 349.
22 [1976] 11 Empl. Prac. Dec., at 6813.
23 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974).

[Vol. 52:364]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

employer's seniority system was not racially discriminatory and did not perpetuate prior racial discrimination in violation of Title VII! 4 From Waters, the
Evans court concluded without elaboration that United's facially neutral seniority
policy "cannot be said to perpetuate past discriminations in the sense required to
constitute a current violation of Title VII," and thus affirmed the district court's
dismissal of Evans' complaint'
2. Evans on Rehearing
On rehearing, 2 the Seventh Circuit reversed its prior decision, holding that
the facts alleged in Evans' complaint would, if true, constitute a continuing violation of the Civil Rights Act.27 The court based its reversal primarily upon the
Supreme Court's decision in Franks v. Bowman TransportationCo., Inc.,21 which
was handed down after the original Evans decision. In Franks, the Supreme
Court ruled that it is appropriate under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (g) to grant retroactive seniority and back pay, despite a facially neutral seniority policy, when the
individual complainant can prove that he has been deprived of such benefits because of an employer's prior discriminatory practices. s
Plaintiffs in Franks had joined in a 1971 class action against their employer
trucking firm and certain unions for racially discriminatory employment practices
in violation of Title VII. Both named petitioners had filed charges with the
EEOC within several days of their terminations, and thus timely filing was not
an issue in the case." Instead the Court focused primarily on the nature of the
relief sought by the plaintiffs. The defendant employer asserted 42 U.S.C. §
24 Id. at 1318.
25 [1976] 11 Empl. Prac. Dec., at 6813. In his dissent, Judge Cummings pointed out that
the EEOC had considered Evans' charge to be timely, since it had authorized her to sue. He
argued that the EEOC's interpretation of timely filing "deserves deference." Cox v. United
States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289, 291 (7th Cir. 1969). Cummings also argued that the court
should have adopted the reasoning in Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1361
(E.D. Va. 1975), where a stewardess was found to be suffering from a continuing violation
which had originated at the time of her reinstatement after pregnancy three years before. Id.
at 6813-14 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
26 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1976).
27 Id. at 1250. Although this appeal technically concerned only the sufficiency of Evans'
complaint, the Seventh Circuit appeared to leave very little to the trial court to determine on
remand. See text accompanying note 38, infra.
28 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
29 Id. at 764-66, where the Franks Court stated, "Adequate relief may well be denied in
absence of a seniority remedy slotting the victim in that position in the seniority system that
would have been his had he been hired at the time of his application." The Court continued,
Id. at 767: "Obviously merely to require Bowman to hire the class 3 victim of discrimination
falls far short of a 'make whole' remedy. [footnote omitted] A concomitant award of seniority
credit he presumptively would have earned but for the wrongful treatment would also seem
necessary in the absence of justification for denying that relief." Plaintiffs in Franks sought
both "benefit"-type seniority and "competitive"-type seniority. Benefit-type seniority "determines
pension rights, length of vacations, size of insurance coverage and unemployment benefits, and
the like ....
Id. at 786-87 (Powell, J., dissenting). Competitive-type seniority "determines
an employee's preferential rights to various economic advantages at the expense of other employees . . . [such as] order of layoff and recall of employees, job and trip assignments,
and consideration for promotion." Id. at 787.
30 In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 495 F.2d 398, 405 (5th Cir. 1974), the
Fifth Circuit noted, "For Franks' individual claim the statute began running on the date of
his dismissal, May 10, 1968. The running of the limitations period was tolled by the filing of
a complaint with the EEOC on May 13, 1968, three days later." Likewise, the other named
petitioner in Franks filed an EEOC charge against the employer one day after his dismissal.
Id. at 406-07.
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2000e-2 (h) as a bar to the complainants' claims for retroactive seniority. That
section reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards
of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority system . . . provided that such differences
are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.
The Supreme Court determined from the legislative history of § 2000e-2 (h)
that Congress intended it to be a narrow exception to the Act's two general purposes: to prohibit unlawful discriminatory employment practices and "to make
persons whole for injuries suffered" on account of such discrimination. 1 The
Court ruled that § 2000e-2 (h) bars charges stemming only from discriminatory
acts committed prior to July 2, 1965, the effective date of the Civil Rights Act.
Since the acts complained of in Franks occurred after that date, the provision was
found to be no defense to the charges made. The Court, relying on the language
of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (g), concluded that retroactive seniority is an appropriate
form of relief. Section 2000e-5 (g) reads:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may... order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay . . . , or any other equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate....
Despite the fact that retroactive seniority is not specifically mentioned in §
2000e-5 (g), the Court asserted that seniority is just as important as back pay in
any court's attempt to make whole a victim of discrimination. 2 Quoting from
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,3 the Franks Court warned that retroactive
seniority, like back pay, should be denied

only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central
statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy
and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination.34
The Evans court specifically relied on Franks in reaching two of its conclusions. First, it found that the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 200Oe-2 (h)
was sufficient to dismantle United's bona fide seniority system defense.3" Second,
31
32

424 U.S. at 763.
Id. at 771.

33
34

422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
424 U.S. at 771.

35 It is unclear whether United Air Lines actually raised 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) to
defend its seniority system against Evans' complaint. The Seventh Circuit in Evans ambiguously stated, "United's argument would appear to rest, sub silentio, on the protection afforded
bona fide seniority systems by section 2000e-2 (h) ." 534 F.2d at 1249. No mention of §
2000e-2 (h) was made in the original Evans opinion.
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it adopted Franks' holding that retroactive seniority can be an appropriate
remedy under § 2000e-5 (g), thus making such a remedy available to Evans.
Finally, the court reversed its earlier holding that Evans' cause of action had
expired under § 2000e-5 (e) due to her failure to file a charge with the EEOC
within 90 days of her 1968 termination. The court found that,
[i]f the prior discharge was itself a discriminatory one, then United's seniority
policy is an instrument that extends the impact of past discrimination, albeit
unintentionally. Consequently, the present application is deemed to be discriminatory. 36
To support this conclusion, the court cited several cases in which the employers'
inherently neutral seniority policies were held to violate Title VII if their effect
is "to perpetuate disadvantages accruing from prior discrimination.""7
However, the actual role of the Franks case in the Seventh Circuit's reversal
of Evans is unclear. Although the court offered Franks to support its denial of
United's defense, and to allow retroactive seniority to remedy employment discrimination, neither conclusion was crucial to the ultimate decision. While
Franksinvolved an EEOC charge filed within the statutory 90-day period, Evans
by contrast involved an alleged continuing violation, and the relation of that
continuing violation to the timely filing requirements of the 90-day statute.
Also puzzling is the fact that the court held that United's policies constituted
a continuing violation, without discussion of the threshold question of whether
Evans' unusually long delay in filing an EEOC charge was so unreasonable as to
bar-or at least limit-her action. No attempt was made to establish guidelines
indicating the extent to which courts should allow an allegedly continuing discrimination to continue before a plaintiff must file a charge. The court similarly
failed to consider the equitable interests of parties other than the victim of the
discrimination: namely, the incumbent employees and the employer, both of
whose interests are increasingly jeopardized if charges are not timely filed and
adjudicated.
Additionally, it is significant that the Seventh Circuit appears to have
decided an appeal on the sufficiency of Evans' complaint as if it were an appeal.
on the merits of the case. The action was remanded to the trial court, but it is
not clear from the opinion whether the appellate court left any significant issues,
apart from a determination as to damages, to be determined by the district court.
Although the Seventh Circuit did leave it to the trial court to decide "if the
prior discharge was itself a discriminatory one, . . ."" discrimination appears
here to be a foregone conclusion, since the no-marriage rule by which Evans was
terminated was declared unlawfully discriminatory by the Seventh Circuit in

Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., in 197 1."
36 534 F.2d at 1250. From this passage it is unclear whether the Seventh Circuit was
framing the issue to be decided at trial, or actually was deciding the merits of the case. See
text accompanying note 38, infra.
37 Id. at 1250-51 n.15.
38 Id. at 1250.
39 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
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The Continuing Violation Theory
In holding that application of United's seniority policy violated the Civil
Rights Act,4" the Seventh Circuit recognized that:
[Evans'] charge would not be timely and the jurisdictional prerequisites to a
civil action would not be fulfilled under 4the
Civil Rights Act ...
is valid. 1

theory of a continuing violation

unless her

A critical issue in Evans, therefore, is whether the facts warrant a finding of a
continuing violation. If they do not, the jurisdictional requirements of Title VII
have not been met.
Examination of continuing violation cases indicates that the theory is most
often applied in three distinct situations. In each, courts have modified the filing
requirements of § 2000e-5 (e) in an effort to advance the specific purposes of the
Civil Rights Act: the elimination of both unlawful discrimination and its effects. 2
Toward this goal, one type of continuing violation has been found in those cases
in which unlawful practices actually are continued, so that filing against the first
occurrence is equivalent to filing against the last occurrence of the practice. For
example, when an employer unlawfully continues to refuse to hire or promote
a person,43 that employer continually violates the Act. In these cases, the actual
practice "continues," therefore filing within 90 days of the last discriminatory
occurrence is sufficient to uphold a charge against the prior occurrence as well.44
The second category of cases in which courts have found the theory applicable involves a violative practice which has ceased but which is replaced by
40

534 F.2d at 1250. The court stated:
If the prior discharge was itself a discriminatory one, then United's seniority policy
is an instrument that extends the impact of past discrimination, albeit unintentionally.
Consequently, the present application of United's seniority policy is deemed to be
discriminatory.
41 Id. at 1249.
42 Underlying policy reasons were addressed in United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479
F.2d 354, 360-61 (8th Cir. 1973) and in United States v. Dillon Supply 'Co., 429 F.2d 800,
803-04 (4th Cir. 1970).
43 See Belt v. Johnson Motor Lines, 458 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1972), where black drivers
were continually denied more lucrative "over-the-road" driving assignments. As the District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia explained:
[A] judicially evolved exception to this timely charge requirement has developed where
practices complained of are "continuing" in nature ....
The obvious rationale behind
this exception is that there is no single isolated discriminatory act from which the
limitation might run.
Healen v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., [1975] 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 917, at 920 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 26,
1973).
44 In Bartness v. Drewrys USA, Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
939 (1971), women were required to retire at age 62 whereas men were retired at age 65.
The court said the practice continued so as to allow timely filing when a woman filed an
EEOC charge more than 90 days after her retirement; similarly in Mixson v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel., 334 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ga. 1971), a widow was denied a company annuity
when her husband died at age 59 years, 10 months, thereby failing to qualify for the annuity
at age 60. Plaintiff-widow argued the annuity was given to women workers at age 55 and
therefore that the differentiation was sex discriminatory. The court allowed suit stating that
the practice was continuing, making filing timely even though filed more than 90 days after the
death of plaintiff's husband; in Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 46 F.R.D. 442 (N.D. Ga.
1968), a black was permitted to sue because he was continually excluded from a governance
committee of a company employee club; suit was likewise allowed though filed more than 90
days after a lay-off, when the court in Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.
Me. 1970), held that a union continually failed to press grievances of women members who
claimed their lay-offs were unlawfully discriminatory.
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a second unlawful practice continues the discrimination. Thus, in King v.
GeorgiaPower Co.," for example, an employer discontinued a practice of making
discriminatory job assignments but instituted a discriminatory testing procedure
in its place, thereby continuing the original discriminatory practice. Again, then,
filing against the later occurrence of discrimination is equivalent to filing against
the first occurrence. Similarly, in other cases, a discriminatory recall of men over
women has been held to continue a previous practice of refusing original employment to women."
Recent decisions indicate the emergence of a third type of continuing violation justifying modification of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)'s time requirement. In
these cases, the original discriminatory practice has ceased but the discrimination
is deemed to continue because adverse effects of that original practice are perpetuated by an otherwise nondiscriminatory company policy. This third type of
continuing violation is most often found when seniority policies operate to the
disadvantage of employees formerly subjected to a discriminatory practice of the
employer. An an example, in United States v. N.L. Industries," a company's
policy of assigning blacks to one relatively undesirable department had been discontinued because of its discriminatory nature. Nonetheless, under a seniority
system that based promotions on time spent in a department, rather than on total
time employed with the company, the effects of the discriminatory practice were
found to be perpetuated far beyond its actual tenure. Consequently, the continuing nature of the violation made the action timely filed. Thus, a neutral
policy can become unlawful if it serves to continue the lingering effects of prior
discriminatory practices."8
45 295 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
46 Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969); and Tippett v. Liggett
& Meyers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292 (M.D.N.C. 1970).
47 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); see also Section by Section Analysis of H.R. 1746, accompanying the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972-Conference Report, 118 CONG.
REQ. 7166-68 (1972), where Congress noted and accepted these two types of continuing violation cases when it stated:
Court decisions under the present law have shown an inclination to interpret this
time requirement so as to give the aggrieved person the maximum benefit of the
law....
Existing case law which has determined that certain types of violations are
continuing in nature, thereby measuring the running of the required time period
from the last occurrence of the discrimination is continued and other interpretations
of the courts maximizing the coverage of the law are not affected by [these amendments].
48 In Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976), the court held a facially neutral last
hired-first fired seniority system perpetuated adverse effects of New York City Police Department's previous discriminatory hiring practices toward women; in Palmer v. General Mills, Inc.,
513 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1975) a neutral seniority plan that provided that advancement in a
department was dependent on seniority in that department was held to perpetuate effects of
previous sex discrimination; similarly a black in Gilmore v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 509
F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1975) successfully argued that past discrimination presently affected his
chances for promotion; the court said at 52:
[It is] open to plaintiff to demonstrate a violation of Title VII on either of two
independent bases: that the employment policies reflect present discriminatory conduct
or that current policies, though neutral on their face, carry forward vestiges of past
discrimination. This represents the traditional dual focus in civil rights litigation
upon purpose, as well as effect.
In Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 236 (5th Cir. 1974), effects of
discriminatory educational testing procedures were carried forward by operation of a seniority
program; likewise, job advancement for production line workers was affected by previous
discriminatory entry-line limitations in Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416
F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
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Stewardess cases brought under Title VII readily fall within this third type
of continuing violation. 9 Foremost among these cases are ones involving discriminatory maternity terminations which have been found to be perpetuated by
the operation of seniority policies as to reinstated stewardesses.5" Courts generally
find that such a neutral seniority policy's operation impermissibly continues the
prior discriminatory termination, using essentially the reasoning employed by the
court in Evans to allow suit.51
However, one factor in Evans distinguishes it from previous continuing
violation cases. In Evans, four years had elapsed between the time Evans was
terminated by the unlawful practice and the time she experienced its effect
through the operation of the seniority policy. The Seventh Circuit failed to note
or discuss the significance of this time lapse when it applied the continuing violation theory. Perhaps it would have been at least conceptually more precise if
the court had created a new theory: namely, that the effects of the old discriminatory practice were revived, rather than continued, under operation of the
seniority policy of United. Nevertheless, the court applied the continuing violation theory and by so doing seemingly decided that the interruption between
practice and effect was irrelevant. Thus, Evans represents a dramatic extension
of the continuing violation concept.
An Evaluation of the Continuing Violation Theory Applied In Evans
Evans is illustrative of the conflict between the social policies underlying
the continuing violation theory and the long-recognized policies favoring speedy
prosecution of claims. The case presents the question of whether a plaintiff's
delay in pressing a Title VII claim should be allowed to prejudice unduly the
interests of later-hired employees who stand to lose substantial competitive seniority benefits, and of employers who could face unreasonably long periods of
liability to potential claimants.
1. The Rights of Other Employees
The Evans decision reflects an underlying theme of the Supreme Court in
Franks: the burdens of past discrimination must be shared if victims of employment discrimination are to be restored those rights of which they have been unlawfully deprived.52 Since in a case like Evans the aggrieved employee is restored
at the expense of other employees, it is important to consider the interests of those
other employees.
49 Courts appear to disagree as to whether various practices of airline companies violate
the Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., 544 F.2d 892 and 444 F.2d 1194 where courts disagreed over
how no-marriage rules violated the Act; additionally see Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc., 405
F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Cal. 1975), in which the court held refusal to reinstate former stewardesses
terminated under a no-marriage rule was itself discriminatory and awarded $41,917 and $57,843
to the plaintiffs; but see, Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc., 514 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1975), in
which refusal to reinstate rule terminated stewardesses was not found unlawful.
50 See Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Va. 1975); Healen v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., [1975] 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 917 (5th Cir. Dec. 26, 1973);
and EEOC Dec. No. 71-413, [1972] 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 233 (Nov. 5, 1970).
51 See note 50 supra.
52 424 U.S. at 777: "We are of the view . . . that a sharing of the burden of the past
"
discrimination is presumptively necessary ...
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Reinstatement of a discrimination victim with retroactive competitive
seniority benefits 5 results in the disruption of the vested competitive seniority
rights of other employees. In effect, the displaced employees are made to pay
for their employer's discrimination. 4 As Chief Justice Burger has noted, the
awarding of competitive seniority benefits in such situations is like "robbing
Peter to pay Paul.""5 Moreover, the offending employer is not-punished when
one employee is put ahead of another on a promotion or layoff list, since such a
remedy requires the employer merely to rearrange its workers without increasing
its costs.56
In the event that the district court is faced with the task of fashioning a
remedy for Evans, it may do so in such a way as to consider the interests both of
Evans and of other employees. This could be accomplished by awarding "front
pay" to Evans, rather than retroactive competitive seniority benefits. Front pay
is advance payment made as restitution when full reinstatement with seniority
is impossible or impractical.5 For instance, in Hyland v. Kenner Products Co.,58
six months' front pay was awarded to a female employee in lieu of reinstatement
when the court found that antagonism between her and her employer made
reinstatement an unworkable remedy. Similarly, in White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp.,5" front pay was deemed an appropriate remedy when several black
employees brought a class action challenging certain discriminatory company
policies. By the time of suit, most of the plaintiffs in White had become too old
to perform adequately the positions which the court found they deserved. Consequently, plaintiffs were awarded three years' front pay to compensate them
for anticipated losses of earnings and job seniority. The court justified its award
of front pay, saying:
Front pay or prospective relief is essential here because of the historical
discrimination by the company, the continuing present effects of these
practices, the limited number of vacancies in better paying job positions
and the ages and physical limitations of the plaintiffs and members of their
class. Such relief is also necessary to avoid the necessity of "bumping" white
employees to put the plaintiffs in their rightful positions.60
53 See note 29, supra.
54 424 U.S. at 788-89 (Powell, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 781 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice also stated in his dissenting
opinion that "in every respect an innocent employee is comparable to a 'holder in due course'
of negotiable paper or a bona fide purchaser of property without notice of any defect in the
seller's title."
56 Id. at 788-89 (Powell, J., dissenting). At least one court has attempted to prevent this
inequitable result by recognizing the interests of other employees. The Sixth Circuit in Meadows
v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975), urged that representatives of present employees be allowed to intervene in employment discrimination disputes so that courts "in dealing with job seniority [might better] consider the interests of the workers who might be displaced." Id. at 949.
57 Front pay is a form of restitution, and thus is an equitable, not legal, remedy. Cf.
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), cited in Hyland v. Kenner Products Co., [1976] 11
Empl. Prac. Dec. %10,926, at 7912 (S.D. Ohio May 5, 1976), aff'd as to damages, [1976] 13
Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,427 (E.D. Va. Oct. 26, 1976).
b8 [1976] 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,926 '(S.D. Ohio May 5, 1976). See also Lewis v. Philip
Morris, Inc., [1976] 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,350 (E.D. Va. Sept. 2, 1976).
59 [1975-76] 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,470 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 15, 1975).
60 Id. at 6019. [emphasis added] See also Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d
257, 267-70 (4th Cir. 1976).
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Front pay, therefore, is an alternative available to courts which can be utilized
to avoid unfair treatment of present employees when fashioning a remedy for a
discrimination victim.
Moreover, it is arguable that Congress intended that courts should use
equitable discretion in fashioning remedies so that other employees are not treated
unfairly in the process. Three provisions of the Civil Rights Act indicate
Congress' concern for persons other than the discrimination victim.
Section 2000e-2 (h) 1 of the Civil Rights Act, previously discussed, was inserted to preserve the legitimate seniority rights vested in employees as of the
date the Civil Rights Act took effect in July, 1965. As Senators Clark and Case
stated in an interpretive memorandum presented to Congress, "Title VII would
have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospective and not
retrospective."62 Thus, incumbent employees' seniority rights existing at the time
of the Act were granted at least some measure of protection from potential
Title VII claimants.
Another provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j), " prohibits employers from
granting preferential treatment to minority individuals at the expense of other
employees. Senator Clark, responding to arguments by Senator Hill that Title
VII would cause reverse discrimination in favor of minorities, noted:
There is no provision, either in title VII or in any other part of this bill, that
requires or authorizes any Federal agency or Federal court to require preferential treatment for any individual or any group for the purpose of achieving
racial balance ....

On the contrary, any deliberate attempt to maintain a

given balance would almost certainly run afoul of title VII because it would
involve a failure or refusal to hire some individual because of his race, color,
what
religion, sex, or national origin. What title VII seeks to accomplish,
G4
the civil rights bill seeks to accomplish is equal treatment for all.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority
provided that such differences are not the result of an intention
or merit system ...
to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin ....
62 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964). The full text of the interpretive memorandum pertaining to seniority states:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospective
and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating in the
past and as a result has an all-white working force, when the title comes into effect
the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in
order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are
hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired
earlier. (However, where waiting lists for employment or training are, prior to the
effective date of the title, maintained -on a discriminatory basis, the use of such
lists after the title takes effect may be held an unlawful subterfuge to accomplish
discrimination.)
63 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970) reads:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer ...
to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons
of any race, color, religion, sex or national origin . . . in comparison with the total
number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any
community, State, section or other area.
61

64

110

CONG. REC.

7207 (1964).
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Finally, § 2000e-5 (g) " was amended in 1972 to limit back pay accrual
to two years before a charge of continuing violation is filed with the EEOC. By
placing the two-year limit on back pay awards, Congress implicitly recognized
that the court's discretion in restoring an aggrieved employee must take into account other interests, and that total restoration of one employee might not be
equitable to all parties involved.6"
It appears, therefore, that Congress intended that the interests of other employees as well as the interests of the victim of the discrimination be considered
in shaping remedial awards in discrimination cases. However, the Supreme Court
appears to disagree with this interpretation of the congressional intent underlying
the Civil Rights Act. In Franks, as noted above, the Court stated that full
retroactive seniority is presumed to be appropriate relief for employees fired for
discriminatory reasons."7 This principle was adopted by the Seventh Circuit in
Evans.6" Such a presumption in favor of plaintiffs, however, arguably interferes
with the district court's statutory discretion to consider the equitable interests of
later-hired employees.
2. Prejudice To The Employer
The Seventh Circuit in Evans additionally failed to consider the implications
of its decision with regard to the interests of the employer. By permitting the
claim to be brought, the court may have subjected United to liability for an
unreasonably long period of time.
Statutes of limitation and the equitable doctrine of laches protect the
interests of defendants from threats of indefinite liability. The policy justifying
both concepts is that it is inequitable for an injured party not to put an adversary
on notice of his claim.69 By placing various time limits in Title VII, Congress
expressly indicated its intention to prevent plaintiffs from bringing "second
thought," or stale complaints.7" Almost all jurisdictions have held that timely
filing of an EEOC charge within the limits prescribed by § 2000e-5 (e) is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing suit under Title VII. 7 ' However, as noted
in previous discussion, judicial exceptions to the time requirements have evolved
in continuing violation cases."2
Even if Evans' situation falls within one of the judicial exceptions to the
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. 11 1972) reads in pertinent part as follows:
Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing
of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce
the back pay otherwise allowable...
66 424 U.S. at 791 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting).
67 See text accompanying note 52, supra.
68 534 F.2d at 1250.
69 Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
70 Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 892 (5th Cir. 1970).
71 Prior to Evans, many courts held that discriminatory terminations of employment were
independent, single violation of the Civil Rights Act, each sufficient to start the statutory period
for filing. See Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc., 514 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1975); Olson v.
Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975); Dudley v. Textron, Inc., 386 F.
Supp. 620 (E.D. Pa. 1975); [1976] EEOC v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec.
10,932 '(S.C. Mar. 25, 1976); [1976] Buckingham v. United Air Lines, Inc., 11 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cases 344 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 1975).
72 See text accompanying notes 40-51, supra.
65
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filing requirements of § 2000e-5 (e), the delay problem cannot be ignored. Traditionally, in the absence of a statute of limitations, the equitable defense of
laches has been available. The Fifth Circuit has indicated that a laches defense
may be raised in Title VII actions. The court, in its treatment of Franks v.
Bowman TransportationCo., Inc.,73 stated that:
In a proper case, laches might be applied to bar a claim entirely, or it might
bar only part of the remedy sought, such as the backpay award or a portion
of it.74
The defense of laches requires a showing that plaintiff's lack of diligence in
asserting a claim has caused injury, prejudice or disadvantage to a defendant to
the extent that it is inequitable to allow the claim to be enforced. 5
Laches was successfully used as a defense to a Title VII action in EEOC v.
South CarolinaNational Bank." There the court dismissed an employee's charge
when the employer first received notice of the claim more than three years after
it was filed.7' The court held the delay damaged the employer's ability to respond
to the charge." If a continuing violation is found in Evans, the applicability of
the equitable defense of laches to bar the action, or at least limit recovery, should
be considered. The court's opinion indicates no attempt by the plaintiff to pursue
the union grievance procedure in 1968"9 or to reapply for employment with
United or any other airline. Moreover, Evans waited a full year after her reinstatement before complaining of loss of pay and seniority. The court made
no inquiry into these matters; nor did it evaluate the legal significance of Evans'
delay. A possible consequence of the Evans court's disregard of the four years
between 1968 and 1972 might be that future employers may be subject to indefinite periods of liability to those victims of discrimination whom they have
reemployed.
If Evans ultimately is allowed full retroactive seniority, each year of her
delay will have served to increase the costs of restoration to both employer and
employees."0 The costs may well be unrealistic, since the relief would be based
on the assumption that Evans would have remained a United stewardess from
1968 through 1972. Any number of reasons, however, might have prevented
her from continuing as an employee during this entire period.
73
74
75

495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 405.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1016-17 (4th ed. 1968).

JURISPRUDENCE

See also 2 J.

POMEROY, EQUITY

§ 419-d (5th ed. S. Symons 1941).

76 [1976] 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,932 (S.C. Mar. 25, 1976).
77 On Dec. 29, 1971, seven months after the employer's allegedly discriminatory refusal
to reinstate the employee following maternity leave, she filed a charge with the EEOC. The
employer received bare notice on May 14, 1971, that a "hiring" charge had been filed, but
the notice contained nothing more about the specific complaint. Not until Sept. 10, 1974, did
the employer receive an "amended" charge identifying the former employee and her complaint.
Id. at 7931-32.
78 Id. at 7933-34. See also EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300 (M.D.
Ga. 1975).
79 534 F.2d at 1248 n.2. See text accompanying note 5, supra.
80 A trial court might consider limiting Evans' retroactive seniority benefits to a maximum
of two years before she filed her EEOC charge-such a limitation would parallel the two-year
limitation on back pay in Title VII actions as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (g) (Supp. II
1972). See text accompanying notes 65-66, supra.
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Finally, success of Evans' theory might have the undesirable social effect of
discouraging employers from rehiring persons against whom they discriminated
years ago. Employers may be unwilling to pay rehired employees additional
wages, and unwilling to disrupt the seniority status of their present employees."1
In addition, if employers were to refuse to reinstate on these grounds, the applicants might be able to allege in new charges--on the basis of Evans' theory of
continuing violation-that the employer's refusal to rehire them "perpetuates"
the effects of the previous discrimination. 2
Conclusion
In Evans, the Seventh Circuit applied a continuing violation theory to
permit a suit in 1973 based on an unlawful discrimination which occurred in
1968. Under the continuing violation theory, the filing time requirements of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 are modified to allow suits filed during the operation of
an otherwise nondiscriminatory company policy, if the policy is deemed to perpetuate the effects of a prior discriminatory act. Suit is permitted even though
the time period for filing against the prior unlawful practice has expired.
In Evans, unlike other continuing violation cases, there was a gap of four
years between the time of the unlawful practice and the point at which the
effects of the practice were experienced through the operation of the otherwise
lawful seniority policy. The Seventh Circuit failed to accord sufficient weight
to this critically distinguishing feature in its application of the continuing violation theory.
Furthermore, by ignoring the time gap in Evans, the court left important
questions unanswered. The court did not inquire into Evans' employment
activities during her four-year separation from United. The court did not question whether she sought employment during this period with United or any
other employer. Further, the court did not question whether United refused to
reemploy Evans at any time before 1972, and if it did, for what reason. Had
these questions been addressed, it would have been easier for the court to balance
the competing interests of other parties potentially affected by Evans' claim:
namely, other employees hired after Evans' termination whose seniority rights
would be affected by a grant of full retroactive seniority to Evans; and the
employer, who may be subject to liability for an indefinite period of time for past
acts of discrimination as a result of the Seventh Circuit's decision.
David R. Bruegel and John R. Ruhl
81 The problem of employers' reluctance to rehire former employees with full seniority
and back pay is discussed in the original Evans opinion, [1976] 11 Empl. Prac. Dec., at 6814 n.6.
82 See 405 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Cal. 1975), discussed at note 49, supra. See also REPORT
OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAST HIRED, FIRST FIRED: LAYOFFS
AND CIVIL RIGHTS '(February, 1977) at 34-35, in which the Commission urges courts to go

beyond Franks, by awarding back pay and constructive seniority from the date individuals would
have applied for work with an employer but did not because of the employer's reputation for
discriminatory hiring practices. The Report recommends that these later hired employees be
eligible for back pay and seniority from the date they originally would have applied for work if
they can show they were finally hired by the employer, that they were a resident in the area at

the time the employer engaged in discriminatory hiring practices, and that they would have
applied for work earlier if not for the employer's discriminatory hiring practices.

DUE PROCESS-DUE

PROCESS SAFEGUARDS ARE INVOKED WHEN A STATE
SERIOUSLY INJURES THE REPUTATION OF AN EMPLOYEE IN THE COURSE OF
DISCHARGING HIM FROM STATE EMPLOYMENT

Colaizzi v. .Walker*
On July 16, 1974, Illinois Governor Dan Walker dismissed state employees
Samuel Colaizzi, the Superintendent of the Division of Private Employment
Agencies of the Illinois Department of Labor, and Samuel Indovina, an investigator in that division. The Governor explained this action in two press
releases issued that same day. According to these statements, Colaizzi and
Indovina were discharged because an investigation revealed that they had abused
their official positions by attempting to coerce Zenith Associates, an employment
agency, into dropping or reducing charges which it had instituted against a
former employee.' When Zenith refused to cooperate in the manner requested,
Colaizzi and Indovina subjected it to a sustained period of administrative harassment.' The statement which announced the appointment of Colaizzi's successor made it clear that the two men were discharged because they had "attempted to use the power of their office to force a company under their supervision to drop possible criminal actions against an employee." 3
After their dismissal, Colaizzi and Indovina filed a complaint in United
States district court, alleging violations of their fourteenth amendment rights.
Claiming that the allegations contained in the press releases were disseminated
without notice, and that they were not given an opportunity to refute the
Governor's charges,4 the plaintiffs contended that this procedure deprived them
of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.' The complaint asked for damages
* 542 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Dec.
21, 1976) (No. 785).
1 Id. at 971.
2 Id, This harassment consisted of the institution and subsequent abandonment of
Department of Labor charges, the arrest of the owners of Zenith and abandonment of these
criminal charges, and the temporary suspension of Zenith's officers from the employment agency
business after the filing of new Department of Labor charges.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. The word "liberty" in the fourteenth amendment encompasses a multitude of personal interests which are "difficult of definition," as the Supreme Court states in Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976). Mr. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Paul, collected a
number of often quoted Supreme Court statements about the concept of "liberty" in an
attempt to demonstrate the broad sweep of the protection it affords. Id. at 722-23. In Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Court emphasized that "[i]na Constitution for
a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed."
Id. at 572. Earlier, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court noted that
the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been
definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id. at 399. Thus, the discussion concerning the existence of a liberty interest in cases
such as Colaizzi involves only a few of the values which may, as aspects of "liberty," be protected from state infringement under the fourteenth amendment. See note 55 infra, for the
Supreme Court's distinction between liberty interests which invoke procedural safeguards and
those which act as substantive restraints on state actions.
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and injunctive relief against Governor Walker and two members of the state
Office of Special Investigations. This prayer for relief was based on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, one of the Civil Rights Acts of 1871, which provides a remedy at law
or in equity against persons who, under color of state law, deprive a citizen of
the United States of the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution and laws
of the United States.6 The district court dismissed this portion of the complaint
because it failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.!
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed this dismissal and held that the
complaint did state a claim cognizable in federal court under § 1983. The court
concluded that when state officials discharge a person from employment, and in
the course of such termination release information which stigmatizes that person's
reputation, they infringe a constitutionally protected liberty interest. The existence of this interest requires that state officials accord the employee due process,
such as, for example, notice and an opportunity to be heard. Failure to comply
with these safeguards results in an unconstitutional deprivation of the "liberty"
protected by the fourteenth amendment.8
In reaching its conclusion, the Seventh Circuit relied primarily on two
9
Supreme Court decisions, Wisconsin v. Constantineau
and Board of Regents v.
°
Roth," and on a Seventh Circuit case, Adams v. Walker.' In so deciding, the
court was forced to distinguish Paul v. Davis,2 a recent Supreme Court case."
This comment will consider the holding in Colaizzi in light of the body of
6

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
7 542 F.2d at 972. The complaint contained four counts. Count I contained this charge
against Governor Walker and the Office of Special Investigations employees; the claim was
based not only on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but also on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985 (1970). The
district court dismissed this count for failure to state a claim, and the Seventh Circuit upheld
the dismissal as it concerned §§ 1981 and 1985. Id. The body of this comment deals with the
Seventh Circuit's disposition of the § 1983 claim.
Count II was a defamation action against the same three defendants based on the federal
court's pendent jurisdiction. The district court also dismissed this count for failure to state a
claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed this dismissal against the Governor and one of the
employees because of their immunity from suit under state law. The defamation claim against
the other employee of the Office of Special Investigations was remanded for further findings
of fact. Id. at 971, 974.
Count III alleged a conspiracy among the three defendants already mentioned, plus two
employees of Zenith, the employment agency involved in the case. The trial court dismissed
the count, for failure to state a claim, with regard to the first three defendants, and granted
judgment on the pleadings to the other two defendants. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit,
without extensive discussion, reversed, stating that a claim was presented under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Id.
Count IV was also a defamation action, against the two employees of the employment
agency and the agency itself. The district court entered judgment on the pleadings for the
defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed, on the grounds that the district court would
consider this count pendent to Count III. Id.
8 Id. at 972. The Seventh Circuit simply decided that the complaint stated a cause of
action. The court did not specify the particular procedures which must be followed in order to
satisfy the due process requirement.
9 400 U.S. 333 (1971).
10 408 U.S. 564(1972).
11 492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974).
12 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
13 See 542 F.2d at 972.
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case law which grew out of decisions such as Constantineau and Roth. It will
also discuss the impact of Paul on this body of law. The Seventh Circuit's
decision in Colaizzi is clearly consistent with the law prior to Paul, and is arguably within the scope of Paul. Although the Supreme Court has never squarely
addressed the issue presented in Colaizzi, there is language in Paul which the
Seventh Circuit used, correctly it seems, to distinguish those two cases. The
implications of Paul, however, pervade this whole area of the law. These implications raise questions about the vitality of Colaizzi, and suggest that, even if
Colaizzi itself is correct on its narrow facts, its rationale will not extend beyond
these facts. The very narrowness of Colaizzi serves as a reminder that Paul casts
doubt on the continued viability of some of the earlier broader holdings of the
Seventh Circuit. The decision in Colaizzi and the questions it raises also illustrate that an exact definition of the "liberty" which will call forth the procedural
due process safeguards of the fourteenth amendment has not yet been successfully
formulated.
Constantineau and Roth
A full understanding of the decision in Colaizzi requires an examination of
the two cases which are primarily responsible for the development of the "liberty
interest" concept involved in cases such as Colaizzi. The roots of the concept
that due process guarantees are invoked when a state seriously impairs the reputation of a person in the course of terminating his state employment lie in the
1971 decision of the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Constantineau.4 That case
involved a state statute which authorized certain individuals, mostly local officials,
to prohibit persons, who were thought to be troublesome to the community
because of "excessive drinking," from buying or receiving liquor.1" Acting
pursuant to the authority granted in this statute, a police chief circulated notices
in retail liquor outlets which forbade the sale or gift of liquor to appellee for a
year. The chief implemented this prohibition without notifying appellee or giving
her the opportunity to be heard?
The Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision that the Wisconsin
statute which established this procedure was unconstitutional because it denied
to persons such as appellee the rudiments of due process. The Court concluded
that, "When a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be
heard are essential."' 1
The Supreme Court elaborated on this concept in its decision the next year
14

400 U.S. 333 (1971).

15 Id. at 434.
16 Id. at 435.
17 Id. at 437. This sentence was quoted by the Seventh Circuit in Colaizzi. 542 F.2d at
972. One portion of the opinion in Constantineau which is relevant in light of the restrictive
reading given to Constantineau.by the Supreme Court in Paul is the following statement of the
issue: "The only issue present here is whether the label or characterization given a person by
'posting,' though a mark of serious illness to some, is to others such a stigma or badge of
disgrace that procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard." 400 U.S.
at 436. Mr. justice Brennan points out, in his dissent in Paul, that the Paul Court was effectively denying that this was the "only issue" involved in Constantineau. 424 U.S. at 730. For a
discussion of Paul, see notes 42-49, infra and accompanying text.
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5
in Board of Regents v. Roth."
Roth was a non-tenured teacher at a state university. He received notice from the university president that he would not be
rehired for the following year; the president gave no reasons for this action. Roth
was not afforded an opportunity to seek administrative or judicial review of the
decision, and brought suit claiming that this procedure denied him his fourteenth
amendment rights. 9
The Supreme Court held that this summary procedure for discharging nontenured teachers did not violate any constitutional rights. No "property" or
"liberty" right recognized by the fourteenth amendment was involved. Therefore, procedural due process did not come into play.2" In the course of its
decision the Court nevertheless intimated that there "might" be circumstances
in which refusal to rehire an employee could infringe a liberty interest. It employed a two-tiered approach to determine whether such an infringement had
occurred; later courts have used this approach as a standard for determining
whether or not a protected liberty interest exists. First, the Court noted that
since no serious allegation against Roth accompanied the decision not to rehire
him, there was no impairment of his reputation in the community. 2' Here the
Court quoted the passage in Constantineauwhich required that notice and an
opportunity to be heard be given when the state impugns a person's "good name,
honor, reputation, or integrity."2 2 Second, the Court concluded that there had
been no action on the part of the state which would substantially hinder Roth's
search for future employment.22 The Roth Court did not expressly state that the
presence of either of these conditions would necessarily invoke a liberty interest.24
Later courts, however, have interpreted this language as providing guidelines
useful in deciding whether a person has been deprived of a liberty interest without
due process. Constantineau and Roth thus provide the theoretical framework
which the Seventh Circuit has used in deciding cases such as Colaizzi v. Walker.

Application of the Principle: The Seventh Circuit
In Lipp v. Board of Education of City,"5 the Seventh Circuit applied
the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Constantineau and Roth.
There, plaintiff was a substitute schoolteacher. He alleged that the procedure used to evaluate his performance violated the due process requirements
18 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
19 Id. at 566-8.
20 In deciding that no "property" interest was involved, the Court noted that the Constitution does not create property interests. Rather, they are defined by "an independent
source such as state law." 408 U.S. at 577. Roth's status as a non-tenured teacher in
Wisconsin meant that he had "absolutely no interest in re-employment for the next year," and
thus no cognizable fourteenth amendment "property" right. Id. at 578. Property rights are
not at issue in Colaizzi, since there was no allegation of any infringement of a property right.
542 F.2d at 972.
21 408 U.S. at 573. "The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any
charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in the community."
22 See note 17, supra.
23 408 U.S. at 573. "Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in declining to reemploy the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom
to take advantage of other employment opportunities."
24 Id. at 573-4. The Court did indicate that if either of these factors had been present in
Roth, it "would be a different case."
25 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972).
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of the fourteenth amendment." Lipp's efficiency rating, compiled by his principal, noted that Lipp exhibited a "negative attitude toward the school" and an
"anti-establishment obsession." The court of appeals rejected the contention
that this statement violated a "liberty" interest and thus invoked the protection
of the fourteenth amendment. In so doing, the court employed the two-level
inquiry first utilized in Roth to determine whether a liberty interest existed.27
First, the court concluded that that "anti-establishment" label did no "serious
damage" to Lipp's "standing and associations" in the community.2" To complete its analysis, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the inclusion of this unfavorable information in a report which otherwise expressed satisfaction with
Lipp did not sufficiently infringe his "freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities" to warrant the imposition of procedural due process
safeguards.29
Implementing this same test in Suarez v. Weaver,3" the Seventh Circuit concluded that a liberty interest had been infringed. That case involved a doctor,
who had participated in the medical assistance program of the Illinois Department of Public Aid. He was discharged from the program because there was
evidence that he had written an excessive number of prescriptions for dangerous
narcotics. This information was conveyed to the doctor in a letter, and was also
forwarded to the state agency in charge of licensing and regulating physicians in
Illinois." The doctor was afforded no opportunity to rebut the damaging
evidence, nor was he notified prior to his discharge.
The Seventh Circuit held that under these circumstances the state had
deprived the doctor of his constitutional right to procedural due process. The
court noted that the boundary between allegations that "trigger procedural protection" and those that do not was as yet uncertain. However, it suggested that
"past cases establish that charges which may become public and which suggest
immorality, dishonesty, mental deficiency, or abnormal emotional imbalance
invoke due process considerations."3 2 While the court did not work through the
two-level analysis which it had utilized in Lipp, it concluded that the charge
against the doctor, which was communicated to the licensing body, "sufficiently
implicate[d] plaintiff's reputation as a practicing doctor and as a citizen" to warrant the invocation of procedural safeguards such as an administrative hearing.3"
The Seventh Circuit made a further attempt to flesh out these standards
in Adams v. Walker, 4 a 1974 case cited in Colaizzi.35 In Adams, the Governor
26 Id. at 803.
27 See notes 21 and 23, supra.
28 470 F.2d at 805, quoting in part the Roth test, 408 U.S. at 573.
29 Id. A similar Seventh Circuit case, in which failure to rehire a non-tenured teacher,
not accompanied by any serious charges against her, was held not a circumstance in which
procedural due process was required, is Shirck v. Thomas, 486 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1973).
30 484 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1973).
31 Id. at 679.
32 Id. at 680-81.
33 Id. at 679, 681. This decision seems consistent with the current state of the law after
Paul, since the episode occurred in the course of his discharge from employment. However,
one statement of the court in Suarez has definitely been invalidated by the Supreme Court's
decision in Paul. The Seventh Circuit in Suarez prefaced its discussion with the remark that
reputation is sufficient to trigger procedural due process protection. Id. at 680. Paul flatly
rejected this proposition. See notes 42-49, infra and accompanying text.
34 492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974).
35 542 F.2d at 972, 974.
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of Illinois dismissed the chairman of the Illinois Liquor Control Commission,
stating in a telegram to the chairman that the removal was based on "incompetence, neglect of duty and malfeasance in office. . ."" Adams, the discharged
official, claimed that the action violated a constitutionally protected liberty
interest.
The Seventh Circuit rejected this contention after considering both prongs
of the Roth test. It concluded that an "unelaborated charge" of the sort made
against Adams does not involve sufficient implications of dishonesty, immorality,
or similar faults to meet the first half of the test. While words such as "malfeasance" might indeed appear to seriously impair a person's reputation, the
court admonished against reading such language out of context.3 7 The words
used in the telegram to Adams constituted a "talismanic phrase" laid out in a
state constitutional provision dealing with the removal of certain state officers by
the governor. The Illinois courts had interpreted this particular provision as imposing no specific requirements on the governor in determining to discharge an
employee for incompetence or malfeasance; no objective standards exist to limit
his decision."8 Thus, the Seventh Circuit read the governor's recitation of the
required language as a mere statement that " 'I am dismissing you because I
think I can find a better liquor commissioner.' "" Such a statement, according to
the court, did not impugn Adams' integrity in such a way as to infringe a liberty
interest.
Although the court recognized that there was substantial "overlap" between
the two prongs of the Roth test, it nevertheless proceeded to inquire as to whether
Adams would thereby be foreclosed from taking advantage of other employment
opportunities. The court noted that Adams was not disqualified from future
government employment, nor was there the danger that existed in Suarez, in
which potentially devastating charges were sent to plaintiff's professional licensing
body."0 Since neither aspect of the Rot&test was met, the court concluded that
no liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment had been infringed.
Thus, in the years following Constantineauand Roth, the Seventh Circuit
gradually developed a body of case law useful in determining whether or not
particular state conduct violated a liberty interest, as that concept had been
defined in Constantineauand Roth. Were it not for the intervening decision in
Paul, Colaizzi simply would have been another in this continuing line of cases.
As the court stated in Colaizzi, "The charges contained in the press release...
charged sufficiently reprehensible conduct so as to impugn the good name and
reputation of Colaizzi and Indovina, and thus appear to fall squarely within
the language of Constantineau."'" However, the Seventh Circuit realized that its
task in Colaizzi was somewhat complicated by the Supreme Court's decision in
Paul v. Davis, and it proceeded to confront the implications of that case.
36 492 F.2d at 1004.
37 Id. at 1007.
38 Id. at 1004-5.
39 Id. at 1008.
40 Id. at 1008-09. In the court's words, there was no indication of a "legal barrier to future
employment." This "legal barrier" interpretation of the Roth test will be discussed later, see
notes 81 and 82 supra and accompanying text.
41 542 F.2d at 972.
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Paul v. Davis
In Paul, police in Louisville, Kentucky, circulated among local merchants
the names and pictures of persons designated by the police as "active shoplifters."
Respondent Davis' name appeared on that list. Although Davis had been
arrested at one time for shoplifting, he had never been convicted of that offense,
the charge against him having been "filed away with leave [to reinstate]." 4
Based on these facts, Davis filed suit under § 1983 claiming that the liberty guaranteed him by the fourteenth amendment had been infringed without due process
of law. The Supreme Court reversed a Court of Appeals decision in favor of
Davis, in part because the word "liberty" does not "single out reputation as a
candidate for special protection over and above other interests that may be protected by state law."" In other words, mere stigmatization of a person's character by a state does not warrant the invocation of procedural due process protection. Thus, Davis would have to establish more than injury to reputation in
order to state a claim.
This holding seems clearly antagonistic to the underlying spirit of Constantineau." Nonetheless in Paul the Supreme Court distinguished, rather than
overruled, its earlier holding in Constantineau that "[w]hen a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government
is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." 4 According to the Court's analysis in Paul, this does not mean due process safeguards
must be applied whenever the state defames an individual. Rather, the Court
read the clause, "because of what the government is doing to him," as referring
not only to a detrimental characterization by the state but also to a simultaneous
deprivation of a "right" or "status" previously accorded the defamed person.
Thus, according to Paul, the constitutional claim in Constantineau arose not
solely from plaintiff's being designated a drunkard, but from the fact that Constantineau, in the course of being so labelled, was deprived of her right to buy
liquor. Thus, "it was the alteration of legal status which, combined with the
injury resulting from the defamation, justified the invocation of procedural safe4 7
guards."
The Court similarly characterized the Roth inquiry as having sprung not
from a mere concern that the state might have damaged Roth's reputation, but
from the fact that any stigmatization would "occur in the course of the termination of employment." 48
From this analysis the Court drew the conclusion that the state must do
more than seriously damage a person's reputation before it is constitutionally
required to comply with due process safeguards. In Constantineau and Roth
the added requirement was satisfied by the "alteration of legal status" which accompanied the injury to reputation. The Paul Court did not list all of the state
42

424 U.S. at 695-96.

43

Id. at 696, 701.

44 Id. at 701.
45 See note 17, supra.
46 424 U.S. at 708 (emphasis supplied in Paul).
47 Id. at 708-09.
48 Id. at 710.

[Vol. 52:378]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

activities which might satisfy this test, but it did indicate that "tangible interests"
must thereby be affected. 9
Paul and Colaizzi
A restrictive attitude toward the concept of a "liberty" interest pervades the
decision in Paul. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit's approach in Colaizzi appears
consistent with the Court's delineation in Paul of such interests. In distinguishing Roth, the Supreme Court noted that a liberty interest would be found in
such cases only when stigmatization actually occurred in the course of termination of state employment.5 ° This analysis perhaps signals a more restrictive interpretation of Roth than had previously prevailed. However, it also recognizes
that some state-inflicted injury to reputation can infringe a constitutionally protected right, provided that the facts fit into the rigid formula enunciated in Paul.
The essence of Paul is that mere injury to reputation, even though state inflicted,
is insufficient to invoke a liberty interest. This attitude is demonstrated by the
Court's description of the vital element lacking in Davis' case; the Court noted
that the only value involved was reputation, "apart from some more tangible
interests such as employment."'" The clear implication of such language is that
serious injury to reputation, occurring in the context of termination of government employment, would be an infringement of liberty that would invoke the
procedural safeguards of the fourteenth amendment.
In distinguishing Paul from the result reached in Colaizzi the Seventh Circuit emphasized this language. After examining the Paul Court's reading of
Roth, the court concluded that the loss of employment which accompanied the
injury to the reputations of Colaizzi and Indovina sufficed to distinguish Colaizzi
from Paul.2 In other words, there was much more in this case than the mere
injury to reputation which was found insufficient in Paul. The requirement that
a tangible loss accompany the injury to reputation was satisfied.
Thus, according to the Seventh Circuit, Colaizzi v. Walker is perfectly
consistent with the rationale of Paul. This conclusion appears valid given the
specific language in Paul indicating that employment is a sufficient tangible
interest.5 There is, however, other language in Paul which makes the conclusion
that Colaizzi is squarely within its scope less certain. The difficulty arises from
the Supreme Court's definition of the type of harm which must occur in order to
49

Id. at 701, 710.

50 Id. at 709. See note 48, supra and the accompanying text.
51 Id. at 701 quoted in Colaizzi, 542 F.2d at 973.
52 542 F.2d at 973-74.
53 In Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hospital, 537 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth
Circuit noted that Paul had not eliminated the concept of the constitutionally protected
"liberty" interest. The court considered the loss of a residency position by a doctor as a sufficient
"tangible loss" to fulfill the Paul requirements. Id. at 365. Similarly, the Second Circuit in
Huntley v. Community School Bd., 543 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45
U.S.L.W. 3101 (U.S. Aug. 3, 1976) (No. 104) read Paul as a reiteration of the concept that
"the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment are available whenever the state, in terminating
an individual's employment, makes charges against him that will seriously impair his ability to
take advantage of other employment opportunities." 543 F.2d at 985.
A recent commentary on this issue concluded that Paul does not remove the protection
of procedural due process from state employees who are wrongfully dismissed from their positions. Lowy, ConstitutionalLimitations on the Dismissal of Public Employees, 43 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 1, 12 (1976).
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infringe a "property" or "liberty" interest and thus invoke fourteenth amendment
safeguards. The Paul Court characterized this harm as a combination of a
tangible loss occurring with injury to plaintiff's reputation, and concluded that
Davis' claim must fail because there was not the requisite "denial of any right
vouchsafed to him by the State and thereby protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment." 4 Earlier in the opinion the Court indicated that the "liberty"
and "property" which must be infringed in order to invoke the procedural safeguards of the fourteenth amendment derive their special status from the fact that
they have either been "recognized and protected by state law" or applied to the
states through the process of incorporation of provisions of the Bill of Rights. 5
This language raises a problem which the Seventh Circuit failed to address
in Colaizzi. Although the Supreme Court clearly implied in Paul that injury to
reputation occurring in the course of discharge from employment infringes a
liberty interest and thus invokes due process safeguards, it is not clear that this
combination of circumstances will always fit within the Paul Court's definition of
liberty interests. In its opinion the Court stated that in order for a liberty interest
claim to succeed, there must be deprivation of a right "vouchsafed .

.

. by the

State." It appears that, under state law, the Governor was free to fire Colaizzi
and Indovina without notice or an opportunity to be heard. In light of this
aspect of their employment, it is difficult to see how the Governor's action deprived them of any protected right. While such employment may be a "status"
that is "recognized" by a state, it is not readily apparent that this position is
"protected by state law" in such a way as to fit within the limited range of protection announced by the Supreme Court. The Paul Court interpreted the
decision in Roth as an indication that injury to reputation, accompanied by loss
of a "tangible" interest such as employment, would be an infringement of a
protected liberty interest. It is clear that damage to reputation is not an alteration of a right "protected by state law." As the Court noted in Paul, "Kentucky
law does not extend to respondent any legal guarantee of present enjoyment of
reputation.... ."" It is not clear that the addition of the factor of discharge from
employment will always suffice to bring the plaintiff within the Court's definition
of liberty interests. When there is doubt as to whether particular employment is
"protected by state law," there necessarily seems to be uncertainty about the conclusion that loss of this employment, coupled with state-inflicted injury to reputation, infringes a liberty interest. While this limited enumeration appears to cast
doubt upon the Supreme Court's suggestion that loss of employment, coupled
with impairment of reputation, warrants constitutional protection, neither the
Supreme Court in Paul nor the Seventh Circuit in Colaizzi attempted to reconcile
any of this potentially conflicting language.
Thus, while the result in Colaizzi appears to be supported by Paul, given
the Supreme Court's specific allusion to employment as a sufficient tangible
interest, the more restrictive language discussed above suggests some uncertainty
54 424 U.S.
55

at 712.
Id. at 710-11. The Court specifies that this enumeration does not circumscribe the

"substantive limitations" on state action necessitated by the word "liberty," but only applies

to those liberty interests which invoke procedural safeguards.
56 Id. at 711.
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as to the exact scope of such interests. Indeed, when the facts of Colaizzi are
analyzed according to the Paul Court's definition of liberty interests, it is questionable whether such a liberty interest is, in fact, present. Yet, the circumstances
in Colaizzi do seem to fall squarely within the example of a liberty interest
provided by Paul in its discussion of Roth. Because of this fact, the court of
appeals did not feel compelled to examine the facts in Colaizzi under the more
limited definition. The emphasis in Paulon employment, as well as the uncertain
significance of the Paul Court's unelaborated definition of liberty, appear to
justify the Colaizzi court's interpretation of Paul.7 Furthermore, the Seventh
Circuit's analysis is consistent with recent cases in other Circuits. In those cases,
loss of state employment was enough to satisfy the tangible deprivation requirement."8 However, it should be recognized that any attempt to expand the
principle of Colaizzi beyond the loss of employment context might fail if the
restrictive language in Paulis applied.
The conclusion of the Colaizzi court that the discharge from employment
sufficed to distinguish the instant case from Paul was not in itself dispositive of
the appeal. The Seventh Circuit also had to determine that the injury to reputation was itself sufficient in light of established standards. The court noted that
these allegations of abuse of authority were serious enough to "gravely stigmatize"
the reputations of the two state employees.59 Such charges clearly meet the test
which has developed from Constantineau and Roth, and the Supreme Court in
Paul did not intimate any disapproval of these standards. Paul enunciated the
requirement that for a state-induced stigma to reputation to be actionable it must
occur in conjunction with a tangible loss of some sort. Paul did not, however,
alter the criteria used to determine if a sufficient stigma exists in the first place.
In this sense, the interpretation of Constantineau and Roth seems unchanged.
Having found this combination of "stigma plus discharge," the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the complaint did state a cause of action "for deprivation of a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest without due process." 6
Unanswered Questions
The continued vitality of cases such as Colaizzi thus depends to some extent
upon whether the facts in each particular instance will fit into the theoretical
structure created over the years by Constantineau,Roth, and Paul. However, the
very nature of such litigation necessarily involves competing values. Thus, the
claims of plaintiffs cannot be successfully resolved by the mere declaration that
57 In his dissent in Paul, Justice Brennan attacked this narrow view of the notion of
liberty. He claimed that "we have never restricted 'liberty' interests in the manner the Court
today attempts to do." 424 U.S. at 722 n.10. In a footnote to the Huntley case, discussed in
note 53, supra, the Second Circuit raised the issue of this restrictive wording in Paul. The court
concluded that liberty and property interests must "ordinarily" derive from state law or from
the Constitution itself, but that "this need, not always be the case." 543 F.2d at 986 n.8.
In Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1976), the Tenth Circuit stressed the fact
that the definition in Paul includes both state rights and Bill of Rights protections which have
been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. However, the court did not speculate as to
whether constitutional protection extended beyond this range. Id. at 390-92.
58 See note 53, supra.
59 542 F.2d at 973-74.
60 Id. at 973.
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a certain set of facts implicates constitutionally protected rights. Rather, courts
must be cognizant of the interests which underpin such disputes and attempt to
balance these various interests.G" Defendants in cases such as Colaizzi and Paul
can usually cite legitimate interests which their disputed action was designed to
protect, and which purportedly will suffer from a holding in favor of the plaintiff.
A decision that a case involves a liberty interest should signal only the beginning
of an attempt to design a remedy which will reconcile the clashing values. The
Seventh Circuit in Colaizzi was not obliged to balance the various interests and
to decide the extent or the form of the necessary procedural protections. Although
the court did cite the portion of Constantineau requiring "notice and an opportunity to be heard. .. "" its holding was simply that the complaint stated a
claim for relief."a It remains for the district court to reach a justifiable accommodation of the competing values involved. State government employees certainly
have a valid interest in being informed of serious allegations which result in their
immediate discharge, and in being afforded an opportunity to refute such allegations. However, state officials, such as Governor Walker, also have an interest
in maintaining the integrity of the body of public servants. Expeditious removal
of persons who have flagrantly abused their positions of authority is necessary in
order to maintain public confidence in state government. Both interests are valid
in a democratic society, but it does not seem that the power of officials such as
Governor Walker will be emasculated if employees are afforded minimum due
process safeguards such as notice and an opportunity to be heard. Government
employers could comply with these protections and still effectively deal with
employees such as Colaizzi and Indovina. The Supreme Court has stated that no
liberty interest is infringed unless there is public announcement of the allegations
against the employee. 4 Thus, there would seem to be no constitutional objection to temporary, summary suspension of alleged wrongdoers, provided that
permanent discharge and public announcement of the reasons for it are made
only after the accused has been afforded a hearing. In Arnett v. Kennedy, 5 the
Supreme Court held that "administrative appeal procedures" which allow recourse to an employee only after the discharge, satisfy the due process requirement."e This decision further evidences the leeway available to employers in such
situations. As a result of this decision, a governor could, apparently, fire the
suspected employee and announce the reasons immediately, as long as a hearing
giving the employee an opportunity to clear his name followed.
Thus, the district court on remand must look beyond the declaration that a
61 One of the criticisms that Mr. Justice Brennan advanced in his dissent in Paul was
that the Court made an over-broad generalization that reputation alone is never a sufficient
interest to warrant the invocation of procedural due process safeguards. The proper approach,
according to Brennan, would have been to "analyze the question as one of reconciliation of
constitutionally protected personal rights and the exigencies of law enforcement." 424 U.S.
at 720-21.
62 542 F.2d at 972.
63 Id. at 972-73.
64 Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976). The Seventh Circuit had already recognized
this principle in Shirck v. Thomas, 486 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1973).
65 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
66 Id. at 157. "Since the purpose of the hearing in such a case is to provide the person
an 'opportunity to clear his name,' a hearing afforded by administrative appeal procedures
after the actual dismissal is a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Due Process
Clause."
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liberty interest is involved in order to arrive at a conclusion that serves these
competing interests well. 7 The extent of the requisite due process safeguards, and
the manner in which they must be observed, are thus not yet certain. However,
it appears that affording notice and an opportunity to be heard to persons such
as Colaizzi and Indovina protects their legitimate interests without unduly
handicapping authorities in the performance of their duties.
Other unanswered questions exist after Colaizzi which extend beyond the
particular litigation which gave rise to this decision. As noted earlier, Colaizzi
seems to be supported by the Supreme Court's opinion in Paul. However, the
narrowness of the Seventh Circuit's decision raises questions concerning the
future applicability of the liberty interest concept. As discussed above, the court
in Colaizzi successfully distinguished Paul because there the Supreme Court made
specific reference to employment as a tangible interest, deprivation of which is
sufficient, when accompanied by state-inflicted defamation, to infringe a liberty
interest. The Seventh Circuit thus avoided inquiring into the Supreme Court's
apparently new definition of liberty interests. The full significance of the suggestion that such interests may arise only from infringement of rights guaranteed
by the state or incorporated from the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment is not yet known.s Cases are likely to arise when an individual who is
not being discharged from state employment is defamed by the state; such cases
will force the Seventh Circuit to confront this requirement.6 9 One area of uncertainty, for example, concerns the distinction between this "liberty" and the
"property" which is similarly protected by the fourteenth amendment. In order
for liberty to be involved, the deprivation apparently must be one which alters
a "status" or "right" protected by the state. However, the Supreme Court has
held that "property" rights also have their origins in state law."0 After Paul, it is
not clear how these interests are to be distinguished.
This narrow basis of the decision in Colaizzi also suggests that the opinion
will be of limited assistance to the Seventh Circuit in future attempts to apply
Paul. The Seventh Circuit's task in Colaizzi was expedited by the fact that the
injury to reputation was clearly inflicted in the immediate course of discharge
from employment. As the connection between the stigma and the tangible
deprivation required by Paul becomes more tenuous, it is conceivable that a
court will characterize state-inflicted stigma as mere injury to reputation and
thus not constitutionally protected.
The Lipp case previously discussed provides an example of a situation in
which this problem might arise.71 There, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the rating
67 The particular litigation which gave rise to the Colaizzi decision contains some other
unresolved issues. The Seventh Circuit, for example, did not decide the extent to which a
qualified good faith immunity would apply to the defendants. The effect which proof of the
truth of the allegations would have was not discussed at any length. Also, the court refused to
consider in this appeal the claim that an unemployment compensation hearing, which
determined that the plaintiffs had abused their positions, satisfied the due process requirement.
542 F.2d at 974-5.
68 See notes 54 and 55, supra and accompanying text.
69 In Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1976), the Sixth Circuit distinguished
transfer of a schoolteacher from outright dismissal. The teacher had been reprimanded, with
the reprimand becoming a part of her record, and then transferred to another school. The
court found that no liberty interest was implicated. Id. at 283-84.
70 For the Roth Court's discussion of "property" interests, see note 20, supra.
71 See note 25, supra.
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procedures used to evaluate teachers in light of the Roth criteria. Although immediate dismissal may not always result from an extremely unfavorable report,
the ratings are related certainly to the continued employment of teachers. In
fact, Lipp's rating contained a recommendation that he not be retained. 2 The
Seventh Circuit in Lipp concluded that the Roth test had not been satisfied.
After Paul, this inquiry would be made only after a showing of a sufficient link
between these allegations and some loss of status. Before the formulation of the
Paul requirement that some "tangible" loss must accompany the injury to reputation, courts did not focus on the connection between the stigmatization and discharge from employment. Although most prior "liberty" cases involved teachers
or other government employees, the decisions centered on the allegations made
against the plaintiffs rather than upon their status as employees. It is clear today
that a change in this status, occurring in the course of the infliction of injury to
reputation, is a prerequisite to any action for deprivation of liberty without due
process. Thus, if a teacher such as Lipp were retained in his position despite
allegations contained in a rating, there would be no infringement of liberty even
if the rating were openly defamatory. It is not as clear, however, exactly how
closely related the stigma and the tangible loss must be. If a loss of employment
did not occur until some time after the injury to reputation, or if the allegations
appear to have played a minor role in the discharge, a court might hold that the
tangible loss was not sufficiently connected with the stigma. These questions of
proximate cause and of timing were not at issue in cases such as Lipp. If a similar
case were before the Seventh Circuit today, the court would have to confront
such issues before it could even consider the nature of the charges under the
Roth test. 3
Another uncertainty which remains after Colaizzi stems from the fact that
there has been no uniform determination in the various circuits of what type of
charges satisfy the Roth test. Thus, even if Colaizzi was correct in holding that a
liberty interest is infringed whenever serious damage to reputation is accompanied
by loss of state employment, it did not provide any guidance in determining just
how serious, and of what sort, these charges must be. The Roth categorization,
discussed earlier, has two components.7 ' The state infringes a liberty interest
when it makes charges that (1) so damage reputation as to impair the person's
standing and associations, or (2) foreclose the person's freedom to procure future
employment. Charges such as those made against Colaizzi and Indovina so
obviously impugn their integrity and honesty that the Seventh Circuit could
proclaim the test satisfied by merely citing Constantineauand Roth.7 5 There was
no real need for a sharp differentiation between the two aspects of Roth; thus,
the Seventh Circuit was spared the necessity of inquiring into the exact scope of
these branches. 6
If, however, the charge is one which does not sufficiently impugn a person's
72 470 F.2d at 803.
73 In Lipp itself, there was not even a delayed discharge. In fact, Lipp was re-hired for
the following year. 470 F.2d at 805.
74 See notes 21 and 23, supra.
75 542 F.2d at 972, 974.
76 Such was also the situation in the Suarez case involving the doctor discharged for
excessively prescribing narcotics. 484 F.2d at 680-81. The Seventh Circuit discussed this
frequent "overlap" in the Adams case. 492 F.2d at 1008.
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character to satisfy the first aspect of the Roth test, it is not clear whether such an
allegation will ever be held to foreclose one's opportunities for future employment.
In other words, the scope of the second half of the Roth test, in those cases in
which it must stand apart from the first half, has not been established. Before
Paul the Seventh Circuit appeared to interpret this standard as encompassing
only those state-inflicted injuries which operated to create a "legal disability"
which would prevent the plaintiff from pursuing future employment. The court
first phrased the test in that manner in Shirck v. Thomas," and pointed to a
particular sentence in Roth as the basis for this conclusion. By way of illustrating
an action which would satisfy the second half of its analysis in Roth, the Supreme
Court had noted that "[t]he State, for example, did not invoke any regulations
to bar the respondent from all other public employment in State universities.'sr7
In Adams v. Walker, a Seventh Circuit case previously discussed,"9 the court
similarly indicated that no foreclosure of employment opportunity would be
found unless the state action involved the erection of a "legal barrier" to the
pursuit of future employment.8 0 The court's language on this point is vague,
however. It is not entirely clear whether this requirement means that the state
must actually disqualify a person from future employment before a liberty interest
arises, or whether the initiation of charges that are likely to result in such legal
disqualification will suffice."' No case has as yet posed this issue; indeed, the
Seventh Circuit has never expressly held that the demonstration of a "legal
barrier" is the only way the second part of the Roth test can be satisfied.82 As
noted earlier, Colaizzi does not resolve this uncertainty. Because the Governor's
charges clearly impaired plaintiffs' reputations, the court declared that the
stigmatization was sufficient without undertaking an analysis of the two branches
83
of the Roth test.
77 486 F.2d 691 "(7th Cir. 1973). See note 29, supra.
78 Id. at 692, quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.
79 See note 34, supra and accompanying text.
80 492 F.2d at 1009.
81 One of the cases cited in Adams was Suarez, where information concerning excessive
narcotics prescriptions was sent to the state licensing body. See note 30, supra and accompanying text. If the result in this case could be clearly traced to the second branch of the Roth
test, it would support the proposition that the mere possibility of a future legal barrier as a
result of the state-initiated injury to reputation would satisfy the test. However, the charge in
Suarez impugned the plaintiff's character so severely that the court could declare the test
satisfied without differentiating between the two tests. 484 F.2d 680-81. See note 76, supra.
82 In Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist., 530 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1976), the
Tenth Circuit stated that a "practical test" was the proper method to determine foreclosure of
future employment opportunities. In Weathers, however, there was no announcement of any
stigmatizing reasons for the failure to rehire; thus, the court had no opportunity to utilize this
"practical test." Id. at 1339.
83 The Supreme Court may provide a clarification of this uncertainty with a decision in
Velger v. Cawley, 525 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3188 (1976). In
Velger the Second Circuit found that a probationary police officer's liberty had been infringed
because of the circumstances surrounding his discharge from employment. He was released
without a hearing or notice of any charges against him; his record, which was readily made
available to prospective employers, showed that his dismissal was due to an "'apparent suicide
attempt.' " Id. at 335. While such a charge appears to satisfy the first branch of Roth, the
Second Circuit focused instead on plaintiff's demonstration of the difficulty he had subsequently experienced in finding employment. The decision seems to be based on this foreclosure. Hopefully, a Supreme Court decision would indicate whether such a practical foreclosure, as opposed to a legal barrier, suffices under the second branch of Roth. The Court may
also decide whether the practice of placing the charge on the record and then making this
available to prospective employers, is sufficient public announcement to infringe a liberty
interest. See Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976). See note 64 supra.
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Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Colaizzi v. Walker appears to be a proper
reading of the precedent provided originally in Constantineau and Roth as
modified by Paul. Much, however, .is left unresolved. The Seventh Circuit
merely decided that the complaint stated a claim for which relief can be granted.
On remand, the district court must attempt to reconcile the competing interests
at stake and to answer the other questions left open by the court of appeals.84
In addition, the troublesome and somewhat restrictive definition in Paul of the
interests protected by the fourteenth amendment concept of liberty, which was
not discussed in Colaizzi, looms as a possible limitation on the future application
of the due process safeguards. Even if the Colaizzi interpretation of Paul triumphs, as seems likely, the question of how closely state-inflicted injury to reputation must be linked to the termination of employment remains. Also, the Roth
test awaits future clarification. Because of the facts of Colaizzi, the Seventh
Circuit's focus was necessarily narrow; thus, these questions, concerning this
evolving body of the law, are left to be resolved at a future time.
Mark McLaughlin

84

See note 67, supra and the accompanying text.

EQUAL PROTECTION-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-EQUAL PROTECTION
REQUIRES THAT PRE-SENTENCE CONFINEMENT BE CREDITED; HOWEVER,
FAILURE TO CREDIT DOES NOT VIOLATE DOUBLE JEOPARDY WHEN THE
TOTAL TIME OF INCARCERATION FALLS WITHIN THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM

Faye v. Gray*
The crowded American criminal dockets have raised a complex of issues
concerning the effective administration of justice in the United States. An area
of growing concern to the courts, legislatures, and legal scholars is the related
problem of jail time spent by defendants while awaiting trial and sentencing.
This concern has resulted in an increasing awareness of the constitutional implications of pre-sentence confinement.'
In Faye v. Gray,2 the Seventh Circuit was presented with the question of
whether a convicted defendant has a constitutional right to have pre-sentence
jail time subtracted from his sentence. The petitioner asserted that such a right
exists under both the equal protection and double jeopardy clauses of the United
States Constitution. In response, the court affirmed the general proposition that

these constitutional guarantees do require pre-sentence confinement credit under
certain circumstances.
However, the Faye decision is seriously flawed in two respects. First, the
decision suffers from the court's inconsistent treatment of the two constitutional
issues. Second, and more important, the court improperly limited the practical
impact of these constitutional credit requirements by failing to reject the application of a presumption of credit when the total time of incarceration is less than
the statutory maximum period allowable for a given offense. This comment
examines both the defective reasoning and the erroneous result reached by the
Seventh Circuit in Faye, and suggests the course which should have been adopted
by the court.

Statement of the Case
Frank J. Faye, Jr. was arrested on July 7, 1971 in York, Nebraska. He was
transported to Omaha, Nebraska and remained in jail pending extradition to
Wisconsin. Faye was financially unable to post the $10,000 bond which was set
at a hearing on August 14, 1971. Thus, he remained in the custody of Nebraska
officials until September 1, 1971, when he was extradited to Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. A $10,000 bail was also set in Wisconsin; still unable to post bond,

Faye remained in custody in the Milwaukee County Jail until his conviction on
two counts of rape on November 16, 1971.
Subsequently, Faye was incarcerated at the Wisconsin Central State Hospital
541 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1976).
1 See generally Schornhorst, Presentence Confinement and the Constitution: The Burial
of Dead Time, 23 HAST. L.J. 1041 (1972); Stacy, ConstitutionalRight to Sentence Credit for
Pre-trial Incarceration,41 U. CIN. L. Rav. 823 (1972); Note, Sentence Crediting for the
State CriminalDefendant-A Constitutional Requirement, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 586 (1973).
2 541 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1976).
*
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for pre-sentence examination to determine the need for specialized treatment
under the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act. Faye remained in the hospital until
January 11, 1972, when he was returned to the Milwaukee County Jail to await
sentencing. On January 18, 1972, after having spent a total of 176 days in confinement, Faye was sentenced to concurrent terms of seven years on two counts
of rape. Each rape conviction carried a possible maximum sentence of 30 years
under Wisconsin law.
Faye filed a pro se motion in the sentencing court for a reduction in sentence
to reflect credit for his 176 day period of pre-sentence confinement. Upon denial
of the motion by the sentencing judge, Faye filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
Faye's petition set forth two constitutionally premised arguments. First, it
alleged that since his pre-sentence confinement was the direct result of his
financial inability to post bond, his right to equal protection of the laws had been
violated by the sentencing court's refusal to credit this period against the sentence
imposed. The district court rejected this contention, holding that a presumption
arises that the sentencing judge has in fact credited the pre-sentence time when
the period of pre-sentence confinement, together with the sentence imposed, is less
than the statutory maximum penalty allowed for the offense. The court noted
that Faye had failed to overcome this presumption, and concluded that his right
to equal protection had not been violated.
Faye further urged that the county court's refusal to credit his pre-sentence
confinement was unconstitutional under the fifth amendment. The district court
rejected this argument as well, and held that the double jeopardy prohibition is
not violated when the period of pre-sentence confinement together with the
sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum penalty. Finding no
merit in either constitutional challenge to the action of the sentencing court, the
district court dismissed Faye's petition.
Faye appealed the district court's decision to the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. Again, Faye argued that the circuit court for Milwaukee
County had violated his rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution by failing to credit the 176 days of pre-sentence confinement when sentence was imposed following his conviction.
Equal Protectionand the Denial of Pre-sentence Confinement Credit
Faye's argument that failure to credit pre-sentence jail time violates equal
protection was based upon a developing line of federal decisions recognizing the
constitutional implications of indigency. As early as 1956,' the United States
Supreme Court invoked the equal protection clause to ensure that indigent
defendants are afforded equality of treatment in the criminal process. Although
the Court has not as yet addressed the precise issue of a constitutional right to presentence confinement credit on equal protection grounds, the general equal protection rationale has been extended to related areas of sentencing procedure.
3 See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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This extension has served as the basis for the express recognition of such a right
by other federal courts.
The equal protection implications of sentencing and indigent prisoners were
first addressed by the Supreme Court in Williams v. United States." In that case,
the Court struck down the Illinois practice of incarcerating beyond the maximum
term those individuals unable to pay a fine. In reaching its decision, the Court
emphasized that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment "requires that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive
offense be the same for all individuals irrespective of their economic status." 5
A subsequent case, Morris v. Schoonfield,6 also concerned the sentencing of
an indigent defendant. In Morris, the petitioner's sentence did not exceed the
maximum term. However, his financial inability to pay an accompanying fine
resulted in a longer sentence than would have been imposed had he been able to
make payment. The Court remanded the case with the direction that it be
rendered consistent with its recent Williams decision. Of greater significance,
however, is Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion, which emphasized that an
arbitrary extension of a man's sentence solely because he lacks economic means is
constitutionally intolerable:
The same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also inheres in jailing
an indigent for failure to make immediate payment of any fine, whether or
not the jail term of the indigent extends beyond the maximum term that
may be imposed on a person willing and able to pay a fine. In each case,
the constitution prohibits the state from imposing a fine as a sentence and
then automatically converting it into a jail term
solely because the defendant
7
is indigent and cannot forthwith pay in full.
Mr. Justice White's general position was ultimately adopted by the Court in
Tate v.Short.8 In Tate, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a sentencing scheme in which a convicted defendant was obliged
to pay a fine or to spend time in jail "working off" the fine--the classic "30 days
or 30 dollars" sentence. The Court ruled that to transform a statutorily prescribed
fine into a jail term because the defendant is unable to pay violates equal protection.
Following these Supreme Court decisions, many federal courts have recognized that denial of sentencing credit to an indigent prisoner for time spent in
jail, due to his inability to post bond, raises similar constitutional questions.
Several of these courts have expressly held that it is a denial of equal protection
to deny credit for such pre-sentence confinement.' Unfortunately, a number of
these decisions have interpreted Williams as holding that equal protection is violated only when the period of pre-sentence confinement, together with the sentence imposed, exceeds the statutory maximum allowed for the offense.a°
t 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
5 Id. at 244.
6 399 U.S. 508 (1970).
7 Id. at 509 (White, J., concurring).
8 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
9 See, e.g., King v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1975); Ham v. North Carolina,
471 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973); White v. Gilligan, 351 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
10 See, e.g., Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1974); Hook v. Arizona, 496 F.2d
1172 (9th Cir. 1974); Hill v. Wainwright, 465 F.2cd 414 (5th Cir. 1971).
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In contrast, some decisions have interpreted Williams more broadly, and
require credit for any period of pre-sentence confinement due to indigency regardless of whether the aggregated period would exceed the statutory maximum."
As the Eighth Circuit asserted in King v. Wyrick:1
It is obvious .

.

. that equal protection considerations obtain as well

in the case of an indigent prisoner who is denied jail time credit on a prison
term less than the allowable maximum prescribed by statute. He still must
serve a longer term in connection with the offense than would a wealthier
prisoner who is sentenced to the same term but who is able to meet bail to
avoid incarceration before trial and sentencing.13
These decisions have apparently adopted the reasoning set forth in Mr. Justice
White's concurring opinion in Morris v. Schoonfield,'4 and view the question of
whether the aggregated period extends beyond the maximum term as constitutionally irrelevant.
Although these latter decisions appear to support the petitioner's contention
in Faye, this expansive interpretation of Williams has been diluted in many cases
by a qualifying presumption which renders this support illusory. Most decisions
on point do support Faye's argument by asserting the unqualified proposition
that equal protection is violated whenever pre-sentence confinement is not fully
credited.' However, many courts have severely limited the practical impact of
this proposition by simultaneously holding that if the total time of incarceration is
less than the statutory maximum period, it is presumed that the sentencing court
in fact credited the pre-sentence time." In Faye, since the petitioner's total jail
time was less than the statutory maximum, the strength of his equal protection
argument depended on whether the Seventh Circuit would adopt the presumption of credit.
This presumption apparently derives from the District of Columbia Circuit's
opinion in Stapf v. United States,17 which construed a portion of the federal
sentence crediting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3568." This act provides in pertinent
part that:
[T]he Attorney General shall give any . . . person credit toward the service
of his sentence for any days spent in custody prior to the imposition of
sentence . . . for want of bail set for the offense for which sentence was
imposed where the statute requires the imposition of a minimum mandatory
sentence.' 9

In Stapf, the defendant had received the maximum sentence allowable, but
11 See, e.g., 516 F.2d 321; 471 F.2d 406; Monsour v. Gray, 375 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Wis.
1973); 351 F.Supp. 1012.
12 516 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1975).
13 Id. at 323.
14 See text accompanying note 7, supra.
15 See, e.g., 471 F.2d 406; 351 F. Supp. 1012.
16 See 516 F.2d 321; 375 F. Supp. 786; Withers v. North Carolina, 328 F. Supp. 1152
(W.D.N.C. 1971).
17 367 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
18 Act of September 2, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-691, § 1(a), 74 Stat. 738, as amended, 18

U.S.C. § 3568 (1970).
19

Id.
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the offense did not carry a minimum term. Thus, he was not eligible under the
act for credit for his period of pre-sentence confinement. Protesting his ineligibility, Stapf challenged the actes "minimum mandatory sentence" limitation, and
claimed that the district court had erred in refusing to credit his pre-sentence jail
time against the maximum sentence. The District of Columbia Circuit agreed,
holding that Congress, in providing an automatic credit of pre-sentence time
served for minimum sentences, also intended to accord such a credit if the maximum sentence under the law is imposed' The court concluded that sentencing
courts are under a duty "to provide credit for pre-sentence custody for want of
bail to all defendants not granted credit administratively by virtue of the [minimum mandatory sentence] provision of § 3568."21
This sweeping statement was limited, however, by the court's procedural
qualification that whenever it is possible, as a matter of mechanical calculation,
that credit was given, a reviewing court will conclusively presume that it was
in fact granted by the sentencing court. 2 Thus, whenever the total time of incarceration faced by a prisoner is less than the statutorily allowable maximum,
it is irrebuttably presumed that this fact reflects credit for any pre-sentence confinement. The Stapf court's sole justification for the application of this presumption was that the time and cost involved in the adjudication of individual claims
for credit under the statute "outweighs any possible unfairness."23 Accordingly,
other federal courts, including the Seventh Circuit, adopted and applied the
Stapf presumption in subsequent cases involving § 3568.4
The Stapf presumption, as applied to federal statutory claims for credit
under § 3568, was ultimately extended to constitutional claims for credit by state
prisoners.25 However, this extension has not gone unchallenged. In King v.
Wyrick,2" for example, the Eighth Circuit applied the presumption of credit, but
not without questioning its appropriateness in a habeas corpus action presenting a
constitutional claim for sentence credit as distinguished from a statutory claim
under § 35682 Moreover, when applied to constitutional claims for sentence
credit, the presumption has never been accorded the conclusiveness associated
with its statutory application.28
These concerns were amplified by the petitioner in Faye. Faye expressly
raised the issue of whether it is constitutionally permissible to presume that the
sentencing judge had credited his pre-sentence jail time. However, the Seventh
Circuit evaded the issue, stating:
20 367 F.2d at 328.
21 Id. at 330.
22 Id. However, some courts have refused to adopt the District of Columbia Circuit's
holding as to the conclusive nature of the presumption. See, e.g., United States v. Downey,
469 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1972).
23 Id.
24 See, e.g., Swift v. United States, 436 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
920 (1971); Holt v. United States, 422 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1970); Brotherton v. United
States, 420 F.2d 1357 (10th Cir. 1970); but see Padgett v. United States, 387 F.2d 649 (4th
Cir. 1967).
25 516 F.2d 321; 375 F. Supp. 786; 328 F. Supp. 1152.
26 516 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1975).
27 Id. at 324.
28 See id.; 375 F. Supp. at 788. These decisions reject the application of any presumption
when the record clearly indicates that credit was not in fact given.
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We . . . need not address the specific question of whether the Stapf presumption should appropriately be utilized where the claim for sentence credit
is constitutionally rather than statutorily based, for we believe any presumption is throughly rebutted when the sentencing judge clearly indicates that
he in fact did not credit such pre-sentence time in sentencing the petitioner.29
Thus, the Faye court avoided the central question by reasoning that even if the
application of the presumption were upheld, it had been "clearly rebutted by the
sentencing judge's own words."3 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court with respect to its finding that the presumption had not been overcome in the instant case.
In summary, there are numerous federal decisions supportive of a constitutional right to pre-sentence confinement credit on equal protection grounds.
However, some of these decisions have extended the Stapf presumption to equal
protection claims for credit when the total jail time facing a prisoner is less than
the statutory maximum. In this context, the most critical question facing the
Faye court was whether it would follow the Eighth Circuit in applying this
presumption to constitutional claims for credit as distinguished from statutory
claims under § 3568. Yet the court evaded this issue, and decided that Faye was
entitled to re-sentencing on the narrower grounds that even if the presumption
were adopted, it had been clearly rebutted in the case before it.
Denial of Pre-sentence Confinement Credit as Violative of Double Jeopardy
In addition to his equal protection argument, Faye contended that the sentencing judge's failure to credit his pre-sentence jail time violated the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy." This second argument was based upon
the Supreme Court's holding in North Carolina v. Pearce.2 In Pearce,the petitioner had been convicted of assault with intent to commit rape and sentenced
to a prison term. Several years later, he initiated a state post-conviction proceeding which culminated in the reversal of his conviction by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina. Pearce was subsequently retried and convicted of the same
offense, and sentenced by the trial judge to an eight year prison term. However,
the trial judge refused to credit the time served by Pearce pursuant to his first
conviction, and Pearce challenged the constitutionality of this denial of credit
before the United States Supreme Court.
The Pearce Court determined that the petitioner was entitled to have his
time served pursuant to the reversed conviction fully subtracted from the new
sentence, since to deny such credit would result in an element of "multiple punishment" which is constitutionally impermissible. 3 The Court concluded by holding
that the fifth amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy "is violated when
punishment already exacted for an offense is not fully 'credited' in imposing
29

541 F.2d at 668-69 (emphasis added).

30 Id. at 669.

31 The United States Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment's guarantee against
double jeopardy is enforceable against the states through the fourteenth amendment in Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
32 395 U.S. 711 (1969).

33 Id. at 717-18.

[Vol. 52:393]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense." 4
Although the Pearce Court only addressed the constitutional implications of
time served pursuant to a conviction which has been reversed, other federal courts
have interpreted its rationale to require credit for pre-trial incarceration as well. 5
As the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina noted in Culp v.
Bounds: " " [A prisoner's pre-trial] incarceration is indistinguishable in effect from
that of one, such as Pearce, who is retried after obtaining post-conviction relief.""7
These decisions proceed on the assumption that since there is no real distinction
between pre-trial and post-sentence detention, the Pearce decision mandates that
credit must be extended for time spent in custody prior to commitment.3
Relying on Pearce and the related pre-sentence confinement cases which
followed it, Faye argued that the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy required the crediting of the entire 176 day period of his own presentence jail time. The Seventh Circuit rejected this contention, and held that a
failure to credit violates the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment only
when pre-sentence time, together with the sentence imposed, exceeds the statutory
maximum penalty allowed for the offense. The Faye court asserted that when
the total time of incarceration falls within the single maximum period of punishment set by the legislature, no grounds exist for finding the element of "double
punishment" proscribed by Pearce.9
This assertion, however, is constitutionally suspect. The difficulty stems from
the fact that the Seventh Circuit's holding in Faye is inconsistent with the actual
"multiple punishment" prohibition established by the Supreme Court in North
Carolina v. Pearce40
In Pearce,the Supreme Court illustrated the notion of constitutionally prohibited "multiple punishment" with an example in which a prisoner's total jail
time exceeds the statutory maximum." However, the Court went on to emphasize that:
Though not so dramatically evident, the same principle obviously holds true
already endured is not fully subtracted from any new
whenever punishment
42
sentence imposed.
Thus, the Faye court erroneously inferred that Pearceis violated only when total
jail time exceeds the statutory maximum. While this is the most "dramatically
evident" example of multiple punishment, it is not the only situation envisioned
by the Pearce Court in which a denial of credit violates double jeopardy. A
-prisoner's total jail time might well be within the statutory maximum, but he is
still subjected to multiple punishment if pre-trial detention already endured is
34 Id. at 718.
35 See, e.g., Taylor v. Gray, 375 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Parker v. Bounds, 329
F. Supp. 1400 (E.D.N.C. 1971); Culp v. Bounds, 325 F. Supp. 416 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
36 325 F. Supp. 416.
37 Id. at 419.
38 See, e.g., 375 F. Supp. at 793; 329 F. Supp. at 1401-02; 325 F. Supp. at 419.
39 541 F.2d at 667.
40 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
41 Id. at 718.
42 Id. (emphasis added).
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not fully subtracted from the sentence imposed.4"
The Presumption of Credit: "Now You See It, Now You Don't"
The manifest logical weakness of the Seventh Circuit's treatment of the
double jeopardy issue in Faye raises the question of the actual rationale of the
court's decision. It is apparent that the court's specious "avoidance" of Pearce's
multiple punishment prohibition cannot support the conclusion reached in Faye.
Rather, the underlying basis of the Seventh Circuit's rejection of Faye's double
jeopardy argument appears to be a judicial presumption that when total incarceration time is less than the statutory maximum, a reviewing court will
presume that credit was in fact given by the sentencing judge to avoid multiple
punishment.
This implicit presumption, as applied to double jeopardy claims for credit,
is virtually indistinguishable from the Stapf presumption which has been applied
to equal protection claims. The Seventh Circuit cited Culp v. Bounds4 4 as authority for the proposition that Pearce holds that a failure to credit violates the guarantee against double jeopardy only when total jail time exceeds the statutory maximum. However, in Culp, the North Carolina district court explained its restrictive interpretation of Pearce as follows:
This court assumes, without deciding, that where the time spent in
custody before commitment when added to the sentence given after trial is
less than the statutory maximum, no constitutional issue is presented. In
that situation, this court ...

is reluctantly inclined to indulge the fiction that

the trial judge who imposes sentence has given the defendant credit for time
served before commitment. See the order in Withers v. North Carolina..
and cases cited therein.4"
This explanation makes clear that the basis of the Seventh Circuit's limited
interpretation of Pearce is indeed a presumption of credit. Moreover, the Culp
4
" an equal protection case, incourt's reference to Withers v. North Carolina,
as applied to double jeopardy
this
presumption,
source
of
dicates that the ultimate
itself.
presumption
claims for credit, is the Stapf
Hence, it is evident that the Seventh Circuit's treatment of Faye's two arguments are in conflict. While the court avoided addressing the applicability of the
43

For example, suppose that two defendants, Jones and Smith, are arrested and charged

with the same offense. The offense carries a maximum sentence of 1 year. Jones posts bond
and is released pending the outcome of his trial, but Smith remains in custody. Three months
after the date of their arrests, both are convicted and sentenced. The sentencing judge determines that in both cases an appropriate sentence is six months. Thus, Smith's total time of
detention remains within the statutory maximum. Nevertheless, unless the sentencing judge
credits Smith's pre-sentence time, he will spend a total of nine months in custody, whereas Jones
will spend only six months. Since the sentencing judge determined that six months was an

appropriate sentence (as substantiated by Jones' sentence), the extra three months Smith must
endure is tantamount to "multiple punishment." The Faye court, however, would deny that
Smith is entitled to credit on double jeopardy grounds since his pre-sentence jail time when
added to the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum. This result is neither
consistent with common sense nor with Pearce.
44 325 F. Supp. 416 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
45 Id. at 419 n.l.
46 328 F.Supp. 1152 (W.D.N.C.1971).
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Stapf presumption because of the admissions of the sentencing court, it simultaneously applied the identical presumption to Faye's double jeopardy contention.
In addition, the Faye opinion reveals two inconsistent positions concerning
the conclusiveness of these presumptions. With respect to the applicabilty of the
Stapf presumption in equal protection cases, the Faye court effectively adopted
the Eighth Circuit's position in King v. Wyrick47 to the effect that, in constitutional claims for credit, "any such presumption must be rebuttable."4" In contrast, the implicit double jeopardy presumption imposed by the Seventh Circuit in
Faye is apparently conclusive: if the total aggregate jail time is less than the statutory maximum, it is conclusively presumed that there has been no element of
"double punishment."
These inconsistencies in Faye compound the error of the Seventh Circuit in
avoiding the issue of whether the Stapf presumption is appropriate when claims
for credit are of constitutional dimension. Logical consistency would have
required the court to address the issue of the applicability of a presumption of
credit when the claim is constitutionally based. Further, the constitutional dimension of such claims should have compelled the court to reject the application of
any presumption, whether express or implied, unless squarely within Stapf's statutory context.
The Stapf presumption, even as applied to statutory claims for credit under
18 U.S.C. § 3568, is subject to challenge since no federal court has ever offered
any factual support for its imposition. There has been no evidence advanced
which tends to establish the existence of a nationwide judicial practice of taking
pre-sentence custody into account at the time of sentencing.49 Rather, the sole
reason advanced for the adoption of the presumption is the inconvenience that
would be experienced by the courts in adjudicating individual claims for credit."
While such a justification might warrant the application of presumptive
credit to claims brought under the statute, it is certainly not sufficient when
balanced against a defendant's constitutional rights. As one legal writer persuasively argues:
It would seem that administrative convenience, not to mention justice,
would be served better by a contrary rule; that is, unless the record is clear
that the trial judge did indeed award full credit..., the presumption should
be that credit was not given and the state should bear the burden of proving
the contrary. In other words, if the requirement of credit is of constitutional
dimension, it can hardly be satisfied by an unsubstantiated "presumption"
that a trial judge complied with the rule."'
These inherent difficulties with the Stapf presumption, particularly when
applied to constitutional claims for pre-sentence credit, should have been addressed by the Seventh Circuit in Faye v. Gray. This case provided the court with
an opportunity to ensure that "dead time," or pre-sentence confinement, is duly
47
48
49
50
51

516 F.2d 321, 324 (8th Cir. 1975).
541 F.2d at 668.
See Schornhorst, supra note 1, at 1063-64.
Stapf v. United States, 367 F.2d at 330.
Schorrhorst, supra note 1, at 1063.
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credited in compliance with constitutional requirements. Any presumptive credit
device poses a serious obstacle to a sound pre-sentence confinement policy which
is consistent with a defendant's constitutional guarantees. In Faye, the Seventh
Circuit should have firmly rejected the application of any presumption of credit
when a denial of pre-sentence confinement credit is in potential conflict with the
Constitution.
Instead, the court refused to address the petitioner's challenge to the Stapf
presumption, and in effect voiced approval of an implicit presumption of credit
in response to Faye's double jeopardy argument. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Faye v. Gray is doubly vexing: the court not only failed to address the
central issue, but forfeited sound judicial reasoning and jeopardized constitutional
rights in the process. It can only be hoped that either the Seventh Circuit or the
Supreme Court will soon affirmatively address the applicability of the Stapf
presumption to claims for credit of constitutional dimension, and thereby correct
the mistaken approach adopted in Faye.
Joseph F. Winterscheid

DOUBLE

JEOPARDY-INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
BASED ON BAD INFORMATION DOES NOT BAR RETRIAL

United States v. Lee*
Introduction
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment prevents the individual
from being tried more than once for the same offense.1 Thus, if the government
fails to prove a defendant's guilt, it cannot continually try the defendant until a
guilty verdict is reached. Difficulties arise, however, in determining whether
retrial is violative of the fifth amendment, when a trial is aborted or dismissed.
In United States v. Lee, the information was found to be defective after all the
evidence had been presented but before a verdict had been rendered. The
Seventh Circuit was asked to determine whether the double jeopardy clause
barred retrial.
Phillip Jerome Lee was arrested and charged by an information with theft
while on property under the jurisdiction of the federal government. 2 At the
beginning of his bench trial, Lee moved for dismissal of the information because
it failed to allege one of the statutory elements of the crime: that the offense was
committed knowingly and with the intent to deprive the owner of the use and
benefit of the property.' This defect, obvious on the face of the information,
would render voidable a conviction based on that information.4 However, instead
of acting on Lee's motion at that time, the district court judge took this motion
under advisement and proceeded with the trial to the conclusion of the government's case.' Only after Lee again moved for dismissal did the district court
judge dismiss the information, stating:
No such allegation [that the offense was committed knowingly and with
intent] is contained, no matter how I stretch my imagination when I read
the Information. There is nothing here that even smacks of an element of
intent.'
A grand jury subsequently returned an indictment charging Lee with the
same crime as that alleged in the information.' Lee was tried and found guilty.
* 539 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1976).
1 The pertinent portion of the fifth amendment reads: "nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The obvious purpose of this
double jeopardy clause is to prevent the government from trying an individual more than once
for the same offense. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975).
2 The statutes involved were 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1970) and IND. CODE § 10-3030 (1975).
3 1st Trial Transcript at 3-5, United States v. Lee (N.D. Ind. 1974).
4 Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891). In this case, the Supreme Court overturned the convictions of two men who were tried on a defective indictment. They were tried
again and found guilty along with a third man who was found not guilty at the first trial.
Their case again went to the Supreme Court in United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
5 1st Trial Transcript at 3-5, United States v. Lee *(N.D. Ind. 1974).
6 1st Trial Transcript at 67-68, United States v. Lee (N.D. Ind. 1974). Under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 (e), the United States Attorney could have amended the information at any time before the verdict.
7 United States v. Lee, 539 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1976).
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On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Lee's conviction, holding that double
jeopardy protection did not apply to his case. 8 Lee's petition for certiorari was
granted by the Supreme Court on January 10, 1977.
A proper understanding of this case requires an explanation of how the
double jeopardy clause protects the individual criminal defendant, and an explanation of what situations fall under that protection. It will then be possible
to make clear the uniqueness of the facts of this case and the importance of the
Seventh Circuit's holding.
The Double Jeopardy Clause
Claims of double jeopardy can arise in at least six situations. First, the
initial trial stops short of a verdict, and the defendant is convicted on retrial.9
Second, the first trial ends in an acquittal, and the defendant is tried again. °
Third, the first trial ends in a conviction, which is overturned on defendant's appeal and he is convicted on retrial of a greater offense, or of the same offense
along with other counts arising out of the same transaction but not charged
against him in the first trial." Fourth, the first trial ends in a conviction, and the
defendant is then tried on charges technically different from the charges in the
first trial but arising out of the same transaction.' Fifth, the defendant is tried
for the same offense by two or more different sovereigns (federal government,
state government, military court martial)." Sixth, the defendant may have committed in one transaction a crime against several people or objects and may be
tried individually for the crime against each person or object. 4
Lee falls within the first type of double jeopardy claim; his first trial ended
prior to the rendering of a verdict, and on retrial he was convicted. Existence of
such circumstances does not always invoke the fifth amendment's double jeopardy
protection. Before the second trial can amount to double jeopardy it must be
found that: 1) the defendant was in jeopardy at the first trial; and, 2 ) there was
no "manifest necessity" to declare a mistrial or a dismissal before the verdict.
1. When Does Jeopardy "Attach"?

5

According to the United States Supreme Court in Serfass v. United States:
[I]n the case of a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a jury is impanelled
and sworn .... In a non-jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the court begins
to hear evidence.'6
8 Id.
9 See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
10 See 163 U.S. 662.
11 See McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1936).
12 See Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
13 See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820).
14 See Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
15 The word jeopardy is derived from the Old French "jeu parti," which literally means
"divided game." American Heritage Dictionary at 702-03 '(1969). The idea behind the word
is that once both parties have entered into the trial, they are each entitled to continue until
one wins and one loses, because it is unfair for one side to stop when it appears that he is
losing, and then be allowed to start over again before a different referee.
16 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975).
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Hence, in Lee, jeopardy did attach. The Lee court, in a non-jury trial, heard all
of the prosecutor's evidence and offered the defendant an opportunity to put on
evidence before the district court judge dismissed the case. The Serfass test was
passed as soon as the district court judge heard the first word spoken by the first
witness.
2. Manifest Necessity to Dismiss and Retry
Manifest necessity to dismiss or to declare a mistrial and to retry the defendant has been found in the following situations: when it was discovered that a
juror was acquainted with the accused ;17 when a defect in the indictment or information is discovered ;"8 or when the exigencies of a military trial on the battlefield command the end of the proceedings. 9 This is the same type of determination which was made by the district court judge and upheld by the Seventh
Circuit in Lee.
The doctrine of manifest necessity is simply a recognition that it is impossible
to expect every trial, once it has begun, to result in a verdict!' There are occasions when the trial judge will decide to end the proceedings, such as when a
juror's bias is discovered during the trial. In these cases, barring inappropriate
governmental activity, the government will not be barred from trying the
defendant again."' However, before the trial judge comes to that conclusion, he
must carefully consider the alternatives. He must balance the rights and interests
of the government against the rights and interests of the individual criminal
defendant. The defendant has a right to proceed before the first tribunal to face
him because that tribunal represents to him an opportunity to be acquitted. It
is true that every tribunal represents that opportunity, but it is also true that
a defendant's chances before one jury can be greater or worse than his chances
before another. If it is a trial by jury, which the defense counsel helped to select,
that same jury may be unavailable to the defendant again, and that jury might
have been the one that would have acquitted the defendant, whereas the next
jury may not. More important, however, may be the fact that the defendant may
have revealed his defense strategy to the prosecutor. Once the prosecutor has run
through this full dress rehearsal, he should be well prepared both to present his
case in its best light and to counter the defendant's evidence at the next trial.
There are times when the government has an interest in ending the proceeding if nothing of value to the government can come of it or if there are unusual
circumstances. 2' If, for example, the trial is proceeding on a faulty indictment,
only an acquittal or a conviction is possible if the trial is pursued to a verdict,
neither of which can benefit the government. An acquittal would bar the
defendant's possible retrial, according to the principles of the double jeopardy
17 Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
18 Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916).
19 Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).

20 United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
21 Id.
22 Nothing of value can come from a trial based on a faulty indictment. Also if the
prosecutor suddenly becomes ill, dismissal may be the only viable alternative.
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clause. Alternatively, a conviction based on a faulty indictment would likely be
overturned on appeal requiring the government to begin the criminal process
again or give up.
In weighing the interests of the government and the defendant, trial judges
have the authority to:
discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking
for
all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity
23
the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.
It is important to understand the meaning and effect of what the trial judge does
when he declares a mistrial in one of these situations. First, he has, either
explicitly or impliedly, found a manifest necessity to dismiss the case. The
corollary to such a decision has always been that the double jeopardy clause
does not bar retrial. This decision, however, does not deny the fact that jeopardy
has attached to the first proceeding, for, according to Serfass, once the jury has
been impanelled and sworn, or once the trial judge, as trier of fact, has begun to
hear the evidence, jeopardy has attached.24 Indeed, if jeopardy had not attached
to the first proceeding, no balancing of interests would be required because no
double jeopardy protection would be implicated. So, when a trial judge finds
manifest necessity to dismiss the first trial and retry the defendant, he is, in effect,
2
deciding that this situation is an exception to the double jeopardy protection. "
The importance of Lee does not lie in whether the trial judge was correct in
finding manifest necessity to dismiss. There is no doubt that dismissal was manifestly necessary because nothing binding could result from a trial on a defective
information except an acquittal. Rather, Lee challenged the traditional corollary,
that retrial is not barred by the double jeopardy clause. Lee did not seek to
completely overturn that corollary, but only to make an exception to it based on
the unique facts of his case, the most important fact consisting of the district
court judge's unnecessary pursuit of a useless trial.
3. Seventh Circuit: Jeopardy Attached, Manifest Necessity Existed
The Seventh Circuit recognized that, under Serfass v. United States,
jeopardy attached to the first trial at the point at which the district court judge
began to hear the evidence.2" The mere fact, however, that jeopardy has attached
to a proceeding does not, under the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause,
necessarily mean that a retrial is barred. 27 Only in cases where the first proceeding produced an acquittal is a retrial absolutely barred by the fifth amendment
double jeopardy clause.2 8 Considering the procedural possibilities, if the trial
fails to reach a verdict and is not disposed of on the merits of the case, then a
dismissal or a mistrial must have been declared. A question then arises as to
23
24
25
26
27
28

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580.
420 U.S. at 377, 388.
See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579.
420 U.S. at 377, 388.
410 U.S. 458.
See 163 U.S. 662.
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whether the mistrial was manifestly necessary in order to meet the ends of public
justice. 29 The ends of public justice demand that the government prosecute
suspected criminals efficiently in order that the guilty be convicted and properly
dealt with. If this end cannot be accomplished in a proceeding, then the possible
need to dismiss the case presents itself. A balance must then be struck between the
public's interest in prosecuting a suspected criminal successfully, and the defendant's interest in carrying forward with the first trial. This balance is not to be
weighed by the mechanical application of rules, but rather should turn on the
facts of each individual case.30
In support of the court's conclusion that Lee's retrial did not violate the fifth
amendment double jeopardy clause, the Seventh Circuit relied upon the Second
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Velazquez. 1 Velazquez was indicted for
failure to report for induction and a plea of not guilty was entered. After reading
the defendant's fourteen pretrial motions and portions of the defendant's Selective
Service record, the trial judge dismissed the indictment. The government appealed this dismissal, and the defendant opposed that appeal claiming it violated
his fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy. According to this
defendant, the trial judge had acquitted him on the merits of the case, notwithstanding the fact that the judge had styled his order a dismissal.2 An acquittal
is a verdict, that is, a determination made by the trier of fact that the defendant
is not guilty; such a decision bars retrial.3 " A dismissal, on the other hand, is not
a decision on the merits of the case, but only a procedural decision not to continue
with this proceeding to a verdict. If this procedural decision is required by
manifest necessity, retrial is not barred. 4 By contrast, if this decision is not
required by manifest necessity, then retrial is barred by the double jeopardy
clause. The Second Circuit determined that:
Velazquez was not placed in jeopardy by the determination of the trial court
when it based the dismissal of the indictment against him solely on motion
papers submitted prior to trial, before either the selection or waiver of a
jury and without any opportunity for counsel on either side to be heard.3"
It is not clear why the Seventh Circuit cited and discussed this case for it is
easily distinguishable from Lee. Unlike Lee, Velazquez never faced an impanelled
and sworn jury or the hearing of evidence in an adversary trial setting. Consequently, jeopardy never attached to the first Velazquez proceeding; thus the
second Velazquez proceeding could not constitute double jeopardy. Of course,
jeopardy did attach in Lee as soon as the district court judge began to hear the
evidence.
After comparing Lee with Velazquez, the Seventh Circuit found that the
29 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579.
30 Id. at 580. Although the Seventh Circuit did not cite Perez on this matter or specifically state that this was their approach, it can be inferred that the Seventh Circuit applied
this balancing test.
31 490 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1973).

The Seventh Circuit's opinion misspelled Velazquez as

"Valazquez."

32 Id.
33 163 U.S. 662.
34
35

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579. Lee is seeking to create an exception to that rule.
490 F.2d at 33.
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double jeopardy protection did not apply in Lee. According to the court, the
dismissal of the trial was not based on the evidence adduced at the trial so it was
not an acquittal based on the merits of the case. In addition, the court thought
it significant that Lee's counsel did not object to going forward with the trial,
even though he had moved for dismissal before the trial began. This point should
be of minor importance, however. The protection of the double jeopardy clause,
if it applies, cannot be waived as an appealable issue. But even if such a waiver
was possible, the facts here would not support such a waiver argument because
Lee's counsel moved for dismissal, thus preserving the issue for appeal.
The Seventh Circuit concluded its opinion by considering the legal effect of
a hypothetical conviction on Lee's first trial. In doing so the court compared Lee
to an early United States Supreme Court case, Ball v. United States." In Ball the
defendant was indicted with two others for murder. The indictment failed to
state when and where the victim died. Such a defect would, like the one
in Lee, have rendered any conviction based on that indictment void or voidable."
Ball was acquitted, but the other two defendants were convicted. These convictions were later overturned by the United States Supreme Court.'
Subsequently, all three defendants were re-indicted under an adequately worded indictment. Ball pleaded former jeopardy and former acquittal; the other two
defendants pleaded former jeopardy by reason of former trial and conviction. All
three defendants were in jeopardy at the first trial in the sense that jeopardy
had attached to the first proceeding when the jury was impanelled and sworn.
Former acquittal, as pointed out earlier, always bars retrial, whereas a former
conviction does not. No manifest necessity balance was necessary in Ball because
a verdict was obtained. Despite the protection that the double jeopardy clause
should have afforded Ball, he was convicted with the other two defendants at the
second trial. The Supreme Court held that:
a general verdict of acquittal upon the issue of not guilty to an indictment
undertaking to charge murder, and not objected to before the verdict as
insufficient
in that respect, is a bar to a second indictment for the same
39
killing.
Clearly such a decision comports with the underlying policy of the double
jeopardy protection: once a person is acquitted of a charge he may not be
charged again for the same alleged offense.
Accordingly, Ball's conviction was reversed, but the convictions of the other
two defendants, who were convicted at the first trial, were affirmed on the theory
that the convicted defendants impliedly waived their double jeopardy protection.
When a criminal defendant overturns his conviction on appeal, he implicitly
waives his fifth amendment protection against being tried again for that same
offense. This waiver theory is supported by the fact that, while the defendant
has a right to appeal an illegal conviction, the ends of justice are defeated by
allowing a convicted criminal to escape the consequences of his act because of
36 163 U.S. 662.
37 140 U.S. 118.
38 Id.
39 163 U.S. at 669.
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a mistake on the government's part or because of an unavoidable circumstance.
So the defendant may appeal, but he thus opens the door to a retrial.
Relying on Ball, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that if Lee had been found
guilty at the first trial "his appeal would likely have resulted in a reversal and
4 This is probably true
. .a new trial would not constitute double jeopardy.
because Lee's counsel knew of the defect in the information and should have
known its legal effect. Ball, however, is distinguishable from Lee as was
Velazquez. In Ball there was a verdict, which means that either the defendant was
acquitted and could not be retried, or that the defendant was convicted and
retrial would be allowed, on the waiver theory, after the conviction is overturned
on appeal. However, in Lee, there was no verdict. In altering the facts of Lee
in order to compare the case with Ball, the Seventh Circuit apparently did not
consider the fact that, had Lee been acquitted at the first trial, a retrial would
have been barred.
The real basis of the Seventh Circuit's holding was that manifest necessity
to dismiss the first trial and retry Lee existed, based on an analogy with a recent
Supreme Court case, Illinois v. Somerville.4 There, the defendant was indicted
for theft by an Illinois grand jury. A jury was impanelled and sworn, but before
any evidence was presented, the prosecutor moved for dismissal because of a jurisdictional defect in the indictment. After the indictment was dismissed, another
indictment was issued which, on the basis of double jeopardy, the defendant
moved to quash. This claim was overruled and the defendant was convicted.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, stating that the facts fulfilled the
manifest necessity requirement. The trial court could reasonably conclude that
the ends of justice would have defeated by allowing the trial to continue because
no valid conviction could have resulted from that indictment.4 2 If the ends of
public justice require the government to exert its efforts to convict suspected
criminals, pursuit of such a trial would defeat those ends.
The comparison between Lee and Somerville, however, is tenuous. In
Somerville, the dismissal was granted before any evidence was presented,
whereas, in Lee, the dismissal was granted only after the government's case had
been presented. It is admittedly true that, in Lee, justice demanded that the
district court judge dismiss the information before the trial began, jeopardy
attached, because, as in Somerville, no valid conviction could have been based
on the information as it appeared." But that decision on Lee's motion for dismissal should have been made before the trial began. This was the proper
procedure which allowed a finding of manifest necessity in Somerville. If the
district court judge was unsure on how to rule, he could have called a continuance in order to resolve the issue. Instead, he took the motion under advisement
and proceeded to hear all the evidence offered by the prosecution. In effect, the
district court judge put Lee through all the psychological trauma of a criminal
*

40
41
42
43

539 F.2d at 614.
410 U.S. 458.
Id. at 471.
140 U.S. 118.
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trial when there was no hope of gaining a conviction from this proceeding."'
Since the trial proceeded to the conclusion of the government's case, it
becomes more difficult to determine what the ends of public justice demand. If
one assumes that a verdict of guilty would have been inevitable, then dismissal,
even at this late point in the trial, was the only appropriate action; therefore,
there was manifest necessity to dismiss. Apparently, the Seventh Circuit did
assume that a verdict of guilty was inevitable.45 However, a not-guilty verdict
is always possible. Whether the trial judge should declare a mistrial at this point
in the trial, therefore, becomes more difficult, and the prejudice to the defendant
caused by the error in proceeding to this point under a bad information is increased. The prosecutor has had his complete dress rehearsal, and the defendant,
having divulged his defense strategy, has lost his first opportunity for acquittal.
The Seventh Circuit failed to recognize this case as a unique fact pattern
which does not fall precisely within any of the previously defined double jeopardy
claims." Just as it is possible for the defendant to waive the protection of the
double jeopardy clause when he appeals a conviction, so, perhaps, can the government be estopped from trying a defendant a second time if the judge, or the
prosecutor, have abused their discretion in creating a situation where jeopardy
attaches but no verdict is obtained. All the parties in a criminal proceeding are
obliged to live up to minimum standards of professional conduct. When the
judge or the prosecutor fail to live up to those standards, and in so failing cause
prejudicial error to the defendant, the defendant deserves a remedy, and the fifth
amendment's protection against retrial seems to be the most appropriate remedy
for such a situation.
The Supreme Court has recognized the double jeopardy protection as the
appropriate remedy when the judge or the prosecutor abuses his discretion in
causing a premature termination of the defendant's trial. In Downum v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that there was no manifest necessity to dismiss
the defendant's first trial when the key witness for the prosecution failed to appear
due to the prosecutor's negligence." The defendant was indicted for stealing
checks from the mail, and forging and uttering those checks. After a jury was
selected and sworn, the prosecutor asked the judge to discharge the jury because
his key witness was not present. Thereupon the defendant moved for dismissal,
which motion was denied, and the judge granted the prosecutor's motion to
44 This argument may appear to sound in due process rather than in double jeopardy,
but one should not be misled by the nature of the prejudice suffered by Lee or by the unusual
cause of the apparent double jeopardy. The fact that Lee went through two trials, to which
jeopardy attached, because of the abuse of discretion on the part of the district court judge, while
raising a possible due process argument, does not diminish the double jeopardy aspect of this
case. The same abuses and the same prejudice can be depended upon, and the same remedy
demanded, under both theories. See Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 '(1953). The
propriety of the judge's decisions, and their effect upon the defendant's right to one fair trial
must be weighed against the ends of public justice under either theory.
45 539 F.2d at 614.
46 See text accompanying notes 12-17 supra.
47 There is no authority for this estoppel theory. However, there is authority for the
proposition that if the prosecutor or the trial judge abuses his discretion in ending the trial
prematurely (without manifest necessity) over the defendant's objection, then retrial is barred.
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
These cases were not presented to the Seventh Circuit for consideration in either the Appellee's
or the Appellant's brief.
48 372 U.S. 734.

[Vol. 52:403]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

discharge the jury. Two days later, the case was called again and a second jury
impanelled. The defendant's plea of former jeopardy was overruled, and the
trial resulted in a guilty verdict. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction, but the
Supreme Court reversed.
The Court held that there was no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial
since there were other options that the court could have chosen.49 For example,
the trial court could have granted a continuance or the prosecutor could have
amended the information before the verdict."0 The Supreme Court's opinion also
hints that the district attorney's negligence weighed against the government in the
manifest necessity balance. 5 ' Thus, in this case, the defendant's right to have a
decision from the first tribunal to face him outweighed the government's interest
in aborting the first trial and having a retrial. The facts simply did not fulfill the
requirement of manifest necessity, and the double jeopardy protection barred
retrial.
The same result was reached in United States v. Jorn 2 There, the defendant was charged with filing fraudulent tax returns. After a jury was chosen
and sworn, but before any evidence was presented, the trial judge became concerned about the right of the witnesses to avoid incriminating themselves. After
attempting to explain to the witnesses their constitutional rights, the trial judge
decided that they should all talk to their own attorneys, whereupon, he aborted
the trial. When defendant Jorn was brought back for retrial, the same judge
dismissed the information on the ground of former jeopardy, thereby implicitly
finding that there had been no manifest necessity to dismiss the first trial.
The government appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which held that,
on occasion, a mistrial is necessary and a retrial should not be barred." According to the Court, however, the discretion which allows such a necessary evil must
weigh one important factor: "the need to hold litigants on both sides to standards
of responsible professional conduct in the clash of an adversary criminal
process." ' Again, the fact that the trial judge had other options besides aborting
the trial was an important factor in the court's decision against the finding of
manifest necessity.
It is apparent from the record that no consideration was given to the possibility of a trial continuance .... [I]t seems abundantly apparent that the
trial judge made no effort to exercise a sound discretion to assure that, taking
all the circumstances into account, there was a manifest necessity for the sua
sponte declaration of this mistrial.55
49
50
51
States

52
53
54
55

Id. at 737.
See Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964); FED. R. CIMs. P. 7(e).
372 U.S. at 738 n.l. The opinion quoted from an earlier Court of Appeals case, United
v. Watson, 28 F. 499, 500-01 (1856).
The mere illness of the district attorney, or the mere absence of witnesses for the
prosecution, under the circumstances disclosed by the record in this case, is no ground
upon which, in the exercise of a sound discretion, a court can, on the trial of an
indictment, properly discharge a jury, without the consent of the defendant, after the
jury has been sworn and the trial has thus commenced.
400 U.S. 470.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 487.
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The court concluded that a second prosecution of this defendant would violate
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.
Downum and Jorn can be distinguished from Lee in that the dismissal in
Lee was required by manifest necessity and the ends of public justice, and was
requested by the defendant." The only common thread in Lee and Jorn and
Downum lies only in the abuse of discretion on the part of the judge and the
prosecutor in not rectifying the problem when the defendant requested appropriate action."
Conclusion
Since Lee went through two proceedings concerning the same occurrence,
and since jeopardy attached to both of those proceedings, the claim of double
jeopardy is properly presented. The question of whether the claim should be
upheld or not turns upon whether there was manifest necessity to dismiss and to
retry. The doctrine of manifest necessity would have supported the district court
judge's action had he taken that action when the manifest necessity first appeared: when Lee's counsel first moved for dismissal. Since he did not, a novel
question is now before the Supreme Court. Its decision ultimately rests on the
balance between society's need to bring criminals to justice and the criminal
defendant's right to undergo only one trial experience. In this unique situation,
the balance tips in favor the individual's rights, and the Seventh Circuit's decision
should be reversed.
Frederick R. Daniel

56
57

539 F.2d 613.
This is the basis of the argument presented by the petitioner Lee to the Supreme Court.

SELF-INCRIMINATION-PRIVILEGE

AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

PRECLUDES CONVICTION FOR MISPRISION OF A FELONY WHEN THE
DEFENDANTS ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY

INVOLVED IN THE CONCEALED CRIMINAL

CONDUCT

United States v. Kuh*
Introduction
A fundamental conflict often exists between the exercise of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the federal statutory prohibition
against concealment of information relating to felonies defined in the federal
Misprision Act.' While the governmental interest in compelling the reporting of
known felonies is clear, it is limited by the fifth amendment privilege which
affords protection against compulsory self-incrimination in the face of a possibility
of criminal penalty. The necessity for resolution of this basic conflict was
presented to the Seventh Circuit recently in United States v. Kuh.2 Specifically,
Kuh raised the question of whether the fifth amendment privilege may defeat
liability for misprision for failing to disclose information for fear of potential
liability under the federal Bank Robbery Act.' Recognizing the Government's
misinterpretation of the elements required to prove a violation of the federal
Bank Robbery Act, the Seventh Circuit found that, in light of genuine jeopardy,
the defendants' fifth amendment privilege precluded any conviction which might
result for misprision of a felony.
In reviewing this case, the Seventh Circuit enunciated its view on the correct scope to be afforded the fifth amendment privilege when its exercise
abrogates the affirmative disclosure requirements of the federal Misprision Act.
Although the constitutional problem arose from what appears to be a misunderstanding by the government of the elements of the underlying substantive offense,
the court's opinion is significant in that it reveals the Seventh Circuit's view on the
constitutionality of the Misprision Act as applied to criminal defendants involved
in prior criminal conduct.
This comment will examine the Seventh Circuit's view of the scope of the
fifth amendment privilege to determine whether this view is in accord with the
fifth amendment's underlying policy, as promulgated by the Supreme Court. In
so doing, this comment will maintain that the court's resolution of the conflict
between the fifth amendment and the misprision statute follows closely that
judicial precedent. However, it will be seen that the Seventh Circuit's refusal to
overrule its prior holding in United States v. Daddano,4 based on its conclusion
that the case is factually and legally distinguishable from Kuh, serves both to
-

1

541 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1976).
18 U.S.C. § 4 '(1970) reads as follows:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a
court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known

the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the
United States, shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more than three
years or both.

2
3
4

541 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1976).
18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970).
432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905 (1971).
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obfuscate its holding in the present case and to deny lower courts a clear and
precise test for future resolution of fifth amendment conflicts.
On July 11, 1975, an armored truck en route to the South Suburban Federal
Savings and Loan Association, located in Harvey, Illinois, was robbed of
$150,000. Subsequently, FBI agents arrested Irwin Berndt and Edward Howard
and charged them with the robbery. Some thirteen days later, the defendants,
James Kuh and Howard Rea, informed an FBI agent that $70,100 of the stolen
money had been buried near Monee, Illinois. Four days later, Kuh and Rea were
arrested on a complaint alleging that they had unlawfully and knowingly received
and concealed the money, knowing it to have been taken from a bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c).' While the facts given in the Seventh Circuit's
opinion do not make clear the extent of the defendants' involvement, if any, in
the actual theft, it appears both from the complaint and from later statements
by the prosecutor that the Government did not have sufficient proof to inculpate
the defendants as either aiders and abettors or accessories before the fact. Consequently, the Government proceeded to seek conviction under the provision for
unlawful receipt and concealment of the proceeds of a bank robbery.
In early September, a hearing was held on the complaint which resulted in
a finding of probable cause and a forwarding of the matter to the grand jury for
consideration. On October 28, 1975, the grand jury returned a two-count indictment. Count one of the indictment charged Berndt and Howard with bank
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b).' Count two of the indictment, however, charged defendants Kuh and Rea with misprision of a felony in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 4, in that, after learning of the felony, they possessed and concealed
a portion of the stolen money and did not, as soon as possible, disclose to federal
authorities their information regarding the bank robbery.' The decision by the
Government to seek conviction under § 4, rather than the receiving provision
of the federal Bank Robbery Act (18 U.S.C. § 2113(c)), was apparently the
result of the Government's conclusion that § 2113 (c) required proof of intent to
steal, which could not be established in Kuh or Rea's case.
Kuh and Rea subsequently filed a motion to quash the misprision count of
the indictment. During a hearing on the motion, the assistant U.S. attorney
trying the case stated, in response to a question from the district court as to the
nature of the Government's evidence, that he felt it was necessary for the Government to prove both the failure to disclose knowledge of the felony and the

5

6

7

18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) (1970) reads as follows:
Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of, any property
or money or other thing of value knowing the same to have been taken from a
bank, credit union, or a savings and loan association, in violation of subsection (b)
of this section shall be subject to the punishment provided in said subsection (b) for
the taker.
18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1970), in relevant part, reads as follows:
Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or
money or any other thing of value exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the care,
custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings
and loan association, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
10 years, or both. ...
541 F.2d at 674.
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concealment of the stolen money.' The district court accepted this in-court statement as a binding representation of both the Government's meaning in count
two and what it would attempt to prove under the count. Consequently, the
defendants contended that the burying of the money with knowledge of its
stolen nature amounts to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (c) which provides:
Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of, any
property or money or other thing of value knowing the same to have been
taken from a bank, credit union, or a savings and loan association, in violasubject to the punishment
tion of subsection (b) of this section shall be
provided in said subsection (b) for the taker. 9
On this basis, the defendants argued that their fifth amendment privilege relieved
them of any obligation to reveal information which might tend to show that they
had committed the crime. Accepting this argument, the district court dismissed
count two of the indictment.
The case reached the Seventh Circuit on an appeal by the Government under
18 U.S.C. § 3731. In an opinion by Judge Pell, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court dismissing the misprision count. The court noted,
however, that nothing in its opinion prevents the Government from prosecuting
the defendants under § 2113 (c).
The Elements of a § 2113(c) Offense
The action of the Government in seeking and obtaining indictments against
the defendants for misprision of a felony was the result of the prosecutor's misinterpretation of the interrelationship between subsections (b) and (c) of the
federal Bank Robbery Act. In addition to believing that the defendants' conduct
did not amount to "aiding and abetting" the prior robbery,'0 the Government
also concluded that the defendants were not liable for receiving the proceeds of
the robbery under § 2113 (c)." Relying on language in the Fourth Circuit case
of United States v. Harris,2 the Government contended that the words "in
violation of subsection (b)" as used in § 2113(c) required that the money be
concealed with intent to steal or purloin.' The Government, believing that the
defendants had no such intent, concluded that they were liable only for misprision and, therefore, could not claim a reasonable fear of incrimination. Thus,
the Government believed that the fifth amendment would not bar punishing the
defendants for failing to disclose their knowledge of the felony.
In order to invoke the fifth amendment privilege, a defendant must have a
reasonable fear that his communication may incriminate. 4 Whether the defendants in Kuh could have reasonably feared incrimination had they made the
communications sought by the misprision statute depends on an analysis of the
8 The government's attorney acknowledged that the indictment had made no mention of
the burying of the money; however, he stated a bill of particulars adding the fact of the burial
had been provided to the defense. Id.
9 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) (1970).
10 541 F.2d at 674.
11 Id. at 675.
12 346 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1965).
13 541 F.2d at 675.
14 Hoffman v. United States, 34-1 U.S. 479 (1950); Mason v. United States, 244 U.S.
362 (1917); 81 Am. JUR. 2d, Witnesses § 39 (1936).
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required elements of a violation of § 2113. Subsection (b) proscribes the taking
and carrying away, with the specific intent to steal or purloin, monies exceeding
$100 from any of the designated financial institutions." Subsection (c) proscribes the receiving or concealing of monies taken in violation of subsection (b),
knowing them to have been so taken.' Not clear from the language of the two
subsections, however, is the nature of the relationship, if any, between them.
In 1959, the Supreme Court addressed this question in Heflin v. United
States." There, the defendant had been charged with violations of both subsections (b) and (c) and, upon conviction of both counts, had been sentenced
to two consecutive terms of imprisonment. After reviewing the scant legislative
history surrounding § 2113 (c)," the Court, per Justice Douglas, struck down
the consecutive sentences, concluding that subsection (c) was inapplicable to the
defendant. The congressional intent underlying subsection (c), according to the
Court, is to reach a second group of wrongdoers, those receiving the loot, and
not to pyramid the offenses of the bank robbers themselves."
The Heflin decision was followed two years later by Milanovich v. United
0
States."
In that case, the Court again reviewed a conviction for both theft and
the receipt of the property allegedly stolen. Although in Milanovich the Court
dealt with a crime which was committed on a Naval base, and thus prohibited
under a different statute," it found no difference between the two statutes or
their legislative histories to justify differing interpretations."
The defendants in Milanovich, husband and wife, transported three others
to a Navy commissary under an arrangement whereby the three were to break
into the commissary safe. The defendants, who were to remain outside as both
getaway drivers and lookouts, departed before the three thieves returned from
the building. Upon their exit with the proceeds of the theft, the three thieves,
finding no getaway car, buried their loot and proceeded on foot. Approximately
three weeks later, the wife received part of the booty from the robbers.
The Supreme Court, in reviewing the wife's conviction for both the original
theft and the subsequent receiving, held that the conviction for receiving stolen
property could not stand. The Court concluded, over a dissent by Justice Frankfurter,23 that the fact that the taking and the receiving were distinct transactions,
both in time and place, would not distinguish the case from Heflin. 4 Furthermore, the fact that the wife was liable as a principal in the larceny only by way of
15 See note 6 supra.
16 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) (1970).
17 358 U.S. 415 (1959).
18 During that inquiry, the court referred to H.R. REP. No. 1668, 76th Cong., 2d Sess., 1,
which noted that the law prior to the adoption of subsection (c) did not proscribe as a
"separate substantive offense" the receiving or possessing of the Federal Bank Robbery Act.
19 358 U.S. at 420.
20 365 U.S. 551 (1961).
21 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1970).
22 365 U.S. at 554.
23 In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter argued that the common law doctrine of merger of
offenses as well as the commonsensical reason that a man who takes property does not at the
same time give himself the property he has taken forms the theoretical base for the Heflin
decision and that such concepts are inapplicable to transactions, such as were present in
Milanovich, which were neither coincidental nor contemporaneous. Id. at 559 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
24 365 U.S. at 554.
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accessorial liability would not serve to distinguish the two cases.25 Thus, the Heflin
and Milanovich decisions leave little doubt that convictions under §§ 2113(b)
and (c) are mutually exclusive.
With these cases as precedent, the Seventh Circuit turned to an analysis of
the Government's view of the required elements of a § 2113(c) violation. In
arguing that subsection (c) required concealment with the intent to steal or
purloin, the Government placed substantial reliance on Harris. In that case, the
Fourth Circuit reviewed a conviction for both stealing and knowingly receiving
the proceeds of the same robbery; a clear violation by the trial court of the
Heflin and Milanovich rules. In Harris,the court, noting that the indictment was
defective for failing to allege that the monies concealed had been taken originally
with the intent to steal, stated: "only possession and concealment of money taken
with that intent [i.e. the intent to steal or purloin] is criminal."2 It was this
language which the Government interpreted as requiring that the money be concealed with the intent to steal.
In response to this position, the Seventh Circuit correctly recognized that
the Harriscourt was merely holding that an indictment under § 2113(c) must
allege that a defendant has possessed and concealed money taken originally by
someone who had the requisite intent to steal or purloin.27 In support of its interpretation of Harris, the Seventh Circuit relied on language of the Supreme
Court in United States v. Gaddis.2" Gaddis was, however, primarily directed at
resolving conflicts among the circuits as to the proper appellate remedy for a
district judge's error in permitting convictions under both § § 2113 (b) and (c).
Insofar as it was relevant to the Government's contention in the present case, it
merely reaffirmed the doctrine already promulgated in both Heflin and Milanovich. Namely, that possession of the proceeds of a bank robbery in violation
of § 2113 (c) is not a lesser included offense of the robbery statute but is, rather,
intended to reach "those who receive the loot from the robber."29 In evaluating
the requirements of § 2113 (c), the Seventh Circuit determined that the Government's contention that the defendants could not reasonably fear conviction under
that statute was without merit. It was this determination which raised the conflict between the misprision statute and the fifth amendment privilege.
The Elements of Misprision and the Fifth Amendment Privilege
The Government's assumption, albeit faulty, that the defendants could
not be convicted of either a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) or of 18 U.S.C. §
3, punishing accessories after the fact," led to the conclusion that the misprision
25 Id.
26 346 F.2d at 184.
27 541 F.2d at 675.
28 96 S. Ct. 1023 (1976).
29 Id. at 1027.
30 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1970) states:
"Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been committed, receives,
relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or
punishment, is an accessory after the fact." The government apparently concluded that conviction under this section was precluded as the defendants did not receive the money in order to
hinder or prevent the apprehension of the robbers.
See generally Skelly v. United States, 76 F.2d 483 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 295 U.S. 757
(1934).
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statute could constitutionally be applied to the defendants. The validity of the
Government's argument that the defendants could not claim a reasonable fear of
incrimination under § 2113(c) disappeared with the Seventh Circuit's correct
interpretation of the requirements of that section.
However, in further support of its belief that the misprision statute was applicable, the Government argued that 18 U.S.C. § 4 does not purport to attach a
penalty to the mere failure to communicate knowledge of the commission of a
felony; rather, it also requires an affirmative act of concealment.31 Thus, the
Government contended that although the fifth amendment might proscribe the
attachment of criminal sanctions to the mere failure to disclose on the part of a
person fearing incrimination, the penalizing of failure to disclose, when coupled
with proof of an affirmative act of concealment, removes the statute from the
scope of the fifth amendment's protection.
While it is true that the federal courts, in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 4, have
held that the statute's conjunctive language, "[w]hoever . . .conceals and does

not disclose,"32 requires both an affirmative act of concealment and a failure to
disclose,3 3 there is no doubt that the statute seeks to compel communications of
a testimonial nature. It would seem that so long as the failure to disclose is an
essential element of the statute, and the required disclosure has a self-incriminating potential, the fifth amendment would prohibit conviction under that statute.
Nevertheless, in support of its conclusion that the added element of active concealment prevents the application of fifth amendment protection in the present
case, the Government cited the Seventh Circuit case of United States v. Daddano."4
In Daddano, several persons conspired to and robbed a Chicago bank.
Later, four members of the group were arrested for the robbery. While they were
in custody, one of the other members approached a bail bondsman, Montagna,
and provided him with a portion of the proceeds of the robbery so that he might
arrange bail for the four who were incarcerated. It was clear from the evidence
that Montagna knew that the money had come from the robbery.3" After arranging bail for the four, Montagna was again approached by members of the
group, who expressed concern that some among their midst might be divulging
information to the authorities. Consequently it was decided that, in an attempt to
locate the leak, all the members of the group would take a polygraph exam.3"
Montagna's involvement both in the planning of the polygraph exams and in
delivering their results was clearly shown by the evidence. Subsequently, Montagna and the other members of the group were arrested, tried and convicted for,
inter alia, misprision.
31 541 F.2d at 676.
32 See Lancy v. United States, 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922;
Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939); Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795
(10th Cir. 1934) ; United States v. Farrar, 38 F.2d 515 (lst Cir. 1930), aff'd, 281 U.S. 624
(1931).
33 See note 1 supra.
34 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905 (1971).
35 Id. at 1122.
36 It was stated in the state's evidence that anyone failing the tests would be "silenced."
The inference drawn from this evidence was that any member of the group could shoot the
one failing the test. Apparently, no one failed. Id.
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On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Montagna argued that the fifth amendment prohibited the application of the misprision statute to him. He contended
that if he had reported information about the bank robbery, he would have
reasonably feared that that information would lead to his own conviction, either
as an accessory after the fact or for having knowingly received part of the
proceeds of the robbery. In responding to this claim the Seventh Circuit stated:

We think the answer to this argument . . . is that the offense of misprision
as defined in 18 U.S.C. 4 consists of an act of concealment in addition to
failure to disclose. Thus the statute does not purport to punish one solely
for failure to report facts
which he has reasonable fear might lead to his
37
conviction of a crime.
It was this portion of the holding in Daddano on which the Government sought
to rest its argument that the defendants in Kuh could constitutionally be charged
with misprision despite their potential liability under § 2113 (c).
Distinguishing Daddano: Confusion by Clarification
In the present case, the Seventh Circuit, confronting the Government's
reliance on Daddano, concluded that the cases are factually and legally distinguishable. 8 While there can be no doubt that Daddano is factually distinguishable,39 the court's assertion that it represents a valid legal distinction may
well raise constitutional objections. The legal distinction found by the court appears premised on two different lines of reasoning. First, the Seventh Circuit
pointed out that in Daddano the affirmative act of concealment was the administering of the polygraph exams in a context obviously meant to stifle communications to the authorities. This, the court noted, amounted to a distinct and separate
act of concealment, not itself a part of the original offense. In contrast, the court
stated that the concealment in Kuh, while incidentally cloaking the felony, was
itself the violation of § 2113(c). The court thus appears to be stating that the
fifth amendment privilege will bar prosecution under the misprision statute only
when the act of concealment is itself a felony.
Second, the court observed that the Daddano indictment charged the defendant with misprision in concealing the original bank robbery by the administration of the polygraph exams. The defendant was not charged with the misprision of receiving and concealing part of the proceeds of the robbery. Thus,
the court stated that the rejection of the fifth amendment privilege in Daddano
centered on Montagna's fear of being convicted as an accessory after the fact
by arranging for the polygraphs. In this distinction, the court is apparently
holding that it is the nature of the affirmative act alleged in the indictment, and
not the self-incriminating potential of the sought-after communication, that will
control with respect to the claim of privilege under the fifth amendment. This
37 Id. at 1125.
38 541 F.2d at 677.
39 As the court noted in Daddano, and recounted in Kuh, the facts confronting the Daddano court were undeniably unique.
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is borne out by the fact that in Daddano both the misprision by polygraph, and
the misprision by receipt of the stolen money, involve, as an essential element
of proof, the failure to disclose identical information regarding the same bank
robbery.
Both of these premises seem to ignore the similarity, for purposes of constitutional analysis, between the self-incriminating potential of the sought-after
communications in each case. In both Daddano and the instant case, at the time
the duty to disclose arose, the defendants were involved in and could reasonably
apprehend that their information would lead to liability for criminal conduct.
While the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the rejection of the privilege in
Daddano took place in the context of Montagna's fear of conviction as an accessory after the fact, it is unlikely that the fear of accessorial liability related to
his prior receipt of the stolen money. Instead, in rejecting Montagna's claim, the
court appears to have focused only on his fear of accessorial liability by reason
of administering the polygraphs. Thus, it appeared to the court that Montagna
was claiming the fifth amendment privilege because his act of concealment (the
polygraphs) also amounted to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3. In other words, the
Daddano court refused to accord the privilege to a defendant who claimed a fear
of being incriminated under a different statute (18 U.S.C. § 3) for those very
same acts of concealment alleged in the misprision indictment. The confusion
surrounding the court's attempt to distinguish the case from Kuh is that, even
under the court's own analysis, Kuh and Rea's claim of privilege based on a fear
of incrimination under a different statute (18 U.S.C. § 2113(c)) for the same
acts of concealment alleged in the misprision indictment was upheld.4"
Thus, the constitutional problems flowing from the Daddano holding, as well
as from the Seventh Circuit's present effort to distinguish that case, remain unresolved. By focusing so narrowly on Montagna's involvement with the polygraphs, the Daddano court failed to recognize that the information he did not
disclose would have, if disclosed, provided the Government with substantial
assistance in prosecuting him for a crime committed prior to, or simultaneously
with, his acquisition of that very information. The court's holding in Daddano,
even if viewed only as establishing liability for misprision for a separate act of
concealment committed after the acquisition of information regarding the felony,
would seem constitutionally suspect as it ignores the fact that liability for this later
misprision still involves punishment for failure to disclose incriminating information. This calls into question the Seventh Circuit's view as to the scope of the fifth
amendment privilege.
In the present case, the Seventh Circuit began its examination by inquiring
into the incriminating potential of the sought-after communication. The Seventh
Circuit correctly realized that, before communications come within the protection of the fifth amendment, there must be a showing that the danger of incrimination is both real and appreciable in the course of the ordinary operation
of law. 1 In the present case, the failure to communicate information which the
Government is seeking is, under the correct interpretation of § 2113 (c), sufficient
40
41

541 F.2d at 677.
See note 14 supra.
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to convict on that charge. Whether proof of the added element of an affirmative
act of concealment would have sustained a conviction under either 18 U.S.C. §
3 or § 2113(c), the fact remains that the communication sought by 18 U.S.C. §
4 would have subjected the defendants, Kuh and Rea, to a real, appreciable
danger of conviction for criminal conduct engaged in prior to or simultaneous
with their acquisition of knowledge of the felony. This is no less true in Daddano.
In Hoffman v. United States,4' the Supreme Court stated that the fifth amendment privilege extends not only to answers that would in themselves support a
conviction under a criminal statute, but also to those which would furnish a link
in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a crime."' In
Daddano, as in the instant case, the defendants clearly had reason to apprehend
that the sought-after communications would provide such a link.
If the Seventh Circuit, by distinguishing Daddano, intends to differentiate
between cases, such as the present one, in which the affirmative act of concealment alleged in the indictment is itself a criminal act which only incidentally
intended to conceal, and cases, such as Daddano, in which the act of concealment is distinct from the concealed crime and is done for the sole purpose of concealment, it is not supported by either the fifth amendment or its interpretive case
law. If, however, by distinguishing Daddano, the Seventh Circuit intends to
differentiate between cases in which the defendant, by complying with the disclosure requirements of the misprision statute, would incriminate himself with
respect to criminal conduct engaged in prior to or simultaneously with his acquisition of knowledge of the felony; and cases in which the defendant's only fear of
incrimination relates to conduct engaged in after his acquisition of knowledge of
the felony, then it is in accord with the fifth amendment, which does not protect
against communications regarding future offenses." The problem with this interpretation of the Daddano distinction, however, is that Daddano is an
instance in which the defendant was involved in criminal conduct prior to or
simultaneously with his acquisition of the information he failed to report; this
involvement would have been revealed had he complied with the requirement of
the statute to disclose that same information to the Government.
Attaching the possibility of criminal liability to the failure to communicate
information regarding criminal conduct to the Government will, regardless of
whatever other elements may be required to sustain a conviction, run afoul of
the fifth amendment whenever the sought-after communication has a self-incriminating potential at the time the duty to disclose arises. The Seventh
Circuit itself noted in the present case that it is difficult to understand how a
criminal conviction could be substantiated when the duty to notify authorities
is precluded by constitutional privilege.45
Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Kuh, correctly delineated the re42 341 U.S. 479 (1950).
43 Malloy v. Hogan, 375 U.S. 1 (1963).
44 See United States v. Prior, 381 F. Supp. 870 (D. Fla. 1974); 21 AM. JuR. 2d,
Criminal Law § 353 (1970).
45 541 F.2d at 677.
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quirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (c) and applied them to the defendants' claim of
fifth amendment privilege. The court recognized and resolved the conflict
between the duty to disclose under 18 U.S.C. § 4 and the privilege against selfincrimination. In affirming the lower court's dismissal of the misprision count,
the Seventh Circuit afforded protection to the constitutional rights of the defendants while recognizing that nothing in its opinion restricts the Government
from prosecuting the defendants under a correct interpretation of § 2113 (c).
However, the court's attempt to distinguish Daddano leaves in doubt
whether it intends to perpetuate the more limited scope of privilege in misprision
cases promulgated there. Additionally, the near identical requirements of 18
U.S.C. § 4, interpreted as requiring an affirmative act of concealment, and 18
U.S.C. § 3, penalizing accessories after the fact, when coupled with Montagna's
fear of incrimination under § 3, calls into question whether the Daddano court
misinterpreted their single distinguishing element, the failure to disclose. The
court may thus have failed to accord correct deference to the fifth amendment
privilege in the face of a statutory duty to disclose information which may be
incriminating."
In evaluating the scope of the fifth amendment privilege vis-a-vis misprision,
it should make little difference whether the act of concealment is separate and
distinct from the concealed felony or is itself the essence of the defendant's felony.
To dismiss a claim of privilege in the former case, and sustain it in the latter, is
to create an artificial distinction not inherent in the fifth amendment. It would
appear that the only correct distinction is between cases in which disclosure, at
the time the defendant acquired information concerning the felony, would incriminate him and those in which it would not. Both Daddano and Kuh fall
into the earlier category. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's refusal to overrule Daddano
leaves in doubt the scope of its holding in the present case as there appear to be
no constitutionally significant grounds for distinguishing the two cases.
Michael Craig Donovan

46 Of course, it is necessary that there be an element of compulsion before the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination will apply. In the instant case that compulsion is apparent on the face of the statute, as it purports to attach a penalty to the failure to disclose.
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1973); Hofstra v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
Indeed, just such considerations have led the drafters of both the Model Penal Code and
the federal Comprehensive Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975 to eliminate the offense of
misprision altogether and rely only on the general accessory and obstruction of justice offenses.
See Model Penal Code § 208.32A, commentary (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); REPORT OF TI-E
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY TO ACCOMPANY S. 1, S. Doc. No. 94-00, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
326 '(1976).

II. Federal Procedure
CIVIL PROCEDURE--RULE
RULE-APPEALABILITY

23-CLASS ACTIONS-THE FINAL JUDGMENT
OF

CLASS ACTION

DETERMINATIONS

Weit v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.*
Anschul v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc.**
The appealability of district court interlocutory orders granting or denying
class action status is an area of considerable complexity and controversy. The
accepted rule has been that these interlocutory orders cannot be reviewed on
appeal until after the litigation has proceeded to final judgment in the lower
court.' Weit v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co! and
Anschul v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc.' adhere to this traditional rule, but raise significant questions concerning matters of judicial economy. The specific questions
posed are whether the policies of the final judgment rule are well served in
complex, lengthy class actions by denying immediate review of interlocutory class
determination orders and whether their denial increases the potential of relitigation and jeopardizes the rights of parties and non-parties. These issues will be
examined in the context of these two recent Seventh Circuit decisions which
explored statutory and judicial exceptions to the final judgment rule and the
rationale supporting their use.
Weit v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.
Jack Weit and two other credit cardholders brought an antitrust class action
against five Chicago banks and the Midwest Bank Card System alleging violations of the Sherman Act. Counts I and II of the complaint charged that defendant banks had conspired to fix the interest rate charged to cardholders.
Moreover, counts III and IV alleged that defendant banks had conspired with
correspondent banks to fix the interest rate charged cardholders. Finally, counts
V and VI claimed that defendant banks had conspired with their correspondent
banks to fix the discount charged to merchants, thereby raising the price of the
merchant goods sold to the cardholders. Plaintiffs sought treble damages, totaling
more than three billion dollars, and an injunction to require all cardholder
interest rates and merchant discount rates to be renegotiated on an individual
basis. The district court granted plaintiff class status for counts I-IV, but denied
plaintiff class status for counts V and VI. The court also denied plaintiffs' motion
to certify a defendant class for counts I-IV.' Plaintiffs appealed both orders. A
third order prescribing the method for "notifying the plaintiff class was also ap535 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1976).
544 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1976).
1 Traditionally, interlocutory class determination orders-the district court's ruling on
whether litigation will proceed as a class action or individual action-are denied access to
appellate review at the initial or intermediate stages of the proceedngs.
2 535 F.2d 1010 (7thCir. 1976).
3 544 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
4 Plaintiffs sought to have a defendant class certified apparently to broaden the scope of
available injunctive relief.
*

**
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pealed and later consolidated with plaintiffs' two former appeals.5 Defendant
moved to dismiss the appeals for want of appellate jurisdiction. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted defendants' motion on the grounds that
none of the orders qualified for appellate review under the final judgment rule.
Anschul v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc.
Simon Anschul, a passenger aboard one of defendant's cruises, sought to
bring a class action on behalf of himself and all other passengers. The action was
initiated to recover: (a) the difference between the price of the cruise as advertised and the actual cruise (which was curtailed due to the fuel crisis); or,
(b) the amount by which defendant was unjustly enriched. Plaintiff appealed
the district court's denial of class status. The Seventh Circuit held that it lacked
jurisdiction to review the appeal because the order did not qualify as a final
decision.
The Final Judgment Rule
At common law a rule developed that appeals could be taken only from a
final judgment; this rule has since been codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.6 The
underlying purpose of this rule is that: Finality as a condition of review is an
historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure [to forbid] piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a single controversy.'
Consistently, courts have held that orders granting or denying class action
status are not final within the meaning of § 1291.' Such orders do not dispose
of the litigation; are primarily procedural in nature; and are subject to review
after final adjudication on the merits.9 Several exceptions to the final judgment
rule of § 1291, however, have been established and may be applicable in a class
action context.
Statutory Exceptions: Application to Weit and Anschul
1. Appealability Under § 1292 (a) (1)
The plaintiff in Weit sought to bring the appeal of the two orders denying
class certification within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a) (1) which provides:
The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts.. ., or of the judges thereof, granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions ....
5 FaD. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) requires that "the court shall direct to the members of the
class the best notice practicable . . . , including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort."
6 "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States . . . , except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
7 Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940).
8 See Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094, 1097 (2d Cir. 1974).
9 Williams v. Mumford, 511 F.2d 363, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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This method for obtaining immediate appellate review of interlocutory orders is
available only when injunctive relief is sought. Since the Anschul plaintiff was
seeking solely monetary damages, the class action order was not reviewable under
this section.
By contrast, the Weit plaintiffs sought both monetary damages and injunctive relief. They argued that the district court's class action orders narrowed
the scope of injunctive relief sought in their complaint, thereby bringing the
order within § 1292(a) (1). This argument had been successful in several civil
.rights cases where broad injunctive relief was sought to curtail discriminatory or
abusive practices.' For example, plaintiffs in Brunson v. Board of Trustees"
alleged that dual, bi-racial school systems were being concurrently maintained by
the defendant school board. The plaintiffs requested broad injunctive relief,
including a reorganization of the school system. The lower court's order
denied certification of a plaintiff class. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that
this order was immediately reviewable under § 1292 (a) (1) because it effectively
limited the scope of injunctive relief. 2 The injunctive relief obtainable from
continuing the litigation would require the admission of only the named plaintiff
(and not necessarily the other students in plaintiff's class) to the school of his
choice." Since a reorganization of the school could not be accomplished through
individual actions, the court concluded that the requested injunctive relief had
been effectively curtailed by denying certification of a plaintiff class.
In Williams v. Mumford, 4 the District of Columbia Circuit criticized the
Brunson holding as an "unwarranted expansion of the statutory language."' 5
Williams involved an action for alleged discrimination in the employment
practices of the Library of Congress brought by two black employees on behalf
of themselves and other blacks employed by the Library. The District of
Columbia Circuit rejected the Brunson premise: that refusal to grant class status
was a modification or refusal to issue an injunction since the order eventually
would affect the scope of equitable relief." According to this court, refusal to
grant class status was "neither issuance nor denial of an injunction."'" Clearly,
the court was reluctant to extend a statute which it perceived as a limited exception to the final judgment rule.'
Both Brunson and Williams confirm that an interlocutory order denying
class status might restrict the relief available at a later stage of the proceeding.
Williams, however, would restrict appeals under § 1292 (a) (1) to orders directly
impinging issuance of injunctions, apparently assuming that any restriction on
injunctive relief caused by dismissing the class action order may be adequately
remedied by appealing the class action determination after final judgment.
The Weit court was confronted with a situation which, though analogous
10 The court determined that this argument should not be extended to antitrust litigation.
Rationale in support of this conclusion, however, was not proffered by the court.
11 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962) (per curiam), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 933 (1963).
12 Id. at 108-09.
13
14
15
16
17
18

Id. at 108.
511 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Id. at 369.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 370.
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to Williams and Brunson, was more complex because two orders were involved.
The first order denied a defendant class for counts I-IV. 9 The second order
The questions raised were: (1)
denied a plaintiff class for counts V-VI.
whether an injunction against the named defendants would act as an injunction
against the entire defendant class; and, (2) whether an injunction inuring to
the benefit of a single plaintiff would adequately protect the entire plaintiff class.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that any injunctive relief "would, for all practical
purposes"" result in the elimination of the enjoined practices for each of the
banks involved; and that an injunction in favor of one plaintiff would provide
"as a practical matter"2 2 adequate relief to the entire class.23
The majority's conclusion appears sound. Changes in policies or regulations
imposed on one bank would certainly have a similar impact upon its correspondents. Policy changes necessitated by dealing with one customer also would flow
to the benefit of other customers or credit cardholders. Further, the apparent restriction on injunctive relief could be remedied by appealing the class determination order after final judgment. Giving the requirements of § 1292 (a) (1) a
practical construction, it appears that the majority's action in denying the order
was correct at least within the limits of § 1292(a) (1 ).
2. Appealability Under § 1292 (b)
The orders sought to be appealed in Anschul and Weit were not certified
for appellate review by the district judge. The Anschul court, perhaps seeking to
mollify the harshness of its refusal to hear plaintiff's appeal, does discuss the
possibility of review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 4 Under § 1292(b), the
district judge can certify interlocutory orders for appellate review when there
is: (1) a controlling question of law; (2) substantial grounds for difference of
opinion; and (3) when acceleration of the litigation would result from an immediate appeal. This approved method ensures that parties are not prejudiced
in those areas where the law is uncertain and when an immediate review of an
interlocutory order would expedite rather than delay the litigation.
Since the appellate court retains discretion to deny review for certifications
improvidently granted or if the appellate docket is overcrowded,25 § 1292(b) is
an appropriate device for obtaining appeals from interlocutory orders. The
potential for inundation of the appellate docket is effectively negated by this
appellate right of refusal. Generally, the Seventh Circuit has encouraged the
19 535 F.2d at 1012.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1013.
22 Id.
23 The Weit dissent was troubled by the "vague and uncertain" measure which the majority had employed-the "practical" criterion-in reaching its decision. Id. at 1015 (Swygert,
J., dissenting).
24 "When a district judge, in making . . . an order not otherwise appealable under this
section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so
state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
an appeal ....
25 Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 754 (3d, Cir. 1974).
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use of such certifications." Apparently, this is in recognition of the fact that
there is a definite need to review interlocutory class action orders under certain
circumstances. Of course the district judge may decide not to grant the aggrieved
party's request for certification27 since certification of interlocutory orders for
appellate review under § 1292(b) is within the discretion of the district judge.
This illustrates one of § 1292(b)'s inherent limitations: the appellate court cannot of its own accord issue the certification, but must select another jurisdictional
basis (another statutory or a judicial exception) 2" to review meritorious appeals
from orders which the district judge has refused to certify.
3. Appealability Under the All Writs Act
The Anschul court embraces the position that a writ of mandamus may be
utilized for any arbitrary refusal by the district court to certify an order for
appeal under § 1292(b).29 However, this contention is not well supported by
existing case law. Historically, the courts have circumscribed carefully the role of
the great writs. Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled that such writs may not be
used "merely as a substitute for the appeal procedure,""0 nor to "thwart the
Congressional policy against piecemeal appeals."'" In light of this view, the
Second Circuit has stated: "Mandamus does not lie to review mere error ...but
only to redress a clear-cut abuse of discretion."32 The character of the writ is
then "drastic and extraordinary";33 there must be "a dear showing of abuse of
discretion..., and the right to such relief must appear clear and undisputable."'3 4
Thus, there is obvious judicial hesitancy to employ mandamus in a class
action context even when the lower court's performance is undeniably question3
able. InterpaceCorp. v. City of Philadelphia
' concerned an order by the district
court allowing nine antitrust actions against the defendant corporation to be
maintained as class actions. Defendant sought a writ of mandamus that would
have compelled the district court to vacate the class action order. Defendant
argued that plaintiff did not meet the necessary prerequisites for a class action
under FED. R. Crv. P. 23." Moreover, the defendant contended that the district
court was required to state the findings which supported its order granting class
status. Upon appeal, the Third Circuit ruled that a district court is not required
to articulate its findings regarding the certification or denial of class action
status." The court, however, did not indicate how the propriety of class action
26 See King v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 1259
Thill Sec. Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 469 F.2d 14 (7th Cir.
April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1975).
27 See, e.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. LeMay, 448 F.2d
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1001 (1971).
28 For example, § 1292(a) (1), the Cohen doctrine or the

(7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam);
1972); See also Parkinson v.
1341 (7th Cir.)

(per curiam)

death knell doctrine discussed

infra.

29
30
31
32
33
34
35

36
37

544 F.2d at 1369.
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
Id. at 30.
A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster Bros., Inc., 365 F.2d 439, 445 (2d. Cir. 1966).
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Ritter, 371 F.2d 145, 146 (10th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 146-47.
438 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1971).
Id. at 404.
The Interpace majority added the caveat that it was desirable to articulate these find-

ings. The dissenting opinion asserts that it is mandatory.
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determinations could be adequately reviewed on appeal if the requisite findings
for making such a determination remain unstated by the lower court.
Clearly, a writ of mandamus cannot be relied upon to resolve abuses of
discretion in failing to certify an interlocutory order for appellate review under §
1292 (b). Since certification is purely ivithin the discretion of the district judge,
it is effectively insulated from appellate scrutiny. Until district judges become
inclined to find controlling questions more as a matter of course, § 1292(b)
represents an attractive but limited form of obtaining review. By itself, it is not
sufficient to guarantee adequate review of meritorious appeals.
Since the class determination orders sought to be appealed in Anschul 8 and
Weit could not be reviewed under statutory exceptions to the final judgment rule,
it is necessary to examine whether such orders fall within the scope of recognized
judicial exceptions.
JudicialExceptions: Application to Weit and Anschul
1. The Cohen Doctrine
The Weit and Anschul plaintiffs sought to bring their appeals within the
ambit of the Cohen doctrine. 9 The Cohen or "collateral order doctrine" was
forged by the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp.40 The Cohen
plaintiff brought a stockholders derivative action against defendant corporation.
Defendant's motion, which would have required plaintiff to post security for
litigation expenses in the event plaintiff did not prevail, was denied by the district
court. The district court order however, did not comply with a state statute
expressly requiring the posting of such security upon commencement of the suit.
Defendant was denied, therefore, the benefit of the legislation. The Supreme
Court determined that this decision:
[A]ppears to fall in that small class which finally determine claims of right
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important
to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require 41that
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.
The Court added that it had long given the final judgment provision a "practical
rather than a technical construction."' 42' The Cohen order was appealable as a
"final disposition of a claimed right which is not an ingredient of the cause of
action . . .. " The Cohen doctrine is applicable, therefore, if an order affects
rights: (1) collateral to the cause of action; (2) too important to be denied
review; and, (3) too independent to be adequately reviewed and corrected after
final judgment.
The Anschul court examined this doctrine and the order denying plaintiff
38 It is unclear from the opinion whether the Anschul plaintiff requested a § 1292(b)
certification. If requested, the district judge denied it. The court merely states that it cannot
consider plaintiff's claim "since it was not raised under § 1292(b)." 544 F.2d at 1369.

39 The Anschul appeal concerned the refusal to grant class status; the Weit appeal

requested relief from the order specifying the method of notifying the plaintiff class.
40 -337 U.S. 541 (1949).

41 Id. at 546.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 546-47.
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class certification in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin." The Eisen plaintiff had brought a class action on behalf
of himself and all other odd-lot traders on the New York Stock Exchange alleging
violations of the antitrust and security laws. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that
the order in Cohen had been appealable on two grounds: (1) the finding was
not "tentative, informal, or incomplete"; and, (2) the decision was not a "step
toward final disposition of the merits of the case."45 Rather, the Court concluded
that Cohen concerned a collateral matter not reviewable on appeal from final
judgment. The order central to the Eisen appeal would have imposed 90% of
the costs involved in notifying the plaintiff class upon the defendant. The notification order appeared final since it would have been difficult for the corporate
defendant to obtain reimbursement from the individual plaintiff for the substantial notification costs after final judgment. Moreover, the notification order
was not part of the cause of action and did not affect the merits. Therefore, the
notification order was appealable under the Cohen exception.
The Anschul court rejected plaintiff's attempt to fit the class action order
within the Cohen exception.4" The Seventh Circuit noted that there was no
question of notice cost as in Eisen; thus the class certification decision was reviewable only after final judgment. The court, however, did not discuss the Cohen
doctrine's other viable ingredients-whether the decision constituted a "step
toward final disposition of the merits" or was not "tentative, informal or incomplete"-enunciated in Cohen and reaffirmed in Eisen. Technically, the class
action order is a tentative and informal order because it is subject to change
at the discretion of the district judge. As a practical matter, however, the
defendant may not have the luxury of treating an order certifying a plaintiff
class as tentative. Rather, he must mount a defense sufficient to protect himself
from liability to a class even though it may later be decertified. The named
plaintiff, as in Anschul, cannot accrue substantial expenses on the assumption
that a "class" denied status may later reappear to help absorb litigation costs.
Parties in such situations must treat the orders as final, rather than tentative, to
adequately protect their rights.
Clearly, the class determination order in Anschul was also "collateral" and
"not an ingredient of the cause of action." The pivotal issue is whether it would
be reviewable after final judgment. Even assuming that a plaintiff would pursue
the action, an appellate court may be unwilling to inject additional parties into
the litigation after final judgment.47
44 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) [Eisen IV].
45 Id. at 171.
46 The original reviewing panel voted 2-1 to hear the appeal, a decision that would have
reversed the Seventh Circuit's historical position. The opinion was circulated to all active
members of the court however, who voted against allowing review of the appeal.
47 Herbst v. International Tel. and Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir. 1974). "Candor
compels us to add that as appellate judges we would be reluctant to hold that a class action
had been improper after the district court and the parties had expended much time and
resources although we might have had serious doubts if we had, reviewed the question at the
inception of the action." Id. at 1313. This heretofore unstated policy and the related policy
encouraging appellate courts to withhold jurisdiction on interlocutory appeals (because
most class actions will be settled before final judgment) are unacceptable in terms of giving
Rule 23 its full effect. The end result of such policies would be to effectively deny any appeal
from the orders by insulating them from appellate scrutiny. Those corporate defendants forced
to settle spurious claims because of prohibitive litigation costs would be especially hard hit.
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The doctrine of "irreparable harm" also emerged from the Cohen opinion
and should have been considered by the Anschul court. The Cohen court reasoned
that by the time a case had been finally adjudicated it might be "too late effectively to review the present order, and the rights conferred by the statute..., will
have been lost, probably irreparably." 4 Since the Anschul plaintiff probably
could not maintain the litigation by himself, the order denying class status effectively would prevent both Anschul and the absent members of the class from
having their day in court. Both, therefore, would be left without an effective
remedy; the irreparable harm that would result is unavoidably apparent.
Generally, the restrictive interpretation the Anschul court imposed on the
Cohen doctrine comports with the treatment it receives in the other circuits. 9
The concern has been that an overly liberal use of the doctrine will greatly increase the number of appeals from interlocutory orders.5" The limiting phrase
"small class" that originally appeared in Cohen and.subsequently was approved
in Eisen, has stayed courts from drifting toward a more liberal application of that
doctrine. Today, the several hundred class actions pending in many of the
circuits illustrate that a wider application of the doctrine to review class determination orders would violate the restricted use apparently contemplated by the
Cohen court. Thus, although the denial of class action status in Anschul showed
substantial promise of irreparable harm, the Cohen doctrine was not misapplied
within its own self-restricting perimeter.
One of the three Weit orders did concern a question of notice as with Eisen.
The Weit dissent pressed for broad appealability arguing that defects in the form
and content of the notice could not be rectified after final judgment. The
plaintiff's primary concern, however, apparently was the increased cost that
would result from the use of the notice system adopted by the court."1 Unlike
Eisen, such a cost differential would be recoverable from the corporate defendants
after final judgment, thereby not prejudicing plaintiffs unduly. The majority
correctly notes that if this appeal were not refused, all such orders specifying the
form and content of notice would be appealable. In many instances, this would
severely undermine the policy of the final judgment rule without providing a
significant benefit to the parties. The majority's denial of appealability in Weit
appears proper; the order by itself is not of sufficient stature or import to the
parties to override the final judgment rule.
2. The Death Knell Doctrine
The Anschul plaintiff's personal claim against defendant seemingly was of
an amount that would have brought the case under the "death knell" doctrine
48 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
49 See, e.g., Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1972). "[W]e have
not been overly hospitable to requests for its [the collateral order doctrines] extension." Id.
at 621.
50 See, e.g., Weight Watchers of Phil., Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l., Inc., 455 F.2d
770 (2d 'Cir. 1972). "We have often indicated that Cohen must be kept within narrow
bounds, lest this exception swallow the salutary 'final judgment' rule." Id. at 773.
51 "[Plaintiff's proposal] would have greatly reduced the costs of notice to the plaintiffs."
535 F.2d at 1014.
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within the Second Circuit." The death knell doctrine is another judicial exception to the final judgment rule which transforms interlocutory orders denying
class status into final and appealable orders. This doctrine, which first emerged
in Eisen, 3 applies to those situations in which the plaintiff would be unlikely to
bear litigation expenses by himself because of the diminutive size of his own
claim.
The Eisen plaintiff, who had a personal claim of only $70, brought a class
action for damages resulting from defendant brokerage firm's alleged violations
of the antitrust and securities laws. In considering an appeal from the order
denying class status, the Second Circuit noted the amount of plaintiffs claim and
concluded that no reasonable lawyer would undertake this complex and costly
case to recover $70:
Dismissal of the class action . . . will irreparably harm Eisen and all others
similarly situated [and would] for all practical purposes terminate the litigation. Where the effect of a district court's order,
if not reviewed, is the death
54
knell of the action, review should be allowed.
Clearly, the touchstone for the doctrine has been the amount of plaintiff's
claim, although the complexity and probable expense of the litigation may also
be relevant.55 For example, the doctrine has not been applied when plaintiff's
claim was $150,000,56 $8,500," z or even as low as $7,482,58 based on the rationale
that any plaintiff with a claim approaching the $10,000 jurisdictional minimum
would have sufficient reason to continue the litigation.59 One thousand dollars
or less apparently represents that amount under which plaintiffs generally would
not press forward.6"
Despite its superficial appeal, the death knell doctrine has not been widely
applied outside of the Second Circuit.6' Although it has been considered in class
action litigation within the Second,62 Fifth, 2 Ninth, 4 and District of Columbia
Circuits, 5 the Third 6 and Seventh" Circuits have rejected it outright.
The Anschul court elected to follow its own line of Seventh Circuit decisions
denying effect to the doctrine. The court, concerned with erosion of the final
52 The amount of plaintiff's claim is not given. It can be inferred, however, from the
nature of the alleged damages and the court's discussion of the death knell doctrine, that
plaintiff's individual claim was nominal in amount. The death knell doctrine is considered for
application only when the plaintiff's claim is small in size, e.g., less than $1000.
53 370 F.2d 119 (2dCir. 1966) [Eisen I], cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
54 Id. at 121.
55 See Graci v. United States, 472 F.2d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1973).
56 Caceres v. International Air Transp. Ass'n., 422 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1970).
57 Milberg v. Western Pac. R. R. Co., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971). Husband and wife
had a combined claim of $8500.
58 Shayne v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 491 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1974).
59 Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971).
60 Green v. Wolf 'Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
61 But see Miller v. Mackey Int'l., Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427 n.3 (5th Cir. 1971).
62 City of N.Y. v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969);
The Korn, Milberg, Caceres, Green and Shayne decisions also involved a determination con-

cerning the applicability of the death knell doctrine.
63

64
65
66
67

See note 61 supra.

Weingartner v. Union Oil Co., 431 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1970).
Williams v. Mumford, 511 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1972).
King v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1973).
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judgment rule, echoed the criticisms of other circuits in supporting its rejection.
The opposition to the doctrine is illustrated by Hackett v. General Host Corp.,"8
a case originating in the Third Circuit. The Hackett plaintiff, who had an individual claim of only nine dollars, sought to recover damages from an alleged
price fixing conspiracy involving a group of bakers. The district court refused
to certify a potential plaintiff class of some six million consumers. In affirming
this decision, the Hackett court rejected the death knell doctrine and attacked
its basic premise that counsel for individual plaintiffs will not continue costly and
protracted litigation to recover negligible amounts.
If the public interest issue . . .is so insignificant that neither a private nor
a public attorney deems it worthy of pursuit, despite the . . . award of
attorney's fees in the event of success . . . then the public interest issue may

well be so insignificant that the redress of a nine-dollar wrong should ...
be left to the realm of private ordering., 9
The decision clearly reflects the Third Circuit's opposition to any breach of the
final judgment rule. A more valid criticism of this doctrine is that it discriminates
against appeals by defendants, or plaintiffs with claims approaching the $10,000
jurisdictional threshold."0
The unpopular character of the death knell doctrine and the restrictions of
Cohen signal the necessity of identifying alternative means for securing immediate
review to protect party and non-party rights in future cases similar to Anschul.
Since "the need for review of class action orders turns on the facts of a particular
case,"" the balancing of interests long advocated by the Supreme Court"2 may
supply the courts with a practical, non-mechanical means of reviewing meritorious appeals from class orders.
Judicial Economy v. Rights of Parties and Non-Parties
1. Judicial Economy
The primary function of the final judgment rule is to promote judicial
economy by denying immediate review to orders that may be reviewed effectively
68 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1972).
69 Id. at 625-26.
70 See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d 'Cir.1971) (Friendly, J., concurring). In an attempt to mute this criticism, the Second Circuit unveiled the "three-pronged
test," a new approach designed to assist in evaluating the appealability of orders granting
class status. The test was developed in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1007 n.1
(2d Cir. 1973) [Eisen III], and applied in Herbst v. International Tel. and Tel. Corp., 495
F.2d 1308 (2d 'Cir. 1974): (1) whether the class action determination is "fundamental to the
further conduct of the case," (2) whether review of that order is "separable from the merits,"
(3) whether that order will cause "irreparable harm to the defendant in terms of time and
money spent in defending a huge class action." Id. at 1312. In subsequent cases, including
Parkinson, and Kohn, the Second Circuit has demonstrated a reluctance to employ either this
new formula or the death knell in reviewing the interlocutory orders. Parkinson in particular
has stressed that the newly created three-pronged test should be given a narrow construction.
Id. at 658. The concurring opinion advocated abandoning the death knell and the threepronged test in favor of reversion to the use of § 1292(b). Id. at 660 (Friendly, J.,concurring).
71 520 F.2d 650, 660 (2d Cir. 1975).
72 See, e.g., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964); Dickinson v.
Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950).
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after final judgment. Some opinions at the appellate level have focused exclusively on the need for reducing appellate workload. The burden on the district
courts also should be assessed.73 Actions that would have been settled, had class
action status not been improperly granted, exemplify the resource waste preventable through timely review of class determination orders. Recently, the view has
been expressed that "immediate review of orders authorizing class actions will aid
the district courts in disposing of these cases and promote the sound administration of justice."7
Moreover, appellate courts should not overlook their level of involvement in
ruling on the question of appealability. Both the Weit and Anschul courts must
have expended considerable resources in familiarizing themselves with the facts
of these cases and the law applicable to them, and in drafting opinions which
accurately reflected their views concerning the appealability of the orders in
question. Obviously, this involvement can sap appellate resources and undermine
the efficiency which the rule was designed to promote. Years later, the Weit and
Anschul courts may once again have to expend considerable effort to reach that
point where the propriety of the original class determination orders may finally

be reviewed. The fact that the courts may have attained this same vantage
years earlier illustrates the duplication of effort that may accompany negative
rulings on appealability. If the merits of the appeal cannot be reached after the
court has agonized over the threshold question, the court's adherence to the rule
seems merely to invoke an illusion of economy.
The potential for relitigation, resulting from improvident class action determinations, is a significant countervailing force to the policy prohibiting immediate review. If the plaintiff class is wrongfully excluded and the named
plaintiff prevails on the merits, the defendant may be collaterally estopped from
denying liability to all absent members of the class." This would increase the
defendant's liability multifold without a commensurate opportunity to defend.7"
The alternative approach of relitigation would involve considerable waste of the
parties' and court's resources. Considering (a) the potential for relitigation,
(b) the desirability of facilitating judicial proceedings in the district court, and,
(c) the illusion of efficiency resulting from the appellate court's initial involvement in resolving the jurisdictional question, adherence to the final judgment rule
may not yield the efficiency in complex multiple party suits that was obtainable
at common law.
2. Rights of Parties and Non-Parties
Present statutory exceptions to the final judgment rule are limited in their
73 544 F.2d at 1370-71 (Swygert, J. and Bauer, J., dissenting).
74 495 F.2d 1308, 1312 (2d Cir. 1974).
75 See Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. & D. Nev. 1962), aff'd sub nom., United Air Lines,
Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964). "We affirm and adopt ...
the 'district court's
treatment of ... mutuality of collateral estoppel." Id. at 404. See also Bernhard v. Bank of
America Nat'l. Trust & Say. Ass'n., 19 Cal. 2d.807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
76 Courts generally first satisfy themselves that the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the former action. Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d
894, 900 (4th Cir. 1965). Strength of the defense, however, may be directly related to the
size of the liability apparent to the defendant.
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applications; judicial exceptions are equally limited or out of favor. There
remains, therefore, the question of whether a broader jurisdictional basis exists
for reviewing class action determinations such as those in Weit and Anschul.
Several Supreme Court cases dealing with non-class actions seem to delineate a
course toward greater appealability. In Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau,7
the Supreme Court was faced with the problem of whether an interlocutory
order concerning venue was reviewable. A receiver had brought an action
against two national banks and 143 other parties alleging a conspiracy to defraud
an insurance company. A question was raised as to which state court had venue
to entertain the action against the national banks. Rather than apply the final
judgment rule rigidly to disallow appeal from the venie order, the Court stated:
[W]e believe that it serves the policy underlying the requirement of finality
. . . , to determine now in which state court appellants may be tried rather
than to subject them, and appellee, to a long and complex litigation which
may be all for naught if consideration of the preliminary
question of venue
78
is postponed until the conclusion of the proceedings.
In so holding, the Court indicated that initial questions, with a high potential
for causing relitigation, should be resolved at an early stage of the litigation.
Applying the Mercantile holding to Anschul, the question becomes whether
the class determination order is comparable in relitigation potential to the venue
order. If the order denying a plaintiff class in Anschul poses a significant risk of
relitigation, presumably, it would be appealable in conformance with the underlying policy rather than the superficial construct of the final judgment rule.
Both Weit and Anschul raise the spectre of the relitigation issue: whether
improperly absented class members must relitigate their claims after the named
plaintiff has prevailed; or, whether the defendant is held liable to the members
through the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The problem arises in Anschul if the
named plaintiff prevails on the merits and wins an appeal of the class determination order. In Weit, if the plaintiff prevails and appeals the order denying certification of a defendant class, it is unclear: (a) whether the defendants will be
collaterally estopped from relitigating the cause of action; or, (b) whether there
will be a new trial to determine liability for each of the excluded defendants.
Either alternative poses significant problems avoidable by an immediate review.
A policy suggesting that the rigidity of the final judgment rule may be
tempered if the rights of parties are prejudiced seemed to underlie the Supreme
9
Court's decision in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp."
The Gillespie plaintiff
was administratrix of her son's estate. The son had died while working on
defendant's ship which was docked in Ohio. Plaintiff claimed a right to recover
under Ohio's wrongful death statute for herself and decedent's dependent
brother and sister. An additional claim was based on the Jones Act. The district
court, acting upon defendant's motion to strike, limited recovery to damages
under the Jones Act and denied recovery for the brother and sister. Plaintiff
sought a writ of mandamus compelling dismissal of the motion to strike or, alter77
78
79

371 U.S. 555 (1963).
Id. at 558.
379 U.S. 148 (1964).
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natively, a § 1292 (b) certification. In reviewing the rulings below, the Supreme
Court stated:
[D]elay of perhaps a number of years in having the brother's and sister's
rights determined might work a great injustice on them, since claims for
recovery for their benefit have been effectively cut off so long as the District
Judge's ruling stands."'
The Court also concluded that it would be appropriate to review a trial court's
interlocutory order if it presented questions "fundamental to the further conduct
of the case.""1 The Court advocated a balancing test in deciding whether an
order is final: "the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand
and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other."8 2
It would be unwise to unilaterally extend Gillespie to Weit and Anschul.
The prospect of denying recovery to dependent family members is more compelling than the loss, to passengers on a cruise, of the economic benefit associated
with a shortened trip. Nonetheless, the rights of the parties are at stake if they
are denied their day in court.
The dissent in Anschul suggests that refusal to review the class order may be
tantamount to denying the rights which the absent members seek to litigate.8 "
Since the plaintiff's nominal claim could be insufficient to sustain him, the rights
of the absent members to recover the alleged amount will evaporate with
plaintiff's withdrawal. Additionally, the dissent notes that if plaintiff pursues the
litigation and prevails, the defendant may contend that the named plaintiff no
longer has standing to appeal since he has no further stake in the litigation."
Presumably, the defendants could also contend that as a result of their exclusion
from the litigious process, absent class members lack standing to appeal. One
court has suggested, however, that unknown members of the class will have
standing to appeal the class action portion of the final decision even though they
were not involved in the litigation." Further, after final judgment the absent
class members may be able to intervene to appeal the class determination, but
this raises a significant question as to whether such intervention is timely.
Several of the above problems were broached in the recent Seventh Circuit
decision Romasanta v. United Airlines, Inc."0 Petitioner was a member of the
putative class in Romasanta. She petitioned to intervene on behalf of herself and
other airline stewardesses in her class who were discharged because of United's
policy against employing married stewardesses. Her petition was filed after the
Romasanta action had progressed to final judgment. The majority concluded
that the named plaintiff, Romasanta, was still acting as the class champion upon
whom putative members could rely to appeal the class determination. 7 The
80 Id. at 153.
81 Id. at 153-54.
82 Id. at 152-53 quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511
(1950).
83 544 F.2d at 1371 (Swygert, J. and Bauer, J., dissenting).
84 Id.
85 431 F.2d 26, 28 n.4 (9th Cir. 1970).
86 537 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
87 Id. at 918.
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court's unstated assumption was that the named plaintiff would have standing
to appeal the class determination order."8
The Romasanta court allowed the petition under the permissive intervention
provision of FED. R. Civ. P..24 (b) (2). The court hurdled Rule 24's requirement
of a "timely" intervention by reasoning that petitioner could rely on the plaintiff
to appeal the class determination after final judgment because the plaintiff had
appealed the initial order.8 9 Petitioner's intervention, therefore, was timely
because she wasn't aware of the need to intervene until after final judgment when
it became clear that plaintiff would not appeal the order. By contrast, the dissent
urged that petitioner should have intervened immediately after the class denial
to satisfy the "timely" requirement and to protect her rights as several members
of the class had done.9" Asserting that the defendant was aware throughout the
litigation of the potential liability to the class, the court dismissed the question of
prejudice. Apparently, a defendant is expected to exert the same quantum of
resources and energy to defend against the named plaintiff that he would in
defending against the entire class.91 This result seems to undermine Rule 23
requirements which were specifically added to afford defendants protection from
multiple liabilities arising through untimely determination of class status.9"
The future of permissive intervention as a tool to allow absent class members
to appeal is, therefore, uncertain.
Applying the Romasanta rationale to Anschul, it is clear that defendants
could be subjected to one-way intervention. This would result from the plaintiff
classes' initial exclusion and later inclusion if the class determination order were
modified after final judgment. At that point, absent class members could intervene
to avail themselves of the judgment and increase defendant's liability multifold.
The situation in Weit is more complex. The district court certified a plaintiff
class for the initial four counts, denied class status for the remaining two, and
denied plaintiff's motion to certify a class of defendants. This complexity is
ameliorated, however, since class certification in four of the six counts should
ensure the involvement of the entire class, and not just the original plaintiffs,
throughout the litigation. Plaintiff class members will not be faced, therefore,
with potential difficulties in obtaining appeals; all will have standing and incentive to appeal the adverse determination after final judgment.
Finally, there is the argument presented by the Anschul dissent that FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(c)( 1) requires a determination by the appellate court as well as the
district court.9" This rule provides:
88 The dissent argued that after the initial class determination order, the named plaintiff
was not necessarily representing the putative class interests. Accordingly, petitioner could not
reasonably believe that her interests were being represented after the class allegation had been
denied and the suit proceeded as an individual action. Id. at 921 (Pell, J., dissenting). Under
this interpretation, it is uncertain whether the named plaintiff would have had standing. It is
also unclear whether absent class members can rely as a rule on the prospect of intervening
after final judgment to appeal the class determination.
89 By this reasoning plaintiffs would be encouraged to appeal interlocutory class determinations to protect the absent class members' right to intervene after final judgment, a result
contrary to the policy of the final judgment rule.
90 537 F.2d 915, 921-22 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (Pell, J., dissenting).
91 The defendant was not even sure of the size of the class. Estimates ranged from 30 to
140 class members. Id. at 917.
92 American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974).
93 544 F.2d at 1373 (Swygert, J. and Bauer, J., dissenting).
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As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to -be so
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may
be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
Appellate determination, as the dissent suggests, would serve the spirit and purpose of this rule by finally settling the matter of class status at the initial stages
of the litigation.9"
Indeed, a recent Supreme Court case lends support to this interpretation.
In American Pipe & Construction Co,. v. Utah, 5 the Court stated that Rule 23
was amended to avoid the potential for one-way intervention." The classic
example of this problem occurred when members of the alleged class awaited
final judgment before deciding whether to intervene and benefit from the
decision. The Court stated:
[7Ihe 1966 amendments were designed, in part, specifically to mend this
perceived defect in the former Rule and to assure that members of the class
would be identified before trial on
97 the merits and would be bound by all
subsequent orders and judgments.
If putative class members are not precluded from future initiatives as Romasanta
suggests, they could await the outcome of the litigation before electing whether
to intervene and appeal the class order. If the outcome were favorable, their
subsequent intervention would approximate that of the one-way intervention
sought to be avoided.9"
Three possibilities are thus suggested. First, the plaintiff, acting as the
champion of the "class," would appeal the adverse class order after he has
prevailed. This assumes that he has standing and will exercise that right even
though no further benefit will accrue to him. Second, the putative class members
will be able to intervene after final judgment. Third, if the above two alternatives
are not available, the putative class simply will be denied their rights. These
uncertain and undesirable effects could be avoided by allowing immediate district
and appellate determination of class status to ensure that the parties to the litigation "would be identified before trial on the merits." 9
Conclusion
The Anschul case contrasts sharply with Weit in the amount of damages at
stake and the complexity of party relationships. Both cases would appear, however, to present facts warranting immediate review of the class determination
orders.
In Anschul, the potential adverse effects to the plaintiff may not seem
sufficient to justify overriding the final judgment rule, since the average damage
94
95
96
97
98

99

Id.
414 U.S. 538 (1974).
Id. at 547.
Id.

See 544- F.2d at 1372 (Swygert, J. and Bauer, J., dissenting).

414 U.S. 538, 547 (1973).
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claim appears small and the litigation should not be unduly lengthy. Yet Anschul
falls within that zone of cases in which denial of class status may have the effect
of denying the right to litigate. Depriving a party of his day in court would seem
to be prejudice sufficient to warrant immediate review.
The class notification order in Weit illustrates the type of order that is undeserving of immediate review and which would tend to subvert the final judgment rule's worthwhile policy against piecemeal litigation. The Weit court appropriately assessed the importance of the notice order and accordingly denied
review. Denying review of the orders refusing class status under § 1292 (a) (1),
while technically correct, was not as sound from a practical standpoint. Since the
scope and extent of the litigation may well be immense, the better course would
be to conclusively establish those participants involved in the controversy at an
early stage of the proceeding. This is especially true since an appropriate statutory exception to the final judgment rule is available to supply the necessary
jurisdictional basis. The complexities involved in a review after final judgment,
when the rightful parties to the action have not yet been included or ascertained,
would appear to effectively offset any incremental saving in workload at the
initial stages of the litigation.
Despite recent dicta in the Second Circuit suggesting a more restrictive application of judicial exceptions,' ° a number of factors collectively signal a trend
toward allowing a larger number of interlocutory appeals from class action
determinations. These factors include: the development and survival of the death
knell doctrine and its counterpart, the three-pronged appealability test; the
reaffirmation of the Cohen doctrine in a recent Supreme Court decision'.. and
the sentiment expressed for a broader application of that doctrine;0 2 the increasing interest in the "fundamental to the further conduct" doctrine of Gillespie;'°'
the interest balancing approach of Dickinson;... and the encouragement to make
greater use of § 1292(b)."' The Weit and Anschul dissents, therefore, appear to
signal a growing trend of appellate thought towards allowing a wider latitude in
appealing class determination orders. As class actions slowly proceed to conclusion, and potential adverse effects crystallize from prediction and conjecture
to reality, it is probable that increasing weight will be given to the rights of
litigants and non-litigants in the context of a balancing of interests approach.
Kenneth R. Martin

100 See note 70 supra.
101 417 U.S. 156 (1974) [Eisen IV].
102 See 544 F.2d at 1370 and 1373 (Swygert, J. and Bauer, J., dissenting) ; 495 F.2d 1308,
1313 n.9 (2d Cir. 1974); 70 CoL. L. Rzv. 1292 (1970).
103 See e.g., General Motors Corp. v. City of N.Y., 501 F.2d 639, 659 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974)

(Mansfield,

J., concurring); New England Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 456 F.2d

183, 185 (IstCir. 1972).
104 See, e.g., 544 F.2d at 1372 (Swygert, J. and Bauer, J., dissenting); 501 F.2d at 659
(Mansfield, J., concurring).
105 See text accompanying note 26 supra.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-EDITED PORTIONS OF TAPES MADE BY COMMON
CARRIER DURING WIRE FRAUD INVESTIGATION ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE UNDER
THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL ACT OF

1968

DESPITE THE FACT THAT SUR-

VEILLANCE IS EXCESSIVE AND THEREFORE ILLEGAL.

United States v. AulerIn United States v. Auler,' the Seventh Circuit considered the scope of the
authority of a common carrier to intercept and disclose wire communications,
under the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968,2 in the context of the prohibitions against the unauthorized publication or use of interstate wire communications set forth in the Federal Communications Act.3 The appellant, Raymond
Auler, was convicted of violating the Wire Fraud Statute,' and sentenced to six
months' imprisonment.
While Auler argued for reversal on several grounds,' the main issue before
the court was the evidentiary effect of the fact that General Telephone had
exceeded the scope of its statutory authorization, thereby conducting an "excessive and therefore illegal surveillance." ' Despite this fact, the court held that
the edited tape recordings which General Telephone turned over to the F.B.I.
were properly disclosed and need not be suppressed. Accordingly, the court
affirmed Auler's conviction.
*
1
2

539 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1976).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (a) (i) (1970) provides that:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or
an officer, employee, or agent of any communication common carrier, whose facilities
are used in the transmission of a wire communication, to intercept, disclose, or use
that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any
activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of the carrier of such communication: Provided, That
said communication common carriers shall not utilize service observing or random
monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control checks.
3 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970) prohibits unauthorized publication or use of wire or radio
communication:
Except as authorized by chapter 119, Title 18, no person receiving, assisting in
receiving, transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effects, or meaning thereof, except through authorized channels of transmission or reception, (1) to any person other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney, (2) to a person employed or authorized to forward such communication to its
destination, (3) to proper accounting or distributing officers of the various communicating centers over which the communication may be passed, (4) to the master of
a ship under whom he is serving, (5) in response to a subpoena issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction, or (6) on demand of other lawful authority....
4 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) prohibits fraud through the use of interstate communication:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire,
radio, television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs,
signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice
shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
5 In addition to the argument examined at length in the accompanying text, Auler
contended that the security agents of General Telephone violated his rights under the fourth
amendment; that the surveillance violated the Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Law; and
that the indictment failed to state an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The court, referring
to settled case law on each point, rejected these subsidiary arguments summarily.
6 539 F.2d at 647.
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This somewhat enigmatic result is the focus of the present inquiry. This
comment explains the Seventh Circuit's treatment of overly intrusive surveillance
by common carriers from a historical perspective in an attempt to demonstrate
the soundness of the approach adopted by the court.
On June 21, 1976, Gary Mattila, a security agent for General Telephone
Company, was informed by an affiliated telephone company that a suspected
"blue box" user had recently assumed residence in his district. The informant,
Bernard G. Schlimgen of Wisconsin Telephone Company, identified the suspect
as Raymond Auler, and substantiated his allegations on the basis of a recently
completed investigation by Wisconsin Telephone which indicated that Auler
had been utilizing a "blue box" to fraudulently place toll-free long-distance calls.
Upon receipt of this information, Mattila ordered 2600 cycle detectors
(which indicate the use of a blue box device) placed on Auler's phones. After
the detection of numerous 2600 cycle calls, Mattila further directed the recording of all multi-frequency tones and conversations originating from Auler's
residence.
On July 30 and 31, Mattila advised F.B.I. Agent Hunter of the results of
General Telephone's investigation of Auler. On the basis of this information,
Agent Hunter obtained a warrant to search Auler's residence. Accompanied
by Mattila, Hunter executed the warrant on August 10. During the course of
the search, the two men discovered and seized a blue box as well as other electronic equipment.
Auler was subsequently tried and convicted of violating the federal Wire
Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343.8 Prior to trial, Auler unsuccessfully sought to
suppress any evidence which was the product of General Telephone's interception of his telephone lines.
Auler's main argument in support of his motion to suppress, as well as on
appeal, asserted that the evidence secured to convict him was obtained in violation of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605.1 Section 605 provides, with certain exceptions, that no person not authorized by the sender may
intercept any wire or radio communication and divulge or publish the existence
or contents of such intercepted communication to any person. Asserting that
the monitoring of his telephone lines by General Telephone, and the subsequent
disclosure of the existence and contents of intercepted communications to the
F.B.I. were made in violation of § 605, Auler concluded that the information
disclosed and the fruits thereof must be suppressed.
In response, the court noted that it had been asked to address the same
argument in an earlier case, United States v. Freeman." Referring to its prior
holding, the Auler court stated:
7 A blue box is used to electronically bypass a telephone company's billing equipment.
After engaging a wide area telephone service system (WATS), the blue box emits a 2600
cycle tone which allows the user to remain within the toll system after the WATS line has
been disconnected. Subsequently, the user "key pulses" through the blue box a series of
multifrequency tones, comparable to those normally generated by a long distance call. However, the telephone company's billing equipment records only the original toll-free call. As
a result, the user is not charged for the call made with the blue box.
8 See note 4 supra.
9 See note 3 supra.
10 524 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920 (1976).

[Vol. 52:'439]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

In Freeman. we considered the scope of the exception, provided in the first
sentence of section 605,["] as amended by the Crime Control Act of 1968,']
in the light of the prohibitions against disclosure of wire communications
listed in the first paragraph of section 605. We held that section 2511(2)
(a) (i) [13] "must sensibly be read as an exception of telephone companies
from the relevant prohibitions of 47 U.S.C. § 605, and, in a sense, as an
authorization." Freeman, supra, at 340.
[T]herefore, we reaffirm our decision that section 2511(2) (a) (i) provides a telephone company with the power to protect its property through
limited monitoring of the lines of suspected illegal users and the subsequent
14
immunity to disclose necessary information to law enforcement agencies.
Although reaffirming the existence of the statutory "common carrier" exception to § 605, Chief Judge Fairchild, writing for the Seventh Circuit, went on
to emphasize that a telephone company's authority to intercept and disclose
wire communications is not unlimited. Rather, he asserted, "it may only intercept a communication which is 'a necessary incident to the rendition of . . .
service or ... (for) the protection of the (company's) rights or property...
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (a) (i)."'5
Given this judicial acknowledgement of the limited scope of the exception,
the particular facts of the case gave Auler's argument new vitality and substance
since the record indicated that General Telephone's surveillance extended beyond
the scope of permissible interception outlined by the court. In fact, the Government conceded at oral argument that, during the two-week period of surveillance,
General Telephone monitored and taped all outgoing calls in their entirety,
whether made fraudulently or in compliance with the subscription agreement.'"
Accordingly, the court was obliged to recognize "that General Telephone conducted excessive and therefore illegal surveillance."' 7
Despite this recognition, the Seventh Circuit held that edited portions of
the tapes obtained during the course of the surveillance were properly admitted
in evidence. This somewhat puzzling decision, while correct in result, was inadequately explained by the court. To remedy this inadequacy, as well as to
explain the opinion's expositional paucity, it is necessary to place Auler in its
historical context. Viewed in the light of prior cases considering the "common
carrier" exception, the Seventh Circuit's treatment of the effect of exceeding
the scope of the exception in Auler assumes value as a precedent which is not
apparent on the face of the opinion.
Auler's Historical Context
In Olmstead v. United States, 8 the first wiretap case to reach the United
11
12

See note 3 supra. This footnote corresponds with the court's note 5.
Pub.L.No. 90-351, Title III, § 803, 82 Stat. 223 (1968). This footnote corresponds

with the court's note 6.
13 See note 2 supra. This footnote corresponds with the court's note 7.
14 539 F.2d at 645-46.

15
16
17
18

Id. at 646.
Id.
Id.
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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States Supreme Court, the police intercepted communications by placing a tap
on the defendant's telephone line. In a 5-4 decision, the majority held that the
police conduct in question did not constitute a search and seizure within the
ambit of the fourth amendment, and that the wiretap evidence was properly
admitted. However, Chief Justice Taft's majority opinion suggested that Congress had the authority to regulate wirietapping in order to "protect the secrecy
of telephone messages by making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by direct legislation." 19
In apparent response, Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act
of 1934,20 which provided in § 605 that:
[N]o person not authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication
and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person.21
This section was first interpreted by the Supreme Court in Nardone v.
United States.2 In that case, the Court held that § 605 prohibited the introduction in federal court of evidence obtained directly by wiretapping. In the
second Nardone case,2" the Court extended this prohibition to "leads" supplied
by wiretapping under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.2"
Despite its current use as such, the language of the statute itself does not
designate § 605 as a rule of evidence. However, beginning with Nardone, it
became, by judicial construction, a rule of evidence which read into the statute
an implicit exclusionary sanction. 5 This resulting statutory exclusionary rule
centered on judicial interpretation of the words "intercept" and "divulge" as
used in the Act.2" As the line of interpretive cases developed, it became increasingly clear that the basis of exclusion was not the initial intrusion or interception
itself, but the explicit directive of § 605 that information thus obtained may
not be disclosed without the sender's consent. 7
Of course, the Supreme Court ultimately reversed Olmstead and recognized
that government agents, state or federal, who engage in electronic eavesdropping
must comply with the constitutional requirements of a reasonable search under
the fourth amendment. 8 Furthermore, any evidence, tangible or testimonial,
that is seized without adherence to these constitutional safeguards must be excluded.' 9 Nevertheless, the importance of § 605's exclusionary sanction remained
19 Id. at 465.
20 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
21 Id., § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934).
22 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
23 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
24 Id. at 340-41. See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
25 See United States v. Sugden, 226 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1955), af/'d per curiam, 351 U.S.
916 (1956).
26 See generally Decker & Handler, Electronic Surveillance: Standards, Restrictions
and Remedies, 12 CALIF. W. L. REv. 60 (1975).
27 See Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 427 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting);
Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 118 (1942); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S.
379, 382 (1937).
28 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
58-60 (1967).
29 371 U.S. at 485; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914).
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of continued importance as applied to private wiretapping, since private searches
and seizures are not subject to fourth amendment restrictions."'
Yet despite the statute's continued force and effect with respect to private
wiretapping, the federal courts developed a judicial exception to its prohibitions.
This exception provides that when a subscriber of a telephone system uses the
system's facilities in a manner which reasonably justifies the telephone company's
belief that he is violating his subscription rights, § 605 does not prohibit the
telephone company from monitoring or recording the calls to the extent reasonably necessary for the company's investigation."
As expressed by the courts, the rationale of the "common carrier" exception
is twofold. One basis for the exception is that when the use of the communication facility itself is illegal, the protections of § 605 are inapplicable. 2 The
courts recognize that the statute was intended by Congress for the protection of
users, and that one who fraudulently bypasses telephone billing equipment has
no legal standing to attack any reasonable measures undertaken by the telephone
company to protect itself.33 The second basis of the exception is grounded in a
judicial construct of the "implied consent" of the unauthorized user. Any person
who chooses to use the facilities of a telephone company, reason the courts, impliedly consents to reasonable billing procedures employed by the company. 4
Thus, the user has no standing to challenge the company's good faith efforts in
that regard.
However, these decisions invariably emphasize that the common carrier's
authority is limited to "reasonable means necessary to protect its interests." Thus,
in Bubis v. United States," the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded
that a telephone company's monitoring of the defendant's calls for three months,
after ample evidence had been secured that he had been using a blue box, was
unreasonable. Accordingly, the Bubis court held that the company's tapes voluntarily given to the government were inadmissible. In Bubis, the court explained
that:
[T]he monitoring and tape recording for such length of time, after ample evidence had been secured of the illegal use by appellant of the company's
facilities, was unreasonable and unnecessary. To sanction such practices on
the part of the telephone company would tend to emasculate the protection
of privacy § 605 was intended to protect.
In these circumstances the district court erred in admitting into evidence
the tape recordings .... 36
On its face, the court's language in Bubis would seem to require suppression
30 Honeycutt v. Aetna Ins. 'Co., 510 F.2d 340, 348 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1011 (1975).
31 See, e.g., Brandon v. United States, 382 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Beckley, 259 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
32 See, e.g., 382 F.2d at 611; 259 F. Supp. at 571; 226 F.2d 281; Casey v. United
States, 191 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 34-3 U.S. 808 (1952).
33 259 F. Supp. at 611.
34

Id.

35
36

384 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 648.
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of all evidence secured whenever the telephone company has exceeded the permissible bounds of the judicially created exception to § 605. The rule implied
by the court's language is that continued monitoring of an individual's telephone
lines, after sufficient evidence has been obtained to secure an indictment for wire
fraud, requires the exclusion of any and all evidence obtained by the telephone
company during the course of its investigation.
However, a more critical examination of the Bubis decision demonstrates
that such a conclusion is patently erroneous, despite the court's language. Bubis
was under prosecution on a federal gambling charge, not the Wire Fraud Statute." This fact weighed heavily in deciding the ultimate outcome of the case
because it precluded the court from applying the traditional justifications for
the common carrier exception to § 605. Obviously, there was no basis for the
application of the "implied consent" doctrine, since Bubis' consent could only
be implied with respect to "reasonable billing procedures," not for the purpose
of convicting him of using interstate telephone facilities for gambling." On the
other hand, the particular facts of the case made the court reluctant to rely on
the "communication illegal in itself" rationale, since to authorize wholesale intrusions on that basis "would tend to emasculate the protection of privacy § 605
was intended to protect."39
Moreover, the actual holding of the Ninth Circuit in Bubis was quite
limited. The court held only that the telephone company's continued monitoring
of Bubis' calls for three months, after ample evidence had been secured that he
had been using a blue box, was unreasonable. Thus, the court concluded, the
tapes voluntarily given to the government were inadmissible in the subsequent
gambling prosecution. The actual holding makes clear that the Bubis court was
dealing only with evidence which had been secured exclusively outside the ambit
of the "common carrier" exception. The court expressed no opinion as to the
possible admissibility of evidence obtained during the course of the initial wire
fraud investigation, but only precluded the admission of evidence secured after
that time when the surveillance became "unreasonable."
Nevertheless, the language of the Bubis court placed the federal judiciary
in a state of confusion with respect to the "common carrier" exception to § 605.
Nowhere was this confusion more manifest than in United States v. Hanna."
In Hanna, the defendant was indicted for three separate violations of federal
law: wire fraud,41 wagering by wire," and using the telephone in interstate
commerce to promote an unlawful activity."3 The government's evidence in its
entirety had been the direct or indirect result of Southern Bell Telephone Company's investigation of Hanna, a suspected blue box user.
Once again, the "common carrier" exception to § 605 was at issue. The
defendant argued that the statute required the exclusion of all evidence stem37 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
38 384 F.2d 643, 648 n.2 (9th Cir. 1967).
39

Id. at 648.

40 260 F. Supp. 430
394 U.S. 1015 (1969).
41 18 U.S.'C. § 1343
42 18 U.S.C. § 1084
43 18 U.S.C. § 1952

(S.D. Fla. 1966), aff'd 404 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
(1970).
(1970).
(1970).
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ming from the interdeption of his telephone conversations. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Hanna's motion to
suppress."
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, this ruling was reversed.45 Judge Rives denied that the telephone company necessarily
had to record any parts of the conversations in order to secure payment of long
distance tolls. He concluded that § 605 required the suppression of all evidence
stemming from those tapes made by the company. Hence, the opinion of the
court in effect denied the very existence of any "common carrier" exception to
§ 605.
In a special concurring opinion, on the other hand, Judge Godbold recognized the existence of the "common carrier" exception, but cited Bubis as requiring the exclusion of all evidence secured by Southern Bell:
[W]hatever right the telephone company may have to determine the existence of communications or the content of communications is limited by
the standards of reasonableness which were exceeded in this case.46
A third position was set forth by Judge Hughes in her dissent, which found
that the telephone company's activities were properly limited and did not violate § 605." Thus, she concluded that the evidence had been properly admitted,
and voiced strong opposition to the views adopted by her brethren on the Fifth
Circuit.
On rehearing," Judge Hughes' position ultimately prevailed. Again writing
the majority opinion, Judge Rives reversed his previous holding, conceding that
he had been "in error both as to the facis and as to the law."" Accordingly,
Hanna's conviction was affirmed.
As Hanna was being considered by the Fifth Circuit, Congress was in the
process of enacting the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968.50 In § 2511(2)
(a) 5 of that Act, Congress gave statutory recognition to the judicially created
"common carrier" exception to the prohibitions of 47 U.S.C. § 605.
As explained by the Senate report:
Paragraph (2) (a) provides that it shall not be unlawful for an operator
of a switchboard or employees of a common carrier to intercept, disclose, or
use wire communications in the normal course of their employment while
engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his
service or the protection of the rights or property of the carrier. It isintended to reflect existing law. (United States v. Beckley, 259 F. Supp. 567
5 2
(N.D. Ga. 1965) ). (Emphasis added)
44
45
46

47

Hanna v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 430 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
Hanna v. United States, 393 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 708.

Id. at 709.

48 Hanna v. United States, 404 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1015
(1969).
49 Id. at 406.
50 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
51- 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i), as amended (1970).
52 [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, 2182.
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Given the difficulties encountered with "existing law," as made apparent in
Hanna, the Senate's comment is somewhat ironic in retrospect. In fact, the
latent ambiguities of "existing law" were recognized by Mr. Justice Fortas just
one year after the passage of § 2511(2) (a) (i), in a cautionary footnote to his
dissent from denial of certiorari in the Hanna case itself:
The Government argues that the applicability of § 605 to events such as
this is now of only academic interest because of the recent enactment of
§ 802 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat.
212, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1964 ed., Supp. IV). That argument is
untenable....
It is by no means clear that the new statute would authorize this kind of
conduct if a similar case occurred today. Unless it did, § 605 would still
apply and the same problems that exist in this case would arise again.53
The precise focus of Mr. Justice Fortas' concern was not the "common
carrier" exception itself, but the effect of exceeding the scope of the exception.
The "kind of conduct" in question was not properly limited investigation and
disclosure, but overly intrusive telephone company surveillance which exceeded
the bounds of "reasonable means necessary to protect its interests." The text
accompanying the above-quoted footnote made this clear:
In a similar case, Bubis v. United States, 384 F.2d 643 (C.A. 9th Cir. 1967),
the Ninth Circuit held that under § 605 the telephone company was not allowed to continue tapping its subscribers' lines to detect fraud "after ample
evidence had been secured of the illegal use ...of the company's facilities."
384 F.2d, at 648. The tap in Bubis recorded the whole conversation and
not merely the first part, but an essential fact-that the interception was
54
more extensive than necessary to detect fraud-is the same in both cases.
Hence, the spectre of the broad exclusionary language employed by the
Ninth Circuit in Bubis continued to have a profound influence on federal courts
considering excessive telephone company surveillance of suspected illegal users.
Mr. Justice Fortas' dissent represents the best example of a misreading of Bubis,
focusing on the language of the opinion rather than the decision's limited holding. Under this erroneous approach, Bubis requires the exclusion of all evidence
obtained if the telephone company exceeded the scope of the "common carrier"
exception. In Hanna, this issue had been defused since on rehearing the Fifth
Circuit was satisfied that Southern Bell's surveillance had been properly limited.
Nevertheless, it was clear that Bubis had erroneously become the basic text on
the effect of exceeding the scope of the "common carrier" exception.
Despite the fact that Congress had given statutory force to the "common
carrier" exception in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (a) (i), the difficulties evidenced in
Bubis and Hanna persisted. In fact, judicial concern over the "standards of reasonableness" was heightened as the courts sought to delineate with precision
53 Hanna v. United States, 394 U.S. 1015, 1017 n.2 (1969)
denial of certiorari).

54 Id. at 1017.

(Fortas, J., dissenting from
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the scope of the statutory exception. For example, in the first case decided under
§ 2511(2) (a) (i), United States v. Shah,5" the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania relied heavily on Hanna in its effort to define the rights and duties of the telephone company under the statute. The court
noted that the statute expressly limits telephone companies to those activities
which are a necessary incident to the rendition of service or to the protection of
the rights or property of the carrier. To give substance to this limitation, the
Shah court quoted the text of.the Hanna opinion with reference to investigation
of suspected illegal users. The district court relied on Hanna to require that
recordings of illegal calls be limited to the dialing and opening salutations.5 6
In its own initial consideration of § 2511(2) (a) (i), United States v. Freeman,5" the Seventh Circuit also demonstrated a heightened awareness of the
limited nature of the statutory authorization which it implied from the Bubis
and Hanna decisions. Discussing § 2511(2) (a) (i), the court emphasized that:
In view of our interpretation of the statutory provision, we do not reach
the proposition that if the use of the communication facility itself is illegal,
the right of privacy does not exist, and the matter may be divulged. See,
e.g., Hanna v. United States, 404 F.2d 405, 406 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 1015 (1969).58
Thus, the codification of the common carrier exception, coupled with the continuing emphasis on Hanna, had effectively precipitated the elimination of one
of the central rationales of the pre-statute judicial exception.
Similarly, in United States v. Clegg,5" the Fifth Circuit examined the restrictive implications of Bubis in the context of the new statute. While deciding that
Bubis was not on point since the telephone company's surveillance had been
properly limited,6" the court suggested that Bubis would require the exclusion of
all evidence obtained if the telephone company had recorded the entire context
of the defendant's telephone calls."
The Clegg court thus advanced the broad exclusionary principle which the
federal courts erroneously tended to imply from Bubis; any surveillance which
exceeded the scope of the "common carrier" exception yields no admissible evidence. Only telephone company surveillance remaining totally within the confines of § 2511(2) (a) (i) could produce evidence which could be offered at trial.
Hence, the codification of the judicially created exception to § 605 resulted
in a new emphasis on the limited nature of its scope. The continued impact of
Bubis and Hanna contributed to this emphasis, and simultaneously perpetuated
the implicit question of the effect of exceeding the scope of the statutory
exception.

55 371 F. Supp. 1170 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
56 Id. at 1175-76.
57 524 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920 (1976).

58 524 F.2d at 341.

59 United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1975).
60 Id. at 614.
61 509 F.2d at 614, n.14.
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United States v. Auler:
The Question Becomes Explicit
In United States v. Auler, the Seventh Circuit confronted the critical question of the effect of exceeding the scope of § 2511(2) (a) (i). Having reaffirmed
the fact that § 2511 provided an "exception to the relevant prohibitions of §
605,"62 and carefully delineating the scope of the exception,6" the court was
forced to concede that General Telephone's surveillance had exceeded that scope.
Although noting the possible civil and criminal consequences of this "excessive and therefore illegal surveillance," the court held that the evidence actually
submitted had been properly admitted since General Telephone only disclosed
to the F.B.I. the limited evidence which is permissible under § 2511(2) (a) (i).
This evidence consisted of edited tape recordings containing only the tones transmitted by the blue box, the dialing signals, and the salutations of fraudulently
placed calls. As the court noted:
The interception of the material recorded on these tapes may be viewed
apart from those more intrusive acts of surveillance which are not immunized
by § 2511(2) (a) (i). The reasonable and necessary interceptions and disclosures need not be suppressed as the "fruits" of illegal surveillance ....14
Since General Telephone provided no evidence to the F.B.I. which stemmed
from excessive interception, and none was offered at trial, the court concluded
that the edited tapes were properly admitted.
This somewhat enigmatic result, while inadequately explained by the court,
establishes a new and positive approach to "the effect of exceeding the scope of
the 'common carrier' exception." The pre-2511 (2) (a) (i) cases of Bubis and
Hanna implied an "all or nothing" exclusionary sanction which had been
echoed approvingly in many post-statute decisions as well: if the common carrier's surveillance exceeded permissible bounds, no evidence stemming from its
investigation may be offered at trial. However, the Seventh Circuit's Auler
decision did not fall prey to this misreading of Bubis. Instead, Auler reflects the
more reasonable rule that although any surveillance which exceeds the scope of
§ 2511(2) (a) (i) subjects the telephone company to civil and criminal penalties,
only information actually obtained outside that scope is properly subject to the
exclusionary sanction.
The underlying rationale of the Auler approach can best be illustrated by
way of analogy to the "plain view" doctrine. Under that doctrine, it has long
been settled that objects falling within the plain view of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
introduced in evidence. 6 The fact that the officer might subsequently exceed
the scope of the doctrine by overly intrusive acts has no effect on the admissibility
of the evidence discovered "in plain view." Only those items secured outside
62 United States v. Auler, 539 F.2d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 1976).
63 See text accompanying note 15, supra.
64 539 F.2d at 646.
65 See, e.g., United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1964).
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the scope of his unobstructed view are subject to exclusion.
So too, under the "common carrier" exception, when evidence is secured
properly within the scope of the exception (i.e., where the telephone company
"has a right to be" under § 2511(2(a) (i)), the fact that the surveillance subsequently exceeds this scope does not render the fruits of its investigation inadmissible ab initio. Rather, only evidence actually obtained after the surveillance
has become "excessive and therefore illegal" is properly subject to a meritorious
motion to suppress.6"
Hence, Auler creates a bifurcated effect of exceeding the scope of § 2511
(2) (a) (i). This approach entails two separate points of inquiry: (1) whether
the surveillance was properly limited; and (2) at what point in time the particular evidence was actually secured. If the common carrier's surveillance exceeds
the scope of its statutory authorization, then civil and criminal liability will result.
However, for the exclusionary sanction to come into play, it is not only necessary
that the common carrier exceed the proper scope of investigation, but also that
the particular evidence sought to be admitted was actually secured outside that
scope.
This limited exclusionary effect represents Auler's most essential contribution to this area of the law, and it stands as a contribution of merit and consequence. By avoiding the pitfalls suggested in Bubis and Hanna, the Seventh

Circuit's decision in

United States v. Auler represents a break with past decisions

which were laden with uncertainty and ambiguity concerning the effect of
exceeding the scope of the "common carrier" exception. Hopefully, Auler will
come to serve not only as a break with this past, but as a positive influence in
future consideration of the rights and duties of common carriers under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2) (a) (i).
Joseph F. Winterscheid

66 In addition, adoption of the "plain view" model resolves any potential difficulties
pertaining to the particular offense to which evidence disclosed by a telephone company
relates. In Bubis, for example, the court expressed concern with the fact that the evidence
secured. by the telephone company related to the gambling charge rather than wire fraud.
The "plain view" analogy makes this conceptual dilemma irrelevant by limiting the
court's inquiry to whether the evidence secured was obtained within the proper scope of §
2511(2) (a) (i). Thus, if a telephone company's investigation is conducted within the prescribed bounds of the statute, evidence of any inadvertently discovered illegal activity may
properly be disclosed to enforcement agencies and used at trial. See, e.g., People v. Sierra,
343 N.Y.S. 2d 196 (S.Ct. N.Y. County 1973).

EVIDENCE-HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF JOINT VENTURERS-CAUTIONARY
INSTRUCTION NOT REQUIRED AT THE TIME THIS EVIDENCE IS OFFERED

United States v. Buschman*
In United States v. Buschman,' the Seventh Circuit considered the need
for a cautionary instruction to be issued when evidence is offered pursuant to
the joint venture exception to the hearsay rule. Specifically at issue was the introduction into evidence of certain incriminating statements made by two individuals who had allegedly worked with the defendant, Buschman, to transact
an illegal sale of firearms.' The trial judge refused the defendant's request to
give such a cautionary instruction, and the statements were admitted under the
hearsay rule exception. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the contention
that this was reversible error and affirmed defendant's conviction.' This comment
will consider whether a judge should give such a cautionary instruction when he
is requested to do so. It will also focus on the question of who should finally
determine the admissibility of hearsay, an issue which must be clearly resolved
before a complete discussion of the need for an instruction can take place.
The joint venture exception to the hearsay rule is a closely related corollary
to the co-conspirator exception. According to the co-conspirator exception,
courts may in certain instances provide that hearsay declarations of one conspirator, made in furtherance of the goals of a presently existing conspiracy, are
admissible in evidence against other alleged conspirators.4 Admissibility of
hearsay in cases where a number of people have allegedly worked together toward
criminal ends does not, however, depend upon the existence of a conspiracy
count in the indictment. The exception may be utilized not only in actual conspiracy trials, but also when, although a joint venture in furtherance of criminal
goals allegedly existed, the defendant against whom the evidence is admitted is on
trial for substantive offenses only.' This was the situation presented in Buschman.
The rationale for these exceptions is the existence of an imputed agency relationship among the participants in the conspiracy or joint venture.6 Each such
participant is assumed to have approved of the acts and statements that took
place in furtherance of the ends to which the members committed themselves.7
Accordingly, each member is responsible for the acts and statements of the others
* 527 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir. 1976).
1 527 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir. 1976).
2 Defendant was convicted of two counts of firearms violations. Count one charged
defendant with knowingly engaging in the business of dealing in firearms, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(a)(1), § 924(a), § 2 (1970). Count two charged him with the knowing
receipt and possession of firearms after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1) (Appendix), § 2 (1970).
3 527 F.2d at 1083-84, 1090.
4 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949), Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60 (1942), Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
5 Uniteal States v. Jones, 438 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1971), United States v. Spencer, 415
F.2d 1301 (7th Cir. 1969), United States v. Lawler, 413 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1970); United States v. Bernard, 287 F.2d 714 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 961 (1961).
6 United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1827). See also the joint venture
cases in note 5, supra, particularly Spencer and Bernard.
7 144 U.S. at 308-09.
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in furtherance of the undertaking. It is this "vicarious responsibility" which
provides the theoretical basis for the admission of hearsay statements pursuant
to these exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Courts have been required, however, to limit the use of these exceptions
because of the circular nature of this reasoning: statements admitted under and
exception tend to establish the existence of a conspiracy, but the existence of a
conspiracy is itself a prerequisite to the admissibility of the statements. Without
caution on the part of the courts, hearsay might "lift itself by its own bootstraps"
into admissibility.9 Confronted with this dilemma, courts have allowed the exceptions to be invoked only in circumstances involving sufficient non-hearsay
evidence to connect a defendant to an ongoing conspiracy or joint venture."
When this evidence was offered by the prosecution in Buschman, the defendant requested a cautionary instruction. Counsel for the defendant asked the
court to admonish the jury, first, that they could not consider this evidence until
the Government established beyond a reasonable doubt that there had been a
joint venture and, second, that proof of the existence of the joint venture could
not be accomplished by means of the hearsay declarations."
The trial judge denied this request, emphasizing that in his view the question
of the admissibility of this evidence was a matter for his sole determination. Thus,
it was not necessary to impress upon the jury the conditional nature of the
hearsay. 2 In so ruling, the judge agreed that the admissibility of this evidence
was predicated upon the establishment by the prosecution of the existence of a
joint venture by independent, non-hearsay evidence. The judge warned that if
the prosecution, after the presentation of its case, had failed to produce sufficient
independent evidence of a joint venture, a mistrial would be granted."
As the trial progressed, the government produced independent evidence
tending to connect Buschman to the joint venture. The judge, satisfied of the
sufficiency of the evidence, submitted the case to the jury, which returned a
verdict of guilty.'4
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit confronted a single issue: was the trial
court's refusal to give the requested cautionary instruction reversible error? Appellant's contention was that such an instruction must be given to the jury at the
time hearsay testimony of one joint venturer is admitted against another. 5
In affirming Buschman's conviction, the Seventh Circuit concluded, after
its own review of the evidence, that there was sufficient independent evidence of
defendant's participation in the scheme to render the hearsay fully admissible
against him. Thus, even if the judge had erred in not giving the instruction when
it was requested, this error would have been harmless in light of the fact that,
ultimately, none of the hearsay was excludible.'
8 287 F.2d at 720.
9 315 U.S. at 75.
10 Id. at 74; 438 F.2d at 466.
11 527 F.2d at 1084 n.1.
12 Id. The uncertainty as to who, in fact, does finally decide whether hearsay is fully
admissible against a particular defendant will be discussed at length in this comment.

13 Id.

14
15
16

Id. at 1084.
Id. at 1083.
Id. at 1084-85, 1090, and note 23, infra.
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In light of the court's conclusion that if there was error it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, it could have disposed of the appeal without considering the merits of defendant's argument. Such a disposition would have been
entirely proper, as it provides a sufficient rationale for affirming the conviction.
Nevertheless, the court did not confine itself to this narrow principle, but discussed the merits of requiring the judge to give a cautionary instruction when the
evidence is first offered. The Seventh Circuit concluded at the end of this
analysis that, while it recommends that the instruction be given in most cases,
it will not impose an ironclad requirement. The court thus upheld the exercise
of discretion by the trial judge. 7
This comment will consider the various arguments that appear in Buschman
concerning the question of whether the cautionary instruction should be given
when it is first requested.' 8 Crucial to the proper treatment of this question, however, is a discussion of who should finally determine the admissibility of hearsay.
Admissibility of such evidence in a conspiracy or joint venture case hinges upon
a finding that there is sufficient independent, non-hearsay evidence to connect
the defendant to the conspiracy or joint venture. The Seventh Circuit in Buschman failed to indicate who must make this determination. The court did not
discuss the question directly, and in the course of its opinion made statements
that are either ambiguous or contradictory in terms of this issue.
The court's failure to elaborate on this basic question is unfortunate. A
definitive statement on the issue of who must make this decision would have
heavily influenced the whole question of when, if at all, a cautionary instruction
must be given. For example, if the jury will eventually weigh the sufficiency of
the dependent evidence, separated from the hearsay, then it will have to learn the
details of its assignment at some point. Thus, an argument could be made that
this educational process should begin when the hearsay is first offered. Others
might argue that, for whatever reason, the instruction regarding the use of such
hearsay should be given at the end of the trial. Regardless of which argument
prevails, it is clear that the fact that the jury plays any role in determining the
admissibility of hearsay is a dominant factor in shaping the respective arguments.
Because of the court's failure to unequivocally decide who makes the final decision on admissibility, the extent to which these arguments are appropriate is
never certain. This prevents both a full understanding of the court's existing
discussion of the merit of requiring an instruction and a proper evaluation of the
court's conclusion.
In addition to providing a necessary contextual basis for the court's discussion, a consideration of the issue of who must make this evaluation would
have afforded the court an opportunity to reevaluate the ramifications of an
established Seventh Circuit practice. Prior decisions of the Seventh Circuit
indicate the use of a bifurcated procedure whereby the judge and the jury both
have a role in invoking the hearsay exception." The government argued in
17 Id. at 1089.
18 See the discussion accompanying note 72, infra.
19 United States v. Rizzo, 418 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1969), United States v. Allegretti,
340 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 911 (1965), adopting earlier dissenting
opinion in prior hearing, United States v. Allegretti, 340 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964),
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Buschman that this is solely a judicial decision, and cited case authority which
criticized any procedure allowing the jury to take part in the evidentiary determination." If the court had discussed the question of who should make this
decision on the non-hearsay evidence, instead of summarily dismissing the issue
without a consideration of the merits, the Seventh Circuit would have confronted those cases which demonstrate the weaknesses inherent in its bifurcated
procedure.
The Seventh Circuit in Buschman could have effectively disposed of the
appeal solely on the ground that if there was error it was harmless. However, the
court chose to discuss the question of whether a cautionary instruction should
have been given when it was requested. It is unfortunate that, in the context of
this arguably unnecessary analysis, the court ignored the problem of who must
ultimately decide the admissibility of the hearsay evidence, since an explicit and
consistent treatment of this issue would have been valuable to the court's existing
analysis of whether it should require an early instruction. In addition, this would
have afforded the Seventh Circuit the opportunity to examine a procedure
followed elsewhere which appears sounder, both theoretically and practically,
than the practice adopted in earlier Seventh Circuit cases.
The Court'sAnalysis in Buschman
The actual basis of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Buschman is not entirely
clear from the analysis offered by the court. Two possible interpretations support its ultimate determination: (1) there was no error committed when the
judge refused to give the cautionary instruction, or (2) if there was error, it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Much of the opinion consists of an extended analysis of policy considerations and of decisions in other cases focusing
on whether the judge must give the cautionary instruction when requested.
Further support of the first interpretation of the Buschman decision is the court's
conclusion that "On the full record of the present case . . . , we hold that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the instruction."'"
Added to this is the caveat that in most circumstances the trial judge would be
"well advised" to give a timely cautionary instruction when hearsay is proffered.22
This segment of the opinion, standing alone, imparts the clear impression that,
in the court's view, the trial judge committed no error.
However, the Seventh Circuit appears to have retreated from this position
in the paragraphs following this conclusion. The court went on to state that,
because the government produced ample independent evidence to connect
Buschman with the joint venture, the hearsay statements of his co-venturers were
fully admissible against him. Because of that fact, no evidence was improperly
considered by the jury. These circumstances fully justify the court's later statement that, "the facts of this case establish that the trial court's refusal to grant
the initial request for the cautionary instruction, if error, would be harmless
20 United States v. Ragland, 375 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 925
(1968).
21 527 F.2d at 1089.
22 Id.
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beyond a reasonable doubt...." Thus, the Seventh Circuit provided another
rationale for affirming the conviction, one which did not depend on an outright
decision that there was no error at trial. While both rationales support the court's
ultimate disposition, it is less than clear which one was determinative.
More confusing, however, is the Seventh Circuit's stance on the basic issue
of whether the judge or the jury has the final responsibility for making the
evidentiary decision on which the admissibility of hearsay depends. Not even the
court's discussion of what must be included in the requested instruction leaves a
clear indication of who has this responsibility. In its summary of the events of
the trial, the court relates that defense counsel asked for a cautionary instruction
that the jury could not consider hearsay testimony until the prosecution "had
established" the existence of a joint venture by means of independent evidence.24
Similarly, in the course of its later admonition that in most instances it would be
appropriate for such an instruction to issue from the trial judge, the court stated
that the instruction should emphasize that the admissibility of the hearsay depended on the condition that the defendant "be shown," by evidence independent
of the hearsay, to have been a joint venturer.2" Neither statement sheds light on
the question of who, in the court's viewpoint, should make that decision. The
requirement that defendant's status as a joint venturer be "established" or
"shown" by independent evidence is ambiguous, since it is not clear to whose
satisfaction this fact must be "shown. 26
Further uncertainty is generated by the fact that the court at various points
in its opinion appears to alternately endorse the two conflicting positions. In
discussing the wisdom of requiring the instruction requested by Buschman, the
court speculated that such a requirement would unnecessarily impede conspiracy
and joint venture cases "by placing a limitation upon evidence at the time admitted when, on the entire record, it would have been demonstrated that it need
not have been limited at all." 27 This statement implicitly presupposes that it is
the judge who makes the evidentiary determination. Unless the judge alone
determines admissibility, he cannot be in a position at the conclusion of the trial
to state that the evidence need not have been limited.
The court made a similar implication later in its opinion. In upholding the
23 Id. at 1090. The court makes this statement immediately after its refusal to consider
the contention that the judge alone should determine the matter of admissibility. It is not
clear whether the reference to harmless error was meant to apply only to the hypothetical
in which the judge made the sole determination of admissibility, or whether the statement
applied to the instant case, where the jury did have a role. Since, as the court concluded,
there was no improper consideration of hearsay, the error would seem to be equally harmless
no matter who made the determination. Whether or not this particular statement was meant
to refer to the present case, the court's analysis, as discussed in this comment, supports that
basis of disposition. As the court said in another part of the opinion, "the defendant can
hardly allege that he was manifestly prejudiced by the court's initial decision to allow the
Government to introduce hearsay statements subject to a connection requirement." Id.
24 Id. at 1084.
25 Id. at 1089.
26 As will be seen, prior Seventh Circuit cases have utilized a procedure whereby the judge
makes the preliminary determination based on the independent evidence. If he is satisfied
with the independent evidence the jury must then also separately consider such evidence before
the hearsay becomes admissible. Perhaps the requested instruction should inform the jury
about both aspects of the problem, but the Buschman court's discussion does not indicate
that it had in mind this allocation of functions. The case remains ambiguous on this question.
27 527 F.2d at 1086.
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judge's exercise of discretion in not giving the instruction, the court indicated
that the judge, at the time the request is made, must confront the question of
"whether there [is] any real need for an instruction

. .

.

,"

since the prosecution

could still, over the course of the trial, link Buschman to the joint venture by
independent evidence.2" This statement appears to be another acknowledgment
of the notion that the judge alone must determine the sufficiency of the independent evidence. If the trial judge can decide that no instruction is needed, and
the court here suggests that he can, then the clear implication is that the task of
passing on the independent evidence is for the judge alone.
However, at other times the Buschman court implied that the jury retains
some role in determining the admissibility of hearsay. When the court discussed
the role of an appellate court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in conspiracy cases, it noted that, when considering an appeal, the court must decide for
itself whether sufficient independent evidence existed, "by which the jury could
tie each defendant to the conspiracy." 29 While the clear thrust of the court's
earlier statements is that it is the judge alone who is concerned with the distinction between hearsay and independent evidence, here it appears that the jury
must make the separation and arrive at a preliminary factual decision.
The intimation that the jury must first separately consider the independent
evidence in order to determine admissibility is bolstered by the extent of the
court's discussion of cases from other circuits in which the jury is required to
perform a similar task." Concededly, the Seventh Circuit attempted to distinguish
Buschman from these other cases. However, the court never questioned the
basic premise advanced in those cases: it is ultimately the jury which must tie
a defendant to a conspiracy before a co-conspirator's declarations can be admitted against him.
Prior Seventh Circuit cases, not considered by the court in Buschman, indicate that in the past this court has accorded to the jury a role in weighing the
independent evidence." In such cases, the Seventh Circuit has employed a
bifurcated procedure in which (1) the judge first makes a determination of the
sufficiency of the independent evidence and admits the co-conspiratorial declarations if the independent evidence satisfies him, and then (2) the jury must also
separately consider the independent evidence before it can consider the hearsay.
United States v. Allegrett3 2 illustrates this procedure. There, the district
court had ruled that certain acts and statements of co-conspirators were admissible against the other conspirators. The defendants' appeal from their convictions required the Seventh Circuit to address the question of who must make the
28 Id. at 1089.
29 Id. at 1085.
30 United States v. Dejesus, 520 F.2d 298 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975),
United States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948
(1975), United States v. Apollo, 476 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1973).
31 See note 19, supra.
32 340 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1964). See also note 19, supra.
33 Id. at 248-50. This discussion occurred in the original dissenting opinion adopted by
the Seventh Circuit on rehearing. The appeal was based on the contention that in announcing
to the jury that the evidence was admissible the judge conveyed the idea that the conspiracy
had already been proven and thus usurped the jury's function. 340 F.2d at 249.
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decision based on the independent evidence. 3 Sitting en banc, " the court held
that in order for such evidence to be admissible the trial judge must determine,
without considering the statements made by other alleged conspirators, that a
conspiracy existed and that a particular defendant was a member of it. If the
judge is satisfied of these facts, and also of the fact that the statement or action
was in furtherance of an ongoing conspiracy, the challenged evidence is admitted
by the judge without limitation." The court re-emphasized after this analysis
that, "the determination of such facts upon which admissibility depends is the
province of the trial judge,"36 and for this proposition it cited United States v.
Dennis and United States v. Carbo. 7 Both of these cases agree with the position
that the judge must follow such a procedure, and in so doing criticize any
practice that reserves a role for the jury in the evidentiary determination.
Despite explicitly approving a rule whereby determination of this issue rests
with the judge, the court in Allegretti proceeded to endorse a procedure whereby
the jury subsequently makes another preliminary determination before the
declarations of co-conspirators are considered. The Allegretti court quotes with
approval the trial judge's charge to the jury, in which he explained ( 1) that acts
and statements of co-conspirators, made in furtherance of the conspiracy, are
admissible against any defendant only if the jury determines that there was a
conspiracy and that defendant was a member of it, and (2) that in making this
determination that defendant was a conspirator, "the jury are [sic] not to consider
what others may have said or done."'"
This test is broader than a limitation on hearsay, since it also includes a
restraint on the use of acts of others and of all statements of others, whether or
not they are hearsay. Hearsay is, however, clearly within the category of, "what
others may have said," and the effect of this instruction is to require the jury to
make a further test to determine whether any hearsay will be admissible against
a particular defendant. Thus, before the jury can consider co-conspiratorial statements against a particular defendant, it must first, without considering any such
statements, connect the defendant to the conspiracy. This charge does not speak
at all of "independent evidence," of "hearsay," or "admissibility."' 9 However,
34 This was an en banc rehearing of the case, which had already been before the court
once. On rehearing, the Seventh Circuit specifically adopted the dissenting opinion in the
earlier case. See note 19, supra.
35 The admission of the evidence is made without limitation on his part. It will be seen
shortly that the jury still has a voice in determining the admissibility of the evidence against
a particular defendant.
36 340 F.2d at 248.
37 Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953
(1964), United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd on other grounds, 341
U.S. 494 (1951). These cases will be discussed at length later in the comment.
38 340 F.2d at 250. By way of contrast, the procedure advocated by cases such as Dennis
and Carbo (note 37 supra) is one whereby "the judge alone separates hearsay from nonhearsay and decides whether the hearsay is admissible. Once he admits the hearsay, the jury
considers it as it would other evidence, and never has to make any separation of the types of
evidence.
A subsequent Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Rizzo, 418 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1969),
confirms the approach taken in Allegretti. Rizzo also makes it clear that when the jury makes
the determination upon which the use of co-conspiratoria acts and declarations depends, the
standard of proof in this inquiry is "reasonable doubt." 418 F.2d at 82.
39 Taken as a whole, the instruction seems to be intended as a check on the possibility
that a defendant will be prejudiced by an unwarranted connection with the acts and statements of other alleged conspirators. In other words, there may be some statements of other
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despite the Allegretti court's failure to address the implications of the instruction,
it is clear that the judge's determination of the admissibility is not final. Before
the jury may consider co-conspiratorial declarations, it must perform its own
version of the independent evidence test."
The trial judge in Buschman followed this procedure in dealing with the
admissibility of the hearsay. When defense counsel requested the cautionary
instruction, the judge made it clear that the preliminary decision upon which the
admissibility of hearsay hinged was for him to make. At the end of the trial, the
judge concluded that the independent evidence linking defendant to the joint
venture was sufficient, and denied defendant's motion for acquittal.4 ' Nevertheless, when instructing the jury, the judge used the identical charge in Allegretti.
In making its preliminary determination as to whether Buschman was a participant in a joint venture, the jury still had to exclude from its consideration, "what
others may have said or done." Then, and only then, the instruction continued,
could acts and statements of other members be used by the jury against the
defendant Buschman.42
Role of the Judge and Jury in the Determination of Admissibility
It is apparent that, if the Seventh Circuit in Buschman had dealt with the
question directly, rather than by indirect and at times contradictory inference,
it would have had to confront cases such as Allegretti in its discussion of who
must make the evidentiary decision. This fact makes the court's failure to
elaborate all the more regrettable. Not only would consideration of this issue have
clarified the related discussion of whether an instruction should have been given,
but it also would have required the Seventh Circuit to examine its past practice
in the light of some of the cogent analysis offered by other circuits.
In Buschman the Government argued that the question of admissibility is
alleged conspirators that do not refer directly to a particular defendant, and there may be
acts that are not performed in his presence or with his knowledge. It is important that such
evidence not be imputed to the defendant on any agency principles unless, in fact, he was a
member of the conspiracy. Thus, he should first be connected to the conspiracy by his own
actions and statements, and the Allegretti charge requires this. 340 F.2d at 250. However, the
Court's instruction goes further and requires the jury in making the connection to exclude all
statements of other conspirators, even, apparently, hearsay statements admitted earlier by the
judge. Such hearsay may refer to what the defendant in question said or did. This is evidence as to a defendant's own conduct, and, once admitted by the judge, would seemingly be
eligible for use by the jury in determining whether the defendant was a conspirator. However,
the hearsay is indeed something that "others . . . have said"; thus, the instruction requires
the jury to ignore even this evidence and to engage, in effect, in a redetermination of the
admissibility of hearsay. The instruction given in United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.2d 754 (2d
Cir. 1970) attempts to cope with this problem.
40 It appears that the jury's version is slightly different, in form if not in substance, from
the judge's task. As Allegretti points out, the judge must determine by means of the independent evidence bath that there is a conspiracy and that this defendant was a participant in it.
340 F.2d at 248. The instruction to the jury requires it to ignore evidence of acts and statements of others in determining whether a defendant was a member of the conspiracy; the
charge does not specify which evidence may be used to establish the conspiracy itself., 340
F.2d at 250-52. The difficulties discussed in this comment would seem to be the same when
the jury has any responsibility in the admissibility determination, so that it is doubtful whether
this distinction has any significance.
41 527 F.2d at 1084.
42 Defendant's Requested Instructions, at 2. This instruction is the model contained in
1 E. DEVITT & . BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONs § 11.15 (1970).
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solely for the judge to decide. To support this proposition the Government cited
United States v. Ragland," a conspiracy case from the Second Circuit. In
Ragland, the trial judge had admitted hearsay statements of co-conspirators into
evidence against a particular defendant. In instructing the jury, the judge explained that it could not use these statements against the defendant unless it
first found that, independently of the hearsay, a prima facie case of conspiracy
had been established." Thus, the jury, as in the Allegretti case, was required to
weigh for itself the sufficiency of the independent evidence before the hearsay
became fully admissible against defendant.
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that this burden on the jury was unnecessary: the judge alone determines whether there is sufficient independent
evidence to admit the hearsay. Once he admits it, the jury is not required to
make any further separation of the hearsay, but may consider it undifferentiated
from the other evidence. The jury is not required to "second-guess" the judge's
determination. 5
The rationale for this rule was developed in a group of opinions written by
Judge Learned Hand. In United States v. Nardone," defendants appealed their
conviction for conspiracy and for substantive crimes relating to the smuggling of
alcohol. Appellants argued for reversal because the trial judge refused to charge
the jury that before they could consider declarations of a co-conspirator against
another they must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the particular
defendant was indeed a member of the conspiracy. Commenting on the duty
which would thereby be imposed on the jurors to separate the declarations from
other evidence, Hand wrote:
Thus, the request was that the jury should consider the declaration only
after coming to a conclusion about another fact; an admonition presupposing
a mental gymnastic impossible for anyone, judge or jury, though judges
have at times presumed themselves capable of it. The competency of evidence
is for the judge alone; any question of fact upon which it depends he must
decide; if he admits it the jury may use it like other evidence-for whatever
it proves to their minds-they can have no concern with rulings about
47
evidence which, as far as it is possible, ought to be kept from their notice.
Judge Hand thus questioned the practical value of such an instruction and
voiced doubts that a juror could successfully compartmentalize evidence, as is
required when the jury has a role in determining the sufficiency of non-hearsay
evidence. In United States v. Dennis,4' he indicated another problem with such.
a procedure. There, the trial judge had reserved the evidentiary question for the
jury and, although his analysis was not necessary to dispose of the appeal, Judge
Hand discussed why that procedure was not proper. He reasoned that if a jury
must satisfy itself that a particular defendant was a member of the alleged conspiracy before co-conspiratorial declarations can be used against that defendant,
43

375 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1968).

44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 478-79.
Id. at 479.
127 F.2d 521 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 698 (1942).
Id. at 523.
183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950). See also note 37, supra.

[Vol. 52:450]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

then the declarations are useless: the case is in effect decided in the course of
this preliminary determination. In other words, to decide that the declarations
are admissible, the jury must first decide that the defendant is guilty of conspiracy. 9
Cognizant of these problems inherent in any approach whereby the jury
participates in this evidentiary decision, the Second Circuit has firmly adhered to
the course suggested by Learned Hand. The law in that circuit today is that the
judge first determines, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, whether there is
sufficient independent non-hearsay evidence to show that a defendant participated in the conspiracy. Once the judge is satisfied, the jury may then consider
all of the evidence, hearsay and non-hearsay, in determining defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.50
The Second Circuit is not the only court that has reached the conclusion
that the jury should have no role in the independent evidence test. In Carbo v.
United States, the Ninth Circuit, in an often-cited opinion, endorsed Hand's approach after a thorough and well-reasoned analysis of the issue. 5 There the
court noted that what makes the issue so delicate is that admissibility is predicated
on a factual determination which is precisely the same as the ultimate factual
question in the case. As the court noted, "the declarations are admissible against
the defendants if they are co-conspirators. If they are co-conspirators they are
guilty." If the jury must first find, beyond a reasonable doubt and solely by
means of the independent evidence, that defendant participated in the conspiracy,
then the hearsay, when admitted, has no value. 2 The jury in effect has already
found the defendant guilty in the preliminary inquiry; the newly admitted hearsay is therefore superfluous. The co-conspiracy exception to the hearsay rule,
an exception created to allow this evidence to come before the jury, is thus
negated by the very procedure which attempts to implement the exception.
The court in Carbo also condemned the suggestion that the problem,
whereby the ultimate factual issue in the case is resolved in the evidentiary inquiry, could be avoided simply by requiring the jury to weigh the independent
evidence by a lesser standard than reasonable doubt.5 3 As an example, the
Carbo court considered the possibility of making the admissibility of the challenged evidence depend upon the government's proving, solely by means of the
independent evidence, a prima facie case.5" The court noted that under this
49 183 F.2d at 230-31. As Hand puts the matter, "In strict logic these instructions in
effect altogether withdrew the declarations from the jury, and it was idle to put them in at all."
50 In addition to Ragland, Nardone, and Dennis, this principle has been reiterated in
United States v. Glazer, 532 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1976), United States v. Projansky, 465 F.2d
123 (2d Cir. 1972), United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d "Cir. 1969), United States
v. Nuccio, 373 F.2d 168 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967), United States v.
Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1945).
51 314 F.2d 718 '(9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964). The Second Circuit
in Nuccio, refers in a footnote to the "helpful discussion" provided by Carbo. 373 F.2d at
173 n.3. Also, in the commentary 1 E. DaviTT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICF AND
INSTRUCTIONS § 29.07 (1970), the editors cite the "excellent discussion" of this problem
provided by Carbo.
52 314- F.2d at 736. The Court notes that by following such a procedure, "The district
court in effect will have told the jury 'You may not consider this evidence unless you first find
the defendant guilty.'"
53 Id. at 737.
54 Id.
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process the jury not only would have to "compartmentalize" evidence, a difficult
feat in itself, but would also be required to apply different standards depending
upon which evidence it was considering at the time. The Ninth Circuit unequivocally stated that a jury could not possibly implement such a procedure
successfully, and speculated that the imposition of this task might confuse the
jury's perception of the necessary standard of proof. Prejudice to the defendant
might well result.55
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit in Carbo reached the conclusion that has
been often repeated by the Second Circuit: the judge must be the sole arbiter of
the factual question to be resolved before the hearsay exception can be successfully
invoked.56
The Third Circuit has also expressed agreement with the principle enunciated by the Second Circuit and by Carbo.57 Of the numerous Third Circuit cases
dealing with this issue, of particular importance to this discussion is United States
8
v. Van Orden."
In that case the court addressed a situation not explicitly
covered by the cases discussed above. Each of the previously considered cases
actually involved a conspiracy trial. However, in Van Orden, hearsay was admitted against a defendant who was convicted of substantive offenses and not of
conspiracy. The situation is thus more closely analogous to Buschman and the
other Seventh Circuit "joint venture" cases."
Under the circumstances, the court expressed no hesitancy in requiring the
judge alone to determine the admissibility question." This rule had been previously announced in the Third Circuit in a case in which there had been a
conspiracy conviction, 1 but the Van Orden court applied the principle without
any discussion of the different circumstances presented by a joint venture case. 2
While all of the cases considered thus far have involved the conspiracy or
joint venture exception to the hearsay rule, there is in the traditional rules of
55 Id.
56 Despite the acclaim accorded to the Carbo decision, a more recent Ninth Circuit case
demonstrates that the policy is not consistently applied even there. The Court in United
States v. Griffin, 434 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1970), upheld an instruction which gives the jury a
role in much the same manner as the Seventh Circuit does. The Carbo case is not mentioned.
57 United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom., Vespe
v. United States, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976), United States v. Rodrigues, 491 F.2d 663 (3d Cir.
1974), United States v. Van Orden, 469 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1972), United States v. Bey, 437
F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1971).
58 469 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1972).
59 See note 5 supra and the accompanying text.
60 469 F.2d at 464.
61 United, States v. Bey, 437 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1971).
62 Although the situation paralleled that in Buschman, the Third Circuit did not use any
"joint venture" language in its discussion of the exception to the hearsay rule and the mechanism by which it is invoked.
Van Orden thus adopted the Bey rule without extensive discussion.
This result seems
entirely proper, since there is no rational basis for applying a different rule in joint venture
cases than in conspiracy trials. The burden on the jury of compartmentalizing evidence in
order to determine the admissibility of hearsay is the same whether the hearsay is admitted
under the joint venture or conspiracy doctrine. The problem of effectively finding the defendant guilty in the preliminary inquiry and thus neutralizing the hearsay exception is also
present in both instances. If the jury were required to find by means solely of the independent
evidence that the defendant participated in the joint venture which allegedly committed the
crime, there would be nothing left to decide once the hearsay was admitted. Thus, the arguments in favor of sole judicial determination of the issue, advanced in cases such as Carba,
Dennis, and Nardone, apply with equal force to both the joint venture and the conspiracy
exceptions.

[Vol. 52:450]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

evidence broad support for a rule whereby the judge alone decides all preliminary

factual matters. This rule is not confined in its application to this particular
hearsay exception. McCormick cites as rationale for this position the argument
that the jury is unable and unwilling to ignore parts of the evidence they have
heard and thus is incapable of properly making preliminary determinations."
McCormick further notes, however, that there is a "strain" upon this principle
when the preliminary question coincides with one of the issues of fact on which
the case depends. Nonetheless, he still expresses support, citing Dennis and
Carbo, for a rule that leaves a judge in sole control of whether the particular
evidence is admissible."4
As noted earlier, the Seventh Circuit is not the only court which has allocated to the jury some responsibility for this evidentiary decision. In Buschman
the court discussed cases which, although primarily concerned with establishing
the requirement that a cautionary instruction be given upon request when hearsay
is first introduced, also stand for the proposition that the jury must pass on the
sufficiency of independent evidence before hearsay becomes fully admissible
against a particular defendant. 5
Of the cases discussed in Buschman, United States v. Honneus66 explicitly
provides for the jury's participation in the evidentiary decision. In Honneus,
the First Circuit heard an appeal from a conspiracy trial at which the judge, at
the time the hearsay was offered, instructed the jury that this evidence could not
be used against a defendant unless the jury found that that particular defendant
was a member of the conspiracy.6
While this instruction would seem necessarily to imply that the declarations
could not be used against a defendant when the jury was making the determination of whether he was a member, the First Circuit apparently did not think that
the implication was strong enough or complete- enough. The court concluded
that the charge did not adequately forewarn the jury that it must find both that
the existence of the conspiracy and defendant's participation in it have been
shown by independent evidence before the hearsay can be admitted. 8 In the
First Circuit's analysis, this point must be clearly explained to the jury,
since the jury is unfamiliar with distinctions drawn in the rules of evidence.
Without direction from the court, "it would be most natural for the jury, in
endeavoring to ascertain whether the defendants were in fact members of the
63 MCCoRasICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 53 (2d ed. 1972).
64 Id. Also the Federal Rules of Evidence, though not yet in effect at the date of Buschman's trial, provide a broad statement of support for the rule that the judge alone determines
evidentiary matters. Rule 104(a) states that "Preliminary questions concerning . . . the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the Court. . . ." While this rule does not
contain any explicit language that the judge's determination is to be final, certainly the Rule
does not encourage the use of a procedure which allows the jury to take part in the evidentiary decision after the judge has ruled on the matter. There is no indication that the words
"shall be determined by the Court" envision anything other than a sole judicial determination. At the very least, courts in Circuits that have in the past allocated to the jury some
function in this procedure will have to confront this statutory rule of evidence in any
future consideration of the issue. FED. R. Evn,. 104.
65 See note 30, supra.
66 508 F.2d 566 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
67 Id. at 576.
68 Id. at 576-77.
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conspiracy, to consider all evidence that apparently bore thereon."69 The court
discussed this in the context of the issue of the desirability of giving a cautionary
instruction when it is requested. Nevertheless, it is clear that the First Circuit has
no doubt that the jury must make the final evidentiary decision. Noticeably
absent in both Honneus and Buschman's discussion of Honneus is an analysis of
the logical and practical ramifications of this assumption. °
If the Seventh Circuit in Buschman had availed itself of the opportunity
presented by the government's argument that Ragland was applicable, it could
have explored some of these ramifications. As mentioned earlier, by discussing
the question of who must make the ultimate determination on admissibility, the
court would have added a necessary dimension to its analysis of whether an instruction should be given when requested. Perhaps more importantly, the court
would have been confronted with the fact that cases which it discussed, such as
Honneus, do not effectively come to grips with the problems posed in Dennis,
Nardone and Carbo 1 For example, the question of whether any court can
realistically expect a jury to make the necessary separation of different types of
evidence would have arisen. Even if the court assumed that the jury could
complete this assignment, the Seventh Circuit would still have faced a problem:
the jury must effectively find the defendant guilty before the hearsay can be
admitted. The exception to the hearsay rule is thus negated by assigning the jury
a role in this process.
It appears that in imposing the burden of making the evidentiary determination on the jury, courts have been concerned that damaging hearsay is used too
freely in conspiracy cases. Such courts, apparently, have simply assumed that
this requirement would provide an adequate safeguard, without considering the
problems outlined in cases such as Nardone, Dennis and Carbo. It would seem
that a preferable way to comply with the requirement that there be independent
evidence of a defendant's participation in a joint venture or conspiracy before
the exception to the hearsay rule is invoked is to leave this preliminary matter
solely in the hands of the trial judge.
The Requirement of a CautionaryInstruction
Although the opinion in Buschman is ambiguous, it -is clear from
analysis of cases such as Allegretti that the Seventh Circuit reserves some role
the jury in determining whether hearsay is admissible against a particular
fendant. This is so despite the court's failure to explicitly acknowledge that

an
for
dethe

69 Id. at 577.
70 The Fifth Circuit also appears to require the jury to assess non-hearsay evidence before
hearsay becomes fully admissible against a defendant. See United States v. Apollo, 4-76 F.2d
156 (5th Cir. 1973), a case discussed in Buschman because of its establishment of a requirement that the cautionary instruction be given -when the hearsay is first introduced. The
rationale of Apollo is discussed in this comment. See note 72, infra, and the accompanying
text. On the role of the jury in the Fifth Circuit, see Landers v. United States, 304 F.2d 577
(5th Cir. 1962), which clearly requires the jury to find both that a conspiracy existed and
that a particular defendant was a member of it before hearsay becomes admissible against
that defendant. 304 F.2d at 582.
71 Hopefully, the court also would have discussed some of its own prior cases, such as
Allegretti, and seen that these cases too are vulnerable in light of the rationale of Dennis,
Nardone and Carbo.
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jury is in effect participating in the evidentiary decision, and despite the lack of
any attempt to confront the well-reasoned criticism that has been directed against
this procedure. With this basic issue thus "resolved," the court's discussion can

be considered in its proper context. As previously noted, at issue is whether the
trial judge was required to give a cautionary instruction to the jury, upon timely
request, when hearsay evidence concerning statements made by co-venturers was
admitted against Buschman.
The arguments of the First and Fifth Circuits in cases such as Honneus and

Apollo are applicable here. These courts acknowledged a need for an early
instruction. Inasmuch as jurors are generally oblivious to evidentiary considerations, they must be admonished not to consider such statements against any
conspirator or joint venturer until they are satisfied by independent evidence that
the particular defendant was part of the conspiracy. As the court in Apollo says,
"This delicately dangerous defusing must be firmly in the jury's minds when the
hearsay is proffered."7 2
In addition to this policy argument, the Fifth Circuit in Apollo relies on
Lutwak v. United States,7" a Supreme Court case which the Seventh Circuit has
accurately interpreted as not being directly on point. In Lutwak the Court dealt
with the necessity of limiting co-conspiratorial declarations made after the conspiracy had ended.74 In its opinion the Court stated that not all hearsay evidence
in conspiracy trials is admissible against all defendants; certain statements, such
as those made after the expiration of the conspiracy, will be admissible only
against the declarant and those present who assent to the statement. Immediately
after making this comment, the Court noted that "these declarations," must be
limited by the Court at the time they are introduced." Later courts, such as the
Fifth Circuit in Apollo, have been inclined to quote this statement as providing
support for a rule requiring a judge to give early cautionary instructions in cases
0
such as Apollo and Buschman."
However, the Seventh Circuit has correctly
pointed out that the Supreme Court in Lutwak was only referring to declarations
which are definitely limited to the declarant or to those present who in some way
assent to the statements. 7 It is unlikely that the Supreme Court in Lutwak was
consciously addressing itself to the problem of the instant case, in which the
evidence is only limited subject to the requirement that the government at some
point produce independent evidence sufficient to make the hearsay admissible.
Lutwak is not direct authority in these circumstances.
In addition to distinguishing Lutwak from these factual situations, the
72 476 F.2d at 163; 508 F.2d at 577.
73 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
74 The conspiracy involved an attempt to defraud the United States in its administration
of the immigration laws, by effecting the entry of three aliens as spouses of American veterans
according to the provisions of the War Brides Act. The Court concluded that the conspiracy
ended when the last alien entered the country; thus, statements made after this point could
not be admitted under the exception to the hearsay rule, since they were not in furtherance
of an ongoing conspiracy. It is this type of statement which the Court discusses. The conviction in Lutwak was affirmed, however, because only one statement was improperly admitted,
and the Court concluded that this did not affect the result. 344 U.S. at 615-20.
75 344 U.S. at 619.
76 476 F.2d at 163.
77 527 F.2d at 1086 n.4. This point is also mentioned in United States v. Halpin, 374
F.2d 493 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1032 (1967), an earlier Seventh Circuit case
similar to Buschman. The court's discussion of Lutwak appears at 374 F.2d at 496.
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Seventh Circuit in Buschman advanced a policy argument which, according to
the court, militates against the establishment of an absolute requirement that the
instruction be given. The court stated that this requirement would "unduly
hamper" the progress of such trials, in that evidence would be limited when it
later turned out to be fully admissible due to the sufficiency of the independent
evidence. The court questioned the value of requiring an instruction when in so
many instances it will ultimately be surplusage.
This argument is inaccurate, however, because it presupposes sole judicial
determination of the sufficiency of the independent evidence."
The court's
analysis is nbt appropriate in a discussion of whether an instruction should be
given in those jurisdictions in which the jury has a role in determining the admissibility of hearsay. If the judge determines with finality the sufficiency of the
independent evidence, then his decision that there is enough such evidence makes
the earlier instruction unnecessary. The hearsay is fully admissible without any
further action on the part of the jury. However, when the jury participates in
determining the admissibility of hearsay, the judge's decision that the independent evidence suffices is not dispositive of the admissibility issue: the jury
must also separately consider the independent evidence. At some point the judge
must instruct the jury concerning the details of this task. Perhaps the Seventh
Circuit would have been justified in holding that the jury is sufficiently educated
by an instruction given at the end of the trial, so that an earlier instruction is unnecessary.8 ° However, the court's indication that the earlier instruction might be
useless in the sense that it might never have to be given is inappropriate. 8
While this point, stressed by the Seventh Circuit in Buschman, is thus not
pertinent to an assessment of the validity of requiring an instruction, there is one
argument against the imposition of the requirement which appears to merit consideration. This argument suggests that if the judge must give a cautionary instruction at the time the hearsay is offered, the impact of the challenged evidence
on the jury may be unduly exaggerated. Although the purpose of the instruction
would be to educate the jury about the details of its function, this emphasis on
the peculiar nature of the evidence also might impart to it an unwarranted
prominence in the minds of the jurors. Thus, when the time comes for them to
ignore the hearsay in the assessment of the independent evidence, they will be
unable to do so. The hearsay will have colored all of the evidence, making compartmentalization impossible.
The cumulative effect of these considerations is to underscore the wisdom
and simplicity of the approach of the Second and Third Circuits, whereby the
evidentiary decison is made solely by the judge, with no jury participation.
However, when the arguments are examined under the assumption that the
jury has a role even after the judge decides to admit the evidence, cases such as
78 527 F.2d at 1086, 1089-90.
79 See earlier discussion of this point in this comment (notes 27-28 and the accompanying
text).
80 A related contention will be discussed in the next paragraph of the text.
81 This argument in Buschman is reflective of the trend, seen in Allegretti, whereby the
final instruction dealing with acts and statement of co-conspirators (the instruction given in
both Allegretti and Buschman) is not explicitly seen as giving the jury a role in determining
the admissibility of hearsay. See note 39, supra.
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Apollo and Honneus seem to indicate that the preferable course is to require that
the instruction be given when it is requested. However, the persuasiveness of this
argument is not so overwhelming, nor the likelihood of prejudice to the defendant
in the absence of the early instruction so clear, as to render untenable the balance
which the Buschman case sought to achieve by recommending but not requiring
that the judge give the instruction in all cases. The court acknowledged that in
most cases the instruction should be given to the jury, but left it within the discretion of the trial judge to refuse to grant the instruction.82 Both the expression
of a preference and the reluctance to establish an ironclad rule seem appropriate.
Conclusion
In affirming Buschman's conviction, the Seventh Circuit could have limited
itself to the conclusion that, even if the trial judge had committed an error in
refusing to give the requested instruction, it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.83 Such a disposition is justifiable in light of the fact that there was ample
independent evidence to connect Buschman to the joint venture, so that no
hearsay was improperly considered by the jury. This analysis provides a
sufficient basis for affirming the conviction. Nevertheless, the court expanded the
scope of its discussion beyond this point, and considered the merits of requiring
the judge to give the instruction when it is requested. The court concluded with
its recommendation that an instruction is warranted in most cases, followed by
its refusal to require that an instruction always be given.84 While this whole
discussion was arguably unnecessary, this seems to be an appropriate resolution
of the question concerning the necessity for such an instruction.
While the court's reluctance to require a judge to give the requested instruction in all cases thus seems justifiable, its discussion of this issue is open to
criticism. First, the court failed to provide any indication of its stance on a pivotal
question: who finally determines the admissibility of the hearsay? Such an indication was necessary to furnish a perspective from which its discussion could be
viewed. In addition, the court missed an opportunity, presented to it by the
government's claim that judicial determination of admissibility is the proper rule,
to consider some well-reasoned arguments in favor of that principle. In the
absence of any consistent indication in the opinion, it is to be assumed that the
court spoke with an understanding that the two-part procedure, endorsed by its
past decisions and followed by the trial judge here, was appropriate. However,
the arguments of cases such as Nardone, Dennis and Carbo, among others, cast
serious doubt on the logical and practical validity of the Seventh Circuit's
practice.
In Buschman the appellant was not prejudiced by the incomplete discussion
because the court could have disposed of the appeal by concluding that if there
was error it was harmless. However, in choosing to ignore the issue of who must
make the ultimate evidentiary determination, the Seventh Circuit obscured the
issue which it discussed, making its analysis less valuable. More importantly, the
82 527 F.2d at 1089.
83 Id. at 1090.
84 Id. at 1089.
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court lost a chance to discuss the procedure followed in the Second Circuit, which
is less complex than past Seventh Circuit practice but which is nevertheless an
appropriate vehicle for dealing with this delicate problem. The procedure
whereby the judge alone determines the sufficiency of the independent evidence
lessens the chances of jury confusion by eliminating the imposition of standards
which are probably impossible for the jury to meet and which, if they are met,
effectively eliminate a long-standing exception to the hearsay rule. Hopefully,
the Seventh Circuit will soon be confronted with a case in which a discussion of
its two-part system for determining the admissibility of statements of co-conspirators and joint-venturers is necessary, so that the well-founded criticism of this
procedure can be more straightforwardly evaluated."5
Mark McLaughlin

85 A District Court within the Seventh Circuit, before the Buschman case, discussed many
of the issues which appear in this comment, and noted that the Court of Appeals has not
adequately resolved some of the problems regarding the determination of the admissibility of
hearsay. United States v. Herrera, 407 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Ill. 1975).

III. Federal Statutes and Governmental Regulation
ANTITRUST-PATENT LICENSING

AGREEMENT WHICH HAS THE EFFECT OF
REQUIRING THE CONSENT OF MORE THAN ONE PARTY FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
FUTURE LICENSES Is TO BE EXAMINED UNDER THE RULE OF REASON

Moraine Products v. ICI America, Inc.*
Introduction
The patent law explicitly grants to a patentee the right to exclude all others
from the making, using or selling of the patented item. The lone patentee
exercising this right will seldom encounter an antitrust problem. However, many
patentees are not possessed of the expertise and capital necessary to successfully
exploit their legal monopoly. Thus, in an effort to commercially exploit their
monopoly market such patentees usually convey some or all of the rights granted
by a patent for a fee to those who are better able to commercially market the
invention. However, the conditions and restrictions attached to these conveyances have become an increasingly frequent target for antitrust attacks.
The Seventh Circuit in Moraine Products v. ICI America, Inc.,' was confronted with a patent licensing agreement which purported to grant an exclusive
license without the right to issue sublicenses. Upholding the decision of the
district court, the Seventh Circuit ruled that such an agreement was not per se
illegal.' Nonetheless, on examination of both the terms of the agreement and the
conduct of the parties, the Seventh Circuit held such an arrangement was not
within the scope of the patent's protection. As the district court had not subjected the agreement to a "Rule of Reason" enquiry,4 the Seventh Circuit
remanded the case for a determination of the reasonableness of the trade restraint
involved.'
This comment will examine both the effects of antitrust restrictions on patent
licensing agreements and the economic policies underlying such antitrust restrictions. Such an examination will reveal that the Seventh Circuit's refusal to
1

2
3

538 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1976).
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970):
Every patent shall contain . .. a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the
term of seventeen years, of the right to exclude others from making, using or selling
the invention throughout the United States ....
538 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 145.

4

Under a "Rule of Reason"

analysis, courts engage in

extensive examination of the

complained-of conduct, its impact on the applicable product and geographic markets, its
economic justification, its history of prior use by and within applicable markets, the size and
strength of competition within the markets and the existence of any barriers to entry into the
market; all in an effort to determine the reasonableness of the particular restraint of trade

involved. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); DeFilippo v. Ford Motor Co., 378 F. Supp. 456 (W.D.
Pa. 1974).
As the Seventh Circuit noted in Moraine Products the absence of a written opinion from
the district court forces one to rely on bench pronouncements to understand its exact holding.

538 F.2d at 146. This, to some extent, obfuscates the precise nature of the examination below.
5 While the language of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), prohibits literally "all
contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade," the courts have construed it as
prohibiting only "unreasonable restraints." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1 (1958).
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declare per se illegal provisions of patent licensing agreements requiring the
consent of more than one party for the issuance of future licenses is unsupported
by the present case law and contrary to the economic theory underlying both
patent and antitrust laws. The court's rejection of the per se illegality of such
provisions appears to impede the achievement of maximum allocative efficiencythe goal of a well-balanced patent-antitrust interface-without increasing the
possibility of the safe business use of such an agreement.
During the 1950's Dr. J. Alfred Rider, a gastroenterologist, developed a
chemical composition for the relief of flatulence in human beings. His research
centered around the use of both methylpolysiloxane (M.P.S.) and finely divided
silica.' During the same period another physician, Dr. Wolffe Harry Feinstone,
filed a patent application for a simethicone-containing deflatulent.
In 1958, Moraine Products was incorporated for the purpose of promoting
Rider's invention. Later that same year, the Stuart Company7 approached
Moraine and expressed an interest in marketing deflatulents containing Rider's
invention. Shortly thereafter, Stuart entered into an agreement with Moraine
which called for a five percent royalty on the sale of simethicone-containing
products in exchange for the assignment of Rider's invention.'
After Stuart began marketing Rider's deflatulent, the Feinstone patent was
issued. Although not identical with the claims of the still pending Rider patent
application, the Feinstone patent claims were similar enough to endanger Stuart's
marketing position. Stuart feared that the production and marketing of the Rider
invention might require a license under the Feinstone patent. Indeed, such fears
were borne out when Plough, a corporation marketing the patented Feinstone
invention, informed Stuart that the unpatented Rider deflatulent infringed the
Feinstone patent. Subsequently, Stuart rescinded its agreement with Moraine
to market the Rider invention and entered into a licensing agreement with
Plough.
Under this licensing agreement,9 Plough granted to Stuart a license, ex6 As in the Seventh Circuit's opinion, the term "simethicone" will be used throughout
this comment to refer to the combination of ,M.P.S. and finely divided silica. That term
originated in the media advertising of "Di-Gel," one of the products involved in this case.
538 F.2d at 137 n.4.
7 The Stuart Company was later acquired by Atlas Chemical Industries which, in turn,
was later acquired by ICI America. Id. at 136 n.1. For the sake of consistency, the
defendant-appellee will hereinafter be called Stuart.
8 This agreement was to be effective whether or not a valid patent issued. Id. at 136.
9 The relevant portion of this agreement provided:
1. Plough grants to Stuart the right to use the Feinstone Invention and a license,
exclusive except as against Plough and Block Drug Company (as provided in
Paragraph 6 hereof), in the United States, its territories and possessions, and nonexclusive in foreign countries, to make, use and sell compositions covered by said
Letters Patent No. 2,951,011, any extension or reissue thereof . . . Stuart does not
have the right under the license granted herein to sub-license in the United States,
its territories and possessions the making, using or selling of said compositions or any
of them; but Stuart may grant sub-licenses to third parties in countries foreign to the
United States and its territories and possessions ....
2. Plough reserves the right of Plough to use the Feinstone Invention and to make,
use and sell compositions covered by said Letters Patent No. 2,951,011, any extension or reissue thereof, covered foreign patents, but except as to Block Drug
Company as provided in Paragraph 6 hereof . . . Plough will not grant to any third
party a license to make, use and sell said compositions or methods of using them in
the United States, its territories *and *possessions.
*
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clusive except as to Plough and one other licensee. In addition, Plough withheld
from Stuart the right to issue sublicenses.
Nine years after the issuance of the Feinstone patent, the Rider patent was
finally issued. Stuart subsequently challenged the validity of that patent and
eventually obtained an adjudication of its invalidity." Moraine, the promoter of
the Rider patent, then initiated the instant action asserting that the mutual agreement between Stuart and Plough to restrict the granting of licenses under the
Feinstone patent exceeded the bounds of the monopoly afforded by the patent
laws. Accordingly, Moraine argued that such an agreement should be judged
under the general provisions of the antitrust laws and, when so judged, amounted
to a "contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade" in violation of
§ 1 of the Sherman Act. Further, Moraine contended that such agreements to
restrict the granting of future licenses have such a pernicious effect on competition, and are so totally lacking in redeeming economic virtue, that they constitute
a per se violation of the antitrust laws. Thus, there was no need for an elaborate
inquiry into the precise harm caused or business excuse for its use." Alternatively,
Moraine argued that, even if such agreements are not illegal per se, the evidence
in this case establishes that the defendants have conspired or combined to impose
an unreasonable restraint on commerce.'
The damage Moraine alleged was the loss of royalty income from the Rider
patent prior to the adjudication of its invalidity.'" Since potential licensees under
the Rider patent also required a license under the Feinstone patent in order to
practice the Rider invention, Moraine argued that the illegal provision of the
Stuart-Plough licensing agreement, which restricted the number of licenses that
would be granted under the Feinstone patent, necessarily reduced the number of
licenses which could be granted under the Rider patent and, thereby, deprived
Moraine of royalty income.'
6. Plough may grant a license under the patents . . . to Block Drug Company of
Jersey City, New Jersey. Plough will exercise its best efforts to limit license to Reed

& Carnick Division of Block Drug Company and to their product known as
"Phazyme"....
10 As a condition of the settlement agreement between Moraine and Stuart for breach
of the 1960 agreement between them, Stuart was given an option to obtain an exclusive license
to practice the Rider invention when and if a patent issued. As soon as the Rider patent
issued, Stuart exercised this option and, shortly thereafter, demanded that Moraine sue Plough
for infringement. After this suit was initiated, Stuart initiated an action seeking declaratory
judgment of the Rider patent's invalidity. These actions were joined and subsequently
resulted in a final adjudication that the Rider patent for the use of simethicone as a human
deflatulent was invalid. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Moraine Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 353
(E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd. in part, 509 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1974).
11 The courts have long acknowledged the existence of a certain category of antitrust
violations where a conclusive presumption of unreasonableness attaches to conduct because of
its tendency to "necessarily produce consequences violative of the Sherman Act or to produce
proscribed consequences in such an overwhelming proportion of cases that minute inquiry in
every instance would be wasteful of judicial and administrative resources." Kennedy v. Long
Island R. Co., 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963). See note 4, supra.
12 See note 5, supra.
13 The recovery of such damages is predicated on the statutory presumption of validity
which attaches to a patent grant. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970).
This assumes, of course, that there was no fraud in obtaining the patent or any prior
knowledge of its invalidity on Moraine's part. See, Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co.,
465 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 939 (1973).
14 The recovery of lost royalties would be restricted to those reasonably anticipated, based
on projected market share, during the period of the patent's presumed validity. It was exactly
these lost royalties that Moraine sought to have trebled under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
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In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the necessity for an indepth economic analysis of the entire competitive setting surrounding the licensing of patents.'" It labelled as "truncated" the judicial focus on only the specific
terms of the licensing agreement, especially when such a narrow examination is
used to upset desirable commercial practices. The court's opinion is significant in
that it distinguished prior cases which held per se illegal license provisions requiring the consent of more than one party for the issuance of future licenses.1"
While the court accepts the contention, at least in this case, that such provisions
are outside the patent's protection, it asserts that neither existing legal nor
economic analysis warrants the conclusion that they are so pernicious or lacking
in redeeming economic utility as to justify a presumption of per se illegality. 7
Patent-Antitrust Interface
Analytically, it is important to realize that the patent consists of nothing
more than the right to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention."8 In interpreting this "right to exclude others," the Supreme Court, since
its earliest decisions, has consistently emphasized that the primary object of the
patent system is, in keeping with its constitutional origins, 9 to benefit the general
public and not to exclusively benefit the inventor.2" By acknowledging that the
primary object of the patent law is to yield a net benefit to the public-via the
grant of a temporary "incentive monopoly" to the inventor 2-- the courts have
unwittingly enunciated the economic theory on which the patent law must either
15 538 F.2d at 145.
16 See notes 57 and 59 infra.
17 538 F.2d at 145.
18 See note 2 supra, The oft repeated judicial explanation that "the patentee receives
nothing from the law which he did not have before and the only effect of his patent is to
exclude others . . ." is only partially true. Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243
U.S. 502, 510 (1917); Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1912); United States v. American
Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 239 (1896). While it is correct to say that the inventor, prior to
the enactment of the patent laws, still owned the product of his inventiveness; what he did
not own was the right to prevent others from duplicating or independently inventing his
creation. The reduction of this "right to exclude" to a property interest which can be bought,
sold or waived for a profit is certainly an example of the patentee receiving something from the
law which he did not have before. The patent grant is, thus, the reduction to a property
interest of the right to invoke the government's power to prevent others from utilizing his discovery without his consent.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8 provides Congress with the power:
To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.
The Patent Code, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. was enacted pursuant to this grant of authority.
20 Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322 (1858); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 1 (1829).
21 As to the dicta, it states:
A patent is not, accurately speaking, a monopoly . . . A Monopoly takes something
from the people. An inventor deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before
his discovery, but gives something of value to the community by adding to the sum
of human knowledge.
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933). There can be little
of substance to support it. The statement may be true as to inventions which could have been
exploited without divulging the secret of their creation, and those only to the extent that another does not subsequently discover and disclose the same invention within 17 years. As to all
the remaining patented inventions-about 98% of them-the patent system deprives the public
of its previously enjoyed right of 17 years of a non-monopolistic price structure in the invented
item.
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stand or fall. That is, that the patent system effects a pattern of resource allocation under which the wealth-increasing function of commercially useful inven2
tions22 outweighs the wealth-decreasing function of the seventeen-year monopoly.
Implicit in this theory is the assumption that the patentee will restrict the supply
of the invented product or process only as much as is necessary to arrive at the
highest possible profit margin.24 In all other regards, the theory of the "incentive monopoly" is that the patentee will fully exploit his invention by attempting to meet the consumer demand. 5
The antitrust laws are, on the other hand, largely concerned with assuring
the possibility of competition within a given product market. These laws attempt
to minimize prices by instilling competition between product-alternatives.26 The
theory of the competitive model, engendered in the antitrust laws, is that lower
product prices will result from several suppliers vying for a larger share of the
existing demand. 7 Obviously, this helps assure that the things consumers want
are produced in sufficient quantity at competitive prices.
The benefits intended to be derived by consumers from the antitrust laws,
while more apparent, are, nonetheless, the same as those intended by the patent
system. Producing more of what consumers want at the lowest cost with the
22 That a patent grant rewards only economically useful inventions is inherent in the very
nature of a monopoly grant. The right to be the sole supplier and, thus, exact a monopoly
price for an invention is of little value if the demand for the invention, itself a function of the
wealth increasing potential of the invention to the consumer, is not sufficient to support a price
structure from which the inventor can recoup his investment together with the desired level
of profit.
23 This assumption could be measured in quantitative economic terms by subtracting the
total value of decline in economic utility (benefit realized vis-A-vis cost) suffered by the public
by reason of the price increases resulting from the output restrictions of a patent monopoly
from the value of the total increase in economic utility realized by all the invention's users.
24 Assuming an informed consumer class, no one would pay more for an item than the
dollar equivalent one individually assigns to the added value, benefits or uses made possible by
the item (ie., the item's "economic utility"). Given that limitation, the incentive offered by
the patent system is the ability to either choose beween restricting output or totally meeting
existing demand or a combination of -both. Obviously, the patentee will choose that course
which permits the maximum profits. In any event, the absence of competition will permit the
item's price structure to approach the value of the item's economic utility to the consumer.
There may, of course, be a difference between how the consumer values such things as time,
leisure and prestige and how the patentee values them (as reflected in the item's price).
25 The patentee, of course, has no obligation to exploit his monopoly. Special Equip. Co.
v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945); Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210
U.S. 405 (1908). Nevertheless, it is clear from the very fact that a monopoly is given, that
the patent system expects exploitation.
26 W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW (1973); Panel Discussion, Patents, Technology and Antitrust Enforcement, 42 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.R. 78, 85 (1972); Kidwell, PatentRight Interchange and Antitrust Policy: Defining the Interface, 43 U. COLO. L. REv. 360
(1972).
27 As is true with most models, the economic model of "perfect competition" is best
utilized as a tool of analysis rather than a goal or substitute for reality. Under that model,
the private enterprise (i.e., profit-maximizing) system would, in the absence of a patent incentive, allocate those resources presently used for research and development to the production
of products currently in demand. This would increase their supply of the demanded product
and, thus, their profits. The problem with this theory is that it discounts the fact that, even
in the absence of a patent system, a certain amount of innovation would result from the
producers' desire to achieve product superiority over competitors and, thereby, maximize profits
by "capturing" a larger share of the demand. Additionally, it assumes that all commercially
useful inventions were developed in a quest for profits. For a succinct presentation and analysis
of the theories that the patent system causes a misallocation of resources by either overrewarding
or underrewarding innovation, see W. BOWMAN, supra note 26; Edwards, Technological
Progress and the Patent Laws, 15 IDEA 19 (1972).
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least amount of scarce resources is certainly the goal of both systems." The
patent systems approach towards this goal is to reward those inventions which
have a wealth-increasing potential to consumers even at monopolistic prices.29 The
antitrust system attempts to achieve this goal by prohibiting output restrictive
agreements in an effort to increase supply and reduce prices.
From the economic vantage point, the patent and antitrust laws are not
inherently in conflict, but are rather two separate paths toward the same end
(wealth-increasing benefits to consumers and efficient producers). That neither
path is boundless in its means presents for resolution the legal question of where
the path dividers should be placed. That the law should look to the economic
ends to be attained for guidance in the placing of those dividers is, itself, patently
obvious.
Judicial Interpretation:The Patent Rule of Reason
As stated earlier, most patent-antitrust conflicts arise from restrictions attached to a conveyance of some or all of the patent rights.'
Generally, these conveyances take the form of a patent licensing agreement.
A patent license is, in effect, a waiver of the patentee's right to sue for infringement." Under such an agreement, the licensee has neither a property right in
the patent nor the right to maintain an infringement action in his own name.' A
patentee may convey by a license the right to make, the right to use, or the right
to sell (or any combination thereof), the patented product or process throughout
the United States. The patentee may even limit the license to a defined field of
use or geographic area."
Often, either the royalty charged by the patentee for the license, or the
peculiar nature of or limited demand for the patented item, may lead the licensee
to require that no further licenses be issued before they will invest the required
capital in the marketing of the item. The licensee will often view this restriction
on future competition as essential to the recoupment of his investment in the
marketing of the item. In order to meet this requirement; the licensee may
request from the licensor an exclusive license; the effect of which will prevent the

28 See note 26, supra.
29 Of course, the assumption is that in the absence of an incentive monopoly the energies
and capital would not be expended on producing those inventions which have wealth increasing potential to consumers. Thus, the monopoly price is the lowest cost at which the
consumer can get the benefits attendant to use of the invention. However, when an invention
which would have been forthcoming anyway is patented (i.e., given an incentive monopoly), the
net effect to society is wealth-decreasing.
30 See generally L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 183 (1977); Kadish, Patents and Antitrust:
Guides and Caveats, 13 IDEAS 83 (1969).
31 4 A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENrS § 380 '(2d ed. 1965); 60 AM. JuR. 2d Patents §§
346-48 (1972).
32 Id. See Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 277 U.S. 8 (1927).
33 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1935).
Of course, this is not to say that patent licenses involving field of use or territorial restrictions
are totally, or even substantially, free of antitrust problems, see Adelman & juenger, PatentAntitrust: Patent Dynamics and Field-of-Use Licensing, 50 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 273 (1975). See
also Kadish, supra note 30.

[Vol. 52:467]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

licensor from granting any license other than the one in question. 4 Usually, an
exclusive license conveys to the licensee the right to issue sublicenses 5
When a patentee, in an effort to maximize his profits from his incentive
monopoly, engages in licensing part of his right to exclude, his chances of running
afoul of the antitrust laws are significantly increased. Since the famous Bath Tub
Trust Case," it has been clear that a patent licensing agreement may not be used
as a shield behind which all restrictions or conditions attached to a license may
hide from antitrust inquiry. In that case, the Supreme Court stated:
Rights covered by patents are indeed very definite and extensive; but they do
not give, any more than other rights, a universal license against positive
prohibitions. The Sherman Law is a limitation of rights,
rights which may
37
be pushed to evil consequences and therefore restrained.
After that decision, it became necessary to determine when restrictions contained in a licensing agreement were a permissible exploitation of the patent
monopoly and when they were violative of antitrust laws as contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade. Once it was determined that the two
bodies of law touched, it became necessary to define their interface.
8
The Supreme Court, in United States v. General Electric,"
promulgated a
test, now referred to as the "Patent Rule of Reason," which delineated the
boundaries of this interface. 9 The Court was asked to determine the legality of
a license provision which purported to set the price at which licensees of General
Electric's light bulb patent could sell the patented product. In answering the
question whether a patentee may restrict a licensee in the selling of a patented
item by limiting the method of sale and the price, the Court stated: "We think
he may do so provided the conditions of sale are normally and reasonably adapted
to secure pecuniary reward for the patentees' monopoly.""0
Examining the patentee's rights vis-ii-vis the antitrust laws, the Court stated:
[T]he patentee may grant a license to make, use and vend, articles under the
specifications of his patent for any royalty, or upon any condition the per34 An exclusive license involves a promise by the licensor that he will not thereafter license
others. An exclusive licensee may, unlike a non-exclusive licensee, maintain an infringement
action in his own name or with the patent owner, W. Electric Co. v. Pacent Reproducers Corp.,
42 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1930); A. DELLER, supra, note 31; 60 A?.. JUR. 2d Patents § 349
(1972).
35 The Seventh Circuit, citing R. NORDHAUS & E. JURow, PATENT-ANTITRUST LAw §
122 (2d ed. rev. 1972), distinguishes between an "absolute exclusive license" which prevents
the licensor from granting any other licenses and usually carries with it the authority to grant
sublicenses, and "limited exclusive licenses" which are merely licenses accompanied by a
covenant not to grant any further licenses without the licensee's consent. 538 F.2d at 141.
This distinction would appear to be valid as long as it is based on the fact that the
consent of two parties is required under the "limited exclusive license." However, should an
"absolute exclusive license" withhold the right to issue sublicense, any meaningful distinction
would dissolve.
36 Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912).
37

Id. at 49.

38 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
39 Actually, the Court referred to a "Rule of Reason" test for patent-antitrust conflicts in
an earlier case, Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 1058 (1902); however, the
test was not expressly adopted until the General Electric case.
40 272 U.S. at 490.
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formance of which is reasonably within the
4 1 reward which the patentee by the
grant of the patent is entitled to secure.

The effect of this "reasonably within the reward" standard is to delineate the
"scope" of the patent monopoly and to proscribe those license restrictions which
expand or extend it. The most obvious example is a license provision which
purports to require the purchase or use from the licensor of an unpatented
product as a condition for the licensing of the potential product. This would have
the effect of extending the monopoly on the patented item to the unpatented
42
one.
Justice's Antitrust Division: The Ancillary and Necessary Test
This "Patent Rule of Reason" test has come under considerable attack by
the Patent Section of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division.4 1 In particular,
the Department's concern has centered around those license restrictions which it
views as not "necessary" to the exploitation of the patent monopoly. Presently,
the Justice Department advocates the following test:
The rule of reason in this area embraces . . . three principal elements: first,
the restriction or limitation must be ancillary of the lawful main purpose of
a contract; second, the scope and duration of the limitation must not be
substantially greater than necessary to achieve the purpose;
third, the
44
limitation must be otherwise reasonable in the circumstances.

This approach disregards the "scope" concept and utilizes in its stead a
concept of the patent exploitation as an encroachment on the competitive sphere.
Under such an approach, it would seem that the problem of containing the output restrictive effects of the patent monopoly solely to the patented item is not as
significant as the desire to instill as much competition as possible between the various exploiters (licensees) of the monopoly." In essence, it promotes a competi41 Id.
42 For an interesting contra argument asserting that the "tied-in" product may be nothing
more than a method of measuring the economic utility of the patented item to the licensee for
the purpose of determining royalty, see W. BOWMAN, supra note 26 ch. 4.
43 Bowes, The Patent-Antitrust Law Interface: How Should it Be Defined?, 18 IDEA 25
(1976); Frost, Restrictions on Fields of Use and Territories, 42 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 633
(1974); Oppenheim, The Patent-Antitrust Spectrum of Patent and Know-How License Limitations: Accommodation? Conflict? or Antitrust Supremacy?, 15 IDEA 1 (1971); Panel Discussion, supra note 26.
44 Address by Richard W. McLaren, The Licensing of Technology Under the United States
Antitrust Laws, 40 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 931, 936 (1971). This is essentially the same test
used to determine the legality of trade restraints under an antitrust enquiry as laid down in
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
45 By asking whether a covenant not to license without mutual consent is "ancillary to the
lawful main purpose" (i.e., exploiting the monopoly), the focus is shifted from one of monopoly
as an incentive to competition as the norm. Indeed, it would seem premised on the assumption
that by instilling competition between the exploiters of the monopoly, the public will enjoy
lower prices as both licensee and licensor will, by reason of the other's presence in the market,
be seeking to produce more efficiently.
It is quite possible that the exact opposite may be true as non-licensing and the exaction of
royalties may well create a stronger motive to invent around the patent and, thus, provide a
product alternative to the public. Certainly, competition between alternatives is more advantageous to the public than competition by a licensee already obligated to pay royalties which
are undoubtedly passed along to the consumer.
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tive encroachment into the sphere of a legal patent monopoly. Such a test may

result in the impairment of productive efficiencies"0 without necessarily effecting a
reduction in the sale price or inherent output restrictions. 7 This approach to
patent-antitrust cases fails to differentiate between legitimate, wealth-increasing
profit maximization and illegal, wealth-decreasing monopoly extension.
Moraine Products: The Need for Exclusivity

Against the foregoing economic and legal background, the particular license
restriction involved in the Moraine case must be examined. In relevant portion,
the licensing agreement of January, 1961, between Plough and Stuart purported
to grant to Stuart a license under the Feinstone patent exclusive except as against
Plough and one other drug manufacturer." Moreover, Plough covenanted not
to grant to any other third party a license to make, use or sell the patented composition. As a consequence of this agreement, no additional licenses could be
granted without the consent of both Plough and Stuart.
There are valid economic justifications for exclusive licenses.49 Often a
licensee may require exclusivity as a precondition to his investment of capital in
converting the patented item to a marketable form and marketing it.
Exclusivity would be a legitimate solution to the problem of subsequent
licensees unjustly utilizing both the refinements in the patented item and the
consumer demand created by the initial licensee's marketing and advertising
programs. Having not borne those initial costs, subsequent licensees could enter
the product market with a lower price structure. Exclusivity would, in such a
situation, permit the initial licensee to recoup his investment together with
reasonable profit without fearing undercutting by a subsequent licensee.5"
The problems, both legal and economic, inherent in exclusive licensing are
twofold: first, its tendency towards an oligopoly in the product-market; and
second, its tendency to foreclose further exploitation of the patent, thereby increasing the output-restrictive, wealth-decreasing effects of the monopoly. In its
opinion, the Seventh Circuit recognized and discussed in detail the oligopolistic
aspects of such a licensing scheme. It acknowledged that when such a scheme
is used to suppress incentives to attack patent validity or to invent around the
patent, or is used to allow the licensees to divide a market among themselves and,
thus, regiment an industry, there is good reason to declare such a restrictive
scheme illegal. 5 However, the court went on to state that there is evidence in the
46 It is nothing short of misconception to believe that even a monopolist is not motivated
to produce efficiently. By reducing production costs, profits will increase whether the market
be monopolized or highly competitive.
However, many royalties are computed on the amount of the patented item produced and
not on the items actually sold. By insisting on competition between patent-exploiters, the
"ancillary test" may actually have the effect of forcing licensees to forgo such efficient business
methods as inventory accumulation and enlisting consignment dealerships in an effort to avoid
paying high royalties while sales are not active. If, on the other hand, fully exploiting the
monopoly (i.e., meeting consumer demand) was the focus of patent licensing law, the licensor
who intends to remain in the market might well be more agreeable to a flexible royalty arrangement.
47 W. BowfiAN, supra, note 26.
48 See note 9 supra.
49 Adelman & Juenger, supra note 33.
50 Id.
51 538 F.2d at 145.
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record supporting both Moraine's assertion that the licensing scheme was a conspiracy to divide the market and Stuart's assertion of a sound commercial ground
for desiring the license restrictions.5" With such a record as a basis, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that the debate surrounding the patent-antitrust interface has
not conclusively established the anti-competitive purpose or effect of mutual
agreements not to grant sublicenses. Thus the court could not "properly eschew
economic analysis and rule .. .the license contract was illegal per-se." 3
Analysis of the Seventh Circuit's Conclusion: The Case for Per Se Illegality
Several Supreme Court decisions dealing with the interface between patent
and antitrust laws have clearly established a judicial preference for attacks on the
validity of any given patent; permitting the monopoly to stand only if the patent
is held valid.54 In the instant case, the agreement, by requiring the consent of
both the licensor and licensee for the issuance of future licenses, clearly makes it
more difficult for third parties to obtain rights under the patent. This, the
Seventh Circuit reasoned, placed such third parties in a position conducive to
attempts to either challenge the patent's validity or to invent around it; actions
which would have been against their economic interest had licenses been freely
given. The benefits the public derives from such attempts, when coupled with the
less output-restrictive effects of an oligopoly (i.e., having more than one party
exploiting an essentially monopolized market), are sufficient, in the Seventh
Circuit's view, to overcome any argument that the agreement has a solely pernicious effect.55
While the court's conclusion against per se illegality is arguably supportable
when examined solely against the judicial policy of encouraging challenges to
patent validity, it, nonetheless, loses much of its persuasive force when examined
in the light of both prevailing economic theory and existing case law. Indeed, the
Seventh Circuit's opinion recognized that judicial scrutiny of patent licensing
agreements should go beyond a mere analysis of their terms and examine the
totality of the economic impact of such agreements.5
However, in conducting
such an examination, the court apparently failed to recognize the purely outputrestrictive results of permitting future licensing of patents to depend upon the
mutual consent of both patentee and an exclusive licensee. While the terms of the
agreement may appear to encourage third party attempts to overcome the patent
monopoly, should such attempts arise it would be in the economic interest of the
parties to the agreement to extend licensing options to the attacking parties.
Indeed, this may be the only time their economic interests coincide. Just such
considerations have led other courts to hold similar agreements per se illegal.
As early as 1951, in United States v. Besser Manufacturing Co.," a district
court, confronted with a licensing scheme which involved the granting of ex52 Id. at 148.
53 Id. at 145.
54 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (abolishing the doctrine that licensees are
estopped from challenging the validity of the patent they are licensed under).
55 538 F.2d at 145.
56 See note 15 supra.
57 96 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Mich. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).
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clusive licenses and an agreement between the licensees and patentee that no
future licenses would issue without mutual consent, noted that this conduct
exceeded the scope of the patent. Recognizing that exclusive licenses may be
valid, the Besser court, nevertheless, held that it was the combination, geared
toward foreclosing present and future competition, which primarily invalidated
the agreement."8 The Besser court appreciated that the patent law, in awarding
an incentive monopoly, intended that the output-restrictive effect of that
monopoly should be only that which is necessary t6 maximize the profits of one
party, the patentee.
Besser was followed five years later by United States v. Krasnov."9 The
Krasnov case involved a cross licensing agreement under which the assignee of
the first patent licensed a patentee of another patent and vice versa. Each party

agreed to relinquish its individual rights to license others and to act jointly in approving or disapproving license applications. Unlike Besser, the licenses involved
in Krasnov were non-exclusive licenses. Citing Besser, the Krasnov court held
that it was the combination of interest in an effort to restrict present and future
licensing which made the agreement illegal per se.60
While it is certainly true that both the Besser and Krasnov cases involved
several other acts offensive to the antitrust laws (price fixing, pooling of patents,
harassment suits, interlocking directorates, etc.), the Seventh Circuit's conclusion
that those cases are distinguishable on that basis,61 and therefore not controlling
on the issue of per se illegality of such license restrictions, is questionable in light
of the language used by both the Besser and Krasnov courts." Indeed, proponents of both the "Patent Rule of Reason" as enunciated in the General
Electric case, and the "Ancillary and Necessary" test as propounded by the
Justice Department, have agreed that the Besser and Krasnov cases are correct in
condemning purely contractual agreements requiring more than the consent of
one party for the issuance of future licenses."3
The Seventh Circuit correctly recognized that § 261 of the patent code, 4
granting the patentee the right to convey exclusive rights under his patent, must
be construed in connection with the antitrust laws.6 Nonetheless, the court expressed concern that such a construction should not upset desirable commercial
58

The Besser court stated:
We believe that the contract under question goes further than is necessary to protect
the patent monopoly of [the patentees]. It may well be that an exclusive license to
one party may be valid but here the patentees have joined hands with the two
largest competitors . . . and have virtually made it impossible for others to obtain
rights under those patents. The contract even gives [the licensees] the power to
restrict competition-present and future-by requiring their joint consent before
licensing others. It is this combination requiring collective action that primarily
invalidates the agreement.
96 F. Supp. at 311.
59 143 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1956 ), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 5 (1957).
60 Id. at 192.
61 538 F.2d at 140.
62 See notes 58 and 60 supra.
63 30 Food DRUG CosM. L.J. 545, 553 (1975); Address by Asst. Attorney General
McLaren, [1969] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
50,106; Oppenheim, supra note 43, at 18.
64 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970) states, in relevant part:
The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner
[by an instrument in writing] grant and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole for any specified part of the United States.
65 538 F. 2d at 143.
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practices without taking into account the factual and economic realities of the
particular market. In rejecting the per se illegality approach, the court apparently
accepted as reasonable the possibility that a licensor would utilize a licensing
scheme, such as the one involved in this case, out of apprehension that he may
be unable to recoup profits lost to competing licensees."6
Assuming that a patentee will make his licensing decisions so as to maximize
his profits under his incentive monopoly, the licensing of another firm to make,
use and sell the patented item must be premised on the belief that the royalties
generated from the increased sales made by the licensee will exceed the loss in
direct profits suffered by the licensor as a result of the added competition. Of
course, this analysis would hold true only when, as in this case, the licensor is
himself engaged in marketing the patented item. Thus, the licensor would restrict his licensing efforts in such a way as to assure that his royalties, together
with his direct profits, represent the maximum profits possible from the incentive
monopoly. The issuing of more licenses would serve only to decrease his profits.
This, in turn, would result in the least output-restrictive situation possible in
light of the patentee's legal right to maximize his profits under his incentive
monopoly.
The use of an exclusive license with no right to issue sublicenses, by a
licensor who is himself engaged in marketing the patented item, results in a situation where the issuing of future licenses will depend not only on the patentee's attempts to maximize profits but also on the licensee's desire to restrict competition
in an effort to increase his direct profits. The result of such an arrangement will,
in most instances, be more output-restrictive than licensing programs which
depend solely on the patentee's search for maximum overall profits. Moreover,
the licensee's need for an exclusive license in order to recoup development and
marketing expenditures would appear to be materially lessened, both by the
initial presence of the licensor in the market, and by the licensee's realization
that the licensor will not seek maximum competition in the market due to his own
presence there.
In short, the use of exclusive licenses with covenants not to sublicense, by
a licensor engaged in marketing the patented item, would seldom, if ever, be a
result of a patentee's legitimate profit-maximization drive.
Conclusion
Whatever may be the Seventh Circuit's view as to the proper scope of a
patent monopoly, it is clear, in light of existing legislation, that the legal propriety
of a seventeen-year incentive monopoly must be recognized. However one defines
the patent-antitrust interface, it is important to note that the Supreme Court has,
in keeping with the language of the Constitution, consistently emphasized that the
primary object of the patent system is to benefit the general public through "the
progress of science and useful arts," and not to exclusively benefit the inventor."z
Regardless of the test used to determine the interface, it is clear from an economic
66
67

Id. at 145.
See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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vantage point that the public benefits only when the patent monopoly is restricted
to the value of the added utility made possible by the invention. The proper application of the antitrust laws would seek both to minimize output restrictions
resulting from patent exploitations and to recognize the legal propriety of
licensing schemes which are mainly profit-maximizing in effect.
The Seventh Circuit's rejection of the per se illegality argument, with respect
to exclusive licenses with covenants not to issue sublicenses made by a licensor
actively marketing the patented item, tends to encourage an oligopoly under
which future licenses could be granted as incentives not to attack the patent's
validity or to invent around it. It is difficult to foresee other circumstances in
which the economic interests of the patentee and exclusive licensee in issuing
future licenses would coincide. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit's rejection of per se
illegality of such licensing provisions tends to permit an increase in the outputrestrictive effects of the patent monopoly when such effects are not the direct
result of the patentee's legitimate drive to maximize solely his profits.
In this case, the court's recognition that the license condition, taken together
with the parties' repeated refusal to issue additional licenses, results in conduct
outside the scope of the patent's protection and forms the basis of its decision to
remand the case for an examination under the antitrust "Rule of Reason." This
resolution, while acknowledging the possibility of an unprotected restraint of trade,
fails to provide the concrete guidance so sorely needed in the quagmire of patentantitrust confficts.
Michael CraigDonovan
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Wright v. Commissioner*
Introduction
Alimony payments made by a husband to his divorced wife are tax deductible to him and includable as income to the wife.' When each spouse owns separate property, the divorce decree will usually require that the parties' marital
estate be divided in accordance with their respective ownership interests. Payments effectuating this division of the estate (also known as a property settlement) are neither deductible to the husband nor taxable to the wife. Proper
classification is, therefore, crucial and disputes often arise over whether a particular payment is alimony or part of a property settlement.
Wright v. Commissioner2 examined this classification issue to determine
whether payments made by a husband to his divorced wife constituted alimony
or were actually in the nature of a property settlement. In doing so, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that certain fixed installments made by William C. Wright
were periodic marital support payments and, therefore, alimony.
In Wright, the Seventh Circuit also dealt, for the first time, with the issue
of whether term life insurance premiums, paid by a husband pursuant to a
divorce decree, can also qualify as deductible alimony. The Seventh Circuit
held that term premiums are not deductible even if the wife is the absolute owner
and irrevocable beneficiary of he policy. The court based its decision solely on
the theory that premiums for term insurance, unlike whole life insurance, convey
no "ascertainable economic benefit" and, therefore, cannot be constructively
received.'
This comment will explore the reasoning used by the Seventh Circuit in
resolving each of the above issues. The Court's decision with respect to the alimony-property settlement issue is sound and consistent with the weight of
judicial authority. The Seventh Circuit, however, erroneously denied William
a deduction for the life insurance premium payments. Its distinction between
term and whole life insurance is unwarranted and inconsistent with both judicial
and statutory authority.
In 1967, Jean W. Wright filed a claim for divorce against her husband,
William C. Wright. She sought, among other things, alimony and a division
of property.' The couple stipulated that their combined net worth exceeded
543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976).
1 The Code never specifically uses the term alimony. I.R.C. § 71(a) requires that the
wife include as income periodic payments she receives pursuant to a divorce decree or written
separation agreement incident to a divorce. See note 24 infra: I.R.C. § 215(a) allows a husband a deduction for periodic payments to his former wife, provided such payments are included in the wife's gross income. See note 30 infra.
2 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976).
3 Id. at 600.
4 Id. at 595. William filed the original claim for divorce. Jean, in turn, filed a counterclaim and the parties proceeded on the latter.
*
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$1,000,000, of which $227,752 was attributable to property separately owned
by Jean.' The remaining assets were owned by William.6
On January 29, 1968 Jean was granted an absolute divorce.7 The pertinent
findings of fact and conclusions of law were as follows: 8
1. Alimony was denied.
2. William C. Wright was required to pay the premiums on a $200,000
term life insurance policy on his life in which Jean Wright was the absolute
owner and irrevocable beneficiary. 9 This obligation was to continue until
the earlier of William's sixty-fifth birthday or Jean's death or remarriage.
3. William was directed to pay Jean, in installments, $228,000 within
ten and one-half years dating from October 4, 1967.
In total, the divorce decree awarded Jean assets worth $459,018. This sum included the present value of the $228,000 installment payments, separately owned
property valued at $227,752, furnishings valued at $20,000, two automobiles
and a $41,260 discharge of indebtedness. 0
The divorce decree directed William to pay $2,000 each month for the first
six months, and at least $1800 per month over a 10'2 year period until the
$228,000 was paid." Further, it directed him to place in escrow marketable
securities sufficient in amount to assure full payment of the principal sum. 2
In May, 1968, three months after the divorce, the parties executed a mutual
release agreeing that the divorce provided for a property settlement "in lieu of
alimony." 3 In calandar years 1968, 1969 and 1970 William paid to Jean as
installments on the $228,000 principal sum, $22,200, $21,600, and $21,600
respectively. 4 In each of those years William also paid $1505, $1459 and
$1415 for term insurance premiums as required by the divorce decree. 5
Pursuant to a tax deficiency determination, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue ruled that Jean erroneously excluded the fixed installment payments
from her gross income in years 1968, 1969 and 1970. The Commissioner found
that the installments were alimony within the meaning of I.R.C. § 71 (a) and
(c). This determination entitled William to deduct the fixed payments pursuant
to I.R.C. § 215 (a)." The Commissioner, however, disallowed William's deduction of the term insurance premiums on the ground that the premiums were not
constructively received by Jean. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner on
both issues.' 7
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Jean contended that the Tax Court
5 Id. at 596.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 The life insurance policy described in the divorce decree was a ten-year, renewable
term policy which, if not converted to whole life, would remain in force until William reached
age 65. See William'C. Wright, 62 T.C. 377, 385 (1974), aff'd, 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976).
10 543 F.2d at 598.
11 Id. at 596-97.
12 Id. at 597.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 62 T.C. at 400.
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erroneously classified the installment payments as periodic within the meaning
of I.R.C. § 71 (a)."8 William also appealed, claiming that the insurance premiums he paid, pursuant to the divorce decree, were constructively received by
Jean. Therefore, he contended the IRS erred in disallowing his deduction of
the premiums in accordance with § 215 (a)." The Seventh Circuit denied both
parties' claims and affirmed the decision of the Tax Court.
The first issue the court of appeals considered was whether William's
installment payments were in the nature of a property settlement or alimony.
It stated that resolution of the alimony-property settlement controversy depends
upon the facts and circumstances of each case: 2 labels used in the divorce decree
are not conclusive. The court, therefore, attempted to uncover proof of the
parties' intent.2'
Jean cited several factors which, in her view, indicated that the installment
payments should be viewed as a property settlement: the payments were secured,
and hence not subject to the contingencies of death or remarriage; they were
made in exchange for her inchoate rights to her husband's property;" and, the
divorce decree stated that the $228,000 principal sum was for a "complete
division of the estate and to complete the division of property of the parties....
The Seventh Circuit, however, listed several factors which it felt outweighed
the indicia supporting the notion of a property settlement. First, the court held
that use of the 102 year installment payment period strongly suggested the
intention to classify the payments as periodic within the meaning of I.R.C.

§ 71(a) and (c):
Had the parties intended these to be installment payments under Section
71(c) (1), rather than periodic payments under section 71 (a), they could
easily have provided
that the principal sum of $228,000.00 must be paid
24
within ten years.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

543 F.2d at 597.
Id.
Id. at 598.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. I.R.C. § 71(a) in pertinent part provides as follows:
(a) GENERAL RULE(1) DECREE OF DIVORCE OR SEPARATE MAINTENANCE-If a wife
is divorced or legally separated from her husband under a decree of divorce or of
separate maintenance, the wife's gross income includes periodic payments (whether
or not made at regular intervals) received after such decree in discharge of (or
attributable to property transferred, in trust or otherwise, in discharge of) a legal
obligation which, because of the marital or family relationship, is imposed on or
incurred by the husband under the decree or under a written instrument incident
to such divorce or separation.
I.R.C. 71(c) provides:
(1) GENERAL RULE.-For purposes of subsection (a), installment payments
discharging a part of an obligation the principal sum of which is, either in terms of
money or property, specified in the decree, instrument, or agreement shall not be
treated as periodic payments.
(2) WHERE PERIOD FOR PAYMENT IS MORE THAN 10 YEARS.-If,
by the terms of the decree, instrument, or agreement, the principal sum referred to
in paragraph (1) is to be paid or may be paid over a period ending more than 10
years from the date of such decree, instrument, or agreement, then (notwithstanding
paragraph (1)) the installment payments shall be treated as periodic payments for
the purpose of subsection (a), but (in the case of any one taxable year of the wife)
only to the extent of 10 percent of the principal sum. For purposes of the preceding
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Second, the court pointed out that, subsequent to the divorce, the parties had
executed a mutual release which referred to the installment payments as "a
property settlement in lieu of alimony." The Seventh Circuit found this factor
to be highly indicative that the parties intended the installment payments to discharge William's legal obligation of marital support. Third, the court noted
that a specific provision of the divorce decree dealt with a property settlement
and, in fact, awarded Jean her separately owned property. Since Jean's property interests were satisfied via a specific decree provision, the court felt the installments were intended to serve as support. Finally, the court held that inchoate interests in property could support a division of the estate only when
"the record clearly shows that the parties so intended the payments for this
purpose... ,,2" No such intent was found.
After denial of Jean's claim, the Seventh Circuit briefly addressed the issue
of whether life insurance premiums paid by William were tax deductible, as
alimony, within the scope of I.R.C. § 71 (a) and § 215(a)." The court decided
that such payments qualified as alimony in all but one respect: the premium
payments were not constructively received by Jean.
It based this decision on
the theory that premiums on term insurance convey no "ascertainable economic
benefit. 2 8
The Seventh Circuit correctly resolved the issue of property settlement
versus alimony. It was, however, mistaken when it held that William's premium
payments for term insurance conveyed no economic benefit upon Jean. In
short, the Seventh Circuit drew an unwarranted distinction between term and
whole life, which ignores the guidelines established by the Commissioner, and
which conflicts with judicial authority and similarly related code provisions.
Periodic Marital Support Payments (Alimony)-Applicable
Statutory and Judicial Concepts
Alimony is a popular term used to describe periodic amounts paid by a
husband to his divorced wife as a result of a divorce decree or a written separation
agreement. These amounts are includable in the wife's gross income2 9 and are
deductible, for federal income tax purposes, by the husband." There are two
sentence, the part of any principal sum which is allocable to a period after the taxable year of the wife in which it is received shall be treated as an installment payment for the taxable year in which it is received.
25 Id. (emphasis added).
26 Id. at 600.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 I.R.C. § 71 (a) establishes the basic requirements before divorce payments made by a
husband to his former wife will be includable in the latter's gross income. See note 24 and text
accompanying note 24 supra.
30 In fact, the Internal Revenue Code permits a deduction for such payments only if the
amounts paid are includable as income to his former spouse. See I.R.C. § 215(a) which
provides as follows:
(a) GENERAL RULE-In the case of a husband described in section 71, there
shall be allowed as a deduction amounts includible under section 71 in the gross
income of his wife, payment of which is made within the husband's taxable year.
No deduction shall be allowed under the preceding sentence with respect to any payment if, by reason of section 71 (d) or 682, the amount thereof is not includible in
the husband's gross income.
Thus § 71(a) and § 215 (a) are complementary in nature in that the latter will only authorize
a deduction if the requirements of the former have been met.
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basic characteristics of all such payments: (1) alimony is always periodic; and
(2) alimony is always taxable to the recipient.
Section 71 (a) establishes four requirements before amounts received by a
divorced wife will be taxed. The payments must be: (1) incurred by her husband pursuant to a divorce decree or ivritten settlement agreement incident to
a divorce; (2) periodic in character; (3) received by the wife either actually
or constructively; and (4) in discharge of the husband's obligation of support
arising out of the marital or family relationship."1 The first requirement is not in
controversy in Wright. The remaining requirements, however, should be briefly
examined.
1. Payments Classified as Periodic
Treasury Regulations and judicial opinions have defined periodic payments
as those made for an indefinite time, or payments which are conditional (e.g.,
on death or remarriage) and, thus, indefinite in amount.3 2 For example, a
divorce decree which requires a husband to make support payments to his
divorced wife until either her death or remarriage is periodic because it is payable
over an indefinite period of time. Moreover, the total value of the payments
cannot be reduced to a definite lump sum. Thus, the above mentioned payments would also be properly classified as periodic because they are, in the
aggregate, indefinite in amount. Contrast the above example with a divorce
decree which requires a husband to pay his wife $90,000 in equal monthly
installments for nine years from the date of the divorce. The equal monthly
payments would not qualify as alimony because fixed sums which, pursuant to a
divorce decree, are payable in installments are not treated as periodic payments. 3
The Code, however, provides an exception to this rule in I.R.C. § 71 (c) (2).
This provision states that principal sums payable in installments will be treated
as periodic payments for the purposes of I.R.C. § 71(a) if the principal sum
"is to be paid or may be paid over a period ending more than ten years from
the date of the decree. . .. "" Payments, therefore, will be characterized as
periodic if they are indefinite in time or amount or if they fall within the
exception noted by I.R.C. § 71 (c)(2).
2. The Constructive Receipt of Income
The regulations and the courts hold that income can be received either
actually or constructively."5 The general rule is that if income is credited to a
taxpayer's account or set aside for him, it will be regarded as having been
constructively received unless there is a substantial limitation or restriction on
31 See I.R.C. § 71'(a), note 24 supra.
32 Van Orman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 170, 172 (7th Cir. 1969); Fidler v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1956); Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 369, 370 (2d
Cir. 1953); Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(i) (1957).
33 See I.R.C. § 71 (c) (1), note 24 supra.
34 See I.R.C. § 71(c) (2), note 24 supra.
35 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1971).
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the taxpayer's right to the money (or property)"6 Moreover, the concept of
constructive receipt is inexorably tied to the concept of the realization of income. Thus, even if a taxpayer does not actually receive income in cash or
property, taxable income will be realized (and constructively received) when
the economic gain associated with the payment redounds to his benefit."' Thus,
income has been held to be constructively received by a taxpayer when payment
was made directly to the taxpayer's creditors,"8 when the taxpayer gave away
interest coupons to his son before they were due, 9 and when the taxpayer's debt
was forgiven.4"
3. Discharge of the Marital Support Obligation
As noted above, periodic payments will not be treated as alimony unless
made in discharge of the marital support obligation. The classification of a payment as being in discharge of marital support is difficult and is one of the principal focuses of this comment. The regulations, however, do provide some
guidance:
Section 71(a) (1) or (2) does not apply to that part of any periodic payment attributable to that portion of any interest in property [transferred
pursuant to a divorce decree or written
separation agreement] which in41
terest originally belonged to the wife.
It is, therefore, apparent that one of the first steps in classifying a payment as
alimony (a discharge of marital support), or as part of a property settlement, is
to determine if the divorced wife owns separate property for which an ascertainable interest can be computed.
a. Relinquishment of Inchoate Rights as Evidence of a Property
Settlement-The Davis Doctrine and Lack of Mutual Intent
The Regulations do not address the question of whether a wife's inchoate
interest in the husband's property is sufficiently ascertainable to serve as consideration for a property settlement. Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that in Wright the existence of such rights did not evidence a nontaxable division of the estate. As indicated below, this conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court.
In United States v. Davis,4 a husband, pursuant to a property settlement
agreement incident to a divorce decree, transferred one thousand shares of stock
to his divorced wife. 4 ' All property transferred was owned by the husband, but,
36 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1971); J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 82
(2d ed. 1973).
37 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940); Anita Quinby Stewart, 9 T.C. 195,
198 (1947).
38 Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
39 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
40 Wall v. U.S., 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947).
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(c)(4) (1957).
42 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
43 Id. at 66.
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under local law, was subject to the wife's statutory marital rights.44 The husband-taxpayer argued that the stock transfer constituted a nontaxable division
of property between two co-owners.4 The Supreme Court denied his claim and
held that the transfer was a taxable event for income tax purposes:
[T]he inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband's property by the Delaware law do not even remotely reach the dignity of co-ownership....
In the present context the rights of succession and reasonable share do not
differ significantly from the husband's obligations of support and alimony.
They all partake more
of a personal liability of the husband than a property
46
interest of the wife.
In Wright, there never was an expression of mutual agreement that Jean's
unperfected rights, arising under local law or otherwise, should serve as consideration for the fixed installment payments. In light of Davis, and in the absence
of a clear showing that the Wrights intended this quid pro quo, it is inconceivable
that Jean's contention could have been upheld. Thus, the Seventh Circuit refused to acknowledge that, absent mutual intent, relinquishment of Jean's inchoate marital rights could serve as evidence of the property settlement. Jean,
however, continued in her attempt to support her cause by contending that
the Tax Court's ruling was inconsistent with prior judicial authority within the
Seventh Circuit.
b. Van Orman v. Commissioner and Houston v. CommissionerDistinguishablePrecedents
Jean argued that the Tax Court ruling was erroneous in light of Van
7
Orman v. Commissioner'
and Houston v. Commissioner.48 A careful examination of each of these cases indicates, however, that Wright is clearly distinguishable.
In Van Orman, a husband agreed, pursuant to a divorce decree, to provide
his divorced wife with a home. Delivery of the house was not contingent upon
death, remarriage, or a change in economic status. Unencumbered title was to
be conveyed within ten years from the date of the divorce agreement.4 9 The
Seventh Circuit held that the husband was not entitled to a deduction for the
mortgage payments on the house because "such payments were not 'periodic'
and were not in discharge of a continuing obligation to support. . . ."" The
court relied on two factors to support this conclusion. First, the house payments
(and related incidental expenses) were not indefinite either in time or amount
and therefore were not periodic. Even I.R.C. § 71 (c) (2) could not salvage a
periodic classification because the mortgage installments were payable for a
period of ten years or less."' Second, in addition to the house purchase clause,
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 70.
418 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1969).
442 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1971).
418 F.2d at 171.
Id.
Id. at 172. See also text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
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a specific alimony provision was included in the settlement agreement. Thus,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the parties intended that the house payments
were to constitute a nontaxable division of property.52
Since the installments were to continue over a period of 102 years, the
Wright payments were properly classified as periodic under I.R.C. § 71(c) (2)'.

Moreover, the divorce decree contained no provision specifically dealing with
Jean's support. The only similarity between Van Orman and Wright is that,
in both, the payments were definite in time and amount. This, however, was not
sufficient similarity to warrant classifying the Wright installments as property
settlement payments. In short, a finding of alimony in Wright is not inconsistent
with the "property settlement" holding in Van Orman. This latter case, as in
Houston, is clearly distinguishable on the facts.
In Houston, a husband was directed by the divorce court to transfer
$500,000 in assets to his divorced wife. Included in this amount was a cash
payment of $415,000. One hundred fifteen thousand dollars was payable within
one month following the date of the divorce. The remainder was payable in
twelve annual installments of $25,000 commencing approximately one year
after the date of the decree.53 The husband-taxpayer attempted to treat the
entire $500,000 transfer as a periodic alimony payment. He argued that all
property (including the $115,000 cash payment) transferred to his wife, within
the first year following the divorce, was properly joined with the twelve annual
$25,000 installments and, therefore, the first-year transfer should have been
viewed as the first in a series of 13 periodic payments. Consequently, he con-

tended that he should have been allowed a deduction of ten percent of the total
value of the transfers within the meaning of I.R.C. § 71 (c) (2)."
The Seventh Circuit found that the amounts paid during the first year of
the divorce were in the nature of a property settlement. The court distinguished
the first-year transfers from the latter installments by the type, size and timing
of the payments. The assets conveyed shortly after the divorce consisted of
$115,000 in cash, a homestead and miscellaneous personal property. Thus, the
court felt the character of the assets conveyed during this period more nearly
resembled a nontaxable division of the estate rather than a large support payment:
Where there is a substantial payment, such as this, which comes soon after
the entry of the divorce decree, we think it not unreasonable to conclude

that a property settlement was intended. 55

In Wright, the fixed installment payments did not resemble the large property and cash transfers which took place during the first year after the Houston
decree. Instead, the Wright installments were analogous to the $25,000 annual
payments, deemed to be periodic under I.R.C. § 71(c) (2), which were to
commence one year after the Houston divorce was final. Thus, given the char52 Id. at 171.
53 442 F.2d at 41.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 42.
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acter and timing of William's payments, the Wright decision is consistent with
Houston and, in fact, is supported by this latter case's rationale.
Van Orman and Houston, therefore, are not supportive of Jean's claim
that William's installments were part of a nontaxable property settlement. These
cases are clearly distinguishable from the facts and circumstances in Wright,
and the Seventh Circuit correctly classified the fixed installment payments as
alimony. Moreover, additional support for this conclusion can be found when
Wright is analyzed in light of certain factors which traditionally have been indicative of periodic marital support payments.
c. Other Factors Suggesting Alimony
In resolving the controversy over classification of a divorce decree payment
as a property settlement or as an alimony award, it is important to determine
each party's intent. Given the ambiguity of many divorce instruments, this is
not an easy task. However, several factors should be considered in distinguishing
support from property settlement:
1. Will payments end upon the wife's death or remarriage? An affirmative
answer suggests the payments are probably alimony.5"
2. Did the wife receive her share of any community, joint, or any other
property for which she had an ascertainable interest prior to the divorce? If
yes, other payments made are probably alimony."
3. Does the agreement state or imply that payments are to be made in lieu
of alimony? An affirmative answer indicates that the parties intended the payments to discharge the husband's support obligation."
4. Were any of the wife's property interests subject to a controversy or dispute in the divorce proceeding? If the property she received was the subject
matter of the dispute, the payments, in all likelihood, resemble a property settlement."
5. Were the payments made to the wife, subsequent to the effective date
of the divorce, substantially equal to the support payments she received during
separation and prior to final disposition of the case? If yes, the payments probably represent alimony.6"
6. Are payments to continue for a period of longer than ten years? A "yes"
answer indicates that the payments were intended to be support within the
meaning of I.R.C. § 7 1(c) (2).el
7. Were the payments related to the husband's income? If yes, this is indicative of alimony."
8. Did the wife, in her divorce claim, ask for alimony? An affirmative
56 Robert I. Martin, 41 T.C.M. (P-H) 1273, 1276 (1972); Treas. Reg. § 1.71-(d)(3)
(A) (1957); Du Canto, Determination of Issue of Property Settlement as Opposed to "Periodic
Payments" (A/K/A "Alimony"), 55 Ciri. B. REc. 130, 138 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Du Canto].
57 41 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1276; Du Canto at 138.
58 Marion R. Hesse, 60 T.C. 685, 693 (1973); 41 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1276.
59 Du Canto at 138.
60 Id.
61 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
62 41 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1276.
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answer suggests the payments were made in discharge of the support obligation.6 3
9. Were the payments secured? If so, they were probably intended to be
in the nature of a property settlement."
It is true that the Wright installments were definite in amount and were
secured. Taken alone, these factors indicate that the fixed installment payments
resembled a settlement of property interests. On the other hand, several characteristics suggest an opposite result. Jean did receive her rightful share of property for which she had an ascertainable interest prior to the divorce. Her original
claim did include a request for alimony and eventually she signed a mutual
agreement which designated the installment payments as "in lieu of alimony."
There was no controversy or dispute during the divorce proceeding regarding
Jean's property interests or ownership rights, and the fixed installment payments
were to continue over a period of 1O/2 years. In the aggregate, these factors
strongly support the notion that the fixed installments were made in discharge
of William's support obligation.
Thus, in Wright the "property settlement-alimony" controversy was resolved in an equitable and accurate manner. In so doing, the Seventh Circuit
properly concluded that the fixed payments were periodic and taxable to Jean
within the meaning of I.R.C. § 71 (a):
Term Premiums as Tax Deductible Alimony
In Wright, the Seventh Circuit also decided that William could not deduct,
as alimony, premiums he paid pursuant to the divorce decree for term insurance
on his life. Despite the fact that Jean was the absolute owner of the policy, as
well as the irrevocable beneficiary, the court concluded that the premium payments did not satisfy the requirements of I.R.C. § 71 (a): they were not constructively received by Jean. In reaching this decision, the Seventh Circuit relied
heavily on the reasoning used by the Tax Court which put great weight on the
difference between whole life and pure term insurance.6" Despite Jean's position
63 Julia Nathan, 19 T.C. 865, 872 (1953).
64 60 T.C. at 693.
65 A term life insurance policy is a contract which provides insurance protection (in the
form of a death benefit) for a limited number of years (e.g., to age 65). The face value of
the policy will only be paid if the insured dies within the stipulated term and nothing will
be paid if the insured dies after the term period has elapsed. Term insurance is relatively
inexpensive in part because of its contingent nature and in part because there is not usually
a build up of cash surrender value. This latter characteristic gives rise to the reference to
term insurance as pure protection. There are many forms of term insurance. A common type
involves an increase in annual premiums every one, five or ten years (depending on the
specific contract). This premium adjustment is necessary to compensate for higher mortality.
See S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, LiFE INSURANCE 55-59 (9th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
HUEUNER & BLACK].
Whole life insurance, in contrast to term, is permanent protection with the face amount
payable provided the policyowner continues to pay the contract premiums (which are usually
payable through insured's age 99). Whole life is typically characterized by its guaranteed
level premium and an increasing cash surrender value. The cash value, moreover, is available
to the policyowner upon request, via a policy loan. Upon the insured's death, the beneficiary
of the policy will receive the face amount which consists of the sum of the cash value and
"net amount at risk." This latter term is properly defined as the difference between the face
amount and the cash value. Note that if, at the time of the insured's death, a policy loan
is outstanding, the amount of the loan will be deducted from the face amount in computing
the death benefit. Id. at 64-69.
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as the absolute owner and irrevocable beneficiary of the term policy, the Tax
Court in Wright held that the inherently contingent nature of the term insurance
6
contract conveyed no ascertainable and indefeasible property interest to Jean.
The Seventh Circuit's resolution of this issue is difficult to accept for several
reasons. First, the facts and circumstances of Wright fall within specific guidance
provided by the Internal Revenue Service. These guidelines support the notion
of deductibility. Second, the weight of judicial authority has long recognized
the deductibility of life insurance premiums as alimony when specific requirements have been met. The Wright facts appear consistent with these require5
ments. Third, Seligmann v. Commissioner" and William H. Brodersen, Jr.,"
cases relied on by the Seventh Circuit and the Tax Court as supportive of the
Wright holding, are erroneous. Fourth, denial of the deduction of the term life
premiums is inconsistent with an I.R.S. ruling which permits the taxpayer to
deduct premiums for a form of insurance whose benefits are no less "contingent"
than the death benefit provided by Jean's policy. Finally, the Seventh Circuit's
contention that the economic benefit conveyed by the term premium was "unascertainable" is inconsistent with I.R.C. § 79(a) and Rev. Rul. 64-328, which
provide the taxpayer with specific guidance for the calculation of the economic
benefit associated with term life insurance premiums.
1. Revenue Ruling 70-21869
Revenue Ruling 70-218 deals expressly with whether life insurance premiums paid by a husband, pursuant to a divorce decree, are includable in the
gross income of the divorced wife under I.R.C. § 71 (a) and, therefore, deductible by the husband in accordance with I.R.C. § 2 1 5(a). Under the factual
situation outlined by the Commissioner, the husband-insured, pursuant to a
divorce decree, absolutely assigned the insurance policy to his former wife. She
was the irrevocable beneficiary and her children were contingent beneficiaries.
Within a specified number of years, the husband was required to convert the
7
policy to permanent insurance and deliver the new policy to his former wife. "
Implicit within the Commissioner's fact pattern is the fact that the original
(pre-converted) policy was term insurance which included a convertibility privilege. 7 ' It must also be noted that, as used, the term "irrevocable beneficiary"
has been interpreted by the Service and the courts to mean that full control over
the beneficiary designation is vested in the wife.
66 62 T.C. at 400.
67 207 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1953).
68 57 T.C. 412.
69 Rev. Rul. 70-218, 1970-1 C.B. 19.
70 Id.
71 Most term insurance contracts include a convertibility provision which gives the owner
of the policy the right to convert the term plan to any form of cash value insurance which
the insurer is issuing at the time of conversion. The insured's state of health at the time of
the conversion is of no consequence. Issuance of the postconverted cash value plan is guaranteed if conversion is affected within the time period indicated in the insurance contract.
The owner may exercise the privilege in a manner prescribed by the company. D. GREGG &
V. LUCAS, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE HANDBOOK 58, (3d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited

as

GREGG & LUCAS].

72 Stevens v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 69, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1971); 62 T.C. at 398; Rev.
Rul. 70-218 at 19.
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The Commissioner ruled that the life insurance premiums were both includible as gross income to the wife and deductible by the husband pursuant to
§ 71(a) and § 215(a), respectively. 3 Moreover, the Commissioner articulated
three conditions which must be met before a husband-insured is entitled to
deduct his life insurance premium payments. First, the premiums paid by the
husband must be pursuant to a divorce decree or written settlement agreement
incident to the divorce. Second, the policy must be absolutely assigned to the
wife. Third, the wife must be the irrevocable beneficiary of the policy proceeds.
Of course these conditions do not eliminate any of the requirements which must
be met before payments are classified as alimony. 4 Thus, the premiums must
qualify as periodic and must be paid in discharge of the husband's support
obligation.
The facts in Wright reveal that all of the above elements were met. The
$200,000 term policy on the life of William was absolutely assigned to Jean, and
she was the irrevocable beneficiary. Moreover, William paid the premiums as
directed by the terms of the divorce decree.
Nowhere in the ruling does the Commissioner imply a variance in treatment
based on the type of life insurance purchased. Had the Commissioner felt that
the type of policy was important, he easily could have provided for this fact.
The Seventh Circuit, therefore, should have utilized the guidelines set out in
Rev. Rul. 70-218 which, as will be shown below, correctly embodies the weight
of judicial authority.
2. Judicial Authority Supporting Deductibility
Anita Quinby Stewart75 involves factual circumstances similar to those
presented in both Rev. Rul. 70-218 and Wright v. Commissioner. A husbandinsured irrevocably assigned two life insurance policies to his divorced wife pursuant to a written separation agreement incident to a divorce." The husband
was required to pay the premiums for as long as his wife lived and remained
The Tax Court
unmarried."
She was named the irrevocable beneficiary.'
upheld the Commissioner's contention that the premium payments made by
the husband were constructively received as income by the wife:
It is difficult to see on what theory it could be successfully contended that
the payments of insurance premiums pursuant to the separation agreement
did not constitute petitioner's income under section 22(k), Internal Revenue
Code. The policies in question were her property and all payments made
were at her instigation, for her account, and designed to redound to her
benefit.7 9 It seems reasonable to say that they were constructively received
by her.
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Rev. Rul. 70-218 at 19.
See text accompanying note 24 supra.
9 T.C. 195 (1947).
Id. at 196.
Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 198.
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Similarly, the insurance policy in Wright was Jean's property. William's premium payments were for Jean's account and, by virtue of the protection provided, were designed "to redound" to her benefit. The Stewart court did not
consider the nature and type of policies in question. Rather, it put great weight
on the fact that the wife was the absolute assignee and irrevocable beneficiary.
In Wright, the Seventh Circuit should have followed the guidance provided by
Stewart and, likewise, should have treated the premium payments as income
to the wife.
0
Hyde v. Commissioner"
involved factual circumstances identical to those
in Stewart. Two questions were considered. First, were the premium payments
taxable income to the wife? If so, was the amount taxable equal to the entire
premium or merely the increase in cash value?"' The Second Circuit resolved
both issues by holding that the wife received an economic benefit equal in value
to the amount of premium."' The court thus acknowledged that the insurance
in Hyde conferred present benefits other than the cash surrender value." Among
the benefits mentioned were death protection (if the insured died within the
specified time period) and the right to receive any dividends on the policies. 4
It is clear from a reading of Hyde that the policies in controversy were whole
life;"' thus the Second Circuit did not have to deal with the economic benefit
of term premiums. The court, however, in referring to death benefits and
dividend rights, correctly noted economic benefits associated with life insurance
w'hich go beyond the accumulation of cash surrender value.
In Wright the premium payments conferred valuable rights upon Jean.
These included death protection until insured reached age sixty-five, the right to
automatically convert the term policy to a permanent plan at guaranteed rates,
and the right to receive dividends.5 6 In short, Stewart and Hyde are strong precedents for the proposition that life insurance premiums, regardless of the nature
of the policy, can qualify as alimony. Neither case focuses on the type of life
insurance in issue and both ground their holding on the fact that the policies,
which were required by the divorce decree (or separation agreement), were
absolutely owned by the divorced wife. As is indicated by the following cases,
this reasoning is consistent with recent judicial pronouncements.
A recent case upholding the treatment of insurance premiums as taxable
alimony is Anita L. Ellis." Again the facts were identical to those in Stewart.
The Tax Court utilized reasoning similar to that appearing in Rev. Rul. 70-218:
it required that the divorced wife include the life insurance premiums in her
80 301 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1962).
81 Id. at 280.
82 Id. at 283.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 283. The Second Circuit, throughout the opinion, refers to the cash value
associated with the policies in controversy. This fact leads to the reasonable conclusion that
the policies in question were whole life.
86 The term policy on William's life was issued by Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
Company. The policyowners of this "mutual" company are in a position analogous to that of a
common stockholder in a corporation. Mutual policyholders are entitled to share in the profits
of the insurance company, through policy dividends, to the extent their premiums are not
needed to pay expenses (including claims). R. RIEGEL & J. MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICES 43-44, (5th ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as RIEGEL & MILLER].
87 42 T.C.M. (P-H) 715 (1973).
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gross income because the policies were absolutely owned by her (and, therefore,
she had the right to name the alternate and contingent beneficiaries); she was
the irrevocable beneficiary; and the payments were deemed periodic within the
meaning of I.R.C. § 71 (a).' Thus, as in Stewart and Hyde, the Ellis court
couched its reasoning in terms of the ownership rights of the wife and the factors
which classified the payments as periodic. The Tax Court did not focus on the
cash surrender value; nowhere in the opinion does the court attribute any significance to the type of policy under scrutiny. There are two possible reasons
for this posture. Either the court did not want to consider an issue that was not
presented by the parties (by implication the policy in question was a permanent
plan), or they felt the type of policy was not a significant factor.
In Wright, Jean was the absolute owner and irrevocable beneficiary of the
policy. By virtue of her complete ownership, she also had full power to name
alternate and contingent beneficiaries. Additionally, William was required to
continue premium payments for an indefinite period of time-until the earlier
of Jean's death, remarriage or William's sixty-fifth birthday. The premium payments were, therefore, periodic. In light of Ellis, the Wright court should have
decided that the premiums were taxable to Jean and, in turn, deductible by
William.
Stewart, Hyde and Ellis are consistent with Rev. Rul. 70-218. Yet, these
cases did not directly consider whether premiums for term insurance can qualify
as alimony. The Second Circuit, however, did address this question, and in
Stevens v. Commissioner,9 it held that the nature of the policy is irrelevant. In
Stevens, the factual situation was similar to that outlined in Rev. Rul. 70-218.
In permitting the husband to deduct the life insurance premiums the court
stated:
But the Commissioner has recognized that the standard death provision is
not the kind of controversy which will forestall the constructive receipt
principle.... If this analysis were correct, premiums paid on a term insurance policy could never qualify as alimony payments because the protection
of term insurance to an irrevocable beneficiary extends only for a specified
period rather than over the life of the insured.90
The Second Circuit acknowledged that an insurance policy has value beyond
payment of the face amount upon the death of the insured. Moreover, this benefit transcends the accumulation of cash value. Death protection is the economic
benefit conferred; the Stevens court assigned a value to this benefit equal to the
premium.
Stevens echoes the position taken by the I.R.S. regarding the constructive
receipt, by a divorced wife, of life insurance premium payments. In Wright, it
is the standard death benefit of a term policy which, in the Seventh Circuit's
view, renders the economic benefit "too" contingent to be constructively received.
These are not the type of contingencies, however, which are contemplated by
either the Service or prevailing case law.9 ' As is pointed out by the Stevens
88
89
90
91
T.C.

Id. at 718.
439 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1971).
Id. at 72.
See Kiesling v. United States, 349 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1965); Florence H. Griffith, 35
882 (1961); James Parks Bradley, 30 T.C. 701 (1958).
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court, disqualifying contingencies "include the husband's retention of the power
to borrow against the policy, to withdraw its cash surrender value or to substitute
himself as beneficiary if the wife predeceases him."9 2
The Stevens holding was sound and should have been followed by the
Seventh Circuit in Wright. It is important to note that William's obligation to
make payments during the term of the life insurance contract was totally within
Jean's control. She had an indefeasible right to receive the death protection
until the insurance expired as a matter of law. This was because she was both
the assignee of the policy and the irrevocable beneficiary. Like Stevens, the
Seventh Circuit in Wright should have found such factors highly significant and
likewise should have held that the economic value of the death protection is
accurately reflected by the amount of premiums paid. Instead, the Seventh
Circuit followed the reasoning of Seligmann and Brodersen. Seligmann is erroneous and Brodersen is both distinguishable and inconsistent.
3. Seligmann and Brodersen
In Seligmann, a husband-insured, pursuant to a divorce decree, absolutely
assigned life insurance policies to an irrevocable trust set up for the benefit of
his wife and children. He retained none of the incidents of ownership. In accordance with the trust agreement, the wife would receive the death proceeds if she
did not remarry and if she outlived her husband. 3 In turn, the husband agreed
to pay the insurance premiums until the. earlier of his death or the date of the
last to die of his wife and children.94 The Seventh Circuit held that the wife
did not receive any of the premium payments. Any benefit accruing to the wife
was considered too contingent and, therefore, not constructively received.95 The
contingencies of death and remarriage created, in the court's view, an insurance
benefit too uncertain to be capable of ascertainment. The Seventh Circuit failed
to recognize, however, that the contingencies which were written into the Seligmann divorce decree were precisely the characteristics needed to qualify the premium payments as indefinite in amount and, therefore, periodic. The holding in
Seligmann seems to suggest that with respect to life insurance, those contingencies
which would qualify premiums paid as periodic, would, at the same time render
the payments incapable of conveying an economic benefit. In light of Stewart,
Ellis, Hyde, Stevens and Rev. Rul. 70-218, such reasoning is unwarranted.
Unlike Seligmann, William Brodersen, Jr. dealt specifically with the includability of term insurance premiums for income tax purposes. Pursuant to a
divorce decree, a husband agreed to pay alimony to his wife. To secure these
payments he purchased a decreasing term insurance policy on his life and named
his divorced wife the absolute owner and irrevocable beneficiary.96 The Tax
Court decided that the husband was not entitled to deduct the term premiums
because the payments were not constructively received by the wife. The Tax
92
93
94
95
96
97

439 F.2d at 73; see Rev. Rul. 70-218, 1970-1 C.B. 19.
207 F.2d at 491.
Id.
Id. at 494.
57 T.C. at 414.
Id. at 419.
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Court relied on two legal theories. First, the deduction was disallowed because
the policy was purchased as security to insure the continuation of alimony payments. Second, it held that even if the insurance had not been purchased for
security purposes, no economic benefit was conveyed because the policy in question was pure term insurance."
The weight of judicial authority supports the theory that premiums on life
insurance purchased, pursuant to a divorce decree, to secure a divorced wife's
alimony payments are not income to the wife and not deductible to the husband. 9 To the extent that the Tax Court in Bradersen relied on this "security for
alimony" theory, the holding is warranted. Of course, the facts in Brodersen
are distinguishable from those in Wright. The Brodersen policy was purchased
to assure the payment of alimony for a fixed period. By contrast, in Wright,
Jean would receive the face amount of the policy in addition to the fixed installment payment if William died within the contract period. The Wright policy
was not purchased for security purposes. The fixed installment payments were
secured by escrowed marketable securities rather than life insurance.
The Tax Court in Brodersen does not base its holding solely on the "security for alimony" theory. Instead, denial of William's deduction in Brodersen is
also grounded on the notion that premiums paid by the husband for pure term
insurance did not convey an ascertainable economic benefit to the wife and were,
therefore, not constructively received by her. The Tax Court distinguished both
Stewart and Stevens because in those cases the policies in issue were whole life
rather than term: 00
As owner of a whole life policy the wife is entitled to surrender it for cash
value, borrow on it, etc., thereby obtaining an additional economic benefit,
over and above any agreed-upon alimony payments. With a term policy,
however, there is only a contingent right to obtain a fixed amount of cash
at the death of the insured which at best affords the wife peace of mind in
knowing his payments are secured. 10'
In distinguishing the two forms of insurance, the Tax Court focused on the cash
surrender value associated with whole life. Mathematically, a portion of each
whole life premium can be allocated to cash surrender value with the remaining
portion allocated to the amount of "pure protection" provided by the insurance
company (equal to the face amount minus the cash value) °. If, arguendo, the
cash value is truly the policy characteristic which supports deductibility of the
premiums, it would logically seem to follow that only that portion of the premium which adds to the cash surrender value should be classified as alimony.
Yet the Tax Court in Brodersen would seemingly permit a deduction of the
entire whole life premium. Ironically, the Brodersen court would, therefore, be
allowing a deduction for a portion of the premium attributable to decreasing
term coverage.'
98 Id. at 417.
99 Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953); Blumenthal v. Commissioner,
183 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1950).
100 57 T.C. at 417.
101 Id. at 417.
102 See text accompanying notes 104-107 infra.
103 Decreasing term is a form of term insurance whereby the face amount of the policy
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The typical whole life (or straight life) policy requires a level annual premium payable for the life of the insured.'
In the early policy years the annual
premiums exceed the cost of protection based on assumed mortality and interest
rates.'
This accumulated excess, adjusted for expenses and certain contingencies, is known as the cash value. The cash value serves two purposes. First,
it constitutes a savings element available to the owner of the policy on demand.
Second, when the insured dies, the cash value is part of the face amount paid
to the beneficiary. As the cash surrender value increases, because of premium
payments and interest, the amount of pure protection supplied by the insurance
company (known also as the net amount at risk) decreases."0 6 Whole life insurance has, therefore, appropriately been labeled as a "combination of decreasing
term insurance [the pure protection element] and an increasing savings or investment element."'0 7
It should not be understood, however, that the Tax Court in Brodersen
would have been correct had it suggested that only the "cash value share" of
the whole life premium could qualify as alimony. A denial, in whole or in part,
of the deduction for life insurance premiums when the requirements of Rev.
Rul. 70-218 have been met, is never appropriate. The Brodersen court's refusal
to classify, under any circumstances, term insurance premiums as alimony is
clearly erroneous. Yet, by implicitly agreeing to the allowability of deducting
whole life premiums, the Brodersen court manifested a misunderstanding of the
nature of permanent insurance contracts (whole life). Moreover, in light of the
"pure protection element" existing in such policies, acquiescence to the deductibility of the entire premium is also contradictory to the Brodersen position on
term insurance.
In short, Seligmann and Brodersen are clearly erroneous in light of Rev.
Rul. 70-218, Stewart, Hyde, Ellis and Stevens and should not have been followed
by the Seventh Circuit in Wright. Moreover, by accepting the nondeductible
posture articulated by the Seligmann and Brodersen decisions, the Seventh Circuit ignored an Internal Revenue Service pronouncement which authorizes a
taxpayer to deduct, as alimony, premiums on a type of insurance whose benefits
are as contingent as those received by Jean Wright.
4. Rev. Rul. 62-39 ' 0s
Revenue Ruling 62-39 presents the Commissioner's position regarding the
tax deductibility as alimony of mortgage, interest, taxes and insurance payments
made by a husband, pursuant to a divorce decree, on property held as tenants
in common with his divorced wife. According to this ruling, one-half of such
decreases by a fixed amount each year. These policies are typically issued over terms extending
anywhere from 5 to 35 years. HUEBNER & BLACK at 59.
104 GREGG & LucAs at 67.
105 Id. at 69.
106 Id. Mortality rates increase each year and at an increasing rate. This tends to increase
the cost of pure insurance coverage. Yet, this is more than offset by the yearly addition to
the cash surrender value. Id.
107 Id. at 70.
108 Rev. Rul. 62-39, 1962-1 C.B. 18.
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payments are includable as income to the wife under I.R.C. § 71 and, therefore, deductible by the husband in accordance with I.R.C. § 215 (a) .o9 Nowhere
in the ruling does the Commissioner indicate the type of insurance involved;
however, it is reasonable to conclude that it is either a fire and casualty policy
or decreasing term insurance to assure payment of the mortgage in the event of
the husband's premature death. If it is the latter, Rev. Rul. 62-39 constitutes
an I.R.S. pronouncement that term insurance premiums can qualify as deductible alimony. On the other hand, if fire and casualty coverage is the "insurance"
addressed by the Commissioner, Rev. Rul. 62-39, in effect, permits a taxpayer
to deduct, as alimony, premiums for insurance in which the economic benefit
is as uncertain and contingent as it is in term insurance.'
The risk insured
against in a typical homeowner's policy is the sudden and unexpected loss or
damage to the house due to fire or other covered casualties. The indemnified
risk under a typical term life policy is the death of the insured within a specified
time period. In both forms of insurance the amount of money necessary to insure
against the risks can be reduced to near mathematical certainty; the economic
benefit received is protection; and the contingent nature of the contract is reflected in the amount of the premium owed. By analogy, the Wright holding is
inconsistent with the Commissioner's position with respect to the "insurance"
mentioned in Rev. Rul. 62-39. If the cost to protect against the risk of a house
burning down can be alimony, so should the cost of providing for the "human
life value" lost if a former husband dies prior to age sixty-five."'
In the Wright holding the Seventh Circuit also asserted that the economic
benefit associated with term insurance premiums is unascertainable. Such reasoning is inconsistent with a specific code section and revenue ruling requiring
that the term premium benefit be included as income and, moreover, providing
the rate information necessary to compute such a benefit.
5. I.R.C. § 79(a) and Split Dollar Life Insurance
Internal Revenue Code § 79(a) provides that an employee must include
in his gross income the cost of group-term life insurance provided by his employer. Taxable income will be realized, however, only to the extent that the
premiums exceed the sum of: (a) the cost attributable to the first $50,000 of
insurance; and, (b) any contributions toward such insurance made by the employee."' The Internal Revenue Service, through Treasury Regulations, provides
the taxpayer with the information needed to compute the economic benefit
associated with the group-term coverage. Table I of the Regulations sets forth
the cost of $1,000 of group-term life insurance for one month computed on the
basis of five-year age brackets." 3 The rates appearing in this table are very similar
109 Id.
110 In fact, it is more likely that a person will die prior to age 65 than it is for his house to
burn down. GREGG & LucAs at 130.

111 See also Illene Isaacson, 58 T.C. 659 (1972) which allowed a husband to deduct, as
alimony, the cost of providing hospital and surgical coverage for his former wife and their
children. For an excellent discussion of life insurance as it relates to human life values, see
HUEBNER & BLACK at 10-28.
112 I.R.C. § 79(a)(l)-(2).
113 Treas. Reg. § 1.79-3(d)(2) (1966).
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to the premiums charged by private companies for similar coverage. It is fair
to say, therefore, that after taking into consideration the statutory exclusions,
the economic benefit associated with group-term coverage is approximately
equal to the premium charged for the insurance.
Section 79(a) applies only to group-term coverage of which several characteristics are noteworthy. As the name implies, the policies are pure term: they
contain no cash surrender value. Furthermore the employee-insured is the absolute owner of the policy. Thus, group-term contemplates a premium payor
who retains none of the incidents of ownership.
Section 79 (a) is statutory proof that term insurance premiums do convey an
economic benefit. That benefit is equal to the amount of premiums paid.
Another area in which the I.R.S. has specifically required an individual to
report, as economic benefit, premiums paid for pure protection is in so-called
split dollar life insurance plans. Such plans are described as follows:
Split-Dollar insurance is a form of insurance co-ownership and is used primarily as a means for one party to help another carry the life insurance
protection he needs. The policy must be of a permanent insurance type
because the 'split' generally divides the cash value from the pure protection
element. Usually one party pays a portion of each premium equal to the
annual increase in cash value, and the other party, usually the insured, pays
the balance. At the death of the insured, the noninsured party receives a
portion of the proceeds equal to the cash value, and the balance of the proceeds is payable to the insured's designated beneficiary. The result is that
the insured obtains insurance protection at very little cost to himself, the
principal premium share being borne by the party helping him."4
Since split-dollar arrangements are normally used in a business context, the
"party helping" the insured is usually the employer. 1 At one time the Internal
Revenue Service considered this "employer help" an interest-free loan (to the
extent of the cash value). This posture has changed, however, and since 1964
the Service has viewed split-dollar plans as a means for "providing an economic
benefit for employees.""' Revenue Ruling 64-328 requires the employee to include, as income, the value of the economic benefit received less the portion of
total premium contributed by the employee. The value of the economic benefit
equals the cost for the pure protection in the policy (face amount minus cash
surrender value) at rates specified by the Commissioner."'
In light of I.R.C. § 79(a) and Rev. Rul. 64-328, it is clear that the economic benefit associated with the cost of pure protection (term insurance) can
be ascertained. The term insurance policy in Wright was also pure protection.
The benefit provided was total indemnification for William's human life value
if death occurred prior to age sixty-five. The ascertainable value of this death
benefit is precisely equal to the premium paid. This is the same approach taken
by Congress in I.R.C. § 7 9(a) and by the I.R.S. in Rev. Rul. 64-328. It also
should have been the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in Wright.
114 GREGG & LUCAS at 676.
115 Id.
116 Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11; GREGG & LUCAs at 685.
117 Id. at 686. These rates, called "P.S.-58 rates," are roughly equal to the cost of oneyear term insurance. Id. at 685.
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Conclusion
Wright v. Commissioner considered two issues. The first dealt with whether
certain fixed installment payments made by William Wright were in the nature
of a property settlement or, instead, Were taxable alimony. After carefully
examining all of the facts and circumstances, the Seventh Circuit correctly concluded that the payments were periodic alimony and, therefore, taxable to Jean
and deductible by William. While several factors indicated a property settlement, there were others which, in the final analysis, swung the balance in favor
of a marital support classification. Thus, the Wright court put great weight in
the 10% year payment period, a divorce decree which granted Jean separate
property for which she had an ascertainable interest, and a mutually executed
agreement declaring the installments to be "in lieu of alimony." Moreover, when
the facts and circumstances in Wright are analyzed in light of relevant factors
outlined above, there is little doubt that the Seventh Circuit resolved the property settlement-alimony controversy in an equitable fashion.
The second issue dealt with whether premiums paid on term life insurance
should have been taxable to Jean under I.R.C. § 71 (a) and, therefore, deductible by William pursuant to § 215(a). The Seventh Circuit concluded that all
but one of the requirements for inclusion as income had been met. The court
held that the premiums paid by William for term insurance conferred no ascertainable economic benefit, and were not constructively received by Jean. This
holding is erroneous and contrary to the weight of judicial authority as indicated by Stewart, Ellis, Hyde and Stevens. The court should have utilized the
guidelines established by the Commissioner in Rev. Rul. 70-218 which predicated
deductibility of the premiums on: (1) a divorce decree or written separation
agreement incident to the divorce; (2) an absolute assignment of the policy to
the wife; and, (3) proof that the wife is the irrevocable beneficiary. In Wright,
each of these requirements was met.
The crux of the Seventh Circuit's holding on this issue was that the economic benefit attributable to the term premium payment was incapable of ascertainment and, therefore, could not be constructively received. This is incorrect
and in direct contradiction with the I.R.S. posture regarding group term and
split-dollar life insurance. For each of these insurance programs, the I.R.S.
specifically attributes an economic benefit equal to the cost of the pure term
coverage provided. Thus, I.R.C. § 79(a) requires an employee who receives
group-term life insurance from his employer to include the cost of the coverage
(less the statutory exclusions) as taxable income. Likewise, if an employer enters
into a split-dollar insurance program with an employee, the employee must also
include the cost of the economic benefit provided as income. In short, Congress
and the I.R.S. have long recognized that the economic benefit associated with
pure term insurance is capable of measurement and is, in fact, equal to the premiums necessary to provide such coverage. In Wright the Seventh Circuit should
have acknowledged this posture and declared that Jean received taxable income
equal to the cost of the death protection provided.
Santo Bisignano, Jr.
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United States v. Meyers "
Introduction
The Hobbs Act1 makes robbery, extortion and conspiracy to commit robbery
or extortion, federal crimes when interstate commerce is affected. Local political
corruption has come within the ambit of the Act by virtue of the Act's twofold
definition of extortion. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (b) (2) states: "The term 'extortion'
means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of
official right."2 Within the past few years, federal prosecutors have utilized the
concept of "official right" extortion to successfully prosecute public officials who
have violated their positions of public trust for personal gain.' The common
thread in each of these prosecutions is that the defendant was a public official
when the illegal act was committed. United States v. Meyers,4 however, indicates a more expansive use of the Hobbs Act: private citizens, who are only
nominated for office but never elected, may be subject to federal prosecution for
misusing their potential official power.
In Meyers, the Seventh Circuit reached three conclusions. First, it reaffirmed the notion that conspiracy can be a continuing crime which does not end
until the goal for which it was formed is achieved.' Second, the court held that a
mere candidate for public office could conspire to commit official right extortion.
Third, the Seventh Circuit decided that it was irrelevant to the issue of guilt or
innocence that the conspirators could not have committed the substantive crime
at the inception of the conspiratorial agreement.
*

1

529 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1976).
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970). The relevant portions of the statute are set forth below:
(a)

Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in
violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section(1) The term "robbery" means the lawful taking or obtaining of personal property
from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of
actual or threatened force or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future,
to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person

or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company
at the time of the taking or obtaining.
(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with his
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear,
or under color of official right.
2 Id. § 1951(b) (2) (emphasis added).
3 See United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Kuta, 518
F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974).
4 529 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1976).
5 See text accompanying note 14 inIra.
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Meyers is the first case in which the official right language of the Hobbs
Act has been used to prosecute public officials for a conspiracy to commit
extortion which commenced prior to their election and while they were still
private citizens. In so doing, it broadens the traditional ambit of the Act and
adds another weapon to the prosecutorial arsenal used to attack political
corruption.
Charles Meyers and Jack Scoville were indicted for conspiracy to commit
extortion under color of official right in violation of the Hobbs Act. Defendants
moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to state a cause of action. The
district court granted their motion. On appeal, the following facts were
stipulated:'
1. In October, 1972, Charles Meyers and Jack Scoville were candidates
for the position of Trustee of the East Side Levee and Sanitary District, East
St. Louis, Illinois. They were both elected the following November. Neither
defendant had been a public official prior to December 6, 1972, when they took
office.
2. The conspiracy was allegedly formed in October, 1972, as a result of a
meeting between defendants and the alleged victims.
3. Any money paid to defendants was allegedly paid during October, 1972,
prior to their election, and was retained through May, 1973.
As indicated in the indictment, one of the official responsibilities of a
Trustee is to award contracts to suppliers and contractors who do business
within the district.7 In doing so, Trustees must exercise unbiased and independent
judgment. The indictment alleged that each defendant conspired to obtain in
excess of $6,000 in return for his promise, if elected, to suspend his independent
judgment in awarding contracts. The Government contended that this conspiracy was in violation of the Hobbs Act. In dismissing the indictment, the
district court reasoned that since both the agreement to pay money and the
actual payment occurred while defendants were still private citizens, there could
be no Hobbs Act violation.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court erroneously couched
the issue in terms of the substantive crime of extortion rather than the separate
crime of conspiracy. 8 The appellate court stated the main issue as follows:
[W]hether, within the meaning of the Hobbs Act, it is a crime for candidates
for political office to conspire to affect commerce by extortion induced under
color of official right during a time frame beginning before the election but
not ending until after the candidates have obtained public office. 9
In dealing with this issue, the Seventh Circuit decided three important subissues. First, the court held that the phrase "under color of official right," 10
specifically modifies only the phrase "obtaining of property from another." Since
it does not modify the word "conspires," an individual need not be a public
6 529 F.2d at 1035.
7 Id. at 1034.
8 Id. at 1035.

9 Id.

10

See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1970) and note 1,supra
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official in order to conspire to commit official right extortion. Second, the court
held that even if the Hobbs Act were restricted to conspiracies taking place
while the co-conspirators were public officials, the alleged activities of the defendants were well within the reath of that statute.11 The Seventh Circuit
pointed out that the lower court overlooked the "continuity of the crime of
conspiracy."' 2 The stipulated facts suggested that the alleged conspiracy continued for several months after the defendants became public officials and,
therefore, by that time their conspiracy clearly was proscribed by the Act. Finally,
the court dealt with the question of whether impossibility is a defense to a
conspiracy prosecution: namely, whether an individual can be convicted of
conspiring to commit a crime if it is impossible for him to commit the substantive offense. The court concluded that impossibility is not a defense to such a
charge. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit resolved the main issue by holding
that the Hobbs Act does reach conspiracies to commit official right extortion
which are formed while the co-conspirators are private citizens and which
continue after they are elected to and assume public office."
,The Issues
The court's reasoning has broad implications for the prosecution of future
political corruption. By holding that one need not be a public official in order to
conspire to commit official right extortion, and that impossibility is not a
defense, unscrupulous candidates, who threaten to misuse their future official
position unless money is paid prior to their election, will be subject to Hobbs Act
prosecution.
Although several alternative issues were raised by the parties to Meyers,
the Seventh Circuit apparently resolved the question before it on the conspiracycontinuity theory. In declaring the controlling legal theory the court stated:
More important, however, is the consideration of the Government's contention that even if the phrase "under color of official right" in § 1951 (b) (2)
were held to modify the word "conspires" in § 1951 (a), 4 the alleged conspiracy existed even after Meyers and Scoville took office.'
This statement suggests, then, the strong reliance on the notion of conspiratorial
continuity in deciding the case. Thus, the alternative issues addressed by the
court, statutory construction and impossibility, might be viewed as dictum. After
consideration of the soundness of the conspiracy-continuity theory, it will be
shown that the court correctly decided the issues relating to statutory construction
and impossibility, thereby allowing other federal courts to utilize the Meyers
reasoning in convicting political candidates.
The Conspiracy-ContinuityTheory
The district court failed to recognize that conspiracy is a continuing crime
11
12
13
14

529 F.2d at 1036.
Id.
Id. at 1038.
Id. at 1036.
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which does not end until the object for which it was formed is achieved. 5 In
Meyers, the object of the conspiracy was the suspension of defendants' independent judgment as public officials. The fact that the conspiracy was formed
prior to actually taking office was, in the court's view, not controlling. The court
pointed out that, on the facts stipulated, the trier of fact could properly conclude
that the conspiracy continued for several months after defendants had taken
office.'" This reasoning is sound and supported by judicial authority.
A leading case upholding the conspiracy-continuity theory is Grunewald v.
United States." Defendants were indicted and convicted of conspiracy to
defraud the United States by preventing the criminal prosecution of certain
taxpayers for fraudulent tax evasion. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the
defendants sought to bar the indictment because the three-year statute of limitations had elapsed. The Government argued that the facts indicated a subsidiary
conspiracy to conceal the illegal activity and that certain overt acts of this subsidiary conspiracy occurred within the period of limitations." The Supreme
Court rejected this contention and decided that the outcome of the case would
depend on what the state alleged and proved to be the central objective of the
conspiracy.' Sustaining the idea that conspiracy can be a continuing crime, the
Court stated:
If, therefore, the jury could have found that the aim of the conspiratorial
agreement was to protect the taxpayers from tax prosecutions, and that overt
acts occurring
in the indictment were -in furtherance of that aim, we would
20
affirm.

Thus, the Court suggested that once the main objective of a conspiracy is determined, the overt acts in furtherance of this objective will keep the conspiracy
alive. McDonald v. United States" is also illustrative of the conspiracy-continuity
theory. There the defendant, McDonald, was convicted of conspiring to kidnap
a person in violation of a federal statute." McDonald did not know of the
kidnap plot nor was he in any way involved in carrying it out. In fact, his
involvement occurred nearly four months after the ransom had been paid and
the victim released. He merely changed the "marked" ransom money into
unmarked bills. Nevertheless, the court upheld the conspiracy charge finding
that the object of the conspiracy was to obtain money which could be used
without the possibility of tracing. Since the defendant's involvement occurred
before that goal had been achieved, he was deemed to be part of the conspiracy
from the beginning. In explaining this view, the court provided the following
guidelines to determine when the object has been reached and the conspiracy
ended:
15 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
16 529 F.2d at 1036.
17 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
18 Id. at 397.
19 Id. at 411.
20 Id.
21 89 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1937).
22 Act of June 22, 1932, ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326 (1932)
1201 (1970)).

(current version at 18 U.S.C. §
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Whenever the unlawful object of the conspiracy has reached that stage of
consummation, whereat the several conspirators having taken in spendable
form their several agreed parts of the spoils, may go their several ways,
without the necessity of further acts or consultation about the conspiracy,
with each other or among themselves, the conspiracy has ended.23
This standard is useful in analyzing the facts of the Meyers case. It
suggests that one must view the conspiracy and all of its intended activity as a
whole. Although the extortionate money was allegedly paid before Meyers and
Scoville were officials, the scheme was predicated on the suspension of independent judgment as soon as they took office. Further acts were, therefore,
required beyond the mere acceptance of the money, before the conspiracy could
be deemed to have ended.
It is apparent that the conspiracy-continuity theory is sufficient by itself to
decide this case; the conspiracy having been deemed to continue beyond the
time defendants took office, applicability of the Hobbs Act is unquestionable.
The Meyers court, however, chose unnecessarily to delve into the issues of
statutory construction and the defense of impossibility. By doing so, they
significantly broadened the reach of the Hobbs Act in prosecuting illegal
political activities.
Extortion Under Color of Official Right
Early in the opinion, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the phrase
"under color of official right," located at the end of subparagraph (b) (2) of the
Act, should be interpreted as modifying the verb "conspires" located in paragraph (a). Had the court decided that the "official right" phrase does modify
the word "conspires," it would have been clear that only a public official could
commit such a conspiracy, and the impact of the statute with respect to the
prosecution of private citizens running for political office, would be largely lost.
The court, however, quickly dispensed with this issue and held that "under
color of official right" does not modify the verb "conspires." It relied on "established canons of statutory construction." 24 As is pointed out by a well-known
authority on statutory interpretation, "the words are to be applied to the
subjects to which they appear by context most properly to relate to and to which
they are most applicable." 25 The court pointed out that the phrase "obtaining of
property from another" appears in the same subparagraph and precedes the
phrase "under color of official right." Read in context, these two phrases relate to
each other, with the latter modifying the former. Nowhere in this subparagraph
does the word "conspires" appear. Without any evidence of congressional intent,
to say that the "official right" phrase modifies a verb in a preceding paragraph
is stretching the established rules of construction.
Indeed, the legislative histories of the Hobbs Act and its predecessor, the
23 89 F.2d at 134.
24 529 F.2d at 1036.
25 2A J. SUTHERLAND,
1973).

STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION,

§ 47.26, p. 136 (4th ed., C.

SANDS,
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Anti-Labor Racketeering Act of 1934,26 support the interpretation that any
individual can conspire to commit "official right" extortion. The Racketeering
Act, amended in 1947 by the Hobbs Act, was enacted to protect interstate commerce from racketeers who utilized violence, extortion or coercion to effect their

illicit objectives." In 1942 the Supreme Court decided United States v. Local
807,28 which immunized from the strictures of the 1934 Act labor union members
who threatened force or violence to obtain money or property from employers.29
In addition to being a legislative response to this decision, and thereby eliminating
this unwarranted exception, the purpose of the Hobbs Act is to protect interstate
commerce from robbery and extortion by "whoever might commit such offenses."' Thus, there remains very little difference between the purpose and
effect of the original legislation and its amended version. Both acts proscribe
robbery; 3' both proscribe "official right" and "force or fear" extortion; 2 and
both make illegal, conspiracies to commit these crimes."3 The interpretation that
the Meyers court gave to the Hobbs Act comports with the historical purposes of
both statutes. Conspiracy to obtain money through extortion, even if the agreement focuses on the conspirator's future official position, is among the types of
activities sought to be proscribed by these statutes. Official racketeering is no less
of a danger to commerce than racketeering resulting from the efforts of organized
crime. Congress is silent on the meaning they ascribe to the word "conspiracy"
however, it is unlikely that they would have limited application of the crime to
the "force or fear" definition of extortion.
There is, yet, another reason why the Hobbs Act should be interpreted as
including private citizens in its proscription against conspiracy to commit
"official right" extortion. As mentioned earlier, the legislative history of the
Hobbs Act is silent regarding the meaning of the word "conspires." This being
the case, the accepted posture is to presume that Congress intended to use the
word according to its well-accepted judicial meaning: a person can properly
be convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime although personally incapable of
committing the substantive offense. Illustrative of this judicial meaning is
United States v. Rabinowich 4 in which defendant was convicted of conspiring
to violate 29(b) (1) of the Bankruptcy Act 5 despite the fact that under the

26 Anti Labor Racketeering Act, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979 (1934) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1951 (1970)).
27 H.R. REP. No. 1833, 73d Cong., 2d Sess 2 (1934).
28 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
29 Id. at 527.
30 CONG. REC. 11905 (1945) (remarks of Representative Robsion).
31 Compare Anti Labor Racketeering Act § 2(a), ch. 569, § 2(a), 48 Stat. 979 (1934)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970)) with Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1)
(1970).
32 Compare Anti Labor Racketeering Act § 2(b), ch. 569, § 2(b), 48 Stat. 979 (1934)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970)) with Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2)
(1970).
33 Compare Anti Labor Racketeering Act § 2(d), ch. 569, § 2(d), 48 Stat. 979 (1934)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970)) with Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1970).
34 238 U.S. 79 (1915).
35 Bankruptcy Act § 29(b)(1), ch. 541, § 29(b)(1), 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (current
version at 11 U.S.C. § (1970)).
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pertinent language he was legally incapable of committing the substantive
offense." Nonetheless, the Court upheld the conviction holding the notion of
impossibility uncontrolling.
Paragraph (a) of the Hobbs Act specifically prohibits a conspiracy to
commit extortion which in any way or degree has an effect on interstate commerce. The legislature did not indicate any special conditions under which
such conspiracies. were to occur. Thus, one is left with the settled interpretation
of the nature and scope of this admittedly amorphous crime. If an individual, as
the weight of authority suggests, can be convicted of conspiring to commit a
crime which it is impossible for him to personally commit, there is no reason
to believe that under paragraph (a) of the Act a private individual cannot also
conspire to obtain property from another, "with his consent, induced ... under
color of official right." When the district court dismissed the case holding that a
mere candidate could not commit the substantive crime of "official right"
extortion, it failed, as the Seventh Circuit indicated, to consider the nature and
scope of conspiracy.
Impossibility as a Defense
The Meyers court also dealt with what it perceived to be defendants' implicit allegation 7 that impossibility is a defense to a conspiracy prosecution:
"[T]he impossibility that the defendants' conduct would result in consummation
of the contemplated crime is not persuasive or controlling."3 The authority cited
for this proposition was Beddow v. United States.9 In that case, defendant was
convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States by both forgery and the
false uttering of Government securities. Despite the fact that the securities could
not have been cashed because they were not properly witnessed, the conviction
was upheld. The defense of impossibility was rejected. The court stated that
the success or failure of the criminal conspiracy was not relevant to the question
of defendant's guilt or innocence.4" Israel v. United States41 also rejects impossibility as a defense to a conspiracy prosecution. The Sixth Circuit upheld
defendant's conviction of conspiracy to conceal property from a trustee despite
the fact that defendants, who were neither bankrupts nor dischargees in bank36

Id. The relevant language of 29(b) (1) is as follows:
Sec. 29 Offenses.
(a) ....
(b) A person shall be punished, by imprisonment for a period not to exceed two
years, upon conviction of the offense of having knowingly and fraudulently (1)
concealed while a bankrupt, or after his discharge, from his trustee any
property belonging to his estate in bankruptcy....
37 529 F.2d at 1037. In their opening Reply Memorandum defendants said they were
not raising impossibility of fact or law as a defense; however, a supplement to the memo contained language which led the Court to perceive the defense as implicit. In their Supplemental
Reply Memo defendants asked: "Why was it impossible for the defendants to conspire 'to
obtain property under color'? Because the Government stipulation clearly states that the
property be obtained prior to the defendants' election, and, in fact, the 'property' was
'obtained' prior to their election."
38 Id.
39 70 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1934).
40 Id. at 676.
41 3 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1925).
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ruptcy, could not have legally been convicted of the substantive offense. 2
In short, the court in Meyers correctly concluded that impossibility is not a
defense to a conspiracy prosecution. Thus, the fact that a private citizen cannot
obtain property by extortion induced under color of official right has no bearing
on the propriety of convicting him of conspiracy to commit such an offense.
Prior JudicialAuthority
The decision reached in Meyers results naturally from several years of
judicial interpretation of the Act. Federal prosecutors, within and without the
Seventh Circuit, have often utilized the official right definition of extortion to
attack political corruption. A major focus of these decisions has been to define
the types of official conduct proscribed by the Act. A summary of the important
cases expanding the statutory language helps to explain the Seventh Circuit's
current interpretation.
In United States v. Hyde,43 the defendant, Attorney General of Alabama,
obtained money from life insurance companies and securities dealers by threatening to prevent these organizations from doing business in the state.4 4 On appeal
from a Hobbs Act conviction, the defendant argued he was guilty of nothing
beyond classic bribery." He contended that the official right definition of extortion does not encompass threats by a public official to enforce valid rules.
The Fifth Circuit denied the defendant's claim and stated: "It is the wrongful
use of an otherwise valid power that converts dutiful action into extortion. If the
purpose and effect are to intimidate others, forcing them to pay, the action
constitutes extortion.""c,
The language of the Act was broadened beyond Hyde in United States v.
Braasch." There, the defendant, a Chicago police captain, obtained money
from tavern owners in return for protection from the enforcement of regulatory
laws.4" He was convicted of conspiracy to commit extortion under color of
official right. Captain Braasch, on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, argued that
the police- activity under scrutiny amounted to no more than bribery and was,
therefore, not covered by the Act.49 In upholding the conviction, the Seventh
Circuit stated:
It matters not whether the public official induces the payments to perform
his duties or not to perform his duties, or even, as here, to perform or not to
perform acts unrelated to his duties which can only be undertaken because
of his official position. So long as the motivation for the payment focuses on
the recipient's office, the conduct falls within the ambit of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. 50
42 Bankruptcy Act § 29(b)(1), ch. 541, § 29(b)(1),
version at 11 U.S.C. § 21 (1970)).
43 448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971).

44 Id. at 820.

30 Stat. 544 (1898)

(current

45 Id. at 822.
46 Id. at 833; see also United States v.Sopher, 362 F.2d 523 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 928 (1966).
47 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974).

48 Id. at 142.

49 Id. at 151.
50 Id. (emphasis added).
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Thus, the Braasch standard proscribes, as extortionate, the receipt of money or
property induced by the official's misuse of his official power. This standard has
subsequently been reaffirmed in other Seventh Circuit opinions.51
A further expansion of the official right language addressed the issue of
whether the Act encompasses the misuse of de facto official power. The Third
Circuit provided the answer in United States v. Mazzei 2 Defendant, a state
legislator, promised the corporate victim that certain state agencies would agree
to rent office space from the corporation. In return the defendant received a
substantial sum of money." Mazzei contended that the Hobbs Act did not reach
his activity since he had no statutory authority over the leasing policies of the
agencies. Nonetheless, the Third Circuit upheld the Hobbs Act conviction,
finding that the statutory language contemplates a misuse of both de jure and
de facto power."4 The court articulated the standard by holding that the
defendant "[E]xploited a reasonable belief that the state system so operated that
the power in fact of defendant's office included the effective authority to determine recipients of the state lease here involved." 55
The cumulative effect of such cases as Hyde, Braasch and Mazzei is an
almost unlimited applicability of the Hobbs Act to instances of local political
corruption. Any public official can commit extortion induced under color of
official right regardless of whether or not the individual has actual power to
carry out the promises which are the subject of the extortionate activity. The
Seventh Circuit has continued this expansive interpretation of the Hobbs Act's
statutory language, with Meyers reflecting a predictable willingness to apply the
notion of extortion under color of official right in an imaginative manner. Meyers
deals specifically with private citizens who eventually ascend to a position of
public trust. Since their illegal conspiracy, formed prior to their election, extended
into the terms of office, the court had little difficulty in applying the statute.
However, if the past affords a basis for prediction, there is no reason to believe
that, under similar circumstances, failure of election would bar a conviction.
Conclusion
United States v. Meyers seems to be limited to the notion that a conspiracy
does not end until its ultimate goal has been achieved. By stressing the importance of the conspiracy-continuity theory, the Court suggested this to be the
foundation of the case. Whether or not other jurisdictions will likewise restrict
this decision will depend, in large part, on the accuracy with which the court
resolved the issues of statutory interpretation and the defense of impossibility in
conspiracy prosecutions. As noted earlief, the court's resolution of these issues
was sound and supported by judicial authority.
The canons of statutory construction, the legislative histories of both the
Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 and the Hobbs Act, and the well-accepted
51 See United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1975) and United States v. Kuta,
518 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1975).
52 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1975).
53 Id. at 641.
54 Id. at 643.
55 Id.
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judicial meaning of the crime of conspiracy support the contention that the
Hobbs Act proscribes a conspiracy to commit extortion induced under color of
official right regardless of whether the conspirator is a public official. If the
conspiratorial scheme, even if effectuated by a mere candidate, focuses on a
future (extortionate) misuse of that candidate's public office, there is a Hobbs
Act violation provided the jurisdictional element of interstate commerce is
present. Indeed the weight of authority supports the court's conclusion that
impossibility is not a defense to a conspiracy prosecution. 6
The importance of the Meyers decision is that a federal prosecutor may
now be able to police the political arena for improprieties which, in the past,
have been largely subject to local jurisdiction. Consider a hypothetical case in
which a private citizen running for mayor promises, in violation of his future
public trust, that as soon as he is elected he will grant political favors to
businessmen, provided they make "contributions" directly to him or his political
party. The businessmen, unsure of the outcome of the election, play it safe and
agree to the extortionate scheme. Assuming the requisite plurality for a conspiracy prosecution and the necessary effect on interstate commerce, a federal
prosecutor may utilize Meyers in two ways to reach this illegal activity. First, if
the candidate is elected and the conspiracy continues, the "continuity" theory
can be applied to prosecute the mayor. Second, and more important, is the basis
for prosecution if the candidate loses the election. The Meyers interpretation of
the Hobbs Act language, combined with the irrelevance of the impossibility
defense, indicates that this citizen can be successfully prosecuted for conspiring
to commit extortion induced under color of official right, even though at the
inception of the conspiracy it was legally impossible for him to commit the
substantive crime.
It is impossible to predict how much the "conspiracy-impossibility" dichotomy will be used by federal authorities to prosecute political candidates. To
the extent it is used, a new dimension will be added to the already versatile
Hobbs Act.
Santo Bisignano, Jr.

56

See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.

LABOR LAW-UNFAIR LABOR

PRACTICES-UNIONS REQUIRED TO ARBITRATE

BEFORE ENGAGING IN SYMPATHY STRIKE

NLRB v. Keller-Crescent Company*
Negotiations broke down during the summer of 1972 between the KellerCrescent Company (Company) and Local 117 of the Evansville Printing and
Pressmen and Assistants Union, AFL-CIO (Pressmen). The Pressmen called a
strike and established a picket line. During the strike, twelve members of the
Evansville Typographical Union No. 35 (Local 35), a union which represents
a different unit of employees of the Company, refused to cross the Pressmen's
picket line. Local 35 is a subordinate union of the International Typographical
Union (ITU) and the Pressmen are a division of the AFL-CIO.'
When the Company learned that Local 35 was contemplating honoring
the Pressmen's picket lines, it informed Local 35 that, in its opinion, §§ 12 and
13 of the collective-bargaining agreement between the Company and Local 35
prohibited that action. Section 12, a limited sympathy strike clause, provided
that Local 35 members would not be required to cross a picket line established
by any other subordinate union of the ITU' Section 13, a broad mandatory
arbitration agreement, prohibited strikes or lockouts unless the other party refused to comply with the grievance procedure.' After the Pressmen's strike
ended, the twelve sympathy strikes returned to work and were subjected to disciplinary suspensions by the Company for violation of the contract's no-strike
-

538 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1976).

1
2

Id.
Section 12 reads as follows:
No employee covered by this contract shall be required to cross a picket line
established because of a strike by, or lockout of, any other subordinate Union of the
International Typographical Union, when such strike is authorized by, or such lockout is recognized by the ITU.
Section 13 reads as follows:
A Joint Standing Committee of two representatives each of the Employer and the
Union shall be selected. It is agreed that if neither of the Union representatives is an
employee of the commercial branch of the printing trade, that one member shall
be selected by the Union from the employees of the above-mentioned commercial
branch of the trade, such member to attend all meetings of the Joint Standing Committee, but not to have power to vote on decisions. To this committee shall be
referred all disputes which may arise as to the application of and construction to be
placed upon any provision of this agreement, or alleged violation thereof, which
cannot be settled otherwise. . . . The decision of the committee shall be final and
binding upon both parties. Provided that the General Laws of the International
Typographical Union shall not be subject to arbitration.
It is agreed that the conditions prevailing prior to any dispute shall be maintained until the Joint Standing Committee has rendered a decision as provided above
except in discharge cases.
There shall be no strikes or lockouts during the term of this agreement unless
either party refuses to comply with the grievance procedure as outlined hereinabove.
It is agreed that the procedures for settlement of any disputes or grievance
arising under this contract are as defined herein and that the only recourse each
party may have against the other for any damages alleged to be due for any breach
of this contract shall be the Joint Standing Committee.

3

Under no circumstances shall the arbitrator have the power or right to add to,
subtract from, change or modify any provision of this contract. The arbitrator is
authorized only to interpret the specific provision(s) of the contract, and to apply
them to the specific facts of the grievances which are being arbitrated.
510
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clause. An unfair labor practices charge was filed against the Company with
the NLRB.
After a fact-finding investigation,- the administrative law judge found that
the no-strike clause of the contract5 was inapplicable because waiver of the right
to strike' extended to matters only within the scope of the arbitration grievance
procedure. Since the issue of the strike was the Pressmen's contract, which was
not arbitrable under Local 35's contract, it did not fall within the no-strike ban
of § 13. It was not a "dispute or grievance arising under this contract. ... "'
The administrative law judge ruled, however, that the employees had
breached the no-strike clause because of the limited sympathy strike clause of
§ 12. He concluded that the parties intended to encompass within § 12 a prohibition on the honoring of any picket line other than those of subordinate unions
of the ITU. Although § 12 contained no express waiver of the right to honor
another union's picket line, such waiver could be implied from the language of
the section considered together with extrinsic evidence as to the parties' intent.
The administrative law judge felt that the union's attempt to broaden its longstanding picket-line clause to cover all picket lines at the plant revealed its belief
that the contract, as it existed, would not protect sympathy picketing. Accordingly, the administrative law judge recommended that the complaint be
dismissed.
A majority of the NLRB agreed with the administrative law judge that a
sympathy strike did not fall within the no-strike ban of § 13. The majority,
however, did not find that Local 35 had, even impliedly, waived its statutory
right to honor the Pressmen's picket line. The NLRB referred to a line of cases
requiring that the waiver of a collective bargaining right must be in "clear
4 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970). This section empowers the NLRB to issue an unfair
labor practice complaint whenever it is alleged that someone is engaging in such practices.
The NLRB cannot initiate an unfair labor practice proceeding without the impetus of an
outside complaint. The filing of the charge initiates an investigation of the alleged statutory
violation and a trial examiner is appointed. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.2, 101.10(a) (1976). His duty
is to inquire fully into the facts as to whether the respondent has engaged in or is engaging
in an unfair labor practice affecting commerce as is set forth in the complaint. 29 C.F.R. §
101.35 (1976). The trial examiner's decision is filed with the NLRB which then enters an
order transferring the case to it. The parties are notified and have twenty days to file exceptions to the trial examiner's decision. 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.45(a), 102.46(a) (1976). 29 U.S.C.
§ 106(c) (1970) provides that if no exceptions are filed within twenty days after service on
the parties of the trial examiner's report and recommended order, or within such further
period as the NLRB may authorize, the recommended order becomes the NLRB order and is
effective as therein prescribed. If any party files exceptions to the trial examiner's decision,
the NLRB may decide the matter upon the record or after oral argument, or may reopen the
record and receive further evidence before an NLRB member or agency, or may close the case
on compliance with the trial examiner's recommendations, or make other disposition of the
case. 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(b) (1976). The trial examiner's recommendations may be accepted
or rejected by the NLRB. See NLRB v. Oregon Worsted Co., 94 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1938).
29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1976) directs the NLRB to hear and determine the dispute, and to issue
an order requiring the offending party to cease and desist if it finds a violation. 29 U.S.C. §
160(c) (1976). The NLRB has no power to enforce its own orders, but is empowered to
petition any court of appeals for the district wherein the unfair labor practice took place or
wherein the person bound by NLRB order resides or transacts business. See In re Labor
Board, 304 U.S. 486 (1937). The court has jurisdiction of the proceeding and. of the question determined therein, and has power to issue such temporary relief or restraining order
as it deems just and proper, and to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying, or setting
aside the NLRB order in whole or in part 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
5 See § 13, supra note 2.
6 See § 12, supra note 1.
7 See § 13, supra note 2.
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and unmistakable language." 8 Since it was not so expressed in the contract, the
NLRB found that this right had not been waived; the employees remained
protected in their expressions of sympathy for the other union's causes. The
Board ruled, therefore, that the Company had engaged in unfair labor practices
in violations of § 8(a) (1), (3) of the National Labor Relations Act.' The Company was ordered to cease and desist from these unfair labor practices and to
make whole the twelve employees for any loss of wages they had suffered. The
NLRB, then, petitioned the court of appeals to enforce its order.'" The Seventh
Circuit denied this application for enforcement, concluding that Local 35 members were contractually bound to arbitrate the dispute over the construction
of the sympathy strike clause once disagreement over whether or not it ruled
out the possibility of sympathy strikes for non-related unions emerged. This
decision can only be understood against the background of developing case law
in the area of mandatory arbitration and no-strike clauses.
Historical Background of Mandatory Arbitration and No-Strike Clauses
1. Taft-Hartley Act
In response to the oft-expressed concern that there exists an inherent judicial
bias favoring management in labor disputes, 1 Congress divested federal courts
of jurisdiction to issue restraining orders or injunctions in labor disputes.12 With
the growth and increasing strength of unions, however, the need to empower
the judiciary to aid in arbitration proceedings became apparent. Thus Congress
granted to the federal courts in the Labor Management Relations Act (TaftHartley Act),"3 jurisdiction to issue restraining orders and injunctions in certain
limited cases. Subsequently, this was construed as a congressional mandate
favoring arbitration. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Textile Workers' Union v.
Lincoln Mills4 held that the Taft-Hartley Act conferred upon the courts the
power to force compliance with arbitration procedures to which both parties
had agreed.

8 Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 925 (1975), quoting NLRB v. Wisconsin Aluminum Foundry Co., 440 F.2d 393,
399 (7th Cir. 1971). That case in turn takes the phrase from a line of Sixth Circuit cases,
including Beacon Journal Publishing

9

'Co.

v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir. 1968).

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1970).

The only dissenting member of the Board had

not inquired as to the applicability of § 13 to the strike as had the administrative law judge
and the majority. Rather, he recommended that the order of dismissal be adopted. This

decision was based on his conclusion that the strike was a violation of § 12 of the agreement

because its language inescapably implied that the Local 35 members were prohibited from
honoring any picket lines other than those specifically excepted in that clause. Moreover, he
thought it was clear, in light of the collateral evidence, that the union had understood the
clause to preclude such sympathy strikes. Accordingly, he found that § 12 of the agreement
had waived the employees' statutory right to lend support to the striking Pressmen by refusing

to work. 538 F.2d at 1294-95.
10 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970). See also note 3 supra for a brief summary of procedure
and authority for unfair labor practices complaints.
II See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
12 29 U.S.C. § 164 (1970).
13 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970).
14 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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2. Boys Market Injunction
In 1970, the Supreme Court held in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Local 770,'" that the federal policy to encourage arbitration mandated that a
narrow exception be carved out of the anti-injunction clause of the NorrisLaGuardia Act. Here the union was using a strike to strengthen its demands

and was short-circuiting the mandatory arbitration procedure to which it had
agreed. The Ninth Circuit denied the injunctive relief that the Company had
requested because it considered itself bound by the earlier Supreme Court decision in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson." Sinclair Refining had held that § 4
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act" barred a federal district court from enjoining a
strike in breach of a no-strike clause in a collective-bargaining agreement, even
though the agreement contained binding arbitration provisions enforceable under
§ 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act. 8 Upon examining Boys
Market, however, the Supreme Court reversed its holding in Sinclair Refining.
Instead, it held that in those particular circumstances-where the grievance
was subject to arbitration under the collective-bargaining agreement, the Company was willing to arbitrate, and the violations of the no-strike clause were
causing irreparable injury-the Norris-LaGuardia Act considered in conjunction with § 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act does not bar the granting of injunctive relief. 9 Three criteria were established which had to be met in order to
justify the issuance of the injunction. First, the parties had to have agreed to a
procedure for the adjustment of the dispute. Second, the strike sought to be
enjoined must be over a grievance which both parties are contractually bound
to arbitrate. Finally, the injunction must be called for by the regular principles
of equity.2"
3. Boys Market and Sympathy Strikes
One of the most controversial uses of the Boys Market injunction was in
sympathy strike cases. Since the strike of a union in a sympathetic work stoppage is not over a grievance the union is bound to honor, but rather over the
grievance of some other group, the criteria for the issuance of the injunction
would not appear to be met. As the Sixth Circuit said in a recent case, "there
is a clear difference between a labor dispute which results from a work-stoppage
and work-stoppage which is the result of a labor dispute .. ."21 Whether this
distinction was significant enough to take a case out of the narrow exception
laid down by the court in Boys Market was the question considered by the lower
courts.
A split of authority developed among the circuits on the application of the
15
16
17
18

19
20

398 U.S. 235 (1970).
370 U.S. 195 (1962).
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).

370 U.S. at 254-55.

398 U.S. at 254. See Comment, The New Federal Law of Labor Injunctions, 79 YALE

L.J. 1593 (1970).

21 Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union 53, 520 F.2d 1220,
1225 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3221 (1976).
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Boys Market exception in sympathy strike cases. Injunctions have been granted
in the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits,2 but denied in the Second, Fifth,
and Sixth." The Seventh Circuit had adopted an intermediate position of a
case-by-case analysis of the specific language of the individual contracts. 4 This
growing conflict among the circuits prompted the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America.2"
The Court in Buffalo Forge discussed its rationale for the Boys Market
holding; namely, the need for a judicial method of implementing the congressional mandate for private grievance and arbitration procedures whenever
possible." The agreement of management to arbitrate would be meaningless
without the commensurate obligation of the union not to strike over an arbitrable issue. In fact, this interdependence is considered to be so essential that an
obligation not to strike over an arbitrable dispute is implied even when no
express no-strike clause exists. 7 In the absence of an explicit expression negating
any implied no-strike obligation, the agreement to arbitrate and the duty not
to strike should be construed as having coterminous application. It would be
necessary, therefore, to have a clause in the collective-bargaining agreement
which specifically and expressly negated the no-strike implication of a broad
mandatory arbitration provision.
Even in light of this strong preference for resort to the private dispute
settlement, however, the Buffalo Forge Court found that Boys Market was not
controlling in the sympathy strike situation because:
[t]he strike at issue was a sympathy strike in support of sister unions negotiating with the employer; neither its causes nor the issue underlying it were
subject to the settlement procedures provided
by the contract between the
28
employer and respondents [the union].
The strike in no way deprived the employer of its bargained right to strike.
There was no direct connection between mandatory arbitration and obligation
not to engage in sympathy strikes as there was between mandatory arbitration
and the obligation not to strike over an arbitrable dispute. The Company may
22 Valmack Indus. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.24 263 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated
and remanded, 96 S. Ct. 3215 (1976); Associated Gen. Contractors v. International Union
of Operating Engineers, 519 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1975); Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505
F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975); Island Creek Coal Co. v.
UMW, 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1974); Wilmington Shipping
Co. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1022 (1974); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 497 F.2d
311 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive
Chauffeurs, Local 926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.) (enbanc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974);
Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973).
23 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3221 (1976) ; Buffalo Forge Co.,
vs. Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 911 (1975); Amstar Corp. v.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972).
24 Hyster Co. v. Independent Towing Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976); Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975).
25 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
26 Id. at 3147.
27 Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95 (1962).
28 96 S. Ct. 3141, 3147 (1976).
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allege that the union violated the no-strike clause by participating in the sympathy strike, but this is not sufficient to call forth an injunction. The federal
courts were granted the power to issue injunctions to enforce arbitration, not
to halt specific violations of collective-bargaining agreements. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court settled the conflict among the circuits by ruling that Boys Market
injunctions could not issue in sympathy strike situations.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recognized that although no injunction
could issue because the situation did not warrant the application of the narrow
Boys Market exception:
[w]hether the sympathy strike the Union called violated the no-strike clause,
and the appropriate remedies if it did, are subject to the agreed upon dispute settlement procedures of the contract ... are ultimately issues for the
arbitrator. The employer thus was entitled to invoke the arbitral process
to determine the legality of the sympathy strike and to obtain a court order
requiring the Union to arbitrate if the Union refused to do so. Furthermore, were the issue arbitrated and the strike found illegal, the relevant
federal statutes as construed in
our cases would permit an injunction to
29
enforce the arbitrable decision.
Thus, even though a sympathy strike may be determined ultimately to have
been in violation of the collective-bargaining agreement, the employer may not
obtain an injunction under Buffalo Forge. The legality of disciplinary action
taken after the strike is a separate issue from the issuance of the injunction.
Distinction Between Unfair Labor Practice
Proceedingsand Injunctions
The Seventh Circuit had previously considered the arbitrability issue as the
same whether it arose under unfair labor practice proceedings or under applications for Boys Market injunctions." In view of the distinction made by the
Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge,"' this combining of enforcement cases and injunction petitions is no longer legitimate. As in Buffalo Forge, the arbitration
provision in Keller-Crescent may be broad enough to reach disputes over the
meaning of the no-strike clause itself. Whether it does encompass that clause is
the first place where the Company and the Board disagree. 2
1. Keller-Crescent
The Board determined in Keller-Crescentthat sympathetic activity involved
no issue that could be reached by resorting to the arbitration procedure. Local
35 was not striking over an issue that had arisen out of its contract; the strike
was in sympathy for a dispute between the Company and the Pressmen. Obvious29 Id. at 3146.
30 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976).
31 96 S. Ct. at 3147.
32 Because the NLRB initiated the action in petitioning the court to enforce its order, it
is its contentions rather than those directly of the union which are at stake here. See note 3
supra for more complete outline of procedure.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February 1977]

ly, that conflict could not be resolved in any arbitration proceeding between
Local 35 and the Company. Since there would be no purpose, then, in the
arbitration process, it would follow that sympathetic activity would not fall
within the penumbra of the prohibition of the no-strike clause. The Board
cited the Seventh Circuit's decisions in the Hyster Co. v. Independent Towing
Ass'n" and Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB" cases as authority for its
assertions that a dispute over the meaning and applications of the picket-line
clause is not arbitrable. Both of those cases involved the question of the arbitrability of a sympathy strike. The Gary Hobart case, like the Keller-Crescent
case, arose in the context of an unfair labor practice charge. The Seventh Circuit unequivocally stated:
[t]he refusal to dishonor another local union's picket line or engaging in a
sympathy strike in connection with another local's strike are not disputes
or controversies arising under or in connection with the first local union's
agreement and are therefore neither arbitrable nor subject to the no-strike
provision[s] [of the bargaining agreement]. 35
Further, the Board argued that § 12 does not waive the employees' right to
engage in sympathy strikes which honor picket lines established by groups other
than subordinates of their own International. The enumeration and specific
reservation of certain statutory rights should not imply a waiver of ones not
mentioned." A collective-bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract to
which the principles of law governing ordinary contracts apply.3' Rather, it is a
generalized code which has been adopted by the parties to cover the whole employment relationship and to comply with the strong statutory protections of
rights that Congress has provided.'"
The Company maintained that the very fact that there was a question over
the interpretation of the picket-line clause should draw the controversy within
the parameters of the mandatory arbitration procedure and, therefore, within
the no-strike prohibition. The union insisted that since the strike had nothing
to do with its own contract with the Company, mandatory arbitration was inapplicable. Conversely, the Company pointed out that there was a dispute over
the interpretation of a clause of the contract 9 and that the strike would be
illegal if the arbitrator ruled in favor of the Company on that issue. The question, therefore, should be submitted to the arbitration procedure in order to

33 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976).
34 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 "(1975).
35 Id. at 288.
36 530 F.2d 1291, 1297 (1976).
37 Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 385 U.S.
157, rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1966); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376
U.S. 543 (1964).
38 "An employee's claim does not necessarily fail where he cannot point to a specific
contract provision on which the claim is founded, because there are too many problems, and
too many unforeseeable contingencies to make the words of the contract the exclusive source
of rights and duties." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
577 (1960), citing to Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Hagv. L. REV. 1482
(1959).
39 Whether or not the picket-line clause permitted that particular sympathy strike.
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comply with the agreement and, in accordance with the purpose of the contract,
to avoid pressure tactics.
Moreover, the Company urged the Seventh Circuit to accept its view that
because § 12 enumerated what picket lines could be honored, it necessarily precluded the possibility that any others could be accorded the same respect. The
court found the latter contention to be persuasive, but chose to base its decision
on prior authority within its own circuit and on a much broader basis.
2. Consideration of the Specific Contract Language
After briefly outlining the arguments of the opposing parties, the Seventh
Circuit in Keller-Crescent analyzed the particular language of the agreement."
By doing so, it distinguished its own precedents of Gary Hobart and Hyster.
Citing a long line of cases favoring arbitration and the peaceful resolution of
labor disputes,4 ' the court recognized the presumption of arbitrability which
only disappears if it "may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."4
Section 13 of the agreement makes the construction of any provision of the
agreement subject to the arbitration procedure. Clearly, the limited picket-line
clause of § 12 is a provision of the agreement. Accordingly, then, in order for
the court to have found that the sympathy strike did not fall within the no-strike
ban of § 13, it must have been able to state with positive assurance that § 13
could in no way be interpreted to cover the dispute over § 12. This it was not
prepared to do; the court determined that the evidence available simply did
not meet such a high burden. In fact, the only support the Seventh Circuit
found for the contention that the sympathy strike issue was not arbitrable was
the suggestion by the Board that the Gary Hobart and Hyster cases controlled.
Those cases contained very specific language to the effect that a sympathy strike
could not be an arbitrable issue because it was not a dispute or controversy
arising under the collective-bargaining agreement.43
3. Distinguishing Gary Hobart and Hyster precedents
On the basis of Buffalo Forge, the Seventh Circuit felt justified in distinguishing at least the Hyster case because it involved a petition for a Boys Market
injunction rather than an attempt to enforce or review an unfair labor practices
charge.44 More important, however, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that all
cases are limited by their facts, and application of a case as precedent is limited
to the degree of similarity of the facts of the two cases. The court found that
the factual circumstances of the Gary Hobart and Hyster cases differed in several
40 As was its established practice in considering the question of arbitrability in sympathy
strike cases. 530 F.2d 1291, 1295-96 (1976).
41 Western Publishing Co., Inc. v. Local 254, Graphic Arts I.U., 522 F.2d 530 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3428 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1976); Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
42 414 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1974).
43 See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
44 96 S. Ct. 3141, 3146 (1976).
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important aspects from the Keller-Crescent case. The most crucial difference
was the addition of the picket-line clause to the collective-bargaining agreement
in Keller-Crescent. This inclusion of specific language dealing directly with the
issue of sympathy strikes almost inevitably made the issue arbitrable when
coupled with the very broad arbitration clause also involved in Keller-Crescent.
The court concluded, therefore, that the dispute over the interpretation of § 12
was arbitrable. According to the court, allowing the language of Gary Hobart
and Hyster to control would encourage employees to strike over the interpretation
of picket-line clauses, rather than utilize the agreed upon arbitration process.
This would be violative of public policy and the congressional mandate.
Impact of Keller-Crescent
The Seventh Circuit in this case has used its usual case-by-case analysis of
specific language to decide a controversy arising over the arbitrability of a sympathy strike. The court maintains that its decisions on the arbitrability of sympathy strikes are consistent;45 the decisions show differing results because determinations were based on the language of the individual agreements, and the provisions of the agreements were different enough to warrant the seemingly contrary findings of the cases.46 This case-by-case method allows for flexibility and
permits the court to balance the competing demands of existing case law in its
own circuit with new input from the Supreme Court." Moreover, it makes the
ultimate disposition of a case turn on particular clauses of the specific collectivebargaining agreement. The focal point of the court's scrutiny in the KellerCrescent case was the inclusion of the picket-line clause of § 12 in the agreement.
Without that, the case would have been indistinguishable from the Gary Hobart
case which involved otherwise similar language in treating grievance procedures
and no-strike clauses. In order to avoid the strong precedent of non-arbitrability
of that case, the Seventh Circuit had to distinguish it on the basis of the picketline clause.
The strong presumption of arbitrability which they rely so heavily upon,
however, is not an end in itself. This presumption has been developed merely
as an aid to facilitate the congressional preference for private settlement of disputes. By labelling the sympathy strike question arbitrable, the court is, in
theory, preventing the union from using force to argue its position, thus promoting the settlement of the suit by arbitration. Unfortunately, that end is not
achieved. Clearly, the heart of the dispute and, thus, the cause of the strike,
was the question of whether § 12 was to be read as excluding all sympathy
strikes, except those of subordinate unions, or whether it was a mere specification
of one of many situations when a sympathy strike would be permitted.
The Union was not striking for recognition of its right to honor picket lines
of other unions. Indeed, even the employer's recognition of that right would
not have ended the strike. The Local 35 sympathizers returned to work only
45 538 F.2d 1291, 1295-96 (1976).
46 519 F.2d 89; 511 F.2d 284; Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293 (7th
Cir. 1974).
47 See note 26 supra.
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when the Pressmen removed their pickets. They did not stay out until the Company agreed to recognize the right to engage in sympathy strikes. Obviously, here
the purpose of the work stoppage by Local 35 was not to force a settlement
before arbitration could take place. On the other hand, if Local 35 had declared
that it would not return to work until the pickets were removed, and the Company acquiesced in their interpretation of § 12, a different situation would have
existed. The strike would have been over an arbitrable grievance, and the union
would have been required to submit to arbitration before engaging in any such
work stoppage.4" The Seventh Circuit's fear is unwarranted; allowing the Gary
Hobart decision to control this case would not encourage employees to strike
over the interpretation of picket-line clause rather than arbitrate.
This difference in characterizing the catalysts of the two different types of
strikes, however, is not necessarily a practical difference. Even though the origin
of the strike was not § 12, that clause became an arbitrable issue once the strike
had commenced. Since there is a strong presumption of arbitrability, § 12 could
only be interpreted to be nonarbitrable if there were virtually no way in which
it could be read as the Company contended. The Seventh Circuit determined
that this high burden was not met. With this in mind, it is difficult to imagine
how it ever could be met. Nonetheless, the waiver of a collective-bargaining
right must be in "clear and unmistakable language."4 Such a waiver, therefore,
could not be inferred by omission. The Company's contention, that the union
waived its rights to engage in non-subordinate union sympathy strikes, collapses
in the face of this mandate for specific waiver language.
There is also a practical problem which should be noted. The Company
contended that as soon as there was a dispute over whether or not the sympathy
strike in question fell within the exception to the no-strike clause embodied in
§ 12, an arbitrable dispute came into existence and the union was required to
submit to arbitration before striking. The Seventh Circuit's adoption of this
reasoning could mean that whenever a union includes a provision specifically
reserving their sympathy strike rights, there exists a potential dispute as to its
meaning. The Company, then, could at least delay every sympathy strike by
questioning whether it fell within the clause. Ironically, under the KellerCrescent decision and the Gary Hobart ruling, it would seem preferable for a
union wanting to preserve its sympathy strike rights not to treat them at all in
the collective-bargaining agreement. The Seventh Circuit's finding of arbitrability assumed that § 12 could be interpreted as a waiver of some sympathy
strike rights. This is completely unwarranted in light of the clear and unmistakable language requirement for such a waiver. In so ruling, the Seventh Circuit
made it difficult for a union to explicitly protect its sympathy strike rights in a
collective-bargaining agreement without giving the Company the potential of
delaying each strike by invoking the arbitration process to determine its legality.
Kathryn Kelly

48
49

522 F.2d 530.
414 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1974).
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Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. OSHA Review Commission*
The provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)" are
designed to increase employee protection on worksites. Indeed, the general purpose of the Act is "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in
the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human
resources .. ."' Toward this goal, OSHA requires government inspections of
worksites.' During reasonable times, an inspector may enter a worksite to inspect
and investigate the place of employment.' Moreover, a walkaround right provision exists requiring the presence of employer and employee representatives on
such inspections.5 This requirement provides a direct aid to inspectors in satisfying the statutory mandate. This requirement also serves to provide representation for the interests of both parties: employer and employee.' However, the
size and manner of selection of the constituency of this combined inspection
party can lead to conflicting results between the general purpose of the Act and
the specific purpose of the walkaround right provision.
In Chicago Bridge & Iron, the Seventh Circuit applied a substantial compliance standard to the walkaround right provision of OSHA. Unfortunately, a
non-discriminatory application of such a standard could diminish rather than
enlarge employee protection. This comment will analyze the effect this substantial compliance standard has upon the walkaround right provision, the inspection section, and the general purpose of the Act.
Chicago Bridge & Iron Company was one of many prime contractors involved in the construction of a nuclear power plant at Zion, Illinois. Pursuant
to the walkaround right provision, an inspector sought to organize a group
representing employees and employers to accompany him on his inspection of
the worksite. For this purpose, the inspector contacted the project manager of
the worksite. The resulting inspection party was comprised only of representatives of employees and employers from the two largest contractors at the site;
consequently, Chicago Bridge & Iron was not represented in the party.
As a result of this inspection, twenty-three employers were issued citations
for violations of OSHA.' In particular, eight violations were found against
*

1

535 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1976).
29 U.S.C. § 651, et seq. (1970).

2 Id.§ 651(b).
3
4
5

Id. § 657.
Id. § 657(a).
The contested walkaround right provision is stated in the following language:
Subject to regulations issued by the Secretary, a representative of the employer and
a representative authorized by his employees shall be given an opportunity to accompany the Secretary or his authorized representative during the physical inspection
of any workplace . . . for the purpose of aiding such inspection.
Id. § 657(e).
6 See note 14, infra.
7 For the issuance of citations, see 29 U.S.G. § 658.
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Chicago Bridge & Iron.' Instead of correcting the violations,9 Chicago Bridge &
Iron chose to contest the citations before an administrative law judge appointed
by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission." Chicago Bridge
& Iron premised its argument on the fact that neither it nor its employees were
given an opportunity to accompany the inspector as required by OSHA.
Though a formal offer to accompany the inspector was not given to Chicago
Bridge & Iron, the inspector had informed a representative of the company that
an inspection was to be undertaken. Moreover, after the inspection had commenced, the project manager also informed Chicago Bridge & Iron of the inspection and of the constituency of the inspection party. Despite this informal
notification, the administrative law judge vacated the citations because the inspector had failed specifically to extend the walkaround right to Chicago Bridge
& Iron. On review, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
reversed this holding." Consequently, Chicago Bridge & Iron petitioned the
Seventh Circuit for review of the Commission's order. 2
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit considered whether an inspector's failure
to extend formally the walkaround right to a company is grounds for voiding
citaions issued to the company resulting from that inspection. In reaching its
decision, the Seventh Circuit examined the contested walkaround right provision,
focusing on the type of reading to be given that provision: mandatory or
directory. In addition, the court examined the sufficiency of the inspector's
attempt to effectuate the provision balanced against the general purpose of the
Act. The court accepted the inspector's performance and concluded that when
an inspector has substantially complied with the mandatory walkaround right
provision, then in the absence of a demonstration of prejudice from the inspection, citations issued to the company as a result of the inspection are valid.
The Walkaround Right, § 657(e)
To permit employee involvement in worksite inspections, groups representing the unions pushed for inclusion of the walkaround right in OSHA. Groups
representing the employers sought to maintain control over production. Accordingly, the Act provides that a representative of both groups "shall be given an
opportunity to accompany the Secretary or his authorized representative during
the physical inspection of the workplace."' Thus, representation of both em8 OSHA distinguishes between a serious violation and a non-serious violation. A serious
violation is defined in the following manner:
A serious violation shall be deemed to exist in a place of employment if there is a
substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition which exists, or from one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or
processes which have been adopted or are in use, in such place of employment unless
the employer did not, and could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know
of the presence of the violation.
Id. § 666 (j). A non-serious violation is a violation which "is specifically determined not to be
of a serious nature. . . ." Id. § 666(c).
9 The option to contest a citation is available to an employer. Id. § 659(a).
10 For the hearing procedure, see id. § 661 (i).
11 The Commission is authorized to review the decisions of administrative law judges. Id.
12 For the procedures governing judicial review, see id. § 660.
13 Id. § 657(e) (emphasis added).
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ployees and employers on the inspection party is, clearly, the product of compromise.' Furthermore, it was believed that employee participation would serve
as an invaluable aid to the inspector on his inspection of the workplace.15
Although the Seventh Circuit concluded that the term "shall," within the
walkaround right provision, is to be given a mandatory reading," it allowed
substantial compliance, rather than strict compliance, to satisfy this requirement."7 In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily upon the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Accu-Namics, Inc. v. OSHA Review Commission.' In Accu-Namics,
a citation for a serious violation issued to an employer was upheld, despite the
inspector's failure to follow the letter of the law: (1) the inspector failed to give
employee and employer representatives an opportunity to exercise their walkaround rights; and, (2) the inspector failed to identify himself immediately
upon his arrival at the worksite. A citation was issued as a result of the cave-in
of a trench, twenty-four feet deep, in which four employees, laying pipe, were
killed.
The Fifth Circuit ruled that the inspector's failure to give the opportunity
to exercise the walkaround right and to identify himself on arrival were procedural or technical violations. If such violations did not prejudice the employer,
the court reasoned that these procedural deficiencies could not be used to render
void the citation. According to this court, such a conclusion was necessary to
avoid frustrating the general purpose of the Act: "to assure so far as possible
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources ... ""
Fully in accord with this reasoning in Accu-Namics, the Seventh Circuit
Chicago Bridge & Iron determined that the OSHA inspector need only substantially comply with the mandatory procedure for the walkaround right, provided the employer is not prejudiced thereby; hence, a substantial compliance
standard was imposed.'" This unusual conclusion is primarily explained by the
practical justification provided by the court for its decision, which seems to
create a division between the letter and the application of the law. The mandatory reading of the walkaround right provision is severed from the practical
14

In the words of one senator:
This section -reflects a fair and practical resolution of the conflicting viewpoint of
employers who fear that an unlimited right of employees to accompany inspectors
would lead to disruption of production operations and, the viewpoint of employees who
urgently believe they need their representatives to participate and assist in the
inspection which is so important to their continued protection in their job.
116 CoNG. REc. 37340 (1970) (remarks of Senator Williams).
15 The importance of employee involvement is brought out by the senator later in his
speech:
Certainly no one knows better than the workingman what the conditions are, where
the failures are, and particularly, where there are safety hazards. The opportunity
to have the workingman himself and a representative of other workingmen accompanying inspectors is manifestly wise and fair, and in arriving at the objectives of
the legislation, I think it is one of the key provisions of the bill presented to the
Senate in committee.
116 CONG. REc. 37340 (1970) '(remarks of Senator Williams).
16 535 F.2d at 375.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 376. 515 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1975).
19 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1970).
20 535 F.2d at 377.
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effect of that section. If "the employer is unable to demonstrate that prejudice
resulted from his non-participating in the inspection,"'" then there is no practical
basis to render void citations issued during the inspection. Consequently, in the
Seventh Circuit's interpretation, the primary concern for adequate safety conditions overrides the procedural conditions of statutory compliance. Upon a
closer analysis of the court's 'opinion, however, this departure from the mandatory letter of the law is not justified by this practical consideration in all cases.
Substantial Compliance Standard
No actual notice of the walkaround right was given to Chicago Bridge &
Iron. Before the inspection, an inspector informed a representative of Chicago
Bridge & Iron that an inspection was to be undertaken, and the inspector gave
the representative an informational pamphlet explaining OSHA. Later, a project manager also informed Chicago Bridge & Iron of the inspection and of the
constituency of the inspection party. In the absence of a formal offer to have
its representative accompany the inspector, Chicago Bridge & Iron made no
request to accompany the inspector. The Seventh Circuit found this to be sufficient compliance with the mandatory requirements of the statute to support
the issuance of citations. 2
Increased safety at a place of employment is the general purpose of OSHA.
To satisfy that purpose, the Seventh Circuit adopted the substantial compliance
standard for the walkaround right provision, provided the employer was not
thereby prejudiced. To avoid prejudice, however, the court could have adopted
a varying standard: strict compliance at small worksites and substantial compliance at large worksites. Instead, the Seventh Circuit validated a substantial
compliance standard regardless of the size of the worksite2
In grounding its argument on the general purpose of the Act, the court
failed to emphasize the importance of the specific purpose of the walkaround
right: to aid the inspection at worksites of varying sizes. If the walkaround right
is strictly exercised, this purpose is presumed to be achieved. In turn, achievement of this purpose is supposed to further the general purpose of the Act. An
inspection party adequately represented by all employer and employee groups is
presumed to lead to a more careful inspection, and thus greater safety. Consequently, it is necessary to attempt to balance both the specific purpose of this
provision and the general purpose of the Act.
Although the walkaround right is supposed to further both its own specific
purpose as well as the general purpose of the Act, it will not always have such
21 Id.
22 535 F.2d at 377-78.
23 The court refused to expressly limit the substantial compliance standard to large worksites. Though it did emphasize the need for this standard at large worksites, it left open the
possibility of applying the standard to smaller worksites: "This result [the abandonment of the
strict compliance standard], we believe, is compelled particularly in the circumstance of large
on-site inspections involving multiple contractors." Id. at 376-77. The express holding, likewise, fails to limit the standard. Id. at 377. By relying on this overbroad holding in Chicago
Bridge & Iron, the Ninth Circuit, in Hartwell Excavating Co. v. Dunlop, 537 F.2d 1071 (9th
Cir. 1976), applied the substantial compliance standard to a worksite exceedingly smaller than
the one in Chicago Bridge & Iron. For an argument against this misapplication, see text
accompanying note 28, infra.
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consistent and beneficial results. Under varying factual circumstances, the practical effects of the walkaround right, and imposition of the strict compliance
standard to that right, may or may not further either the specific purpose of that
provision or the general purpose of the Act. Specifically, though strict compliance
to the walkaround right provision may not further these purposes at the larger
worksites, it may further the purposes at smaller worksites. The Secretary of
Labor argued that strict enforcement of the walkaround right at a huge worksite
(as in Chicago Bridge & Iron) would result in an inspection party of an unmanageable size. The size of the party would hinder, rather than aid, the inspection;24
the quality of the inspection would be poorer, resulting in less safety assurance.
The Secretary, therefore, argued for judicial adoption of the substantial compliance standard. But strict compliance at a small worksite would not result in
a large unmanageable inspection party, thus each employer and its employees
could be represented on the party. Greater aid could be afforded the inspector,
a more careful inspection and greater safety resulting.
These different practical effects arising at worksites of varying sizes were
overlooked in the Seventh Circuit's summary treatment of the specific purpose
of the walkaround right provision. Indeed, the court admits that the primary
source of support for its application of the substantial 'compliance standard,
Accu-Namics, was able to apply the standard "in spite of the statutory lan'
25
guage.
Instead of an approach grounded squarely upon the specific purpose of the
walkaround right provision, the Seventh Circuit chose to base its reasoning upon
the broad general purpose of the Act. In effect, the court created its broad
substantial compliance rule despite the express language of the walkaround
right provision. In so doing, the court overlooked the practical effects of its
interpretation which might run counter to the specific purpose of the provision
as well as the general purpose of the Act.
A Question of Balance: PracticalEffect of the Walkaround
Right upon the Specific Purpose of the Right
Since the practical effect of an inflexible walkaround right may not be consistent with the specific purpose of that provision, a varying standard, depending
upon the size of the worksite involved, should be applied. Specifically, at the
small worksite, strict compliance to the walkaround right provision furthers the
specific purpose of that provision and the general purpose of the Act. Since each
company and its employees are most familiar with their own work, their representatives, by exercising their walkaround rights, can join with the inspector to
arrive at on-the-spot resolutions.26 The more careful inspection which results
better ensures safety. Obviously, the general purpose of the Act is also furthered
by such a strict observance of the walkaround right.
If strict compliance to the provision is replaced by substantial compliance
at small worksites, the walkaround right is curtailed. Employees and employers
24 This reasoning forms part of the Secretary's policy argument. 535 F.2d at 374.
25 Id. at 376.
26 This reasoning forms a part of the policy argument of Chicago Bridge & Iron. Id.
at 374.
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are thereby denied the opportunity to exercise their rights fully. By omitting a
company and its employees from the inspection, their insight into their own work
is lost. A less careful inspection, and, thus, less safety results. No practical limitation, such as an inspection party of a large unmanageable size, can be found
to justify such an omission. The express purpose of the walkaround right provision, as well as the general purpose of the Act is frustrated: neither the employees nor the employer receives the desired benefits under the provision or Act.
By contrast, at the large worksite the same argument does not necessarily
apply. Here, inspection parties of an unmanageable size would result from
strict compliance with the walkaround right provision. Clearly, such inspection
parties would hinder rather than aid the inspection resulting, perhaps, in a less
safe worksite.
The Seventh Circuit, however, fails to discuss the beneficial effects strict
compliance would have for workplaces of smaller size. After analyzing the
detrimental effect strict compliance would have at a large worksite, the court
announces a broad substantial compliance standard, without expressly limiting
its application, and without working out the practical application of the strict
compliance approach to the walkaround right at large workplaces." This summary treatment of the practical application of both the strict and the substantial
compliance standards to all worksite sizes is an error. In cases involving worksites of various sizes, the practical effect of the walkaround right may or may
not aid the inspection. The practical effect of the right at worksites of varying
sizes should have been examined by the court. Such an examination could have
led the court to limit the application of the rule it sets forth.
The Walkaround Right and Recent Case Law
Due to the Seventh Circuit's failure to expressly limit application of the
substantial compliance standard to large places of employment, the Ninth Circuit
overlooked the effects that differing sizes of workplaces would have upon the
walkaround right provision. Though the facts in Hartwell Excavating Co. v.
Dunlop' made it possible for the Ninth Circuit to use this distinction between
large and small workplaces, Chicago Bridge & Iron made it easier for the Ninth
Circuit to disregard the effects of this worksite size distinction and to incorporate
the substantial compliance standard.
Unlike the Chicago Bridge & Iron worksite (covering twenty-six acres and
over fifty subcontractors), Hartwell Excavating Company was digging a 750-foot
trench which ran under a highway and extended on both sides of the road. As
inspectors were searching for the foreman in charge at the workplace, they noted
several violations of OSHA: inadequate shoring in the trench and insufficient
distance between excavated material and the trench.
Hartwell contended that the lapse in time between the inspectors' initiation
of the inspection and their presentation of credentials to the superintendent provided the basis for a violation of the walkaround right provision.29 The alleged
27 For the court's failure to work out a practical application of the standard at large
workplaces, see id. at 377. The failure to expressly limit the standard is discussed in note 23,
supra.
28 537 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1976).
29 Id. at 1072.
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violations against Hartwell were found without the presence of any representative
of Hartwell in the inspection party. Indeed the party consisted of only the two
inspectors. Hartwell claimed that it was prejudiced by the inspectors' failure
to strictly follow the statute." The testimony of Hartwell's superintendent conflicted with the testimony of the inspectors concerning the depth of the trench
and the composition of the soil. Strict compliance to the walkaround right provision would have secured the superintendent's presence on the inspection party
and could have possibly resulted in an on-the-spot resolution of the conflicting
views.
The practical justification based upon a large worksite was not present.
With only one contractor, an inspection party of unmanageable size could not
result. Moreover, Hartwell's superintendent could have aided the inspectors by
correcting their possibly mistaken opinion at the worksite, rather than before an
administrative law judge or court.
Hartwell's walkaround right was not respected; the inspectors were not
given aid. The citations issued did not necessarily result in greater safety. Safety
at such a small worksite could have been better assured by having the representatives of Hartwell and its employees-the ones whose safety is at stake-as part
of the inspection party. The relatively small effort needed to organize such a
party, and the avoidance of unwarranted citations, further compel strict compliance to the walkaround right at small worksites. Undue reliance upon the
Seventh Circuit's overbroad substantial compliance holding leads to ineffective
administration of the walkaround right provision.
Conclusion
The relation between the practical effect of the walkaround right and its
expressed purpose-to aid the inspection-should be examined more thoroughly
before a court announces a broad substantial compliance rule, as the Seventh
Circuit did in Chicago Bridge & Iron. Though the greater part of the court's
practical argument was based on its assumption that a large worksite is involved,
no such express limitation can be found in the opinion. The danger of applying
this standard to smaller worksites, as illustrated in Hartwell Excavating Co., is
thereby increased.
There are large differences in the practical problems in inspecting a worksite as large as the Commonwealth Edison worksite in Chicago Bridge & Iron,
and one as small as the worksite in Hartwell Excavating Co. While a huge worksite may require a limitation on the strict exercise of the walkaround right in
order to prevent interruptions and distractions to the inspector, in a small worksite the walkaround right could be exercised by all representatives of employees
and employers, resulting in greater aid to the inspector and greater safety. Without a more careful examination, a broad substantial compliance holding impinges too greatly upon both the aid afforded the inspector and the walkaround
right.
James M. Varga
30

Id. at 1073.

McFADDEN ACT-TITLE 12 U.S.C. § 36 (f)APPLICABILITY OF "BRANCH" BANK CONCEPT TO CUSTOMER-BANK
COMMUNICATIONS TERMINALS

Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. ContinentalIllinois National Bank & Trust Co.
and
Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. First National Bank*
Introduction
Introduced in 1927, the McFadden Act, Title 12 U.S.C. § 36 (f), remains
the key legislation on branch banking in the United States today. This 1927 Act
was passed as a response to rapidly-growing congressional concern over the competitive imbalance between state and national banks. With the sudden outbreak
of branching within the state banking system,' the Act was directed specifically
toward alleviating this competitive tension. This goal was to be accomplished by
providing national banks with the same branching privileges allowed banks of
the state system in which they were located. Thus, national banks were to look
to individual state law for branching guidelines.2 Under the McFadden Act,
"branching" occurs whenever "deposits are received, or checks paid, or money
4
lent"3 by a bank at a location that can be construed as an "additional office."
Since enactment of this legislation, major controversy has arisen over the
scope of "branch" banking, and, consequently, over the extent to which national
banks must defer to state law.5 Current interest in the Act, however, is due
primarily to the introduction of computerized banking terminals. This new addition to banking, the customer-bank communication terminal (CBCT),' was
originally visualized as a computer rather than the typical brick-and-mortar
structure generally contemplated by the statute. Understandably, such a technological development could not have been foreseen during the 1920's and, consequently, no specific provision in the McFadden Act encompasses these modern
536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1976).
1 Between 1920 and 1923, several states had allowed their chartered banks to branch, thus
facing the national banking system with an emergency affecting its very existence, and ultimately, the existence of the Federal Reserve System. 65 CONG. REc. 11296-97 (1924).
2 In effect, Congress had placed on state legislatures the responsibility of deciding whether
branching was sound public policy for their respective states. Each state would have to weigh
for itself the benefits of convenience derived from branching against a potential threat of
monopolization.
3 Title 12, U.S.C. § 36(f) defines the term "branch" to includ any branch bank, branch
office, branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of business located in any state or
territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia at which deposits are received, or
checks paid, or money lent. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1970).
4 First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
5 The specific issue over the extent to which national banks must defer to state law was
dealt with in First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966), discussed in
text and notes at notes 40-43, infra.
6 The customer-bank communication terminal, or CBCT, is an electronic device which is
remote from the main bank or from one of its branches. By means of tape which is periodically
processed at the main bank, the CBCT records any information that is not transmitted instantaneously to the control computer. Once a transaction has been completed, it will be
verified in one of two ways: if the CBCT is connected by wire to the bank's central computer,
the verification is said to be "on-line"; if the CBCT is self-contained, the communication
verifying the transaction is "off-line."
*
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facilities employed by banks.'
The question of "branch" status for the CBCT was considered recently by
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In two
consolidated cases, Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. ContinentalIllinois National Bank &
Trust Co., and Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. First National Bank,8 the Illinois Commissioner of Banks & Trust Companies sought an injunction against two national
banks that were utilizing CBCTs in the Chicago area. These computer terminals
were capable of performing functions normally transacted at any bank on a
normal banking day: 1) the depositing of checks or currency in the appropriate
account; 2) the transfer of funds between savings and checking accounts; 3) the
withdrawal of cash; and 4) the payment of installment loans due the bank. For
each of the foregoing functions, the procedure utilized in operating the terminal
was essentially the same.9
The two defendant banks originally intended to operate these terminals
and to open several more in new locations. This decision was prompted by a
1974 interpretive ruling issued by the United States Comptroller of the Currency"° who had stated that CBCTs were not "branch" banks, hence their use
by national banks was not confined by state law. On cross motions for summary
judgment, however, the district court found for the plaintiff, thereby restricting
the defendants' use of the CBCTs. For purposes of making deposits and trans7 'Congress intentionally defined the term "branch" broadly enough so as to include
facilities, such as teller windows. However, there was no immediate need before Congress at
that time to further define the limits of "branching." It could not have foreseen the technological developments that would, in fact, occur fifty years later.
8 409 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
9 Once the customer inserts his magnetically-encoded card into the CBCT and thereby
activates the terminal, the CBCT will scan the card's magnetic tape. If the card has been
damaged, it will be returned to the customer; if it has expired, it will be "captured"
(i.e., retained) by the machine. Provided the card is neither damaged nor has expired, the
CBCT will instruct the customer to insert his "message" through the computer. The customer
begins informing the machine by entering his Personal Identification Number (PIN). He has
90 seconds in which to enter this item. The "message" will also contain the cutomer's electronic fund transfer system (EFTS) access number, and the transaction which he has entered.
After entering his PIN on the keyboard, he will select the type and amount of the desired
transaction. If the machine is capable of dispensing the requested amount, and the customer
sees that it is stated correctly in the window, he then presses the "enter" key. If the amount
in the window is incorrect, the customer may "clear" the machine and begin his transaction
again. See 409 F. Supp. at 1179.
Accordingly, the CBCT sends the message over the telephone wires to the bank's main
computer which in turn checks the customer's Master Record to assure that this matches the
access number sent by the CBCT. The main computer contains several files that are
storage medium for data called a "disc." These include customer authorization files kept on a
indexed according to the EFTS access number, transaction log and history files, and an index
of the PINs in a scrambled pattern so that utnauthorized discovery of them is prevented.
Provided the PIN entered by the customer is correct, the main computer will ascertain the
credit status of the customer, verify the validity of the card, and proceed to authorize the
transaction. Having established that the necessary amount requested does exist, the main
computer will check the "capture code" to determine whether the card has been revoked or
suspended. If the card clears this process, the CBCT will receive an authorization reply from
the main computer. The CBCT will now respond to the authorization, dependent upon the type
of transaction requested by the customer. In the case of a deposit, the customer will insert his
envelope into the machine where a receipt number will be stamped on it. When the receipt
is dispensed, the CBCT transmits a Completion Status Message (CSM) to the main computer.
The other transactions proceed in a similar fashion.
10 On December 11, 1974, the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States construed
Title 12 of the National Bank Act as permitting national banks to establish CBCTs apart from
their main offices and branches. The ruling stated that CBCTs are not "branches" within the
meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 36(f).
12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1976).
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ferring funds, including both check cashing and money lending, the district court
concluded that the CBCTs being operated by the two national banks were branch
banks, and thus subject to state proscriptions under the McFadden Act. 1'
Conversely, for purposes of withdrawing cash and paying installment loans
due the bank, the CBCTs were not branches, and therefore could perform
these two operations 2 despite state branching restrictions. According to the
district court's interpretation of the statutorily-defined term "branch," branching
occurs whenever deposits are made, checks are cashed, or money is lent. Based
on this premise, these last two functions were analyzed by the lower court. Since
neither the cash withdrawal nor the installment loan payment constituted
deposit-making, check-cashing, or money-lending, both activities were declared
non-branch functions and were allowed to continue.'
The two national banks in Chicago appealed the adverse portions of the
district court's decision. On appeal, 4 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court's ruling to the extent that the CBCTs made deposits, cashed checks, and
lent money. These three functions constituted the tripartite criterion within the
McFadden Act. The Seventh Circuit upheld the decision, then, to the extent that
the district court had made a determination clearly within the confines of the
statute and the two national banks were enjoined from further use of the terminals for these three functions. Relying upon the same premise as did the district
court, however, the Seventh Circuit found that the cash withdrawal and the installment loan payment were equally branch functions. 5
In determining the scope of the term "branch" with respect to these two
CBCT functions, the court was faced with two options. It could find that these
two activities were contained within the express statutory formulation of depositmaking, check-cashing, and money-lending, as hybrids of those functions. Alternatively, the court could have held that, although not included within those three
terms, the CBCT functions were, nonetheless, proscribed by the McFadden Act.
Rather than expand the explicit terms of the legislation, the Seventh Circuit
chose the first alternative, thereby attempting to decide the issue consistently with
the criteria promulgated by the McFadden Act.
The Seventh Circuit, only the second circuit to deal with this issue, 6
refused to distinguish the cash withdrawal and the installment loan payment
from those functions proscribed by McFadden. Although these two functions
can be technically distinguished from the three proscribed functions enumerated
in the statute, and in fact were so distinguished by the lower court, the Seventh
11 Pursuant to the relevant portion of Illinois law, branch banking is prohibited by state
banks. Therefore, the two national banks in Lignoul could no longer operate the CBCTs insofar
as these terminals performed "branch" operations under the McFadden Act. See ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 16!, § 106 (1972).
12 409 F. Supp. at 1181.
13 Id.
14 536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1976). On Monday, October 4, 1976, the two defendant banks
in the Seventh Circuit were denied certiorari by the United States Supreme Court. Continental
Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Lignoul and First Nat'l Bank v. Lignoul, 45 USLW 3238 (U.S.

Oct. 1976).
15 Id. at 178.
16 The first circuit to deal with the branching issue presented by the CBCT was the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith,
534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976) [hereinafter cited as IBAA]. See discussion note 108, infra

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February 1977]

Circuit found their essential character to be indistinguishable. The court noted
that holding otherwise would exalt technicality over substantive analysis ' in
dealing with the CBCT. The customer-bank communication terminals, therefore,
were branch banks for every function which they performed.
Interface: The FederalDefinition Within State Branching Law
Although state law determines how, where, and when a national bank can
branch, federal law determines what constitutes a branch." In First National
Bank v. Dickinson,9 the United States Supreme Court rejected the idea that state
definitions of "branch" banking must control the content of the federal definition:
In § 36 (c) Congress entrusted to the states the regulation of branching as
Congress then conceived it. But to allow the states to define the content of
the term "branch" would make them the sole judges of their own powers.
Congress did not intend such an improbable result, as appears from the inclusion in § 36 (c) of a general definition of "branch."2
The relevant portion of that section reads as follows:
A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller
of the Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) within the limits
of the city, town, or village in which said association is situated, if such
establishment and operation are at the time expressly authorized by the law
of the state in question; and (2) at any point within the state in which
said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the
time authorized to state banks by the statute law of the state in question by
language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely
by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location
imposed by the law of the state on state banks...21
The specific issue concerning the CBCT is whether such a facility fits within
the federal definition of a "branch" bank. If the 1927 Act is interpreted restrictively as to national banks, then, to a large degree, the ability of the national
system to expand will be severely limited by the extent to which state banks may
similarly expand under state law. Due to the current status of state law,22 the
inclusion of the CBCT within the term "branch" would inhibit virtually all
development of these terminals within the national banking system. By contrast,
if the CBCT is viewed as a "non-branch" facility of the national banking system,
federal authorities will have the ultimate power to regulate the national banks'
17 The Court of Appeals takes this warning from the Dickinson decision inthe Supreme
Court, 396 U.S. 122 (1969), discussed in text and notes at notes 44-53, infra.
18 Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 516 F.2d
1206 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
19 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
20 Id. at 133. See aLso 39 Fed. Reg.44416, 44417 (1974).
21 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
22 Currently, twelve states prohibit branch banking entirely, twenty-one allow itbut with
geographical limitations, and eighteen permit statewide branching. See the discussion in text
and notes at notes 74-76, infra.
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usage of the computer terminals. Thus, the state banking system would be forced
to adapt or become competitively inferior to the national banks.
Competitive Equality and the Meaning of Branching: Three Views
1. The Notion of "Competitive Equality"
The National Bank Act of 1864,23 the predecessor of the 1927 Act, made
no reference to branch banks. In 1923, however, the Attorney General responded2 4 to the disadvantageous competitive position of national banks after
several state institutions had been allowed to branch. The Attorney General
ruled that it was within the powers of national banks to establish "teller
windows," remote from the main offices of the bank, for the purpose of offering
routine paying and receiving services.2
Shortly thereafter, the United States
Supreme Court overturned this ruling in First National Bank v. Missouri ex rel.
Barrett,2" concluding that the national banks had no implied power to branch,
but were restricted by statute to one office or banking house. In answer to the
Attorney General's position that the power to establish teller windows had become
"necessary" because the states had begun to allow branch banking, the Court
replied that the remedy existed in the hands of Congress only.27
Consequently, Congress attempted to effectively exercise its authority by
formulating the necessary remedy. A House Report on the McFadden Act in
1926 expressed the congressional concern over the survival of the national banking system and the Federal Reserve System. In the face of an expanding state
banking system, Congress indicated that "if state banks continue to engage in
unlimited branch banking, it will mean the eventual destruction of the national
banking system... ."" Representative McFadden warned that the trend toward
conversion of national banks into state chartered institutions would cause mutation of the national monetary policy: 29
The present situation is intolerable to the national banking system. The bill
proposes the only practicable solution by stopping the further extension of
state-wide branch banking in the Federal Reserve System by state member
banks and by permitting national banks to have branches in those cities
where state banks are allowed to have them under state laws.30
Those opposing branch banking argued that the McFadden bill contravened
public policy by placing the entire credit of the nation in the hands of relatively
few financial institutions." In other words, the allowance of extensive branch23
25

Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 101 (1864).
GEN. 1 (1923).
The basis of the Attorney Generals Opinion was the National Bank Act of 1864 which

26
27
28
29
30
31

263 U.S. 640 (1924).
Id. at 659.
H.R. Doc. No. 90, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1924).
See 65 CoNo. Rac. 11296 (1924).
See H.R. Doc. No. 2, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).
66 CONG. REC. 1575, 1624 (1925).

24 34 Op.Arr'y.

permitted national banks to exercise those "incidental powers" necessary to carry on their
business.
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ing would discourage the creation of new banks and encourage the opening of
new branches by already-established banks. To counter such arguments, the
proponents of the McFadden Act emphasized that the power to branch was
limited under the bill. They pointed to the provision which stipulated that state
banks were confined to citywide branching if they were members of the Federal
Reserve System.2 Acknowledging that statewide branching might lead to
monopoly,33 the proponents found citywide branching defensible on the basis of a
service proposition. Since the overpopulation of large metropolitan areas had
made convenient banking facilities a necessity,3" the McFadden Act would allow
national banks to join with state institutions in meeting the needs of modern
industry and commerce. Then, "competitive equality" will have been established 6 between national and state banking institutions.
2. Overstressing the Notion of "Competitive Equality"
The case law interpretation of the McFadden Act has been inconsistent with
the historical evidence surrounding the enactment of this statute. 7 Judicial
decisions have yielded a restrictive reading of the Act as it applies to national
banks. Consistently, courts have adopted the notion of "competitive equality"
between state and national banks as the essence of the 1927 Act. Admittedly, the
McFadden legislation attempts to utilize state law in order to provide certain
guidelines for implementing federal policy, and in this way addresses itself to the
competitive tensions inherent in a dual banking structure. However, the original
tensions which gave rise to the Act were due to the rapid growth of state banks
relative to the growth of the national banking system.
Clearly, "competitive equality" was the congressional goal sought to be
achieved by passage of the McFadden Act. Equally clear, however, is that the
means employed by the statute to attain such competitive balance was to afford
national banks an opportunity to expand. The relevant problem existing in the
1920s was the sudden outbreak of statewide branching. The solution to that
problem was to equalize the competitive scale which weighs the state bank against
the national bank. In other words, the purpose of the Act was simply to allow the
national banking system to meet, head-on, the branching challenge presented by
state banks. In retrospect, then, the notion of "competitive equality" was intro32 Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 191, § 9, 44 Stat. 1229, amending § 9 of the Federal Reserve
Act.
33 According to Representative McFadden, statewide branching was an unsound and "unAmerican" form of banking. 65 CONG. Rac. 11297 (1924).
34 66 CONo. REC. 1645, 1767 (1925).
35 66 CONG. REC. 1775 (1925).
36 'Clearly, the proponents of the bill were arguing that by the adoption of the McFadden
Act, Congress would attain the essential goal of competitive equality. This would, then, eliminate the problem posed by the state banking institutions. Therefore, whether the notion of
"competitive equality" was intended by these drafters to be carried forward into the modern
problem of the CBCT is doubtful. See 68 CoNG. REc. 5815 (1927).
37 To illustrate, compare the six consolidated cases which were decided by various federal
district courts in 1975: Colorado ex re. Bloom v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979 (D. Colo.
1975); Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. and Illinois ex
rel. Lignoul v. First Nat'l Bank, 409 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1975); IBAA v. Smith, 402 F.
Supp. 207 (D.D.C. 1975); Missouri ex rel. Kostman v. First Nat'l Bank, 405 F. Supp. 733
(E.D. Mo. 1975); Oklahoma ex rel. State Banking Bd. v. Utica Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 409
F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
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duced to foster a remedy to a specific problem. It was not meant to be given the
far-reaching impact which case law subsequently attributed to it. Judicially
interpreted, the competitive equality doctrine became a statement of both the
underlying purpose and the test to be used in construing whether a banking
facility was a "branch" under the McFadden Act." Recognition of the doctrine's
original purpose as a solution to a particular antiquated problem became lost.
Utilizing competitive equality as the underlying purpose of this banking law,
the courts have consistently placed severe restriction upon the growth of the
national banking system. This restrictive interpretation is the result -reached by
several federal district courts 9 and now the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
a. Competitive Equality Is Congress" "Underlying Purpose"
In First National Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co.,4" the Supreme Court
recognized that "competitive equality" was the underlying purpose of the
McFadden Act:
It appears clear from this resume of the legislative history of § 36(c) (1) (2)
that Congress intended to place national and state banks on a basis of
"competitive equality" insofar as branch banking was concerned 4'
Under this theory, the question of branch banking is left to the states: 4 ' thus,
state and national banks can compete equally on a state-created level. The goal
is to insure that neither system has branching privileges unavailable to the other.
The burden of interpretation, however, falls on the United States Comptroller of
the Currency.4 He is required to determine both whether branching under the
law of a particular state is permitted, and whether the actual expansion contemplated by a national bank is in fact branching.
b. Departure of "Competitive Equality" from the Brick-and-Mortar"Branch"
The Supreme Court continued to support the Walker Bank rationale in First
National Bank v. Dickinson.44 In Dickinson, the Comptroller had issued interpretive rulings45 authorizing national banks to operate mobile messenger services and
off-premises deposit machines, without regard to state branch banking restrictions. Thus, relying upon the Comptroller's ruling, the First National Bank
acted as an agent for customers during the transfer of funds. This transaction was
considered not to constitute branch banking so long as the bank's contracts of
38 First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966). See discussion in
text and notes at notes 40-43, infra.
39 See note 37, supra. Of the six consolidated cases cited, all except the Oklahoma
decision restricted the national banking system's use of the CBCT to some degree.
40 385 U.S. 252.
41 Id. at 261.
42 Id. at 258.
43 It is to be noted, however, that the Comptroller is not bound by state judicial interpretations. Howell v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 385 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1967).
44 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
45 12 C.F.R. § 7.7490 (1976). (Mobile messenger service) and 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1976)
(deposit machines). The original rule was promulgated in 1966.
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deposit stipulated that no money was actually deposited until brought to the
tellers at the main bank.46
The Supreme Court refused to uphold the process, concluding that the term
"branch bank" includes "any" place for receiving deposits from the bank's
premises.4 ' Recognizing the desirability of fostering a policy of competitive
equality,4" the Court determined that this policy is so firmly embedded in the
banking statutes that a national bank could only establish a "branch" under the
same conditions which permit state banks to do so." Since the relevant state
statute prohibited branching privileges to the state banks, the Court concluded
that the congressional policy of competitive equality foreclosed the Comptroller
from modifying that standard."0 When cash was being delivered and checks
were being received, then, 'a branch bank was in operation "for all purposes
contemplated by Congress."'
Thus, the Dickinson Court settled the legal status of delivery services as
potential branch banks. The Supreme Court's central concern was that certain
aspects of a banking transaction would yield a competitive advantage to one
banking system over the other. 2 In construing the McFadden Act, the Court
believed that it was compelled to view the place of delivery of a customer's cash
or checks accompanied by a deposit slip as an "additional office, or ... branch
place of business ... at which deposits are received.""
3. Application of the Legislative History
Thus, by logical expansion, the Dickinson decision amounted to a determination that a CBCT constitutes branch banking, at least with regard to depositmaking. 4 It illustrates that the operation of such a system would permit an
unacceptable competitive advantage to the national banking system over the
state counterpart.
Disregard for the genuine legislative history found in both Walker Bank and
Dickinson has led to judicial confrontation with the Comptroller's ruling in
Lignoul." Whereas Walker Bank and Dickinson viewed competitive equality as
the underlying purpose of the McFadden Act, the Comptroller refused to inject
this same policy into the branch banking issue. The Comptroller's decision to
46 This contractual agreement between the bank and the customer is referred to as a
Comprehensive Dual Control Contract. Under the agreement, all monies, transported solely
in padlocked money bags furnished by the bank, could be opened only under the dual control
of two of the bank's tellers. See 396 U.S. at 127 n.3.
47 Id. at 135.
48 The Fifth Circuit in Dickinson had held that the mobile messenger service and the
deposit receptacle were "branches." Citing Walker Bank, the circuit court warned of the
danger in overlooking Section 36(f) since the McFadden Act was their guiding force in upholding the doctrine of competitive equality. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 400 F.2d 548 (5th
Cir. 1968).
49 385 U.S. 252.
50 396 U.S. at 138.
51 Id. at 137.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 In addressing the "branch" question with regard to both the mobile messenger service
and the deposit receptacle, the Dickinson Court was faced only with the issue of deposit-making.
Therefore, as far as Dickinson is concerned, the issue of fund transferrals is left unresolved.
55 409 F. Supp. 1167.
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encourage national banks to exercise incidental powers56 represented a challenge
to the case law interpretation of the McFadden Act. Ultimately, the courts would
charge the Comptroller with placing the state banks in a position of competitive
disadvantage."
In 1974, with the advent of the CBCT, the United States Comptroller of
the Currency, James E. Smith, issued an interpretive ruling 8 holding that
CBCTs could be operated by national banks without regard to state restrictions
on branch banking. 9 The ruling stated that CBCTs were not "branches" within
the meaning of the McFadden Act because those transactions usually associated
with a banking facility could not be consummated at such a terminal. The
national banks, therefore, would be permitted to install and operate CBCTs
regardless of whether these computerized terminals were permitted under the
laws regulating state-chartered banks.6"
The Comptroller strengthened his position by stating that when Congress
passed the McFadden Act, it was understood that a branch would be a large and
separate banking facility. 1 He analogized the CBCT to a mailbox through
which customers would be able to communicate with banks to accomplish routine
transactions.2 Accordingly, since banking transactions by mail do not constitute
"branch" banking, then, by analogy, the transacting of the same functions at a

56 The question of implied powers is a long-standing one. There had been a long sequence
of opposition to the exercise of federal power in the banking field. President Jefferson was
opposed to the creation of the first Bank of the United States during his 1801-1809 terms of
office. Thereafter, President Jackson vetoed the Act of Congress which extended the charter of
the second Bank of the United States. The charter was resolved in McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). There, Chief Justice Marshall held that the national bank
could be chartered under the implied powers of Congress.
57 Those courts charging the Comptroller with throwing the scale of competitive balance
would be those that disagree with his ruling, and therefore hold that the CBCT is a branch.
With the exception of the Oklahoma decision, then, the five other federal district court decisions
have challenged the Comptroller's ruling to varying degrees.
58 The Comptroller's ruling reads in part: Part 7 of 12 C.F.R. Chapter 1 is amended by
revising § 7.7491 in the following manner:
§ 7.7491 Customer-Bank Communication Terminals
A national bank may receive and act upon communications from its customers
transmitted through electronic devices or machines requesting the withdrawal of funds
either from the customer's deposit account or from a previously authorized line of
credit, or instructing the bank to receive funds or to transfer funds for the customer's
benefit. The device or machine may be established and operated by the bank, by the
customer, or by a third party. In accordance with the customer's request or instruction and subject to verification by the bank, cash or checks may be received and
cash may be dispensed at the location of the device or machine. The device or
machine may not be staffed by a bank employee, except that the bank for a reasonable
period of time may provide an employee to instruct and assist customers in the operation of the device or machine. Any transactions initiated by such a device or machine
shall be subject to verification by the bank either by direct wire transmission or otherwise. A bank may provide insurance protection under its bonding program for transactions involving such a device or machine. 40 Fed. Reg. 21700, 21703-04 (1974).
59 See discussion in text and notes at note 10, supra.
60 39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44418 (1974).
61 See note 7, supra.
62 The Comptroller also characterized the CBCTs to certain routine activities which were
approved as non-branching in Supreme Court decisions antedating the McFadden Act. In
First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1923), the Supreme Court endorsed a 1911
opinion of Attorney General Wickersham, which held that there is a difference between the
mere appointment of agents to receive and collect money, and the establishment of branch
banks at which a general banking business is transacted.
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CBCT is similarly a "non-branch" operation. 6
Furthermore, the Comptroller's ruling served as a response to regulations of
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board64 and the National Credit Union.6" These
regulations permit the establishment of service units by federally chartered savings
and loan associations and by credit unions respectively. If the remote services for
these institutions were allowed to operate while the CBCT was unplugged
because of its "branch" characterization, the national banking institution would
become vulnerable to competitive attacks by those savings and loan/credit
organizations. This result would yield a lack of competitive equality within the
very federal financial system itself.
In 1975, one of six consolidated federal district court decisions sustained
the Comptroller's position. In Oklahoma ex rel. State Banking Board v. Utica
National Bank & Trust Co.,"6 computer bank terminals were being operated by
Utica National Bank at a shopping center. The Utica customer was able to
initiate a deposit or a withdrawal, provided he had a prearranged line of credit,
funded by a disbursement of funds pursuant to the credit line.6" Such transactions were initiated by the Utica customer at the store where the CBCT was
located, but were consummated in the Utica computer on the bank's premises.
The Oklahoma court made three determinations: First, a deposit is not
received until the items tendered for deposit have been verified, credited to the
depositor's account, and made available for both customer and bank use. Second,
a plastic card" and a personal identification number are not "checks" within
the statutory definition under the Uniform Commercial Code, 9 nor are they

63 The 1974 ruling also made a distinction between a manned CBOT and, an unmanned
terminal. See 39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44418 (1974). With regard to the manned line, the
Comptroller stated that the operator is an employee of a third party, such as a supermarket,
who is financially involved in the transaction. A bank customer presents the necessary information to the operator so that the desired transaction may be implemented. Accordingly, the
transaction instructions are communicated electronically to the bank which consummates the
desired transaction.
With respect to the unmanned terminal, a transaction is not consummated until the bank
is actually notified of the customer's instructions and the amount of funds necessary to carry
out the instructions is received and verified. This notification, receipt, and verification all
take place at the bank after collection of the funds from the CBOT. Thus, the bank cannot
give credit for these funds prior to the receipt and verification, just as it would not be allowed
to give credit for items sent to the bank by mail which have not yet been received. These funds
do not become deposits for any purpose until received and accepted at the chartered banking
premises.
Furthermore, the Comptroller argued that even if the CBCT was a branch bank, it did
not receive deposits, pay checks, or make loans within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1970).
See 39 Fed. Reg. 44416, 44419 (1974). A deposit at an unmanned terminal is not made
until cash or checks are received and verified at the bank, cash withdrawals are not made
pursuant to writing a check but upon the presentation of a card, and cash withdrawals on the
basis of a credit card are not loans because they are effectuated pursuant to a previously approved line of credit and are subject to verification. At the manned terminal, he continued, the
transfers between the customer and store accounts are consummated at the bank with cash
withdrawals actually coming from the store, not from the bank. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1976).
64 39 Fed. Reg. 23991 (1974).
65 39 Fed. Reg.30107 (1974).
66 409 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
67 Thus, the customer did not necessarily need funds in his checking account to make a
withdrawal.
68 In the present case, a "Uticard" was the device needed in order to activate the
terminal.
69 See U.C.C. § 3-104.
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written instruments within the contemplation of the McFadden Act.7 0 Third,
making a loan requires the exercise of the personal judgment of a bank officer
based upon a credit evaluation. The loan is not, therefore, made at the communication terminal since, although the proceeds are there advanced, the
decision of the bank officer is not made there.7 '
Further, the court stated that if other federal financial institutions in
Oklahoma were allowed to use computerized terminals," then the national banks
herein could not be denied such use. The denial would work "unfair treatment,
inequality, and an undue hardship on the banks." 3 Therefore, the court concluded that the use of the CBCT facilities did not constitute branch banking
under the McFadden Act.
Thus, the emphasis of case law on competitive equality conflicts with the
Comptroller's ruling. If the CBCT is a "branch" within the meaning of the
McFadden Act, state restrictions on the use of the OBOT could inhibit the
growth of the national banking system. Currently, twelve states prohibit branch
banking entirely, 4 twenty-one allow it but with geographical limitations, 75 and
eighteen permit statewide branching. 76 Thus, the Comptroller is required to
comply with the particular state's branching conditions via the Walker Bank
rationale.77 On the other hand, if the CBCT is not a "branch," then states will
be faced with the grave task of deciding whether to revamp their traditional
banking structure or be competitively overridden by the national banking system.
70

"The term 'branch' . . . shall be held to include any branch bank ... at which ...

checks are paid.... ." 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1970).

71 409 F. Supp. at 91-92.
72 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has permitted federally chartered savings and loan
associations to establish remote service units (RSUs). 39 Fed. Reg. 23991 (1974).
Similarly, the National Credit Union Administration has permitted federally chartered
credit unions to establish remote terminals. 39 Fed. Reg. 30107 (1974).
73 In making this point, the Court utilized the "form over substance" rationale of the
Dickinson Court. 409 F. Supp. at 95, n.5.
74 See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 14-3-1 (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.06 (West Supp.
1974); ILL. RpV. STAT. ch. 16Y2, § 106 (1973); KAN. STAT. § 9-1111 (Supp. 1974); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 48.34 (1970); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.105 (Vernon 1968); MONT. REv. CODES
ANN. § 5-1028 (1968); NEn. REV. STAT. § 8-157 (Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6,§
2061 (West 1966); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-903 (Vernon 1973); W. VA. CODE §
31-A-8- (1972); Wyoming-no statutory provision.
75 See ALA. CODE tit. 5 § 125 (1) (1960); ARK. STATS. ANN. § 67-340 (Supp. 1973);
GA. CODE ANN. § 13-203.1 (Supp. 1974); HAwAI REv. STAT., § 403-53 (1968)- IND. CODE
ANN. § 28-1-17-1 (Burns 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.1201 (West Supp. 19745; Ky.Rnv.
STAT. ANN. § 287.180 (Baldwin 1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:54 (West 1951); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 172 A, § 12 (Michie Law Co-op Supp. 1974); MIcE. Coap. LAws ANN. §
487.471 (Supp. 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 81-7-1 (1972); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 384-B:2
(1968); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 48-2-17 (1966); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 105 (McKinney 1974);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-14 (Supp. 1973); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1111.02-03 (Page Supp.
1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 904 (Purdon Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-443 (Supp.
1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-3-6 (1971); VA. CODE § 6.1-39 (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 221.04 (1974).
76 ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.415 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 6-190 (1974); CAL. FIN. CODE §
500 (West 1968); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-59 (West Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
5,§ 770 (Supp. 1970); D.C. Code Encycl. Ann. § 26-103(b) (West 1967); IDAHO CODE §
26-1001 (1968); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 442 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 11, § 65
(1968); NEV. REv. STAT. § 660.015 (1973); N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-19 (West Supp.
1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-62 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 714.030-170 (1973);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 19-1-13 (1968); S.C. CODE § 8-57 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN.§ 51-20-1 (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 651 (1971); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
30.40.020 (Supp.1974).
77 In Walker Bank, Justice Clark noted that the "intent of Congress was to leave the
question of the desirability of branch banking up to the states." 385 U.S. at 258.
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The Seventh Circuit: The Persistence of "Competitive Equality"
The Dickinson decision raises the disparity between the Comptroller's ruling
and the case law interpretation of the McFadden Act. In some instances, federal
courts"8 have allowed this disparity to permeate the judicial shield of "competitive
equality." In 1975, two federal district courts79 held that the CBCT did not
constitute a branch bank, while four other district courts reached the opposite
conclusion."0 These six cases preceded the decision of the Seventh Circuit in

Lignoul.
1. Lignoul: An "Indicia of Branchness" in the CBCT
The Seventh Circuit drew upon two district court decisions to conclude that
all functions carried on through the CBCT constitute branch banking. The
district court in Lignoul held that the CBCT was a "branch" only with regard
to making deposits, cashing checks, and lending money; however, with respect to
the withdrawal of cash and the payment of installment loans, the CBCT was
not to be considered a branch. The CBCT, therefore, could remain intact to
perform these latter two functions."1
Regarding the making of deposits, the district court disagreed with the
Comptroller's analogy between banking transactions by mail and by CBCT."2
78 See note 39, supra.
79 See Oklahoma ex rel. State Banking Board v. Utica Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., discussed
in text and notes at notes 66-73, supra. See also Colorado ex rel Bloom v. First Nat'l Bank,
394 F. Supp. 979 (D. Colo. 1975).
In Colorado, the court utilized the competitive equality doctrine with an application of
state law, which prohibited branch banking entirely. First, the court considered the making of
a deposit and concluded that for this function, the machine was a branch bank; the reason
behind this decision was that the bank in question already had a detached facility, and the
CBCT in question was beyond any geographical limitation as well. Second, however, the court
stated that the CBCT was not a branch for the purpose of cashing checks. The CBCT was not
a place at which this transaction takes place because a check, being a written order, is not the
equivalent of the depression of keys on a computer (Docutel) terminal. Finally, the court said
that the CBCT did not lend money either, because the customer's utilization of the bank card
to withdraw cash is merely a drawing against a prearranged line of credit; and to conclude that
this operation constitutes branch banking "would therefore require the conclusion that any
such use of bank credit cards is also branch banking." 394 F. Supp. at 984. Nevertheless, on
appeal in the Tenth Circuit, the Colorado District Court's decision with respect to the latter
two functions was reversed. The circuit court, therefore, held that for the purposes of cashing
checks and lending money as well as receiving deposits, the Fort Collins facility was a "branch"
bank in violation of 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1970). To the extent that such use was permitted by
the Comptroller's ruling, that ruling was invalid. 540 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1976).
80 See 409 F. Supp. 1167.
The other two district court decisions which found that the CBCT was a branch bank were
IBAA v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 207, discussed in text and notes at notes 102-106, infra., and
Missouri ex rel. Kostman v. First Nat'l Bank, 405 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
In Missouri, the court utilized the underlying rationale of the McFadden Act rather than
the specific categorizations of branch functions set out in section 36(f). Involved were two
module machines consisting of a telephone hot-line which was connected directly to the bank.
These machines were able to procure cash, deposit and transfer funds, and make installment
loan payments due the bank.
The court, in a brief opinion, ruled that the two off-premises CBCTs in question would
have to cease operation because they were in violation of the national and state banking laws.
As the court saw it, Congress intended the national banks to have no more branching rights
than were enjoyed by state banks. 405 F. Supp. at 735. Upon appeal by the national bank, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed. 538 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1976).
81 409 F. Supp. at 1181.
82 The Comptroller also characterized the CBCTs as routine activities. 39 Fed. Reg.
44416, 44418 (1974). See note 62, supra.
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The district court pointed out that, in a mail transaction, no bank place of business is involved; rather, the customer mails his requested transfer from some
indeterminate location. On the other hand, the CBCT is clearly a "place"
within the language of Dickinson, s and thus transfers have been consummated
by the customer on the bank's premises, that is, at its branch. Accordingly, such a
transfer at a CBCT would be violative of the Illinois state banking law. 4
Having determined that deposit-making at a CBCT was a branch bank
function, the district court delineated the installment loan payment. This analysis
led to the lower court's conclusion that the installment loan payment, unlike the
deposit, did not constitute "branch" banking:
Payments on installment loans or credit card accounts, however, do not
constitute deposits inasmuch as they are payments on existing loan obligations
or credit card account balances and not the deposit of funds in an account
which is subject to future withdrawals by the customer.8 5
With respect to the functions of check-cashing and money-lending, the
district court accepted prevailing judicial precedent:
Since under Plant City /Dickinson/, the bank's mainfenance of a place,
off-premises, where either /deposits are made/, checks are cashed, or money
is lent, amounts to branch banking, CBCTs must be so characterized. 6
The OBCT was a branch, then, when it cashed checks and lent money as well as
when it made deposits. This conclusion enabled the district court to illustrate how
the withdrawal of cash could be neither characterized as check-cashing nor
money-lending, and therefore, not a "branch" function.
First, the cash withdrawal was not a form of check-cashing because no
check is written in the cash withdrawal transaction. 7 Citing Illinois law, 8' 8" the
district court pointed out that negotiability is the "essential characteristic""0
of the instrument because it contains an unconditional promise to pay money to
a third party. When, however, a card is inserted into a CBCT to secure a sum of
money, there is neither transferability nor third party designation involved.
Second, the cash withdrawal was not a form of money-lending since the use
83 The Dickinson Court argued that the implications from section 36(f) are that the term
"branch bank" at the very least "includes any place for receiving deposits, or paying checks or
lending money apart from the chartered premises." 396 U.S. at 135.
84 The relevant portion of the Illinois Statute provides as follows: No bank shall establish
or maintain more than one banking house or receive deposits or pay checks at any other place
than such banking house, and no bank shall establish or maintain in this or in any other state
of the United States any branch bank, nor shall it establish or maintain in this state any branch
office or additional office or agency for the purpose of conducting any of its business.
ILL. RFv. STAT., ch. 16Y2, § 106 (1972).
85 409 F. Supp. at 1177.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88
ILL. REv.STAT. ch. 26 § 3-104(2) (1963).
89 The relevant portion of the Illinois Statute and of § 3-104 of the U.C.O. provides:
(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money.
(2) A writing which complies with the requirements of this section is
(b) a "check" if it is a draft on a bank and payable on demand.
90 409 F. Supp. at 1177.
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of a credit card to obtain goods and services from a merchant is distinguishable
from the use of such a card to obtain cash on two grounds.91 First, whereas the
CBCT is a bank "place" 92 to obtain cash, there is no analogous place established
by the bank for obtaining goods and services. Second, the issuance of credit cards
with respect to cash advances is an agreement to make small cash disbursals at
some future time rather than actual loans themselves; the agreement does not
transfer funds or commence the running of interest, and therefore, is not a loan.
The district court did not pierce the substantive problem posed by the computerized terminals. It overlooked the infeasibility of permitting the use of the
CBCT for some functions while prohibiting its use for others. The court left
unresolved the real problem, namely whether the functions of cash withdrawal
and installment loan payment are within the proscriptions of the McFadden
Act.9 To conclude that they are not, as the district court did, creates a judicial
revision of the McFadden Act.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court with respect to its decision
on the cash withdrawal and the loan payment. According to the court, these were
branch bank functions as were deposit-making, check-cashing, and moneylending.
The Seventh Circuit distinguished the district court's conclusion with regard
to cash withdrawals and installment loan payments, based upon provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code94 and Illinois law.99 In the case of both the cash withdrawal and the installment loan, the state statute was found to be relevant. That
particular state law declares a check to be a negotiable instrument drawn on a
bank and payable on demand, with negotiability being its essential characteristic.
The instrument is signed by the maker and contains either an order (in the case
of a cash withdrawal), or a promise (in the case of an installment loan payment),
to pay a sum certain in money. Based upon this law, the district court had
pursued a technical distinction by concluding that a card inserted into a CBCT
to secure money was not the cashing of a check.96 The Seventh Circuit disagreed,
stating that the check is merely the means used by a bank to make payment to its
customer. By analogy, the credit card is an order on the bank, and serves the
same purpose as the check:
Any order/or promise/to pay which is properly executed by a customer,
whether it be check, card, or electronic device, must be recognized as a
routine banking function.
. . .The relationship between the bank and its
97
customer is the same.

91

92

Id. at 1178.

See 396 U.S. at 135.

93 "The public should be permitted . . . to enjoy the benefits of modern technology ...
Unfortunately, the language of the McFadden Act establishes a relatively simplistic test as to
what constitutes a branch bank. It was enacted in 1927 at a time when banks performed far
fewer functions and services than they do today. The three services, the performance of any
one of which constitutes a branch, represent a fraction of the myriad of activities carried on
daily by even the smallest national banks." 409 F. Supp. at 1181.
94 See note 88, supra.
95 See note 89, supra.
96 409 F. Supp. at 1177.
97 536 F.2d at 177.
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Furthermore, although the Uniform Commercial Code defines a check as a
negotiable instrument, it also provides that the term "check" may refer to nonnegotiable instruments as well as negotiable ones.9" For example, a transfer of
funds by cable is clearly recognized as a check despite the non-negotiability of
the cable.99 Thus, even in the absence of negotiability, the credit card used for
the purpose of withdrawing cash is a check. According to the Seventh Circuit,
the essential factor is the foundation of the relationship between the bank and
its customer: the former agrees to pay money to the latter's order.'
That order
may be implemented by computer record since computer impulses have been
upheld as sufficient writing under the order test.'
The Seventh Circuit thus ruled that the cash withdrawal and the installment
loan payment were "branch" functions of the CBCT. The question left open by
the acceptance of this rationale is twofold: 1) are cash withdrawals and installment loan payments separate and distinct from deposit-making, check-cashing,
and money-lending? If so, the Seventh Circuit oversteps its judicial powers by, in
effect, re-writing the "branch" criteria set out in McFadden; or, 2) are cash
withdrawals and installment loan payments merely hybrids of either depositmaking, check-cashing, or money-lending? If they are the latter, then they fit
within the express proscriptions of the 1927 McFadden statute.
2. IBAA v. Smith: The CBCT Is a Branch "For All Functions"
Pursuant to a second district court decision, the Seventh Circuit was able
to place the cash withdrawal and the installment loan payment more specifically
within the confines of the McFadden Act. Citing Independent Bankers Association of America v. Smith,' the court refused to distinguish the cash withdrawal
and the installment loan payment from the functions proscribed in the McFadden
Act.'
In IBAA, the focus centered more upon the validity of the Comptroller's
ruling0 than upon the "branch" status of CBCT functions. Nevertheless, the
court in IBAA discussed the various branching functions in light of the Dickinson
ruling:
It has been stipulated that a CBCT permits an existing bank customer to
initiate transactions resulting in a cash withdrawal from his account, a
crediting of funds to his account, a transfer between his checking account
and savings account, and payment transfers. . . . The Court is therefore
98 U.C.C. § 3-104(3).
99 Lourie v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 42 N.Y.S.2d 205 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1943).
100 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 17-1 (1972).
101 See United States v. DeGeorgia, 420 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969). The Court stated that
the mere fact that business records were maintained in a computer rather than in the company
books was immaterial in determining the admissibility of the records into evidence. See also
28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970).
102 402 F. Supp. 207.
103 536 F.2d at 178.
104 In reinforcing the importance of competitive balance between state and national banks,
the IBAA District Court rendered the Comptroller's ruling null and void. By stressing the
argument made in Dikinson, the IBAA deliberators were convinced that the Comptroller's
ruling was clearly without merit. In due course, therefore, the court ruled that any further
utilization of the ruling would serve only to dismiss stability within the national banking system.
402 F. Supp. at 209.
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compelled to conclude that since a CBCT transacts business which is carried
on at the main office, it is a branch under the McFadden Act." 5
The IBAA court reasoned that the definition of "branch" set forth in the
McFadden Act did not have to be a model of precision... in order for it to be
determined that a CBCT does, in fact, perform the above-quoted functions. This
reasoning facilitated its conclusion that all functions of the CBCT-including
the cash withdrawal and the installment loan payment-are branch bank
functions.
The Seventh Circuit drew upon the district court decisions in both IBAA
and Lignoul to conclude:
We see no need for an elaborate opinion in this case. Judge Will['0 7] has
ably covered the off-premises functions performed by the CBCT as to
deposits, cashing of checks, and the loaning of money; Judge Wilkie[ 05 ] in the
IBAA v. Smith case has thoroughly canvassed the functions of the withdrawing of cash and the payment of installments on loans. 0 9
The Seventh Circuit has thus made it clear that in order to adhere to the
Dickinson decision, technical distinctions between branch and non-branch functions must be avoided.
Nevertheless, inconsistency remains between the historical evidence underlying the McFadden Act and the case law interpretation of what the McFadden
drafters had intended. In light of the legislative history, the McFadden Act
should be interpreted so that bank customers may enjoy the benefits of computerized banking while the national banking system is allowed to expand. In light
of the judicial understanding of the 1927 Act, however, public policy has become
secondary to the competitive balance between state and national banks, with
emphasis placed upon state control over branch banking.
Conclusion
The review of modern case law indicates the inadequacy of the 50-year-old
McFadden Act in its application to the CBCT dilemma. The federal courts
have not given proper weight to the historical evidence surrounding the birth of
the federal statute, and have placed undue emphasis upon the concept of
"competitive equality." Upon closer scrutiny, it is evident that a restriction upon
the growth of the national banking system was not the essential idea behind en105

396 U.S. at 135.

106 Id.
107 Judge Will delivered the opinion for the District Court in Lignoul, 409 F. Supp. 1167.
108 Judge Wilkey delivered the IBAA Opinion for the Circuit Court of Appeals in the
District of Columbia. While the Seventh Circuit cites the D.C. Circuit Court, it draws its conclusion based upon the substantive analysis in the IBAA District Court, 402 F. Supp. 207
(D.D.C. 1975).
Upon the U.S. Comptroller's appeal from the district court to the circuit court in
IBAA, the lower court's decision, which had nullified the Comptroller's ruling, was affirmed.
The circuit court reasoned that the legislative history of the McFadden Act and the Supreme
Court's decision in Dickinson together yield an indication that Congress intended to include
under section 36(f) at least the routine and traditional bank services which are usually found at
a bank's main office. 534 F.2d at 943.
109 536 F.2d at 177.
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actment of the statute. Intricate distinctions over branch bank functions can
thus properly be avoided.
Proponents of the case law view will conceivably opt for an amendment to
the McFadden Act, in order to relieve the federal courts of the burden of adapting old statutory law to a modem practical framework. Such an amendment
should seek to facilitate customer convenience; to anticipate its own impact upon
systems of monetary policy, both domestically and internationally; to give proper
weight to the United States Comptroller's decisions. Since the Comptroller is
both interpreter and enforcer of the National Bank Act, Title 12, U.S.C. § 1 et
seq. (1970), his rulings should be judicially challenged only when they are proven
to be unreasonable constructions of federal statutes.
The problem with such an amendment, however, is that it would reinforce
the "competitive equality" interpretation the courts have given to the Act. To
couple the governing force of state branching laws over the national banks with
this restrictive analysis of federal law, computerized banking would be destined
to extinction. Notwithstanding the Walker Bank decision, there is no substance
to the argument that Congress has regarded equality between the federal and
state banking systems as the essence of the McFadden Act. The federal banking
statutes do not mandate absolute equality; national banks have been allowed both
express " and implied" powers that are clearly not possessed by competing state
2
banks.
In either case, whether the McFadden Act can be successfully amended or
not, it is inevitable that the opportunity offered by the CBCT cannot be overlooked. It provides financial institutions with a means of developing more
efficient methods of fund transfer, and should therefore be offered for utilization
to both state and national banking institutions. To implement the proper use of
the CBCT, perhaps the "state v. national" criteria could be discarded to introduce a more practicable test: one that considers whether the use of the CBOT
will lead to a concentration of capital in the hands of a few wealthy banks-not
necessarily national banks-to result in competitive disadvantage to the smaller
banking institutions. Then it would seem more hopeful that the convenience to
customers and the genius behind the CBCT could both be fully utilized without
the destruction of either state or national banking systems.
Edward Charles DeVivo

110
111
112

See Missouri ex rel. Burnes Nat'l Bank v. Duncan, 265 U.S. 17 (1924).
Franklin Square Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954).
One example is Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966).

TRUTH-IN-LENDING

ACT-FIRST

IMPOSITION

ON

OPEN-END

CREDIT

PLANS OF FINANCE CHARGES INCONSISTENT WITH PRIOR DISCLOSURES BEGINS
THE ONE-YEAR LIMITATIONS PERIOD

Goldman v. First National Bank*
The disclosure provisions of the Truth-in-Lending Ac represent Congress'
attempt to insure the dissemination of credit information to consumers who would
otherwise be unaware of the credit costs. Although Congress has established an
enforcement scheme under this Act which encourages private suits, the aggrieved
consumer must pursue his cause of action within a one-year limitations period.
In typical consumer open-end credit plans, this limitations period has often
prevented valid grievances from being remedied. In Goldman v. First National
Bank,2 the Seventh Circuit attempted to alleviate this harsh effect.
Plaintiff, Steven Goldman, applied to the defendant First National Bank of
Chicago for a Bank Americard early in April 1970. In compliance with Truthin-Lending Act provisions relating to open-end credit plans,3 and § 226.7 of
Regulation Z promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board,4 the defendant sent
plaintiff a "Disclosure Statement in Compliance with the Federal Truth-inLending Act." This statement explained the amount and method of computing
the finance charge on credit purchases and cash borrowings.' With respect to
credit purchases, it provided for a twenty-five-day "free-ride" period from date
of billing.G During this period, the consumer could remit the balance and avoid
incurring any finance charge.
The plaintiff's application was approved in April 1970, and the card was
first used on July 1, 1970. The first billing statement he received reiterated that a
1.5 % finance charge would be imposed on the outstanding balance if this balance
were not paid within twenty-five days from the billing date.' Plaintiff used his
card a number of times from September 1970 to January 1971, and avoided any
finance charge by paying the outstanding balance due on each billing statement
within the twenty-five-day free-ride period. He delayed, however, in sending
payment of the balance due February 8, 1971, and his payment was not received
until March 9, 1971. Consequently, a finance charge for the entire period,
* 532 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1976).
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13, 1631-44, 1661-65 (1970). The Act became effective July 1, 1969.
2 532 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1976).
3 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (1970).
4 The specific provisions relating to required disclosures involved in open-end consumer
plans are set out at 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (1970), and require, inter alia, that the creditor disclose the conditions under which a finance charge may be imposed.
In § 1604, Congress empowered the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe "such regulations
to carry out the purposes" of the Act. Section 226.7(a) of Regulation Z sets forth the disclosures which must be made before the first transaction is made on the account, including the
method used to compute the finance charge. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-226.14 (1976).
5 532 F.2d at 13. This statement informed Goldman that the finance charge was computed on the basis of 1.5% on the cash balance outstanding on the billing date.
6 Id. Under many open-end credit plans, the consumer has the opportunity to pay off
the outstanding balance within a certain time after the billing date and avoid any finance
charge of his credit transaction. This time has been termed the "free-ride period." See
Garwood, Truth-in-Lending After Two Years, 89 BANKING L.J. 3 (1972).
7 Specific disclosures are also required on each periodic billing statement. 12 C.F.R. §
226.7(b) (1976).
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January to February 1971, was assessed on the following month's statement.'
Goldman brought a class action under the Truth-in-Lending Act sixteen
months after the account was first opened.' The suit alleged that the defendant
bank had failed to accurately disclose the computation method involved in the
imposition of the finance charge, thereby violating § 1637 (a) and § 1640(a) of
the Truth-in-Lending Act.'
The district court granted defendant bank's motion for summary judgment
on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to bring the action within the one-year
statute of limitations." Goldman had argued that the disclosure violation continued until the creditor complied with the Truth-in-Lending Act's disclosure
requirements. The creditor's compliance marked the beginning of the one-year
limitations period. Alternatively, plaintiff contended that this period should be
measured from the date a finance charge inconsistent with the disclosure is first
imposed.
The trial court, however, determined that the Truth-in-Lending Act and
Regulation Z simply required that credit disclosures for open-end accounts be
made when the account was first opened. Since disclosure of the cost of credit
was made at that time, there was no violation of the Act.' Thus the consumer's
right of action expired one year after the opening of the account. 3
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. 4 Unlike the
8 532 F.2d at 13.
9 Id. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a) (1970) which corresponds to 12 C.F.R. § 226.7(a) requires
disclosure concerning finance charges in connection with open-end accounts before the
account is opened. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970) is the civil liability section for failure to
comply with disclosure requirements. It imposes liability on "any creditor who fails in connection with any consumer credit transaction to disclose to any person any information
. " required to be disclosed.
10 Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 392 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
11 Id. at 218.
12 Id.
13 In a separate opinion, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a determination of
class. It ruled that the class represented by the plaintiff did not meet the tests of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23. The court stated that while the proposed class met the common questions of fact and
law test under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a), the plaintiff failed to show the risk of varying adjudications respecting the class members, and thus did not meet the tests of Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(1) (A).
The major reason for the court's denial of class status was its fear of the possibility of
a crushing damage award disproportionate to the actual injury inflicted due to the minimum
recovery provision of the Act. As originally enacted, § 1640(a) (1) of the Act permitted a
minimum recovery of $100.00. If each member of a class were to recover these minimum
damages alone, the total amount of damages for which an individual creditor could be
liable would be devastating. Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
For a discussion of recent amendments to § 1640(a), see text accompanying note 14 infra.
14 532 F.2d at 22. In addition to reversing the lower court on the statute of limitations
issue, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the proposed class did meet the tests of Fed. R. Civ. P.
23 and therefore the motion for determination of class was improperly denied. In reaching
this decision, the Seventh 'Circuit emphasized not only the recent amendments to the
Truth-in-Lending Act limiting recovery in class actions, but also the actual superiority of
such actions for Truth-in-Lending suits. The court felt that, in cases in which widespread
noncompliance with the Act was found, such class actions had the advantage of preventing
violators from limiting recovery to only a few plaintiffs. Id. at 16.
As noted by the Seventh Circuit, Congress clearly indicated its intent to include class
actions within the Act by amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) in 1974. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a)
(1970) (amended 1974). Before this amendment, a number of couits had ruled that the
incentive given to the individual consumer to enforce the Act in the form of minimum
recovery of damages plus attorney's fees indicated that the class action was inconsistent
with the aims of the Act. See Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D.
412 (S.D. N.Y. 1971). Now, "Congress has recognized that class actions are a proper
vehicle for enforcing a remedial statute such as the Truth-in-Lending Act." Eovaldi v.
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district court, the Seventh Circuit accepted plaintiff's contention that the statute
of limitations should run from time a finance charge inconsistent with previous disclosures is first imposed.15 In light of the Act's focus on the significance
of the finance charge, and its stated purpose to promote the informed use of
credit, the court ruled that the imposition of the finance charge constituted the
last significant event to be used in measuring the limitations period. 6
Truth-in-Lending Act: Legislative Intent
Growing concern at the rapid increase in the level of consumer credit'
without a corresponding rise in consumer awareness of the costs of such credit,
prompted Congress to enact the Consumer Credit Protection Act, or "Truth-inLending."'" The stated purpose of the Act is to "assure a meaningful disclosure
of credit so that the consumer will be able to compare . . . the various credit

terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit." 9 Congress believed that if the consumer were provided with the information necessary to
make an intelligent choice among lenders, his purchasing power in the credit
marketplace would increase." The basic thrust of the Act is the disclosure, rather
than the regulation, of the terms and conditions under which credit may be
extended."
To implement this purpose, Congress required that certain disclosures be
First Nat'l Bank, (N.D. Ill. 1976), 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
98,419. Nevertheless,
determination of class will still depend on the proposed class meeting the dual requirements of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b).
However, Congress has placed a ceiling on the statutory recovery. It has limited the
maximum recovery in any class action brought under this section to "such amount as the
court may allow. . . ." but the total recovery in such action "shall not be more than the
lesser of $100,000.00 or one percentum of the net worth of the creditor." Minimum individual statutory recovery of $100.00 was eliminated in class actions. In 1975, Congress
again increased the maximum recovery to $500,000.00.
As a result of these developments, much of the controversy regarding the appropriateness of class actions under Truth-in-Lending has been eliminated. The class action issue
raised in the case presently under consideration is largely outside the scope of this comment.
Instead, primary attention will be given to the Seventh Circuit's analysis of the statute of limitations question.
15 532 F.2d at 21. Justice Stevens dissented as to the court's ruling on the statute of
limitations issue. He agreed that a different limitation provision might have been more
appropriately enacted for open-end credit accounts. Nevertheless, he emphasized that the
Act imposed the same limitations period on actions involving both open- and closed-end
credit. He concluded that if, as in the instant case, a defendant's violation had occurred
more than one year before the action commenced, the statutory remedy would be barred.
Id. at 22.
16 On October 4, 1976, the Supreme Court denied the defendant bank's petition for a
writ of certiorari. 45 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1976).
17 In H. REP. No. 1040, the Joint Committee on Banking and Currency cited a Federal
Reserve Board report that in 1967 revolving credit had reached $5.3 billion. American families
were paying $13 billion a year in interest and service charges for consumer credit. H. REP.
No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1971.
18 See note 3 supra.
19 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
20 See the remarks made by Senator William Proxmire, reporting to the Senate on
Truth-in-Lending. 113 CONG. REc. 2042 (1967).
The Act apparently achieving the desired effect of increasing consumer awareness of
the cost of credit. In its Annual Report to Congress on Truth-ia-Lending in 1971, the
Federal Reserve Board noted an 18% increase in the number of persons aware of the interest
levels on personal loans. See Garwood, supra note 6.
21 113 CONG. REc. 2050 (1967).
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made in both open-end and closed-end credit transactions,2 and empowered the
Federal Reserve Board to implement the Act by promulgating regulations. Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board is designed to guide credit institutions in
the nature, timing and form of disclosures.2" In addition, Congress gave federal
courts jurisdiction over causes of action for violations of the Act and provided a
statutory scheme for the recovery of damages. The consumer, however, who
initiates an action against an offending creditor in the federal courts must bring
that action "within one year from the date of occurrence of the violation." 24
Judicial Interpretations of the Liability
Provisions of the Truth-in-Lending Act
In asserting its authority over civil actions involving violations of the Act,25
the federal judiciary has been faced with the task of interpreting two crucial,
interrelated questions: (1) what constitutes a "consumer transaction" requiring
disclosures under the Acte' and (2) if a credit arrangement involves a series of
significant transactions, at what point must a creditor make the necessary disclosures to avoid a violation of the Act? 27 Resolution of this second question is
crucial for those plaintiffs faced with the one-year statute of limitations. 8
Closed-end Credit
Courts have addressed these two problems most frequently when closed-end
credit is involved. Under such a credit arrangement, disclosures must be made
"before credit is extended."2 If there is a failure to disclose, a cause of action
accrues and the statute of limitations commences to run from that date. The
22

The term open-end credit is defined as
consumer credit extended on an account pursuant to a plan under which (1) the
creditor may permit the customer to make purchases or obtain loans directly from
the creditor, or indirectly by use of a credit card, check or other device...
;
(2) the customer has the privilege of paying the balance in full or in installments;
(3) a finance charge may be computed by the creditor from time to time on the
outstanding unpaid balance.
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a) (1976). Closed-end credit is all other consumer credit.
23 Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1-.14 (1976), sets forth in great detail a creditor's
disclosure requirements for both open- and closed-end credit transactions. The information
to be disclosed includes the amount in dollars of all finance charges directly or indirectly
imposed upon the extension of credit under § 226.4 and various specific disclosures where
open-end credit plans are involved (e.g., conditions for the imposition of finance charges,
the existence of any free-ride period, etc.) under § 226.7. As required by § 226.6, all such
information must be presented clearly, conspicuously and in a sequence meaningful to the
consumer.

24

15 U.S.C. § 1640(a),(e) (1970).

25 Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 309 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. N.Y. 1970),
noted in 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 664, 667 (1974). This decision concerns the jurisdictional
issue and is one of three separate decisions in the Ratner case. See note 14 supra.
26 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
27 For example, most mortgage agreements, while often considered a unit, actually involve both a commitment to extend credit and the execution of an instrument of indebted-

ness at the closing. Postow v. Oriental Bldg. Ass'n, 390 F. Supp. 1130 (D.D.C. 1975).
28 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970) states that "any action under this section may be brought
... within

one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation."

29 This requirement is set out in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1638(b), 1639(b) which generally cover
the form and timing of disclosures where closed-end credit plans for sale of goods or services
or consumer loans are involved.
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point at which credit is "extended" was first identified by the Sixth Circuit in
Wachtel v. West." There, the plaintiff had argued that the defendant's failure
to disclose information required by § 1635 of the Act"1 constituted a continuing
violation until disclosure actually occurred. The Sixth Circuit rejected this,
pointing out that Regulation Z expressly requires disclosure only when the credit
transaction occurs. Disclosure must take place either when the contractual relationship between the creditor and consumer is created or, at the latest, upon
performance of the contract.3 2
The Sixth Circuit envisioned the violation of the disclosure requirements as
occurring at a specific time.3" In identifying this point, the Wachtel court partly
adopted the Federal Reserve Board's focus on the execution of the credit contract,3 4 but broadened it to include also the performance of the contract. It
therefore expanded the creditor's duty to disclose to encompass the latest transaction in which disclosure of credit information would continue to be relevant to
the consumer. This transaction would, then, mark the beginning of the limitations period. Other circuits have essentially adopted the Wachtel approach by
measuring the one-year limitations period from a specific event in the consumer/
creditor relationship.3
In Stevens v. Rock Springs National Bank,3 6 the Tenth Circuit limited the
application of the Wachtel principle by adopting a stricter view of the Act:
violations occur, at the latest, when the credit contract is formally executed. 7
Despite this difference, both Wachtel and Stevens measure the limitations period
from the date of a specific credit transaction and disregard the date the consumer first became aware of any failure to disclose. Various other decisions have
30 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1973). Plaintiffs brought suit in the federal court under §
1640 of the Act alleging the defendants' failure to disclose financing terms involved in
plaintiffs' obtaining a second mortgage on their home. The suit was brought almost 1Y
years after the mortgage was signed. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the suit based on the expiration of the statute of limitations. 15 U.S.C. §
1640(e) (1970).
31 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1970) sets out requirements for disclosures in residential real estate
financing arrangements. It provides, among other remedies, for recision of the mortgage
contract (other than a first mortgage) when the creditor can acquire a security interest on
the consumer's home.
32 Section 226.8 of Regulation Z requires that all disclosures connected with closed-end
plans must occur "before the transaction is consummated." The Federal Reserve Board has
defined "consummation" as the time the lender issues its permanent loan commitment to the
purchasing customer and the purchaser accepts such commitment. Federal Reserve Board
Letter No. 93, Aug. 27, 1969, reprinted in CLONTZ, TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL at A-31
(rev. ed. Supp. 1972). (These letters represent the official interpretation by the F.R.B. of
the Act's provisions and are given almost as much precedential weight by the courts as the
Regulation.)
33 476 F.2d 1062, at 1065.
34 Id.
35 Only the Fifth, Seventh and Tenth 'Circuits appear to have addressed issues similar to
those raised in Wachtel. See note 30 supra. A line of decisions from the Tenth Circuit most
strongly affirms the Wachtel principle that violations of the Act occur at a specific time.
See generally Redhouse v. Quality Ford Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1975); Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan & Co., 498 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1974); Stevens v. Rock Springs
Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 307 (10th Cir. 1974). See also Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture
Co., 479 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1973).
36 497 F.2d 307 (10th Cir. 1974). Plaintiffs brought a class action alleging failure to
disclose where the purchase of mobile homes under a closed-end plan involved two transactions - the signing of the purchase agreement and the execution of the promissory note.
The court held that the execution of the note was the consummated transaction envisioned
by the Act, and the statute of limitations ran from this date.
37 Id. at 309-10.
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also focused on a specific event which automatically operates as the consummation of the transaction for purposes of liability under the Act." Thus, as interpreted by the federal courts, the extension of credit under a close-end plan
contractually binds the consumer and occurs at an identifiable time. Disclosure
must be made before this time so that the consumer can make an informed
decision whether or not to become bound. This transaction is the latest significant
event at which a disclosure violation can occur, and provides the date from
which the one-year statute of limitations will run.
Open-end Credit
Open-end credit has presented greater conceptual difficulties in the judicial
determination of when a disclosure is required for statute of limitations purposes.
Open-end credit plans possess a distinctly different character from the closedend plans. The Act recognizes these differences and defines an open-end credit
plan as:
[A] plan prescribing the terms of credit transactions which may be made
thereunder from time to time and under the terms of which a finance charge
may be computed on the outstanding unpaid balance from time to time.39
The credit relationship is composed of a series of transactions in which credit is
extended. With each billing the consumer has the option to pay back this extension, by paying the outstanding balance, or to carry the balance to the following statement date and incur a finance charge."0
Despite the nature of the open-end credit plan as a continuing relationship
between the creditor and the consumer, both the Act and Regulation Z require
that disclosures be made to the consumer at specific stages; when the account
is first opened, and with each periodic billing statement. Regulation Z simply
expands the Act's language concerning disclosures when the account is first
opened and mandates disclosure before the first transaction is made.4 Nonetheless, for the purposes of § 1640 (a) liability, both the Act and the Regulation
are unclear as to whether the opening of the account and the billing statements
are to be regarded as one or as separate transactions. Moreover, they are silent
concerning the point during these transactions at which the violation giving rise to
38 See generally Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 353 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D.
Pa. 1973) (closing on a mortgage loan); Bissette v. Colonial Mortgage Corp., 340 F. Supp.
1191 (D.D.C. 1972) (commitment agreement to make a loan); Kristiansen v. John Mullins
& Sons, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 99 (E.D. N.Y. 1973) (the execution date of the installment contract).
39 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (1970). See note 22 supra.
40 Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Mart, 479 F.2d 740, 747 (5th Cir. 1973). See
note 49 infra.
41 The text of the Act is set out at 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a),(b) (1970). The text of the
Regulation may be found at 12 C.F.R. § 226.7(a),(b) (1976). See text accompanying note
9 supra.
The Federal Reserve Board has also informally issued an opinion in its Annual Report
to Congress on Truth-in-Lending that open-end credit plans should be regarded as constitution "one transaction" from its opening to all subsequent extensions of credit for
purposes of liability under § 1640(a). This interpretation conceives the failure to disclose
as constructively occurring when the account is opened, regardless of when the actual failure
takes place. Under this theory, the statute of limitations could have already expired before
the violation of the Act occurs. See Thomas v. Myer-Dickson Furniture Mart, 479 F.2d at 747.
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a cause of action occurs. However, since the Act requires disclosure when the account is opened, and when periodic statements are sent to the customer, it seems
to envision significant, identifiable events in the open-end credit context as
determining when a cause of action accrues. Apparently, the statute of limitations
would run from the date these transactions occur, as in the close-end credit
context.
Measuring the Limitations Period under the Act:
The Continuing Violation Theory
The precise question of when the statute of limitations begins to run in connection with a disclosure violation under an open-end credit plan has not been
directly addressed by any federal district or appellate court. Several have considered the question under a closed-end plan. The major controversy has centered
around the "continuing violation theory." According to this theory, the creditor
is obliged to make disclosures when the credit transaction is consummated."
This disclosure obligation will continue during the existence of the credit relationship. Violations of the disclosure provisions thus continue until they are
remedied. Under this theory, the statute of limitations runs either from the
date of compliance or from the date of discovery of the non-compliance.
In Wachtel, the Sixth Circuit rejected this theory on the grounds that the
Act's purpose is to require the lender to disclose credit information to the consumer before he becomes contractually bound. The Act emphasizes the finality of
the credit contract regarding a consumer's right to invoke the penalties provided
by requiring disclosure before the credit is extended. 3 The duty to disclose arises
once; the violation occurs only when this duty is not fulfilled and does not continue thereafter.
In contrast to the Wachtel court's complete rejection of the continuing
violation theory in Truth-in-Lending actions, the New York district court in
Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, Inc.,44 at least recognized that this theory
was valid for statute of limitations purposes in certain types of wrongs.4 5 Yet it
ultimately rejected this theory in connection with violations of the Act on the
grounds that:
There is nothing in either the letter or the spirit of the Act which imposes
upon the creditor a continuing duty during the entire term of the contract
to disclose46 what he has failed to disclose the first time the contract was
executed.
42 See note 24 supra.
43 476 F.2d 1062 at 1065.
44 59 F.R.D. 99 (E.D. N.Y. 1973). This case involved a class action brought by plaintiff against defendant store for failure to disclose information required by 12 C.F.R. § 226.8
in connection with closed-end installment sales contracts.
45 See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) (Sherman Anti-Trust Act violations); Katz v. NLRB, 196 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1952) (violation
of the National Labor Relations Act).
46 59 F.R.D. at 107. The plaintiff had argued that the failure to disclose was a continuing violation, since during the period of non-disclosure or at the longest, for the life of the
contract, the creditor continues to receive unlawful benefits and inflicts harm on the consumer.
The court rejected this notion on the grounds that the harm envisioned by the plaintiff was
mere speculation and based only on the possibility that the plaintiff might have ended the
contract had she discovered the non-disclosure.
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The District of Columbia Federal District Court in Postow v. OrientalBuilding Association47 also applied a continuing violation theory to a failure to disclose
under the Act. Postow isolated several factors, found in other substantive classes
of wrongs held to be continuing violations, which it considered relevant in Truthin-Lending actions. In particular, the district court emphasized that the misdeed
must have constituted an ongoing, improper relationship which caused a continuing invasion of the other party's rights.4 The court narrowly applied the
continuing theory, however, by ruling that the creditor's duty to disclose continued only from the date the contract to make a loan was executed to the date
of its performance. The period during which the violation was deemed to have
continued was thus carefully confined within the parameters of these two transactions.
The factors used in the Postow decision to determine whether an obligation
to disclose is continuing could also be applied appropriately to the open-ended
credit plan. The consumer/creditor relationship under such plans is a dynamic
one, formed by a series of credit extensions over a period of time. Any failure to
disclose the costs of such credit would result in a continuing invasion of the consumer's rights. The Fifth Circuit in Thomas v. Myer-Dickson Furniture Mart"
recognized this ongoing nature of open-end credit plans. The court pointed out
that one of the primary characteristics of open-end plans is the receipt of monthly
billing statements which offer a continual option to a consumer to carry over
the outstanding balance to the next month and incur a new credit obligation.
Each statement constitutes, in the court's view, a separate consumer transaction
giving rise to potential liability under § 1640(a)." The opening and use of the
account are not to be considered one transaction: instead, they are a series of
separate consumer transactions for which credit disclosures are required.
Moreover, in its discussion, the Fifth Circuit indirectly addressed the
problem of establishing when liability for non-disclosure arises under the Act.
Despite its recognition of the ongoing nature of open-end credit plans, the court
determined that the issuance or receipt of a non-conforming periodic billing
statement is the significant event marking liability.5 ' Presumably, the violation
occurs at this point and the statute of limitations begins to run on the ensuing
cause of action.
Thus the line of cases considering the statutory one-year limitation on Truth47 390 F. Supp. 1130 (D.D.C. 1975). This was an action for disclosure violations
under the Act involving a closed-end mortgage loan agreement in two segments: a commitment to finance and a closing. Disclosure was presented to plaintiffs only one hour before
the final closing.
48 Id. at 1139.
49 479 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1973). Plaintiff brought suit for defendants' failure to disclose on her billing statements for her open-end account the effect of credit life insurance
upon the finance charge, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1970).
50 Id. at 747. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970) provides in part that "any creditor who
fails in connection with any consumer credit transaction to disclose to any person any information required under this part to be disclosed is liable to that person ...
"
In 1974, Congress completely reworded § 1640(a) liability provision and deleted any
reference to "consumer transaction." It substituted a provision placing liability on any
creditor who fails to comply with any requirement imposed under the Act. 15 U.S.C.A. §
1640(a) (1) (A) - (B) (1974), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1) (1970).
51 Thomas v. Myer-Dickson Furniture, 479 F.2d 740. In so concluding, the Fifth Circuit
noted and then rejected the Federal Reserve Board's unofficial view of the "one transaction"
character of such accounts. See text accompanying note 39 supra.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

(February 1977)

in-Lending actions in both the open-end and closed-end contexts focuses on
specific events in the consumer/creditor relationship. The consensus is that the
violation occurs and the statute begins to run from the date of one specific event,
whether this event be the moment the credit contract is performed or the billing
statement is received.
The Goldman Court's Analysis
The Seventh Circuit's ruling in Goldman represents the most lenient approach yet taken by any court faced with the problem of the possible expiration
of the statute of limitations. In reversing the lower court, this appellate court
focused on three elements; the stated purpose of the Act, the specialized nature
of open-end credit plans, and the finance charge.
Initially, the analysis by the Seventh Circuit is similar to that found in the
other federal court decisions discussed above. All evidence a desire to carry out
the spirit of the Act and to adequately protect the unwary consumer. In Goldman, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the main intent of the Act is to punish
the failure to disclose credit terms to the consumer. As the court notes, the general concern is for the "meaningful disclosure of credit terms."52 This concern
provides the background for the court's focus on the special conceptual problems
presented by the open-end account.
According to Goldman, the salient characteristic of an open-end credit account is the lack of a ceiling on the aggregate amount of credit extendable during
the use of the account.53 The Seventh Circuit's emphasis on the amount of total
credit extendable is necessary because such emphasis supports the central role
the imposition of a finance charge plays in the court's subsequent discussion. The
lifetime cost (in terms of the total finance charge) of credit extensions to a consumer could be very high. Awareness of how a finance charge is calculated might
provide enough incentive for the consumer to pay any outstanding balance within
the free-ride period. The court, therefore, is properly concerned that all information about finance charges be disclosed to aid meaningful consumer credit choices.
Despite the Seventh Circuit's sensitivity to the special Truth-in-Lending
problems presented by open-end credit, the court tacitly accepted the Wachtel
interpretation for statute of limitations purposes. Likewise, the Goldman court
concluded that the Act conceives of a specific time in the course of the
credit relationship when a disclosure violation occurs. Like most courts
which have considered the question, the Goldman court rejects the continuing
violation theory for failure to disclose. When open-end credit accounts are
involved, the court recognizes that the Act fails to indicate clearly the specific
52 532 F.2d 10, 18. This language would also apparently include situations, like that in
the instant case, where the disclosure is incomplete or misleading.
53 Id. Open-end credit accounts may impose ceilings on the outstanding debt carried by
a customer at any one time. But if this debt is cleared by payment, the customer is free to
transact more credit extensions. Thus the gross total of all these transactions may well exceed
the actual debt ceiling.
The Seventh Circuit's analysis distinguishes the Goldman approach to open-end credit
plans from the approach in Myer-Dickson Furniture Mart, which characterized such plans
as a constant series of transactions governed by umbrella credit terms. See Thomas v. MyerDickson Furniture Mart, 479 F.2d at 747.
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time violations occur. 4 This omission suggests that different rules may apply
to open-end accounts. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit found that a joint reading of the disclosure provisions of the Act and of Regulation Z pertaining to
open-end accounts revealed a congressional intent to require a specific time for
disclosure of credit information in these accounts.5" The court refused, therefore,
to impose a continuing obligation of the creditor to make disclosures, finding
such intent lacking in either the language or the history of the Act.
Nevertheless, because of the peculiar nature of a free-ride, open-end credit
plan, the Goldman opinion proceeded beyond the "specific time for disclosures"
analysis. It agreed with the plaintiff that, until a finance charge is imposed, a
debtor continues to be unaware of any inaccurate disclosure concerning these
charges. When free-ride periods are built into open-end accounts, discovery of
inaccuracies by the consumer who takes advantage of the free credit ride can be
indefinitely postponed.
The court then attempted to distinguish "no disclosure" from "inaccurate
disclosure.""6 In the former situation the violation is apparent to the consumer,
while in the latter the consumer has no opportunity to test the accuracy of a
disclosure until a finance charge is imposed. While the court's distinction may be
correct, it nevertheless is irrelevant. For purposes of determining liability under
the Act, inaccurate disclosure would seem the equivalent of no disclosure at all.
In both situations, the consumer cannot make an informed choice since all the
facts and hidden costs are not known. Furthermore, the difference becomes immaterial once the court adopts the specific event analysis to determine when
liability arises. Violations of the Act, whether due to no disclosure or inaccurate
disclosure, occur at one specific time. Moreover, the fact that Congress has not
treated inaccurate disclosures as separate categories for liability further minimizes
the relevance of the Goldman court's distinction.
The Seventh Circuit was obliged to draw heavily on legislative intent to
reach a determination that the cause of action accrued when the finance charge
was imposed and that the one-year statute commenced on that date. It correctly
regarded the finance charge as the central consideration in the legislative history
of the Act and, thus, as the major trigger of civil liability." Since the finance
charge's disclosure is essential to the informed use of credit, the court's concern
is understandable. Conceivably, the full impact of an inaccurate finance charge
might not be felt by a consumer who had taken advantage of the free-ride period
until after the statute of limitations had run.
The Act's provisions do not expressly cover this problem. To fill this very
crucial gap, the court made the first imposition of a finance charge which is inconsistent with the disclosure the event which marks the beginning of the one-year
limitations period. This approach implements the Act's purpose by insuring that
54
55

See note 33 supra.
532 F.2d at 20.

56 Id.
57 "The basic disclosure concept contained in the proposed legislation is to require
lenders and merchants to provide consumers with a statement of the 'finance charge! imposed
by the creditor in connection with a particular credit transaction." Report to the Senate on
H.R. 11601, Truth-in-Lending, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CoDE, CONG.

& ADmIN. NEws 1971.
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the consumer is fully informed about the cost of his credit, and reflects the general trend of judicial concern for the consumer."8 Goldman attempted to lessen
the ambiguity of the Act by construing its provisions liberally, thus enabling an
aggrieved consumer to take advantage of the remedy provided for him. 9
Conclusion
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit has not departed radically from the considerations at work in previous decisions. It, too, focused on a specific event in
the credit relationship-the first imposition of a finance charge. If this charge
is inconsistent with previous disclosures, a cause of action accrues to the consumer. The statute of limitations then runs from the date of this event. The
fact that the consumer's actual discovery of the inaccuracies in disclosure may
also occur at the same time is immaterial.6" This analysis is conceptually consistent with earlier decisions which determined that a cause of action arises at a
specific point in a consumer/creditor relationship.
Nevertheless, this decision will expose creditors who offer "free-ride" credit
plans to a greater number of potentially successful suits. Formerly, these suits
were limited by a strict judicial construction of the Act's statute of limitations.
The Goldman decision permits the suspension of this statute until a finance charge
inconsistent with the disclosure is first imposed. Due to the effect of the free-ride
period, this event could occur many months after the opening or first use of the
open-end account.
This result is fully consistent with the "let the creditor beware" philosophy
underlying the Act. Furthermore, the decision limits its impact by making the time
the finance charge is first imposed, rather than its discovery, the material event
commencing the limitations period. The creditor need only show that the finance
charge was first imposed one year before the action was filed in order to defeat
the plaintiff consumer's claim.
58 In general, the federal courts that have considered Truth-in-Lending actions reveal
a strong awareness of Congress' intent to protect the credit consumer. Although often
restricted by rather narrow interpretations of the Act's provisions, all have evidenced a desire
to implement the Act by careful scrutiny of the credit transaction under attack by an
aggrieved consumer-plaintiff. See generally Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.,
411 U.S. 356 (1973); Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974); Allen v.
Beneficial Finance Co., 393 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1975); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New
York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
59 From this decision, it is clear that the Seventh Circuit concurred with the United
States Supreme Court's analysis of the philosophy behind the Act:
The Truth-in-Lending Act reflects a change in Congressional policy from a philosophy of "Let the buyer beware," to one of "Let the seller disclose." By erecting a
barrier between the seller and the prospective purchaser in the form of hard facts,
Congress expressly sought to . . . "avoid the uninformed use of credit."
Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. at 377.
60 Despite a superficial similarity, the Seventh Circuit has not adopted the view expressed
in the dissent to the Wachtel decision. In his dissent, Judge Young argued that the majority
limited the effectiveness of the Act when it ruled that the limitations period began to run
when the mortgage contract was signed. Even though the Act allows the mortgagor to
rescind the contract once the disclosure violation is discovered, his right to recover damages
as well may already have been lost due to the expiration of the statute of limitations.
Analogizing to the approach taken in fraud actions, Judge Young contended that the purposes of the Act would be better served if the Act's limitation provision were interpreted as
beginning either when the failure to disclose was first discovered or when the disclosure was
made. The consumer's actual knowledge thus becomes the event triggering the statute of
limitations. Wachtel v. West, 476 F.2d at 1066-67 (Young, J., dissenting).
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By taking into account the special character of an open-end credit plan, the
Seventh Circuit has attempted to remedy a situation not envisioned by the
framers of the Act. In view of the confusion surrounding open-end credit plans,
and the risk of inconsistent judicial attempts to resolve ambiguity in the Act
concerning them, Congress should define when the cause of action accrues. Unless
it does so, the Act's short statute of limitations will deprive unwary consumers of
the remedies given to them against creditors. Without this necessary clarification,
Congress' intent to encourage private enforcement of the Act through consumer
suits is severely thwarted.
Mary E. Schaffner

TRUTH IN LENDING ACT-MEANINGFUL
NECESSITATES

LOGICAL

SEQUENTIAL

ORDERING

SEQUENCE REQUIREMENT
OF ARITHMETICAL

TERMS-

CO-OBLIGOR ALLOWED TO RECOVER CIVIL PENALTY DESPITE POSSIBILITY
OF MULTIPLE PENALTIES

Allen v. Beneficial Finance Co., Inc.*
The Truth in Lending Act has been the subject of extensive litigation since
its enactment in 1968.' Nevertheless, two particular issues raised under this
Act have received only limited attention in the federal courts. These issues pertain to the meaningful sequence requirement of Regulation Z, and to the question of multiple recoveries by co-obligors arising from one consumer loan. Both
these subjects were recently addressed by the Seventh Circuit in Allen v. Beneficial Finance Co., Inc.' In resolving the first issue, the court joined with an
earlier decision by the Fifth Circuit, concluding that a disclosure statement in a
consumer loan must group arithmetical terms in a logically sequential order.
Furthermore, the statement must group related terms, whether descriptive or
arithmetical, in relative proximity to each other. Secondly, the Seventh Circuit
held that a co-obligor, although not receiving a disclosure statement, is nevertheless entitled to a separate recovery of the statutory penalty, even when the
other obligor is not a party to the action.
On April 2, 1974, plaintiff and her ex-husband renegotiated an outstanding consumer loan with defendant, Beneficial Finance Company of Gary, Inc.
(Beneficial). As a result of the renegotiation, plaintiff's ex-husband received
an additional $453.09, thereby obligating both plaintiff and her former husband
to repayments totaling $2404. However, only plaintiff's ex-husband received a
statement of disclosure detailing the transaction. On January 3, 1975, plaintiff
filed a complaint claiming that defendant failed to comply with the statutory
provisions requiring disclosure of pertinent credit information. Specifically, the
allegation charged that the information provided by Beneficial was not supplied
in a meaningful sequence as required under Regulation Z, § 226.6(a).' Both
parties made motions for summary judgment;4 the trial court granted plaintiff's
motion, and awarded plaintiff the statutory penalty of $1,000 plus attorney's
fees.5
The district court premised liability on defendant's failure to disclose information as required under the civil liability section, § 1640. The court found
that the lack of a meaningful sequence in the disclosure statement effectively
masked any information contained therein.'
Although it affirmed the decision of the district court, the Court of Appeals
531 F.2d 797 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 237 (1976).
1 The Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 102, 82 Stat. 146, 15 U.S.C. § 1601
(1970) (prior to 1974 amendment). The Truth in Lending Act is Title I of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act.

2
3
4
5
6

531 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1976).
12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) (1976).
The ex-husband, who received the statement, was not a party in this lawsuit.
393 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (N.D. Ind. 1975).
Id.
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for the Seventh Circuit premised its finding of liability on different grounds. As
previously indicated, the two principal issues before the Seventh Circuit were:
(1) whether the disclosure statement of the defendant met the meaningful
sequence requirement of Regulation Z; and (2) whether a co-borrower who
did not receive the statement of disclosure could recover for a violation in that
statement.
On appeal, defendant attempted to respond to both issues. Beneficial initially noted that the meaningful sequence provision of Regulation Z is satisfied
by a logical ordering of the terms of the credit agreement. Defendant further
argued that the subtractional ordering of terms appearing in its statement to
plaintiff sufficiently complied with that logical order requirement 8 In response
to the standing issue, Beneficial contended that the statute implicitly precludes
recovery by a co-borrower since it requires the statement of disclosure to be
delivered to only one borrower in a multiple obligor situation. This explicit
limitation on the rights of co-borrowers to receive multiple statements was interpreted by Beneficial to encompass a limitation on the rights of those borrowers
to maintain separate actions. Pursuant to this position, Beneficial contended
that plaintiff should not be allowed to recover for the violation since she was
not the party who received defendant's statement.
Neither contention persuaded the appellate court. The Seventh Circuit
first ruled that Beneficial's statement failed to meet the disclosure requirements
of Regulation Z because the statement failed to group items in a logically sequential order. The court further found liability because the statement failed
to group related items together. The subtractional order provided in the disclosure statement was found by the court to be inadequate, as a matter of law.9
Moreover, although the creditor was obligated to furnish only one statement,
the court found such a requirement does not limit the right of other obligors to
recover if insufficient disclosures appear in the statement furnished. In order to
properly analyze the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Allen, it is necessary to
understand the purpose underlying the Truth in Lending Act.
The Rationale of the Truth in Lending Act
Enacted in 1968, the Truth in Lending Act1 was designed to provide the
consumer with sufficient information to allow a comparison of the cost of dif7 Two other issues were raised by the appellant. In the first, the appellant claimed the
trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment without allowing
oral argument or submission of briefs in opposition to the motion. In the second, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of the meaningful sequence requirement. Both questions
were quickly disposed of by reviewing the rules of civil procedure for the Northern District of
Indiana. 531 F.2d at 799-800, 805.
8 Alternatively, the defendant blamed any deviations from a meaningful sequence on the
practical necessities of a national computer system which compiled the statement. The Seventh
Circuit summarily dismissed this contention on the grounds that creditor convenience is no
defense. Id. at 804.
9 Id.
10 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970). For analyses of the assumptions underlying the Truth in
Lending Act, see Kropke, Consumer Credit Regulation, 68 COLUM. L. Rnv. 445 (1968);
Boyd, The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act-A Consumer's Perspective, 45 NoTRn
DAME LAw. 171 (1970).
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ferent types of consumer credit." It was intended that such information enables
the consumer to make an intelligent decision regarding his use of credit. It was
further expected that these disclosures would promote "consumer shopping"
among credit providers, ultimately resulting in lower credit costs through enhanced competition. However, the Act does not attempt to regulate the substantive terms and conditions of consumer credit, nor does it attempt to place a
ceiling on the cost of that credit. Rather, it is simply designed to better inform
the public of the terms of credit, whatever those terms might be, by requiring
disclosure in a uniform manner.
To implement this purpose, the Act requires creditors to disclose certain
terms and conditions of the credit agreement before completing the transaction.
In particular, it directs all affected creditors to disclose the finance charge and
annual percentage rate of extended credit." The Act further requires that all
disclosures be made clearly and conspicuously, and in accordance with regulations
promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board to carry out the purpose of the
Act." Although other disclosure requirements do exist, their applicability to a
given situation depends on the nature of the transaction involved.
Creditor noncompliance with the provisions of the Act gives rise to a private
damage action on behalf of the borrower. 4 A borrower may recover an amount
equal to twice the finance charge of the loan, subject to a minimum of $100
and a maximum of $1000. In addition, an aggrieved debtor is allowed to
recover any actual damages and reasonable attorney's fees. This civil penalty
provision was inserted by Congress to foster private enforcement, in an effort
to aid governmental agencies in the monumental task of policing the consumer
credit industry.
Courts have generally construed the Act liberally, so that it may accomplish
its broad remedial purpose. The only Supreme Court decision, to date, arising
under the Truth in Lending Act, Mourning v. Family Publications Service,
Inc.," noted the basic effect of the Act: "The Truth in Lending Act reflects a
transition in congressional policy from a philosophy of 'Let the buyer beware'
to one of 'Let the seller disclose.' "" Most courts in dealing with the Truth in
Lending Act have expressly adopted this approach. Characteristic of this approach is a statement by the Fifth Circuit in Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furni11 H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) '(to accompany H. R. 11601), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962, 1970-71.
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 1636-38 (1970). There are a number of exceptions to this rule. A
creditor need not disclose the finance charge in dollars for a long-term mortgage on a residence. Also, the annual percentage rate need not be stated if the finance charge does not
exceed $5 and is applicable to an amount financed not exceeding $75, nor if it does not
exceed $7.50 and is applicable to an amount financed exceeding $75. 15 U.S.C. § 1638. The
Act divides consumer credit into three categories: (1) "open-end credit" extended under a
plan where the creditor permits a line of credit on a revolving basis, such as bank credit
cards; (2) "closed-end sales" such as installment contracts; and (3) "closed-end loans"
extended by banks or consumer finance companies. The loan in Allen falls into category (3),
and this discussion is aimed principally at this category.
13 15 U.S.C.A. § 1631(a) (as amended, Supp. 1976). The Act also authorizes the
Federal Reserve Board to formulate regulations to carry out the purposes of the Act in general.
15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
14 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640 (as amended, Supp. 1976).
15 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
16 Id. at 377.
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ture Company."7 Noting that the Act has formulated a system of private attorney generals to assist in enforcing the legislation, the court pledged its support
to that system:
The regulatory scheme forcefully expounds an emerging ethic of "caveat
vendor," and we will not strain
to avoid giving effect to the Federal Con18
sumer Credit Protection Act.
The Meaningful Sequence Requirement

The Truth in Lending Act is a broad system regulating a complex area of
the economy. Due to this complexity, and the knowledge that many schemes
could be devised to circumvent a rigid set of congressional rules formulated in
a statute which might not be amended for many years, Congress granted authority to the Federal Reserve Board to promulgate regulations enforcing the Act.
Pursuant to this grant of authority, the Federal Reserve Board has issued numerous regulations which are collectively known as Regulation Z. 9 Regulation Z
serves to clarify the broad congressional directives found in the statute and
attempts to adapt the law to changing economic conditions.
The Act also directs the Federal Reserve Board to adopt regulations which
will define in greater detail the statutorily imposed "clear and conspicuous" disclosure requirements." In response to this directive, the Board added a meaningful sequence requirement to the general disclosure section of Regulation Z.2
As used in the regulations, the Seventh Circuit has interpreted the meaningful
sequence requirement to mean that "disclosure statements must use clear language arranged in an order which provides ease of comprehension."22
The staff of the Federal Reserve Board has issued two Public Position
Letters outlining its interpretation of meaningful sequence. The first, Public
Position Letter No. 545,23 did not define the requirements; rather the staff pro-

vided an example of what it believed to be a violation of meaningful sequence.
In their view, it would be a violation "to scatter the disclosures of the various
elements of the finance charge throughout the contract or agreement. 24 Additionally, this letter attempted to clarify the question of who bears the burden
of proving whether the statement is in meaningful sequence. Although the
creditor may meet the requirements of meaningful sequence in a "multitude
of ways," Regulation Z does not prescribe how this may be accomplished. Consequently, the Federal Reserve Board's staff has indicated that, in their opinion,
the burden is on the creditor to prove that his method adequately satisfies the
meaningful disclosure requirement.25
17 479 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1973).
18 Id. at 748 (emphasis in original).

19 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1976).

20 15 U.S.C.A. § 1631(a) (as amended, Supp. 1976).
21 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) (1976).
22 531 F.2d at 801.
23 [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CON. CRED. GumE I 30,759. For the full text of the
letter, see R. CLONTZ, JR., TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL at D-202 (4th ed. 1976).
24

Id.

25

Id.
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The second letter, Public Position Letter No. 780,2" defined meaningful
sequence in terms of grouping items bearing an arithmetical relationship to each
other:
A meaningful sequence would call for those items which are arithmetically
related to appear within a reasonable proximity to each other, not mixed
with items 27
which are irrelevant to a progression of arithmetical computations
or thought.
In these two letters the agency charged with overseeing the administration
of the Act has examined meaningful sequence from both a negative and a positive standpoint. Both letters concentrate on the grouping of related terms; the
second letter expressly forbids the mixing of items not relevant to a mathematical
progression. Yet neither explicitly requires a sequential ordering of terms within
the grouping of relevant items.
Few cases have discussed the requirements of meaningful sequence. The
first case to do so in more than a cursory fashion was Garza v. Chicago Health
Clubs, Inc." The district court in Garza was faced with deciding the relative
positions of default terms in a required disclosure statement. In holding that
such terms must be placed "adjacent to or near other disclosures concerned with
default, '29 the court interpreted meaningful sequence to mean that "those disclosures which are logically related must be grouped together rather than scattered through the contract."3 Thus, the court adopted the view, expressed in
Public Position Letter No. 545, that the requirement applies to the grouping of
all related terms. Since the terms in question were descriptive, the subject of
arithmetical order was not reached.
A somewhat contrary view of the disclosure requirements was taken by
another district court in Barksdale v. Peoples Financial Corp."' There it was
held that the meaningful sequence requirement addressed only those items having an "arithmetic relationship and interdependence requiring presentation in
a logical progression of arithmetic computations or thought."3 2 Therefore, it did
not require that the disclosure of the consequences of default be in relative proximity to, nor in any particular sequence with, the schedule, of due dates, since
those items were informative in nature and had no arithmetical interdependence.
The only court of appeals to discuss meaningful sequence in any depth, prior
to the Seventh Circuit in Allen, was the Fifth Circuit in Bussey v. Georgia Bankamericard." In addressing the format of the periodic statement of a credit card
issuer, the court found the disclosure to be adequate. Without any discussion of
the history of meaningful sequence, the court held that the information satisfied
'
the requirement since it was "logically itemized in arithmetical order."34
The
26

[1976] 5

CONS.

CRED.

GUIDE

(CCH) 1 31,102.

27 Id. at 66,490.
28 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
29 Id. at 960.
30 Id. at 961.
31 393 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
32 Id. at 116 (emphasis in original).
33 516 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1975).
34 Id. at 457.
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copy of the statement reproduced in the opinion shows that the arithmetical information was in two sets of horizontal figures with no clear indication that the
two were linked. In addition, a number of items interrupted the horizontal flow.
Nevertheless, the court affirmed the findings of the special master that the
statement provided meaningful disclosure. Significantly, the Fifth Circuit utilized
an arithmetical sequence test, becoming one of the first courts to do so.
In Allen, the Seventh Circuit found that the statement provided by Beneficial was in violation of the sequence requirement." It elicited two elements
of meaningful sequence from prior authorities. The first was that disclosures
which are logically related should be grouped together;"8 second, the terms
within these groupings must be arranged in a "logically sequential order emphasizing the most important terms."3
The Court initially found that the disclosure statement did not group together terms which were logically related. For example, the elements of the
amount financed were scattered across the top half of the statement. This was
aggravated by the proximate grouping of certain other terms which were not
logically related. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit noted that the statement
failed to describe the security interest in one continuous narration." The description of security consisted of a check-box system and an explanation of the
mechanics of that system.39 It began in the upper right hand quarter of the
statement. Inside a portioned-off rectangle were a set of boxes alongside the
names of various types of assets. The appropriate box was to be checked to
designate which type of asset was to be provided as collateral for the loan. The
explanation of the box system was directly below the rectangle, but the description of the last item to be checked, the real estate mortgage, appeared in the
middle of the page, starting at the left margin. The only indication given the
reader that the latter explanation belonged to the box system was a heading
entitled "Security (cont.)."

The Seventh Circuit next found that the form violated the second requirement of meaningful sequence as well: the statement did not contain a satisfactory ordering of the arithmetical terms within each group."0 This was evidenced
by the statement's treatment of the amount financed. The principal elements
of this item were found in the middle of both columns among minor terms. The
35 531 F.2d at 802. The district court cited ten instances in which the statement violated
meaningful sequence. 393 F. Supp. at 1384-85.
36 531 F.2d at 801.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 803. It is interesting that the court draws the reader's attention to the description of security on the form and merely states that the description does not provide an understandable statement. The Seventh Circuit, in Tinsman v. Moline Beneficial Co., 531 F.2d
815 (7th Cir. 1976), found a similar description to be a violation of the Truth in Lending
Act. Since Illinois law prohibited a security interest from arising unless the debtor acquires
rights in them 10 days after the secured party gives value, the statement purporting to create
a security interest in all consumer goods thereafter acquired is an inaccurate description of
Illinois law. Indiana law is identical to Illinois law on this point. Compare ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 26, § 9-204(2) (1973) with IND. CODE § 26-1-9-204(4)(b) (1971). Hence, in Allen,
Beneficial's statement of security is in and of itself a violation of the Truth in Lending Act.
This, indeed, is perhaps the best evidence of the completely confusing nature of the statement that the Seventh Circuit highlighted the discontinuity in disclosure, yet failed to note its
substantive inaccuracy.
39 See appendix for a facsimile of the disclosure statement.
40 531 F.2d at 803.
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court concluded that there was a need for arithmetical progression, as shown by
the confusion which resulted from this intermingling. This was underscored by
the addition error of five cents which the Seventh Circuit adroitly pointed out.4
The court continued by examining the defendant's arguments relating to
the sufficiency of the subtractional format employed in the statement. 2 The
court correctly noted that there were basic flaws in the defendant's presentation
of the subtractional method. However, the Seventh Circuit did not base its decision on these errors; rather, the court attacked the method itself, finding the subtractional format inadequate as a matter of law.43 It reasoned that the order of
disclosure must correspond to the sequence in which a borrower visualizes a
loan, so that the borrower can easily understand the terms of the contract.
There is little doubt as to the correctness of the Seventh Circuit's decision
holding Beneficial's statement violative of the meaningful sequence requirement.
The statement provided was confusing and failed to disclose in an understandable manner the essence of the transaction. However, the court's rationale was
unnecessarily broad.
The particular question confronting the court concerned the logical order
of the defendant's statement. In agreeing with the lower court's conclusion, the
Seventh Circuit needed only to affirm that court's finding that the statement
contained so many deviations from logical order that it effectively masked meaningful disclosure. However, the court continued its analysis and determined
that even if the information in the statement had been displayed in the correct
form, it would nevertheless have been inadequate because the subtractional
method of presenting that information was itself insufficient under the law. Such
a method fails to follow the conceptual framework in which people visualize a
loan.44 According to the court, the majority of people tend initially to focus on
41 Id.
42 By subtractional order, the defendant meant that the statement began with the
amount of total payments, from which were subtracted the various charges, leaving the
amount actually received by the borrower. For example:
Total of Monthly Payments
Less: Finance Charge
Insurance Costs
Amount Financed
Less: Refinancing of Prior Loan
Amount Received by the Borrower.
Id. at 804.
43 Id. The court summarily dismissed the defendant's contention that any defects in the
form should be ignored because they resulted from the national computer system which the
defendant employed. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that creditor convenience is not a defense,
since the Act was passed to aid the borrower by requiring the lender to supply adequate
information. The lender may not avoid the burden of designing forms which the borrower
can understand by maintaining that its own computer prohibits this. The court further
indicated its belief that the computer is capable of producing a printed form in a more comprehensible format through more intelligent programming, in any event if such programming
is not possible, the necessary data can be transferred by hand to another, more intelligible,
document.
The conclusion of this decision clearly places the Seventh Circuit in accord with those
courts, principally the Garza court, that have interpreted meaningful sequence to require a
grouping of related terms. As evidenced by its finding that the failure to disclose the terms
of the security interest in a more comprehensible format violated the meaningful sequence
requirement, the court rejected the Barksdale decision which limited that requirement to
arithmetical terms.
44 Id.
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the principal element of a loan. Progressing from there, the cognitive process
looks to the interest figure and arrives at the total amount to be repaid.
Notwithstanding the court's rationale, there appears to be no valid reason
for not upholding the subtractional order, if it is correctly displayed. Regulation
Z requires "meaningful sequence"; there is no requirement that a specific format
be followed. Furthermore, although the conceptual framework described by the
court is, theoretically, the manner in which most people visualize a loan; it is
not necessarily the only way people view the transaction. One of the reasons
why Congress requires that monthly payments, as well as the finance charge, be
stated in dollar amounts, is that many people, particularly those at the lowerincome levels, do not make credit decisions based on interest rates. Rather, they
decide whether to borrow primarily on the basis of repayment amounts, considering both total payments and monthly payments.4 5 Under this approach, a
consumer compares his available income with the prospective payment. Thus
for those people who use such a budgeting process, the subtractional order would
not only be adequate, but preferable.
The congressional intent to organize a flexible system of disclosure requirements so that the regulations could be adapted to varying circumstances was
one of the primary reasons for giving the Federal Reserve Board the power to
promulgate rules."8 Since people analyze loans in different ways, prohibiting
the subtractional method is contrary to the congressional intent to organize such
a flexible system. Allowing the subtractional method, when properly implemented and in logical sequence, would permit the creditor to disclose in an order
which reflects the manner in which many people actually visualize a loan. The
regulation does not purport to require a particular meaningful sequence; once
it has been demonstrated that the order is meaningful to a sizeable segment of
the population it should be left to the legislature, or its agencies, to determine if
that order will suffice. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit concluded as a matter
of law, without discussion of empirical evidence, and in direct conflict with the
congressional intent and the testimony before the legislative committees regarding
the consumer's use of the data, that the subtractional method was inadequate.
Additionally, it unreservedly accepted the views expressed in the Public Position
Letters of the Federal Reserve Board's staff. Specifically, this endorsement included the imposition on the creditor of the burden of proving that his statement adheres to the meaningful sequence requirement. Finally, Allen reinforces
prior authorities by demanding a logically sequential order with the most important terms emphasized.
Allen clearly follows the recent trend of courts in giving effect to the Truth
in Lending Act's broad remedial purpose by requiring the creditor to comply
with ever increasing regulations. This trend has several important implications.
First, the imposition of stricter and more numerous requirements should produce
more comparable statements from the various creditors. This greater uniformity
of disclosure, which is the primary goal of the Act, is presumed to start a chain
45 See NATIONAL
UNITED STATES 172,

COMMISSION

ON

CONSUMER

174-75, 182-83 '(1973).

FINANCE,

CONSUMER

CREDIT IN

THE

46 H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (to accompany H. R. 11601),
reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 1962, 1986-87.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February 1977]

reaction: uniformity will promote consumer shopping; shopping will encourage
competition; competition will lower the cost of credit. Additionally, the shortterm cost of disclosure will be increased by the imposition of stricter disclosure
requirements and by the authorization of recovery even when there is no actual
damage. The increased costs resulting from these additional sanctions will
naturally be passed on to all consumers in the form of higher interest rates.
Furthermore, despite Allen's compatibility with the purposes of the Truth
in Lending Act, it leaves the creditor in an uncertain position. Although told
that the subtractional method of presenting information will not suffice, the
creditor has not been provided with a precise indication of how to comply with
the regulation. In refuting the order used by Beneficial, the court has suggested
a possible format: principal plus interest equalling total payments. The question
remains, however, whether this is adequate, or commercially practicable, for
the infinite number of differing transactions which must comply with the statute.
Coupled with this uncertainty, the credit industry is also affected by the
burden which is imposed on the creditor to prove that his statement is in compliance with the law. For all practical purposes, the creditor now must prove
that his statement satisfies the disclosure requirements. Naturally, the ultimate
result of these burdens will be increased costs to the consumer. Deciding whether
to impose these requirements involves a balancing of the costs, both short-term
and long-term, with the expected benefits to the public. This balancing, however, should be resolved by the legislature. Its decision, as reflected in the Truth
in Lending Act, is to increase the requirements in the expectation that costs will
decrease over the long run. Since Congress and the Federal Reserve Board have
left the particular issues involved in Allen unresolved, the Seventh Circuit has
attempted to decide the questions in a manner consistent with that general legislative decision.
Separate Recovery by a Co-obligor
The purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is to require lenders to disclose
to borrowers information relevant to the financial decision involved. The Act
thus requires each creditor to disclose this information "to each person to whom
consumer credit is extended."47 When there is more than one obligor, creditor
need not furnish a "statement of information required under this part . . . to

more than one of them."" Regulation Z adds a condition that the one to whom
the statement is given be "other than an endorser, comaker, guarantor, or a
similar party."49
The Truth in Lending Act is designed by Congress to enhance disclosure
by private enforcement of the law. This is necessitated by the vast number of
loans extended each year."0 While primary enforcement of the Act is delegated
to administrative agencies, the size of the task prompted Congress to reinforce
47 15 U.S.C.A. § 1631(a) (as amended, Supp. 1976).
48 15 U.S.C.A. § 1631(b) (as amended, Supp. 1976).
49 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(e) (1976).
50 See H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (to accompany H.R. 11601),
reprinted in [1968] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1962, 1966-69.
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such a procedure with a system of private enforcement. 5 Thus a section providing for recovery of a civil penalty by the aggrieved debtor was included.
Allen serves to emphasize the problem which confronts a court in attempting
to balance the various considerations necessarily involved under the Act. On the
one side, the interest in inducing private litigation to enforce the law is furthered
by permitting multiple recoveries. Contrastingly, since a party is allowed to
recover the statutory penalty without suffering any actual damages, the interest
in avoiding windfall profits requires that only a single penalty be recovered.
Also, allowing multiple recoveries may result in excessively punitive penalties
when only a single violation occurs.
The ambiguity of the statutory language has resulted in a division of the
courts on this point. The problem has arisen because of divergent interpretations
of the general disclosure section:
§ 1631. Disclosure requirements-Clear and conspicuous disclosure to
person extended consumer credit
(a) Each creditor shall disclose clearly and conspicuously, in accordance with the regulations of the Board, to each person to whom consumer
credit is extended, the information required under this part or part D of this
subchapter.
Statement of information where more than one obligor
(b) If there is more than one obligor, a creditor need not furnish a
statement of information required 52under this part or part D of this subchapter to more than one of them.
In St. Marie v. Southland Mobile Homes, Inc.," a district court equated
"statement of information" with the requirement to disclose. Accordingly, the
court concluded that since subparagraph (b) requires only one statement to coobligors, the creditor had failed to disclose only to that obligor to whom the
statement was given." Hence, the creditor was only liable to that obligor. However, the court emphasized that the two plaintiffs were husband and wife.5 It
theorized that they received the disclosures as a family unit, rather than as two
separate debtors. It specifically left open the question of whether two unrelated
co-obligors would be allowed separate recoveries.
In Burrell v. City Dodge, Inc.,5" another district court denied separate
recoveries after reviewing the legislative history of the Act. Burrell began by
noting that the Act limited liability to $1000 or twice the finance charge "in
connection with any consumer credit transaction." It interpreted this phrase
as showing that the emphasis "is on the transactional liability of the creditor,
not on recovery by the consumer." 7 Furthermore, the court noted that it would
51 Id. at 1975-76.
52 15 U.S.C.A. § 1631 (as amended, Supp. 1976).
53 376 F. Supp. 996 (E.D. La. 1974).
54 Id. at 996-97.
55 Id. at 997.
56 [1976] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
98,764 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
57 Id. at 88,390.
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have been relatively easy for Congress to express an intent to allow separate
recoveries. Thus, faced with this statutory limitation allegedly allowing no
exception, the court concluded that Congress intended only a single recovery.
After analyzing the legislative history, the court reasoned that Congress
intended to penalize the errant creditor, but limited that penalty to one for
each transaction. Since Congress was not attempting to compensate the consumer
for loss, the measure of the penalty should be in terms of the creditor. It also
pointed out that nothing in the Act prohibited the additional recovery of actual
damages. 8
The court then countered the argument premised on an interpretation of
the penalty as liquidated damages. Even if the penalty were designed to measure
the loss, the number of obligors involved would have no bearing on the amount
of damages, since the loss that the penalty presumably liquidates would be the
difference between the cost of the credit actually extended and the cost of alternative credit. However, the court stated, the lost opportunity has the same value
regardless of the number of co-obligors. Thus the liability of the creditor should
be limited to one joint recovery by the co-obligors. Since potential liabilities
would be enormous, the court would not extend the penalties beyond those
explicitly provided for in the Act without a clear mandate. Most courts which
have denied separate recoveries have relied upon Burrell; however, its precedential value has been undermined by the 1974 amendments to the Act.
After the decision in Burrell, Congress amended § 1640, the civil liability
section. The phrase "in connection with any consumer credit transaction," upon
which the Burrell court built its argument, was replaced by "with respect to
any person."' 9 This amendment is significant because it manifests the intent of
Congress to determine liability based upon the persons borrowing rather than
upon the "transactional liability of the creditor."
Consequently several courts before Allen have allowed separate recoveries
for co-obligors. These courts have read the language of the civil liability section
as clearly imposing liability on "any creditor . . . to any person," and providing
no limitation on such liability. For example, in Rivers v. Southern Discount
Company Atlanta 11,6" the district court reasoned that although the creditor is
only required to furnish the statement to one borrower, it is assumed by all
parties that all the borrowers will be able to view that statement. If that copy is
incorrect, then each borrower has received inadequate disclosure. The court
further noted that since two signatures were required by the lender, the spirit
of the Act requires sufficient disclosure to both. Clearly the result of any inaccuracy in even the single statement would be the deception of each borrower
and, consequently, the suffering of damages by each.
The Seventh Circuit in Allen adopts this same approach. First, the court
states that Congress did not intend to limit the general disclosure requirements
58 After the Burrell decision, Congress
damages to the list of recoverable damages.
1976).
59 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970)
1976).
60 [1976] 5 CoNs. CREID. Guma (CCH)

amended § 1640 and specifically added actual
15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a) (1) (as amended, Supp.
with 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640 (as amended, Supp.
j1 98,796 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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of subparagraph (a) by only requiring one statement.6 1 Rather, the disclosure
would be made to all, even though there was only one statement. As the Rivers
court noted, there was no evidence that not all the borrowers were to view the
one statement furnished.
The Seventh Circuit was most persuaded by the variations in the language
employed in the section.2 Subparagraph (a) requires a creditor to "disclose"
to each borrower;" subparagraph (b), on the other hand, requires a creditor
to provide only one "statement of information."64 The court points out the
meaningful difference in this language:
Congress did not say disclosure need only be given to one of multiple
obligors. Nor did it say that recovery may only be had by one. It said a
"statement of information" need only be furnished to one of multiple
obligors."
The court further concluded that since the description of subparagraph (b)
is discussed only in the committee report, under a section entitled "Methods of
Disclosure," Congress merely meant this section to facilitate compliance by
reducing paperwork. 6 In fact, the legislative history of the Act expressly describes the purpose of the subparagraph as being "to reduce needless paperwork. . . ."" Thus the court correctly found no attempt to reduce disclosure
requirements.
Moreover, the court indicated that even if disclosure need be made to only
one borrower, recovery by other obligors is not thereby foreclosed. "Congress
could have expected all obligors to be protected by proper disclosure to only
one in that the one who received disclosure would certainly take the best credit
terms available."" Improper disclosure to one would therefore harm all the
obligors.
This view is seemingly undermined by a portion of the House Report on
the Act. In a general description of the penalty provisions of the Act, the legislative history describes the effect of the penalty:

61 531 F.2d at 805. A further consideration which has swayed these courts is the system
private attorneys general envisioned by the Act. The legislature created a private cause
action for violation of the disclosure requirements to provide an incentive to consumers
report infractions. This consumer action would then greatly assist the governmental agencies
enforcing the Act.
62 Id. at 806.
63 15 U.S.C.A. § 1631(a) (as amended, Supp. 1976).
64 15 U.S.C.A. § 1631(b) (as amended, Supp. 1976).
65 531 F.2d at 806.
66 Id.
67 H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (to accompany H.R. 11601), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD. Naws 1962, 1984.
68 531 F.2d at 805. The Seventh Circuit, in a later case, Mirabal v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp. Nos. 75-1048, 75-1049, 75-1050, slip op. (7th Cir. March 26, 1976),
quoted extensively from Allen. The court also gives further arguments in the form of "practical considerations." Id. slip op. at 17. First, the creditor is gaining additional security by
requiring two signatures. The court sees it as appropriate to proportion punishment for
failure to disclose to the security obtained. Second, administrative problems would arise where
only one obligor sued. For instance, the statute does not discuss who could sue, and how
much one would be entitled to recover. From this the court concludes Congress did not
anticipate the problem-presumably because it expected separate recoveries.
of
of
to
in
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Any creditor failing to disclose required information would be subject to a
civil suit with a penalty equal to twice the finance charge, with a minimum
penalty of $100 and a maximum penalty not to exceed $1,000 on any
individual credit transaction.69
While this language could be interpreted as limiting liability under the Act to
$1000 on any loan, it seems as if the Seventh Circuit was correct, in a later case,
in disregarding it in considering multiple recoveries.7 ' There are four reasons for
this conclusion. First, the language appears in a general description of the Act
and is not specifically aimed at the question of multiple recovery. Second, a
situation in which two (or more) persons co-sign can be interpreted as two
individual credit transactions. The creditor is doing business with two individuals; conversely, both borrowers are liable to the creditor. Third, in the same
paragraph the House Report implies that Congress intends to allow any party
to the transaction a separate recovery.7 In the sentence following the discussion
of the $1000 limitation, the Report states the exemption of credit advertising
from the application of civil penalties. It then describes the purpose of the
exemption:
This exemption has been written into the bill by your Committee to avoid
the possibility that anyone, not a party to an actual transaction, seeing an
advertisement not complying with the
72 disclosure requirements of the bill
would attempt to seek civil penalties.
This indicates an intent to use status as a party to the transaction as a major
test for recovery under the Act, thus implicitly allowing recovery by all parties
to a transaction which violates the disclosure requirements. Additionally, the
exemption of credit advertising implies that Congress foresaw multiple recoveries;
because Congress did not exempt recoveries under co-obligor situations, one can
infer that Congress condoned such recovery. Four, Congress amended the civil
liability provision, § 1640, changing "with any consumer credit transaction" to
"with respect to any person," thus arguably indicating an intent to clarify liability.
Instead of using the transaction as the yardstick, the new law expressly looks to
those persons to whom disclosure is required. This reorientation strongly implies
a congressional intent to allow recovery by all persons actually involved in the
transaction.
Allen, as the first court of appeals decision to expressly address the question
of separate recoveries by co-obligors, should add substantial weight to the deci-

69

H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. '(1967) (to accompany H.R. 11601), reCODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962, 1976.
70 Allen did not cite the legislative history involved. However, Mirabal did cite it.
71 H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (to accompany H.R. 11601),
reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1962, 1976.
72 Id.

printed in [1968] U.S.
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sions of those district courts which have reached a similar conclusion.7" The
possible damage to all obligors who co-sign entitles them to individual recovery;
since they expose themselves to liability under the loan, and possible loss from
inadequate disclosure of credit terms, they should each be afforded full protection. Moreover, since the civil liability provision is designed to promote compliance with the Act, separate recoveries will certainly further that purpose by
increasing the incentive to comply with the law. Thus, the decision to allow
separate recoveries promotes the accomplishment of the purposes for which the
statute was enacted.
Conclusion
There can be little doubt that the decision by the Seventh Circuit in Allen,
holding the disclosure statement of Beneficial violative of the meaningful sequence requirement of Regulation Z, is correct. The statement fails to convey
the terms in an understandable order. However, the court's statement that the
subtractional order of presentation was inadequate as a matter of law is suspect.
There is no basis for requiring one specific order; in fact, such a holding contradicts the congressional attempt to construct a flexible disclosure system. The
ruling adds to the difficulty creditors encounter in striving to design adequate
statements for varying, complex transactions. It also decreases the incentive for
innovation in designing forms to convey the information in a more comprehensible fashion. However, this ruling results in at least one benefit to the creditor:
the uncertainty surrounding adequacy of disclosure is decreased by the total
prohibition of the subtractional method.
The ruling to allow a co-obligor to recover, absent the presence of the other
obligor, is not so easily evaluated. Faced with conflicting legislative history and
statutory provisions, the federal courts have divided on the question. Considering the overall purpose of the Act, including its attempt to motivate private
parties to assist the government in enforcing the law, the Seventh Circuit
selected the better reasoned approach in allowing a separate recovery.
Realistically, Congress never foresaw the precise problem raised by Allen.
Although the practice of requiring co-signatures on a loan is fairly commonplace, especially when the borrower is married, there is no statutory language or
legislative history which expressly addresses this issue. Allen attempts to resolve
this problem in the manner which most closely adheres to the overall purpose
of the Act.
PatrickJ. Crotty
73 Since the decision in Allen two courts have refused to allow separate recoveries under
the amended Act. The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, in Gillard v.
Aetna Fin. Co., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. La. 1976), refused to grant separate recoveries,
on the grounds that such recoveries had been allowed by other courts only when a right of
rescission entitled each obligor to a separate statement. The Fourth Circuit, in Powers v.
Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1976), refused to grant a separate recovery, even when
the right to rescission required disclosure to each obligor. The court relied entirely on the
legislative history of the Act which stated that the maximum penalty on any individual transaction was to be $1000. Since it saw only one credit transaction, it granted only one recovery.
The court noted that the statute read literally does provide that a creditor is liable to any
person to whom disclosure of any information is required. However, it decided to forego literal
application of the statute in favor of its interpretation of the legislative history.
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Appendix*
STATEMENT OF DISCLOSURE
AND LOAN REGISTER
As shown hereon, the amount shown below as the Total of Payments, which is the Amount
Financed plus the Finance Charge, is payable in successive monthly instalments of principal
and charges combined. The Number of instalments and the amounts of the 1st Instalment and
the Other instalments are set forth below. The first of said instalments is payable on the 1st Due
Date shown below and each subsequent instalment on the same day of each succeeding month
thereafter, the final instalment being due and payable on the Final Due Date shown below. The
sum of the instalments is shown below as the TOTAL OF PAYMENTS.
LENDER:
Account no.

Type

Sequential Number

Name & Mailing Address of Borrower(s)

Spouse
Residence Address
<- if not the same

Date of Loan

Ist Due Date

Final Due Date

1st Instal.

Other Instal.

Payable in
Monthly
Instal.

SECURITY: The security for this loan is checked below:
Security Agreement dated
on
on

nl
F]

Furniture
Auto

E]

Accommod Maker

Yr.
El

Make
Real Estate Mortgage

INSURANCE IS INCLUDED IF COST OR PREMIUM
IS INSERTED TO THE LEFT HEREON.

$
$
$
1.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

TOTAL OF PAYMENTS
Precomputed Charges
FINANCE CHARGE
AMOUNT FINANCED
Disability Ins. Cost
Life Ins. Cost
Hshld. Conts. Ins. Prem.
Dwelling Ins. Prem.
Auto. Phys. Dam. Ins. Prem.
Filing Fees-UCC Forms
Certificate of Title Fees

$
$
$
$
$
$
2.

$

Unpaid Baance-Prior Loan
Precomputed Charges
Time Price Differential
Other
Disability Ins. Cost
Life Ins. Cost
Net Balance-Prior Loan
Nature of Security
% ANNUAL PERCENTAGE
RATE
Default Charge

If the box alongside the word "Furniture" is checked, the Security Agreement identified by
the date shown hereon covers all of the consumer goods of every kind then owned or thereafter
acquired by the Borrowers in replacement thereof and then or thereafter located at the
Borrowers' place of residence set forth hereon. Such Security Agreement secures future advances
or loans made by Lender to Borrowers, at Lender's option, within eight years of the date of such
Security Agreement.
At the direction and request of the Borrowers, on their behalf and for their benefit, the
Lender has disbursed, from the Amount Financed, the proceeds of loan for Items 2 through 9
shown to the left hereof and for those items shown below as follows:
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10. Closing Costs-Real Estate .............
11. To: ...................................................
12. To: ..................................................
13. To: ................................................
14. To: .................................................
Cash or Check Delivered to Borrowers
*(Line 1 less sum of lines 2 through 14)

......................................................
..................................................

$$
$
$
$
$

SECURITY (cont.)
If the box opposite the description "Real Estate Mortgage" in said Security section is
checked, this loan is secured by a mortgage on real property owned by the Borrowers which is
the Borrowers' place of residence shown unless otherwise identified below.
Property Other Than Borrowers' Residence
*

Merely a representation of the original agreement.

IV. Legal Profession
ATTORNEYS'

FEES

AWARDS-FEE-SHIFTING

EXCEPTION-LIMITATIONS

UNDER

THE

BAD FAITH

ON FEDERAL COURTS' POWERS

Bond v. Stanton*
In cases of public interest litigation, attorneys' fees often surpass the average
client's ability to pay. In appropriate cases, federal courts may provide relief by
invoking special judicial powers to allocate attorneys' fees between parties to a
suit. The limitations of these powers, however, are not altogether clear.
The Seventh Circuit in Bond v. Stanton' affirmed the liberal exercise of feeshifting power by a lower court. This decision evidenced the current trend
toward a more generous use of attorneys' fees awards. However, in so deciding,
the Seventh Circuit's holding served to further obscure the bounds of federal
court's fee-shifting powers.
Bond v. Stanton involved an injunction suit brought under Title 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983' by Indiana citizens and welfare assistance organizations against state
officials to compel state compliance with federal welfare regulations. Plaintiffs
initiated the proceeding in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana. The action sought to enjoin State Commissioner of Welfare, Wayne
Stanton, and other state welfare officials in their individual and official capacities,
from denying plaintiffs' civil rights by failing to implement Medicaid programs
in a timely manner. It was alleged that state officials had failed to meet a July 1,
1973 Medicaid Program deadline requiring full implementation of an early and
periodic screening, diagnosis and treatment program (EPSDT) for persons under
the age of twenty-one.'
Both parties moved for summary judgment; plaintiffs alleged non-compliance, and defendants, though conceding that full implementation of the
specific program had not been effectuated, argued that plaintiffs had received
more than an adequate amount to provide for the health care needs of their
children.
The district court found that state officials had made ascertainable progress
toward implementing a statewide program in only eight pilot counties. Accordingly, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
and ordered state officials to bring the program within substantial compliance of
the federal regulations by July 1, 1974.'
In addition to requiring injunctive relief, the plaintiffs sought reimbursement
of attorneys' fees. Their request was reserved by the district court in its opinion
on the merits and was subsequently treated in an unpublished order.' That
order provided that an amount of $2,366 would be assessed against the de* 528 F.2d 688 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 426 U.S. 905 (1976).
1 Id.
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
3 Authorization of Appropriations, 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (4) (B) (1970),
pursuant thereto, 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a)(3)(19) (1976).
4 372 F. Supp. 872 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 504 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1974).
5 Bond v. Stanton, No. 75-(N.D. Ind. 1975).

572
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fendants in their official capacities. The district court noted two grounds for the
award: the "private attorney general theory" and the "bad faith exception." 6
The defendants appealed, challenging the constitutionality of this award.
On appeal, apart from the question of whether such an award against state
officials violated the eleventh amendment of the United States Constitution,' the
Seventh Circuit examined the grounds on which the award for attorneys' fees
were made. Citing language from the district court's opinion, the Seventh Circuit
noted evidence of bad faith which supported an exercise of fee-shifting powers:
The bad faith which is the basis for the award may be in conduct which
necessitates the action or in conduct occurring in the course of action. The
defendant state officials, disregarding their clear legal duty, were, in the
words of the district court, "more than two years late in even attempting
to implement a statewide EPSDT program." It was this conduct which
necessitated the present injunctive suit. [Citations omitted] In addition,
defendants, after the suit was filed "continually asserted compliance
with
'8
HEW requirements in the face of documentation to the contrary.
While the court was ultimately forced to dismiss the private attorney general
grounds for the award under Alyeska Pipeline Co. u. Wilderness Society,9 it
determined that fee-shifting could be justified solely on the basis of the bad faith
exception.
An examination of the application of the bad faith exception in recent years
by federal courts indicates a gradual trend toward broadening the exception
beyond its original scope. The Seventh Circuit in Bond also demonstrated a
willingness to expand the scope of the bad faith exception. However, in light of
the Alyeska decision, which sharply criticized judicial expansion of fee-shifting
doctrines, it is questionable whether a continued broadening of the exception is
to be permitted.
Alyeska and the Status of the Fee-shifting Doctrines
The Supreme Court decision in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society
made a significant step toward clarifying the availability of attorneys' fees awards
to prevailing litigants in federal courts. This ruling effectively halted use of the
private attorney general theory grounds for assessing attorneys' fees against the
losing party to a lawsuit. The private attorney general approach, which had
gained increasing favor among the federal circuit courts prior to Alyeska, was a
fee-shifting doctrine available to prevailing litigants who were deemed to have
6 Id.
7 The Seventh Circuit held that such fee-shifting against state officials in their official
capacities was not violative of the eleventh amendment of the Constitution. The court
regarded as controlling a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court in Sims v. Amos, 409
U.S. 942 (1972), citing Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 334-45 (1975), for the proposition
that even summary decisions of the Supreme Court are to be regarded as binding on the
lower federal courts. In so doing, the Seventh Circuit neatly avoided a difficult issue which
has split the circuits. The disagreement among the circuits on the question is described but not
resolved in the Alyeska opinion. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y., 421 U.S.
240, 269 n.44 (1975).
8 528 F.2d at 690.
9 421 U.S. 240.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February 1977]

furthered the interests of a significant class of persons by bringing litigation which
effectuated a strong congressional policy.' 0
In curtailing use of the private attorney general theory, the Alyeska Court
reserved comment on the so-called American rule," as applied to public interest
litigation, but warned that it was not juditial prerogative to dissipate this fundamental rule. The American rule requires that litigants be responsible for payment
of their respective attorneys' fees. Its rationale is to permit parties to seek vindication of their rights in a court of law without being deterred by the possibility of
having to bear the financial burden of their opponent's attorneys' fees.12 The
American rule stands in contrast to traditional English procedure in which fees
are regularly assessed against the losing party.
While the Alyeska Court prohibited further use of the private attorney general theory without express congressional sanction, the decision noted the availability of three traditional exceptions to the American rule: first, when a "common fund" is involved; second, when a litigant's conduct is vexatious, harassing,
or in bad faith; and third, when a court order is willfully disobeyed.' Thus
after Alyeska, failure to justify fee-shifting under one of these authorized
exceptions precludes the award of fees to prevailing litigants.
During the life of the private attorney general theory the awarding of attorneys' fees became increasingly common in lower federal courts, especially in
public interest litigation.' The combination of two factors explained this phenomenon. First, the relatively broad and flexible grounds provided by the
private attorney general theory gave courts wide discretion to shift fees. Second,
civil rights suits often involve compelling equities when private citizens without
large financial resources confront state officers who are backed with unlimited
state funds. Alyeska's elimination of the private attorney general theory compels
federal courts desirous of sustaining equitable awards to justify fee-shifting under
one of the remaining exceptions. Since these exceptions have been customarily
narrower and more stringent than the private attorney general theory, federal
courts undoubtedly feel the parameters within which they can award attorneys'
fees greatly restricted.
Significant among the remaining exceptions to the American rule is the socalled bad faith exception. As noted by the Alyeska Court, this traditional exception permits the awarding of attorneys' fees against a litigant who has acted
in bad faith. In recent civil rights suits the bad faith exception has frequently
been relied upon either as an alternative, or as a supplement to the private at10 See Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam) (doctrine originally announced).
11 421 U.S. at 257, citing Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewery, 386 U.S.
714, 718 (1966); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 (1972).
12 With respect to public interest litigation, however, the American Rule tends to have
the opposite effect. In that context, the American Rule works to deter lawsuits brought by low
income citizens who seek vindication of their federally guaranteed rights. As a result, federal
courts have sought to expand the exceptions to the American Rule out of a sense of equity and
fairness. One of these ways was by means of the private attorney general theory.
13 See 421 U.S. at 258-59. See generally Note, Attorneys Fees and the Eleventh
Amendment, 88 HARV. L. Rv. 1875 (1975).
14 See cases cited at 421 U.S. at 270 n.46.
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torney general theory as justification for attorneys' fees awards against losing
parties.
Generally, the trial court is granted broad discretion in awarding fees on the
basis of bad faith. Barring clear failure of the evidence to support the award, the
decision usually will not be overturned. 5 Notwithstanding this broad prerogative,
however, when a trial court has gone beyond the limits prescribed by the bad
faith exception, the award of attorneys' fees will be reversed on review.16 Despite
evidence which failed to satisfy the usual standards of the exception, the Seventh
Circuit sanctioned its application in Bond. The bad faith exception has two
aspects which govem its application; the level of bad faith conduct which triggers
the award and the timing of the bad faith in relation to the litigation.
TraditionalRequirements of the Bad Faith Exception
1. Appropriateness of the Circumstances
The judiciary's power to shift attorneys' fees under the bad faith exception
is thought to be derived from the -inherent equity powers of the court." All feeshifting engaged in by American courts under this authority has been regarded
as an exception to the fundamental American rule. Traditionally, judicial exceptions have been kept guardedly narrow in order to preserve the American
rule's basic rationale. In general, equitable exceptions to the American rule are
limited to extraordinary situations involving "compelling circumstances and overriding considerations of justice."'"
The bad faith exception is one such traditional equitable exception. Customarily, fee-shifting under this exception has been reserved for contumacious
conduct of litigants before a court. Its rationale is basically punitive. 9 The
purpose, of course, is to deter abuse and misuse of the judicial forum.
The type of conduct which warrants invoking the exception is most commonly expressed by one of two formulas. First the use of the exception is proper
when a party has acted in "bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons." 2 Second is a formulation first articulated by the Fourth Circuit in its
Bell-Bradley line of school desegregation cases. The court there stated that bad
faith conduct exemplifies "unreasonable, obdurate obstinacy" or "persistent
15 Brewer v. School Board, 456 F.2d 943, 947 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892
(1972).
16 See Satoskar v. Indiana Real Estate Comm'n, 517 F.2d 696, 698 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1975).
17 412 U.S. at 4-7. Also see the full discussion of federal courts' power of equity to award
counsel fees in Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co., 28 F.2d 233, 241-42 (8th
Cir. 1928), where authorities are collected and analyzed.
18 456 F.2d at 948. Also espoused by the Supreme Court is the restriction that feeshifting be reserved for "exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice." Sprague v.
Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939). See generally 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
54.77 [2] (2d ed. 1972).
19 412 U.S. at 15; Incarcerated Men of Allen County v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281, 284 (6th
Cir. 1974). Accord Heucker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1245 n.9 (6th Cir. 1976); Class v.
Norton, 505 F.2d 123, 127 n.1 (2d Cir. 1975).
20 F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1973), citing Vaughan v.
Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). 6 Mooa, FEDERAL PRACTICE I 54.77 [2] (2d ed. 1972).
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defiance of the law."'" While reciting these formulas offers some help in determining the level of conduct traditionally required and considered to be exceptional,
an examination of actual civil rights cases, in which the bad faith exception has
most frequently been invoked, better illustrates the required standard.
The Bell-Bradley line of desegregation cases provides numerous examples of
bad faith conduct. In Bell v. School Board," the Fourth Circuit affirmed application of the bad faith exception on the basis of vexatious and obstinate
behavior of school officials who were resisting school desegregation. The trial
record disclosed:
There was a persistent purpose and plan on the part of the defendants to
deny the plaintiffs their constitutional rights . . . [W]e must take into account the long continued pattern of evasion and obstruction which included
not only the defendants' unyielding refusal to take any initiative, thus casting
a heavy burden on the children and their parents, but their interposing a
variety of administrative obstacles to thwart the valid administration wishes

of the plaintiffs for a desegregated education. To put it plainly, such
tactics
3
would in any other context be instantly recognized as discreditable.
Similarly in Tohen v. Jenkins, 4 another school desegregation case, the
Fourth Circuit found that once suit had been filed, defendants continuously
blocked all avenues of compromise and fully litigated every detail to the delay
and detriment of the plaintiffs." Defendants failed on numerous occasions to cooperate with plaintiffs' counsel and the court.'" The court noted two specific
instances of unreasonable litigation tactics: an appeal of a consent order entered
at the defendant's own suggestion; and insistence on an incorrect procedural
position to prolong the trial. 7 The Tahen court assessed attorneys' fees, classifying this behavior as "obdurate obstinacy."
Voting reapportionment cases involving similarly egregious forms of racial
discrimination often provide adequate findings of bad faith. In Sims v. Amos, s
a federal district court in Alabama assessed attorneys' fees against Alabama state
officials on the basis of the bad faith exception and the private attorney general
theory. That suit was the culmination of ten years of repeated court orders and
class actions against the state legislature to compel reapportionment." In addition to repeated deliberate refusals to obey prior court orders, the state officers
were shown to have deliberately presented unacceptable plans to prolong litigation, ° thus causing plaintiffs to incur legal fees in excess of $14,800.
Examples of bad faith conduct which justify fee-shifting, however, are by no
means limited to cases of racial discrimination. In Stolberg v. Members of the
21 456 F.2d at 949 (cases in accord therein collected). Noteworthy is that this formula
has never been reviewed by the Supreme Court despite its wide and repeated usage.
22 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1953).
23 Id. at 500.
24 517 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975).
25 Id. at 6.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 6-7.
28 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
29 336 F. Supp. 924, 930 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
30 340 F. Supp. at 694.
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Board of Trustees,31 the Second Circuit affirmed an award of attorneys' fees
under the bad faith exception. The court noted that the litigation, concerning
the unjustified dismissal of a public employee, had been vigorously opposed by
the defendants, who prolonged the discovery and trial for two years. 2 Moreover,
the court found that the defendants had deliberately suppressed the plaintiffs' first
and fourteenth amendment rights in clear violation of two Supreme Court
3
rulings.
Similarly, in Gates v. Collier,4 the Fifth Circuit awarded over $42,000 in
attorneys' fees pursuant to this equitable exception. The inmate-plaintiffs in that
case claimed that: (1) operation of Mississippi prisons subjected them to conditions and practices which amounted to cruel and unusual punishment; and (2)
regulations on mail were in violation of their first amendment rights under the
Constitution. The district court found that in addition to persistent racial discrimination and abuse, defendants continually sought extensions and delays to
avoid compliance with a district court order." Additionally, defendants repeatedly submitted plans requested by the district court that were inadequate."8
Furthermore, they unyieldingly adhered to a position of denial, compelling the
plaintiffs to undergo extensive pre-trial discovery involving interviews of hundreds
of witnesses. 7
In support of its own affirmance of the application of the bad faith exception, the Seventh Circuit in Bond relied on Doe v. Poelker3 In that case, plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement policies and procedures of St. Louis city hospitals which effectively barred abortions in contravention of applicable state
statutes. The district court found defiance of court orders,39 continual enforcement of hospital procedures designed to circumvent constitutional guarantees,"
evasive trial tactics 4' and willful discrimination by the mayor of St. Louis.2 On
the basis of this wanton and obstinate behavior, the court found it proper to
invoke the bad faith exception.4
This group of civil rights cases illustrates the levels of conduct which typically
result in application of the bad faith exception: affirmative discriminatory
behavior violative of constitutionally guaranteed rights; willful disobedience of
31 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
32 Id. at 491.
33 Id.
34 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973).
35 Id. at 300-01.
36 Id.
37
I. See Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123. That suit involved a contempt proceeding against
a Connecticut welfare official to enforce a prior court order requiring compliance with federal
AFDC regulations. That court found the refusal to obey a direct court order "obdurate
obstinacy" and awarded attorneys' fees.
38 515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1973).
39 Id. at 547.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 548.
42 Id.
43 The Bond court cited a second case, Fairley v. Peterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974),
which broadly interpreted Bradley as holding that the use of the bad faith exception was warranted when defendants violate a clearly established law and compel plaintiffs to expand
efforts preparing and/or conducting a trial. In Fairley, the court affirmed an award of attorneys' fees on the basis of both the bad faith exception and private attorney general theory,
but failed to make clear what precisely was the conduct of the defendants which met the bad
faith grounds.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February 1977]

court orders and injunctions; or dilatory trial tactics designed to prolong litigation
and increase expenses.
In addition, however, to the two formulations of bad faith conduct
presented above, a third formula has appeared in the language of several recent
cases including Bond.44 This third formulation defines bad faith simply as a
"violation of a clear legal duty," omitting elements of wantonness or obstinacy.
Cited as a source' of this broader formula is Allen v. NAACP. 6 Findings of fact
in Allen showed that defendant state troopers had failed to abide by a court
order requiring them to implement an affirmative information and recruitment
program for racial minorities." The lower court held that failure to abide by
the court order compelled the second suit, and, whether out of intentional action
or neglect, such conduct was sufficient to support a finding of bad faith. "Violation of a clear legal duty," then, according to Allen, is not mere violation of law.
Instead, defiance of a specific judicial order to vindicate constitutionally guaranteed rights were the circumstances under which fee-shifting was invoked in
Allen.
However, the Allen court ultimately based its fee award on the private
attorney general theory, which had not yet been stricken down by Alyeska. This
consequently reduced the "violation of clear legal duty" language to mere dictum.
Such a result leaves in doubt whether the court actually would have been willing
to justify fee-shifting on this purported bad faith conduct alone. 8
Examination of the factual findings in Bond reveals that the level of conduct
which warranted invoking the bad faith exception comports much more closely
with the Allen standard then either the Moore's formulation, or the formula
illustrated by the Bell-Bradley line of decisions. Instead of defiance or obstinacy,
the conduct of the Bond defendants prior to litigation is more aptly characterized
as bureaucratic lethargy in failing to implement welfare programs in a timely
manner in compliance with federal standards. The lower court stated:
A careful reading of the original and supplementary materials filed in this
case indicated in a clear and convincing fashion, that little, if any headway
has been made by the State as far as the implementation of the EPSDT
program is concerned. From the information supplied by the Lake County
Welfare Department, as well as that supplied by the State, it appears to a
certainty that the welfare procedures are nearly the same as they were last
year . . . In fact there is no evidence of a comprehensive EPSDT program,
nor even any semblance of any screening program, however minimal ...
[O]ver two years have elapsed since the initial part of the EPSDT program
was supposed
to have been implemented and in full effect by the State of
49
Indiana.

In contrast to the aforementioned cases illustrating the bad faith exception
44 See 522 F.2d at 80; 493 F.2d at 606. Cf. 538 F.2d at 1245 n.9. (also citing the standard formula from MOORE).
45 522 F.2d at 80. But see, 493 F.2d at 606. (attributing formula to Bradley).
46 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
47 United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
48 Cf. Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (mention of the case by the
Alyeska Court suggests, however, that the award made therein may be sustained solely on the
basis of the bad faith exception).
49 372 F. Supp. 872, 874-75 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
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standard of conduct, Bond did not involve willful discriminatory treatment,
defiance of prior court orders, or delaying trial tactics. Certainly, the performance
of the Indiana welfare officials had been inadequate. However, that element of
persistent or defiant misconduct, which at least until Allen has characterized
judicial use of its inherent powers to shift attorneys' fees, was lacking in Bond.
The district court did not suggest that state welfare officials had used prolonged
discovery, sham defenses, or frivolous interlocutory litigation; nor was it suggested that officials had engaged in a course of conduct calculated to prevent or
delay the distribution of welfare benefits. Aside from showing that substantial
sums had been collected by the plaintiffs for their children's health care through
the normal channels of Medicaid,5" the facts demonstrated that some effort was
made to initiate at least a partial implementation of EPSDT in pilot Indiana
counties by the deadline date."'
In addition to the failure of the circumstances in Bond to rank as "extraordinary," other reasons militate against the applicability of the bad faith exception. First is the fact that the case was disposed of by summary judgment. Thus
an attempt to frivolously protract the proceedings was noticeably lacking. Furthermore, a timely implementation of Medicaid programs, especially EPSDT,
has rarely been feasible.'
Clearly, then, the Seventh Circuit has, by its sanctioning of the district
court's discretion in awarding attorneys' fees on the basis of bad faith, permitted
a further broadening of the requirements for the exception. The court has effectively held that non-feasance short of contumacious conduct is sufficient to invoke
the bad faith exception. Not only has the Seventh Circuit followed the trend
taken by those lower federal courts which, by dictum or otherwise, approve of
the "violation of clear legal duty" standard, it has gone further by actually sustaining an award of attorneys' fees based solely on this level of conduct without
the further support of supplementary equitable grounds.
2. Timing of the Bad Faith
In addition to the Seventh Circuit's willingness to liberally interpret the
level of conduct sufficient to invoke the bad faith exception, the court further
indicated a willingness to broadly interpret the exception by relying on bad faith
conduct occurring prior to, rather than during the course of, litigation. Traditionally, the exception was designed only to insure that parties to a suit maintain
due respect for the judicial forum during litigation.5" Consequently, bad faith
conduct giving rise to litigation was more typically regarded as a basis for punitive damages rather than a basis for fee-shifting.
50 Id.
51 Id. Even the district court conceded. the unavoidable problems state welfare officials
encounter in trying to comply with federal regulations and commented that "[t]his court can
sympathize with the State Welfare Department's difficulties in following the decrees of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare." Id.
52 See generally Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House, Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee: Dep't. of Health, Education and Welfare's Administration of
Health Programs: Shortchanging Children, 94th Cong., 2 Sess. (Comm. Print 1976). In fact,
HEW itself was over two years tardy in promulgating the details of the EPSDT Program.
Stanton v. Bond, 504 F.2d 1246, 1248 '(7th Cir. 1974).
53 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAaTICE 54.77 [2] (2d ed. 1972). See, e.g., Universal Oil Co. v.
Root Rfg. Co., 388 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).
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The Seventh Circuit, relying on Supreme Court authority in Cole v. Hall,5"
indicated that it is appropriate to consider pre-litigation bad faith as a basis for
fee-shifting.55 Numerous other circuit courts, citing Hall, have likewise indicated
that the language of that case authorizes use of the exception on the basis of prelitigation bad faith.5" However, it is questionable whether the circuit courts are
warranted in placing exclusive reliance on Hall to justify use of pre-litigation bad
faith for fee-shifting. First, mention of the bad faith grounds for awarding fees
was made only in passing reference to the respondents' erroneous objection that
it had been invoked against them. Since the Hall Court premised fee-shifting on
the "common benefit" rationale, the bad faith language is dictum to the holding.
Furthermore, the language of the Court may be open to more than one interpretation:
Petitioners also contend that the award of attorneys' fees in this case was
improper because the District Court, in denying respondent's claim for
punitive damages, found that "the defendants, in good faith, believed that
they had a right to charge and discipline respondent for his actions." It is
clear, however, that "bad faith" may be found, not only in57 the action that
led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation.
Rather than indicating that pre-litigation bad faith is a basis for fee shifting, the
Hall Court may have been acknowledging a distinction between prior bad faith,
which warrants assessment of punitive damages, and bad faith during the course
of litigation, which warrants suspension of the American rule. Had the Hall
Court intended this second interpretation, punitive damages are the appropriate
remedy for conduct which occurs prior to, or gives rise to the litigation.58 In
contrast, fee-shifting under the bad faith exception applies only to conduct which,
by complicating and prolonging litigation, results in unreasonably excessive attorneys' fees. Despite these worthwhile distinctions, in Bond, fee-shifting was
found to be appropriate on the basis of pre-litigation bad faith while punitive
damages were denied. 9
Although regularly permitted under admiralty law,"0 the Supreme Court
54

412 U.S. 1.

55 The Seventh Circuit also noted conduct during the course of litigation on which it
based its decision to affirm fee-shifting: "[D]efendants . . . continually asserted compliance with
HEW requirements in the face of documentation to the contrary." 528 F.2d at 690. Maintaining a defense of compliance and acting wantonly or vexatiously is easily distinguished, however. This is hardly the "bad faith" conduct which is required by the exception and must accordingly be discounted.
56 See 538 F.2d at 1245 n.9; 522 F.2d at 80; 505 F.2d at 127.
57 412 U.S. at 15.
58 See Donhue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475, (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955

(1973).
59 The reason given by the district court for refusing to award punitive damages against
state officials was that such damages were considered not to be able to serve their proper function of deterrence and punishment when awarded against state officials. This reasoning is
especially anomalous since fee-shifting on the basis of bad faith is considered to be premised
on a punitive rationale.
60 Pre-litigation bad faith conduct as a basis for fee-shifting has been addressed by the
Supreme Court in Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962). There the Court affirmed
assessment of attorneys' fees against a delinquent party. Vaughan, however, was a case in admiralty, in which attorneys' fees are normally awarded as part of compensable damages upon
a finding of bad faith. The Appollon, 22 U.S. [9 Wheat.] 362 (1824). Vaughan may be easily
distinguished from a civil rights case such as Bond. Since the bad faith exception was not the
theory upon which attorneys' fees were awarded in Vaughan, it has little relevance to Bond.
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has never clearly sanctioned use of pre-litigation bad faith as grounds for feeshifting in non-admiralty cases. However, the Court illustrated lower courts'
use of the bad faith exception by citing three non-admiralty pre-litigation bad
faith cases in F.D. Rich Co. v. IndustrialLumber Co. ' a case denying an attorneys' fees award under the Miller Act. Unfortunately, Rich was the very case
relied upon as authority in Alyeska to illustrate the narrow standards required
for use of the bad faith exception. 2 This use of Rich creates some doubt about
the effect of Alyeska, which otherwise criticized judicial erosion of the American
rule.
In response to the affirmance of the American rule and the emphasis placed
on the narrowness of exceptions to that rule by the Alyeska Court, two circuit
courts, thus far, have subsequently discounted the apparent ambiguity created by
the citation of the Rich case, and questioned the appropriateness of pre-litigation
bad faith as a basis for fee-shifting under the bad faith exception.
In Cordeco Development Corp. v. Vasquez6 3 the First Circuit refused to
award attorneys' fees premised on pre-litigation bad faith in addition to assessing
punitive damages. The court termed such an award inappropriate64 since awarding attorneys' fees on the basis of wrongful conduct giving rise to litigation clearly
surpassed the traditional scope of the exception. Such action, the court concluded, would contradict the Alyeska caveat against broadening the equitable
exceptions to the American rule.
Similarly, the Third Circuit in Skehan v. Board of Trustees5 held that attorneys' fees awards against state officials based on pre-litigation bad faith conduct were not permissible. The court discussed the confusion created by the
Alyeska decision with regard to the timing of the behavior and concluded that
foreclosure of broad equitable grounds for awarding fees by Alyeska prevented
such an award, at least when based only on admiralty authority.
According, then, to the views of the First and Third Circuits, an expansive
interpretation of the bad faith exception such as that taken by the Seventh Circuit
in Bond clashes with the indications of the Alyeska decision. The Bond court's
accession to use of the exception on the basis of pre-litigation bureaucratic inefficiencies and, then, exclusive reliance on this modified exception to overcome,
the American rule, indicates that the Seventh Circuit may not have given proper
weight to the Alyeska decision.
Hope for Clarification
As noted at the outset, the Alyeska decision made inroads toward
clarifying the availability of fee-shifting in federal courts. There remain, however, ambiguities concerning the scope of the equitable exceptions to the Amer61 417 U.S. at 129 n.17.
62 421 U.S. at 259.
63 539 F.2d 256 (lst Cir. 1976).
64 Id. at 263.
65 538 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1976).
66 Speculation may be made that the expansive approach taken by the Seventh Circuit was
a frustrated attempt to permit fee-shifting by forcing it into the mold of the bad faith exception resulting from a deprivation of the private attorney general theory. Regardless of laudable
objectives, such would be clearly impermissible.
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ican rule, including the bad faith exception. Bond v. Stanton exemplifies the increasingly expansive interpretation of the bad faith exception adopted by the
circuit courts. Before the exception swallows the rule, one hopes that there will
be reevaluation of this trend toward broadening discretionary fee-shifting.
Clearly, potential litigants as well as counsel could benefit from more definitive
policy on the availability and risks of fee-shifting under the bad faith exception. 7
Kymson F. Desjardins

67 On October 1, 1976, Congress responded to the suggestion of the Supreme Court in
Alyeska that the legislature provide statutory authorization for fee-shifting. The Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 accordingly became law on that date, providing:
Sec. 2. That the Revised Statutes section 722 (42 U.S.C. § 1988) is amended by
adding the following: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981 of the Revised Statutes, title IX of Public Law
92-318, or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of
America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States
Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court in its
discretion may allow the prevailing attorney's fee as part of the costs."
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641
(1976). For congressional intention with regard to the meaning of "judicial discretion" see
H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976).
In accordance with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, the newly enacted amendment to the Civil Rights Act is considered to apply to all cases pending on the date of enactment. Bond, having been granted certiorari is regarded as a pending case. Bradley v. School
Board, 416 U.S. 696, 711-16 (1974). Review in light of the statute may therefore preclude
examination of the bad faith grounds if more general equitable grounds are reinstated by the
Supreme Court.
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